The guided-missile destroyer USS Michael Murphy transits the South China Sea in February 2018.
JASEN MORENOGARCIA/U.S. NAVY
JASEN MORENOGARCIA/U.S. NAVY
It’s too late to constrain China’s creeping militarization and sovereignty claims over dozens of islands and reefs in the South and East China seas, experts say.
China’s island-building and militarization efforts began early this decade. It now claims dozens of islands and reefs in the Paracel and Spratly islands west of the Philippines. The United Nations does not recognize China’s territorial claims, which overlap claims in the same area by Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan.
The U.S. regularly challenges Beijing’s claims by sailing warships within 12 nautical miles of islands that China has built up in the Paracel and Spratly chains. So far this year, the Navy has picked up the pace, conducting at least five freedom-of-navigation operations, or FONOPS, since January: one each through the Paracels and Spratlys, and three through the Taiwan Strait, the latest March 24-25.
That’s half as many operations in three months as the Navy reported conducting in all of 2018. The Navy does not publicize all of those operations, however.
“Our goal is to make sure [China’s militarized outposts] doesn’t become a tool to operationalize an expansive illegal sovereignty claim,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Randall Schriver told the House Armed Services Committee on March 27.
Nonetheless, sailing through those seas — or flying above them as the Air Force had done with B-52 bombers at least three times in March — is probably too little, too late, said security analyst Paul Buchanan, an American, of 36th Parallel Assessments, a private, nonpartisan, strategic analysis consulting firm based in New Zealand.
“The horse has bolted,” he said during a January interview with Stars and Stripes. “The days of confronting the Chinese are long gone. It should have been done 10 years ago. Island-building has enabled [China] to claim possession of the South China Sea.”
On that point, Masayuki Tadokoro, a professor of international relations at Keio University, agreed.
“It is too late to attempt to control China,” Tadokoro said during a panel discussion March 7 sponsored by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
“If we are to contain China now, it is almost impossible because of the economic importance of China and also China’s geopolitical presence” in the South China Sea, Tadokoro said.
Free trade
Conceding the South China Sea to China would imperil free trade in an economically important region, Buchanan said. About $3.37 trillion worth of goods — 21 percent of all global trade — passed through the area in 2016, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ China Power project.
In that area alone, China has claimed 27 reefs and islands, building outposts for military and civilian personnel on 12 of them since 2014, according to the center’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Many of what were once bare reefs and uninhabited islands are now military bases, some with missiles, warship docks and landing strips.
Buchanan said Beijing could continue to allow free transit of the South China Sea to benefit trade, but, so far, has treated the sea as its own.
The U.S. regularly challenges Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by sailing warships within 12 nautical miles of islands that China has built up in the Paracel and Spratly chains.
ILLUSTRATION VIA PIXABAY
“With that embedded in your maritime perspective, it’s pretty hard to be the guarantor of freedom of navigation,” Buchanan said. “Their intentions are not for the betterment of the global community – their intentions are for the benefit of themselves.
“If we replace the U.S. security guarantee for the Chinese security guarantee ... [the South China Sea] will be a Chinese-first checkpoint rather than an open passage,” he said.
A January report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “China Military Power,” said China aims to strengthen its control over disputed areas, enhance its presence and challenge other claimants.
“China’s maritime emphasis and concern with protecting its overseas interests have increasingly drawn the [People’s Liberation Army] beyond China’s borders and immediate periphery,” the report said.
Freedom of navigation
To challenge those moves, the U.S. Navy in 2017 conducted at least six freedom-of-navigation operations, including two in the Paracel Islands, one in the Spratly Islands and the remainder described generally as in the South and East China Seas, according to a Defense Department report that year.
The U.S. routinely explains that its freedom-of-navigation operations are intended to “challenge excessive maritime claims,” though Navy public affairs statements in the wake of those operations rarely tread into details.
However, the 2017 Defense Department report stated that China claims areas around the islands and reefs to which they are “not so entitled” and expects “prior permission” for “innocent passage of foreign military ships” through those areas.
Expecting China to abandon its claims is unrealistic, said retired Chinese Navy Capt. Liu Xiaobo in a March 1 analysis for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a bipartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C.
“It is not realistic for China to ask the United States to abandon its FONOPs, and it is just as unrealistic for the United States to ask China to simply drop its excessive maritime claims,” Liu wrote. “... there is space for consultation between China and the United States here.”
While freedom-of-navigation operations have been part of U.S. defense strategy around the world for decades, Buchanan said it needs to do more.
Getting tough
That means a tougher approach — even if it brings a hostile response, he said in an interview March 22. For example, the Navy could increase the frequency of its freedom-of-navigation patrols and send warships deeper into the 12-nautical-mile radius around the islands and reefs that China claims, he said.
The Navy is “not getting really close to the territorial limits that the Chinese claim. If you wanted to press the point, you could drive way into those territorial waters and see what happens,” Buchanan said. “I wouldn’t doubt that the Chinese would fire upon any warship that went in there.”
In September, a Chinese destroyer, the Luoyang, came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur near Gaven Reef, a Chinese-occupied territory in the Spratly Islands. The Navy called the maneuver unprofessional. The 7th Fleet commander, Vice Adm. Phillip Sawyer, on March 18 in Manila, the Philippines, said the incident does not change Navy plans for freedom-of-navigation operations, according to The Associated Press.
China’s island-building and militarization efforts began early this decade. It now claims dozens of islands and reefs in the Paracel and Spratly islands west of the Philippines. The United Nations does not recognize China’s territorial claims, which overlap claims in the same area by Indonesia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan.
The U.S. regularly challenges Beijing’s claims by sailing warships within 12 nautical miles of islands that China has built up in the Paracel and Spratly chains. So far this year, the Navy has picked up the pace, conducting at least five freedom-of-navigation operations, or FONOPS, since January: one each through the Paracels and Spratlys, and three through the Taiwan Strait, the latest March 24-25.
That’s half as many operations in three months as the Navy reported conducting in all of 2018. The Navy does not publicize all of those operations, however.
“Our goal is to make sure [China’s militarized outposts] doesn’t become a tool to operationalize an expansive illegal sovereignty claim,” Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Randall Schriver told the House Armed Services Committee on March 27.
Nonetheless, sailing through those seas — or flying above them as the Air Force had done with B-52 bombers at least three times in March — is probably too little, too late, said security analyst Paul Buchanan, an American, of 36th Parallel Assessments, a private, nonpartisan, strategic analysis consulting firm based in New Zealand.
“The horse has bolted,” he said during a January interview with Stars and Stripes. “The days of confronting the Chinese are long gone. It should have been done 10 years ago. Island-building has enabled [China] to claim possession of the South China Sea.”
On that point, Masayuki Tadokoro, a professor of international relations at Keio University, agreed.
“It is too late to attempt to control China,” Tadokoro said during a panel discussion March 7 sponsored by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
“If we are to contain China now, it is almost impossible because of the economic importance of China and also China’s geopolitical presence” in the South China Sea, Tadokoro said.
Free trade
Conceding the South China Sea to China would imperil free trade in an economically important region, Buchanan said. About $3.37 trillion worth of goods — 21 percent of all global trade — passed through the area in 2016, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ China Power project.
In that area alone, China has claimed 27 reefs and islands, building outposts for military and civilian personnel on 12 of them since 2014, according to the center’s Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Many of what were once bare reefs and uninhabited islands are now military bases, some with missiles, warship docks and landing strips.
Buchanan said Beijing could continue to allow free transit of the South China Sea to benefit trade, but, so far, has treated the sea as its own.
The U.S. regularly challenges Beijing's claims in the South China Sea by sailing warships within 12 nautical miles of islands that China has built up in the Paracel and Spratly chains.
ILLUSTRATION VIA PIXABAY
“With that embedded in your maritime perspective, it’s pretty hard to be the guarantor of freedom of navigation,” Buchanan said. “Their intentions are not for the betterment of the global community – their intentions are for the benefit of themselves.
“If we replace the U.S. security guarantee for the Chinese security guarantee ... [the South China Sea] will be a Chinese-first checkpoint rather than an open passage,” he said.
A January report by the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, “China Military Power,” said China aims to strengthen its control over disputed areas, enhance its presence and challenge other claimants.
“China’s maritime emphasis and concern with protecting its overseas interests have increasingly drawn the [People’s Liberation Army] beyond China’s borders and immediate periphery,” the report said.
Freedom of navigation
To challenge those moves, the U.S. Navy in 2017 conducted at least six freedom-of-navigation operations, including two in the Paracel Islands, one in the Spratly Islands and the remainder described generally as in the South and East China Seas, according to a Defense Department report that year.
The U.S. routinely explains that its freedom-of-navigation operations are intended to “challenge excessive maritime claims,” though Navy public affairs statements in the wake of those operations rarely tread into details.
However, the 2017 Defense Department report stated that China claims areas around the islands and reefs to which they are “not so entitled” and expects “prior permission” for “innocent passage of foreign military ships” through those areas.
Expecting China to abandon its claims is unrealistic, said retired Chinese Navy Capt. Liu Xiaobo in a March 1 analysis for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a bipartisan, nonprofit think tank in Washington, D.C.
“It is not realistic for China to ask the United States to abandon its FONOPs, and it is just as unrealistic for the United States to ask China to simply drop its excessive maritime claims,” Liu wrote. “... there is space for consultation between China and the United States here.”
While freedom-of-navigation operations have been part of U.S. defense strategy around the world for decades, Buchanan said it needs to do more.
Getting tough
That means a tougher approach — even if it brings a hostile response, he said in an interview March 22. For example, the Navy could increase the frequency of its freedom-of-navigation patrols and send warships deeper into the 12-nautical-mile radius around the islands and reefs that China claims, he said.
The Navy is “not getting really close to the territorial limits that the Chinese claim. If you wanted to press the point, you could drive way into those territorial waters and see what happens,” Buchanan said. “I wouldn’t doubt that the Chinese would fire upon any warship that went in there.”
In September, a Chinese destroyer, the Luoyang, came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur near Gaven Reef, a Chinese-occupied territory in the Spratly Islands. The Navy called the maneuver unprofessional. The 7th Fleet commander, Vice Adm. Phillip Sawyer, on March 18 in Manila, the Philippines, said the incident does not change Navy plans for freedom-of-navigation operations, according to The Associated Press.
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