Friday, June 28, 2024

China urges US to stop supporting PH as US says support is 'ironclad'

From GMA News Online (Jun 29, 2024): China urges US to stop supporting PH as US says support is 'ironclad' (By Reuters)



A vessel of the China military is seen at far right as the USS Harpers Ferry traverses the West Philippine Sea during the Balikatan exercise with Philippine forces on Saturday, April 28, 2024. IAN CRUZ/GMA Integrated News/File photo

BEIJING - China urged the United States on Friday to stop tolerating and supporting "provocations" by the Philippines, after Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell expressed concern about Beijing's "destabilizing actions in the South China Sea".

China and the Philippines have recently traded accusations over "dangerous and illegal maneuvers" affecting their respective vessels in the area around the Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal), a disputed atoll in the busy waterway.

"The United States should stop condoning and supporting the Philippines' provocations and nuisance and take practical actions to safeguard peace and stability in the South China Sea," said Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning.

The Philippines has sent missions to resupply soldiers living aboard the BRP Sierra Madre, a rusty, aging warship deliberately grounded by Manila in 1999 at the atoll to reinforce its sovereignty claims.

At a regular briefing, Mao added that the Philippines had turned its back on a consensus with China, challenging its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and insisting on delivering construction materials to the warship.

On June 17, a Philippine sailor had his thumb cut off after "intentional-high speed ramming" by the China Coast Guard, an assertion China has disputed, saying the actions were lawful. Six other Filipino soldiers were hurt.

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) underscored that it would not dignify the misleading claims of China in relation to the reported collision of Philippine and Chinese vessels in the waters adjacent to Ayungin Shoal.

AFP Chief of Staff General Romeo Brawner said the China Coast Guard “has no right or legal authority to interfere with our legitimate operations or damage our assets within our Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).”

“This reckless and aggressive behavior has caused bodily harm and constitutes a blatant violation of international maritime law, Philippine sovereignty, and sovereign rights,” Brawner added, noting that China’s actions “also pose significant risks to regional stability.”

Campbell made the remarks to China's Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu during a telephone call on Thursday, the US State Department said.

The day before, US national security adviser Jake Sullivan and his Philippine counterpart, Eduardo Año, discussed shared concerns over China's "dangerous and escalatory actions".

The United States reaffirmed its commitment to the Philippines' security, the White House said.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea, including portions claimed by Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam.

Ayungin Shoal is located 105 nautical miles west of Palawan and is well within the Philippines' 200-mile EEZ and is part of its continental shelf. —Reuters/KG, GMA Integrated News

https://www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/nation/911636/china-urges-us-to-stop-supporting-ph-as-us-says-support-is-ironclad/story/

AFP bans mobile phones in sensitive military zones

From the Philippine Star (Jun 29, 2024): AFP bans mobile phones in sensitive military zones (By Michael Punongbayan, Jose Rodel Clapano)



Members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) conduct a counter-landing live fire exercise as part of 2024 Balikatan Exercises at the La Paz Sand Dunes in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte on May 6, 2024. Walter Bollozos / The Philippine STAR

MANILA, Philippines — The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) has banned electronic devices in sensitive military environments as part of enhanced security measures aimed at protecting itself and critical information.

The AFP announced yesterday that it is “implementing stringent device-free policy strategically designed to fortify the protection of classified information and critical infrastructure, ensuring robust defense against potential threats.”

The military said it is restricting the presence of electronic devices in sensitive environments, which “significantly reduces vulnerabilities to cyber espionage and unauthorized access.”

“The device-free policy not only safeguards classified information, but also ensures the operational integrity of critical military infrastructure,” the AFP said.

“The AFP is dedicated to enhancing its capabilities and measures to confront traditional and non-traditional security challenges effectively,” the military said.


The AFP has also called on the public to be vigilant against disinformation campaigns aimed at eroding the public’s trust in the country’s military institution and the government.

“These efforts seek to sow panic, divide our nation and distract us from pressing issues that demand our collective attention,” AFP chief, Gen. Romeo Brawner Jr., said.

“In these trying times, it is crucial for every Filipino to remain vigilant and critical of the information they encounter and share,” he added.

The AFP statement is apparently in reaction to online and social media pages that have been monitored to share wrong information using old photographs or altered content to misinform the public on defense related issues.

Brawner said disinformation “not only distorts the truth but also undermines our unity, making us vulnerable to external challenges that threaten our national security and stability.”

He said the AFP urges the public to verify sources and seek information from credible and official channels and stand together in the face of what he described as desperate attempts to spread discord.
GCash data breach

The Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) is taking seriously the reports on GCash data breach, CICC executive director Alexander Ramos said yesterday.

As an initial step, CICC officials led by Ramos met yesterday with the executives of GCash, the largest mobile payments service, to shed light on the reported data breach.

Ramos, who met the GCash executives at the National Cybercrime hub in Bonifacio Global City, said he wants a transparent assessment of the reported data breach allegedly involving GCAsh.

“We take seriously the alleged data breach and have asked GCash to provide information on the veracity of the contents being published or reported,” Ramos said.

Ramos said GCash has reported that they are working round the clock to check the contents and committed to allow a deeper probe on the alleged attack.

https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2024/06/29/2366402/afp-bans-mobile-phones-sensitive-military-zones

US Navy “Practicing To Sink” China’s 40-000 Ton Aircraft Carrier/Type-75 Warship During RIMPAC Drills – State Media

Posted to the possibly left-of-center Eurasian Times (Jun 28, 2024): US Navy “Practicing To Sink” China’s 40-000 Ton Aircraft Carrier/Type-75 Warship During RIMPAC Drills – State Media (By Sakshi Tiwari)

The United States military is set to sink a decommissioned warship, ex-USS Tarawa, during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise 2024 near Hawaii. The exercise started on June 27 and is scheduled to run through the week until August 2.

The planned sinking of the vessel has piqued the interest of US and Chinese analysts.

Chinese state-owned media Global Times published a report emphasizing the assertions made by analysts: the 40,000-ton target ship is being sunk to “show off the capability to destroy a Chinese amphibious assault ship or aircraft carrier amid current tensions in Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea.”

The report, citing Chinese experts, noted that despite intimidation from the West, China would defend its national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and development interests. Such drills would only damage, not protect, peace and stability in the region.

The sinking of the USS Tarawa will be the first amphibious assault ship of any class to be sunk in over a decade since the ex-USS New Orleans was sent to the ocean floor during the RIMPAC 2010. Earlier, the United States sunk a Chinese-origin vessel with the Philippines as part of the Balikatan 2024 drills amid soaring tensions in the South China Sea.

USS Tarawa (LHA-1) – Wikipedia

“VOA (Voice of America) said the plan to use the ex-USS Tarawa as a target ship in the RIMPAC 2024 is aimed at countering China’s development of large amphibious assault ships and aircraft carriers, and their potential deployment around the island of Taiwan,” noted the Global Times report.

The United States or its allies have not referred to a Chinese naval vessel while announcing the scheduled sinking of the USS Tarawa as part of the multi-national Pacific drills. The SINKEX (sink exercise) is characteristic of each RIMPAC iteration, showcasing live-fire drills and tactical training.

However, the exercise is keenly watched amid heightened tensions with China in the Indo-Pacific region. China has vowed to unify Taiwan with the Chinese mainland—with force, if necessary.

The US President has said on more occasions than one that his country’s military would come to Taiwan’s aid in case of a Chinese invasion, triggering alarm about a potential conflict involving the US and its allies in the region. Several military pundits have predicted that an invasion could be launched by 2027.

The Taiwan issue amidst China’s expansion and belligerent attitude in the South China Sea has led to tempers soaring between the two rivals. Both sides have been preparing for a conflict and honing their combat skills, often using drills to simulate an attack on a notional enemy. China, for instance, has made mock-ups of US naval vessels, including the latest Ford aircraft carrier.

US & Allies To Practice Sinking Of Chinese Vessels?

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been rapidly expanding its fleet of amphibious assault ships. These could be key targets in future conflicts. The sinking of such large vessels — with thousands of crew members and personnel — will also serve as a stark reminder of the human cost of such conflicts.

The USS Tarawa’s displacement is over 40,000 tons, which, according to analysts, is similar to that of some Chinese ships like the Type 075.

The Global Times report referred to a previous report published by VOA News, which quoted an analyst saying that the sinking of the USS Tarawa was to send a message to China that the US and its allies can easily sink a Type 075 vessel, which is expected to be extensively deployed in a future conflict.

Currently, the PLAN has three Type 075s in service and a fourth under construction. These vessels can carry numerous landing craft, troops, armored vehicles, and helicopters and serve as command centers during assaults. China has already pressed these ships in many high-stakes drills in the region to showcase its maritime capability against adversaries.


The PLAN’s fourth Type-075 Landing Helicopter Dock (LHD) is under construction. Source: X (formerly Twitter).

China’s Ministry of National Defense spokesman, Senior Colonel Wu Qian, responded to these claims and informed state media that Taiwan was a key part of Chinese territory and that the 1.4 billion Chinese people should manage their internal affairs independently of foreign powers. Wu stated that the US could not possibly scare the Chinese military with these “drills.”

Chinese military expert Fu Qianshao said that the US could rehearse an attack on an aircraft carrier and an assault on an amphibious assault ship by targeting a 40,000-ton-class amphibious assault ship.

For perspective, China has three aircraft carriers: the Liaoning, the Shandong, and the Fujian. Of these, the Liaoning and Shandong are in operation, while the Fujian is currently undergoing sea trials and has yet to join active duty.

The Liaoning aircraft carrier has a maximum displacement of 60,000 tons, the Shandong aircraft carrier has a displacement of 66,000 tons, and the Fujian has a displacement of 80,000 tons. All three aircraft carriers in the PLA Navy are significantly heavier than the 40,000-ton USS Tarawa. However, analysts across the spectrum have observed that it would provide the RIMPAC participants with a fair idea of the sinking of a notional aircraft carrier.


J-15s Onboard Shandong

As the report started receiving traction, Chinese observers noted that aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships were crucial tools in the PLA’s arsenal for resolving the South China Sea issue and the Taiwan dispute. While aircraft carriers can gain air superiority and control of the sea, amphibious assault ships can conduct multidimensional landings on islands and reefs by transporting troops, amphibious armored vehicles, and air-cushioned landing craft.

If they sink the ex-USS Tarawa, the US and its allies will have a unique opportunity to collect information about weapon efficacy and the resistance of large and well-protected warships to different kinds of threats. It is not the first time that a vessel of that class has been sunk in RIMPAC, and it is not likely to be the last.

Although it is not known what weapons will be used for the sinking, RIMPACs have historically featured the demonstration of updated anti-ship weaponry along with constantly changing tactics, techniques, and procedures.

The sinking of the Tarawa at RIMPAC 2024 will also help to highlight the potential vulnerability of large US warships in future conflicts, given China’s development of advanced anti-ship missiles. These missiles pose a significant threat to US Navy vessels in any battle, especially one concerning Taiwan.

https://www.eurasiantimes.com/us-navy-practicing-to-sink-chinas-40-000/#google_vignette

3rd MLR Concludes Philippine Summer Exercise Series

Posted to The Marines Website (Jun 28, 2024): 3rd MLR Concludes Philippine Summer Exercise Series (1st Lt. Anne Pentaleri3rd Marine Logistics Group)

LUZON ISLAND, PH --

U.S. Marines with 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, 3rd Marine Division, concluded Marine Aviation Support Activity 24, the third of three Philippine-led bilateral exercises with 3rd MLR participation spanning the past three months, on Luzon, Philippines, June 21, 2024. The U.S. Marines’ return to their home station on Marine Corps Base Hawaii, Kaneohe Bay, marks the end of 3rd MLR’s longest rotational deployment of forces to the Philippines since the unit’s redesignation in 2022.

The U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific summer exercise series included Exercise Balikatan 24, Archipelagic Coastal Defense Continuum, and MASA 24, and consisted of bilateral exchanges and training opportunities between U.S. and Philippine Marines aimed at bolstering the PMC’s Coastal Defense strategy while supporting the Armed Forces of the Philippines modernization efforts.

BK24, an annual bilateral exercise designed to strengthen capabilities, trust, and cooperation built over decades of shared experiences, is internationally recognized for its emphasis on “shoulder-to-shoulder” training between all branches of the U.S. and Philippine militaries. The 39th iteration of BK was followed by the first iteration of ACDC 24, a series of USMC and PMC bilateral training and subject matter expert exchanges across the seven warfighting functions of command-and-control, fires, force protection, information, intelligence, logistics, and maneuver. Upon the conclusion of ACDC, the Marines transitioned to MASA 24, a PMC-led exercise designed to enhance capabilities, interoperability, and coordination focusing on aviation-supported operations.

During the 75-day deployment, the Marines and Sailors with 3rd MLR and its three subordinate units – 3rd Littoral Combat Team, 3rd Littoral Logistics Battalion, and 3rd Littoral Anti-Air Battalion – spanned out across nine disparate training areas to conduct five Combined Joint All-Domain Operations events alongside their AFP and PMC counterparts. The CJADO events included the BK24 Maritime Key Terrain Security Operation on Batan, Itbayat, and Mavulis; the BK24 Counter-landing Live Fire at the La Paz Sand Dunes; Littoral Zone Reconnaissance Cobra at IDESS Maritime Center, Camp Cape Bojeador, and Naval Base Camilo Osias; the MASA 24 MKTSO on Batan; and the MASA 24 Littoral Live Fire exercise at Camp Cape Bojeador and Naval Station Leovigildo Gantioqui.

The collaboration between the U.S. and Philippine Marines showcased their adeptness in coordinating, planning, and executing large-scale, intricate, multi-lateral training exercises. This demonstration underscores the enhanced capability and capacity of the combined and joint forces to conduct territorial defense operations.

“Exercises are like a second language that, as you are performing the exercise, you are also sending a message to both your adversaries, your like-minded partners, and other stakeholders. It sends a message of confidence in our ability to protect as north as possible." said AFP Col. Michael Logico, director of the joint and combined training center of the AFP.

The ability of the U.S. to train with the AFP in the Philippines is founded on one treaty and two agreements: the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed in 1951; the Visiting Forces Agreement, signed in 1998; and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, signed in 2014. These agreements allow both nations to strengthen military, economic, and cultural ties for years to come through continued bilateral training opportunities. In April of 2023, the U.S. and Philippines announced plans to expand the EDCA to include four new sites, two of which were used to support bilateral training between 3rd MLR and their PMC counterparts with 4th Marine Brigade in the 2024 iteration of the exercise.

As 3rd MLR forces complete their retrograde from the Philippines, the U.S. Marines are already working alongside their AFP and PMC partners to plan next year’s return.

“The U.S. Marines exercise in the Philippines because our allies are in the Philippines,” said Col. John Lehane, the commanding officer of 3rd MLR. “We will continue to do so as long as we are invited back by our Philippine allies each year.”

With the Philippine-led exercises growing in scale and complexity, bilateral staff discussions of 3rd MLR bringing additional capabilities, personnel, and equipment into the country for next year’s iterations have already begun.

“The more that 3rd MLR can enhance and enable the naval, joint, and combined forces’ ability to sense and make sense of the operating environment while providing a combat-credible rapid and ready response capability, the more we can complicate an adversary’s decision-making cycle and contribute to our Philippine allies’ goal of deterrence,” said Lehane.

3rd Marine Littoral Regiment is a dedicated U.S. Marine Corps unit specializing in amphibious and littoral warfare operations. Stationed on Oahu, Hawaii, and deployed throughout the Indo-Pacific region, 3rd MLR is committed to promoting regional security and stability through strategic partnerships and collaborative efforts with partner nations and Allies.

For media inquiries, please contact: 1st Lt. Annie Pentaleri, 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment COMMSTRAT, anne.pentaleri@usmc.mil

https://www.marines.mil/News/News-Display/Article/3821030/3rd-mlr-concludes-philippine-summer-exercise-series/

Special Issue: Violence Targeting Local Officials

Posted to the possibly left-of-center Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Website (Jun 22, 2023): Special Issue: Violence Targeting Local Officials (By Tomas Buenaventura)


The Philippines

Published: 22 June 2023

Rivalries Between Local Elites Fuel Violence

The Philippines has historically grappled with a high level of violence targeting local administration officials, particularly in relation to electoral competition between local elite families. The high-profile assassination of Negros Oriental Governor Roel Degamo in March 2023 is a recent example that illustrates this phenomenon.1 However, such violence has long persisted in the Philippine countryside. The most notorious example is the Maguindanao Massacre of November 2009, in which 58 people were killed in an attack masterminded by members of the Ampatuan clan against their rival Mangudadatu family.2 The attack is also thought to be the most lethal assault on the press in contemporary history, as 32 journalists were among those killed.3 The massacre took the lives of several members of the Mangudadatu family during an election-related event, including a vice mayor and other relatives of a Mangudadatu scion set to run against an Ampatuan for governor.4

These examples reflect the brazen nature of such violence. However, its prevalence is equally alarming: ACLED records 716 acts of violence against local officials between 2018 and 2022. Such violence is heavily concentrated in rural areas, particularly in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM), and especially during election periods. ACLED data show notable spikes of violent events targeting local government officials during the May 2019 midterm and May 2022 general elections, with BARMM, particularly the Maguindanao provinces, accounting for a disproportionately high amount of such targeting.

BARMM, like other rural areas that see elevated levels of such violence, is marked by conflict and characterized by a devolved political system, the proliferation of political dynasties, and the domination of ‘strong families’ who find recourse in violence to secure their interests. This report examines the temporal and subnational patterns seen in the targeting of local officials in the Philippines.

Electoral Violence Driven by Hired Unidentified Assailants

While the Philippines is home to many conflicts, including the communist insurgency as well as the Moro separatist struggle in Mindanao, a large percentage of the violence targeting local officials occurs outside of such conflicts. Many attacks occur without clear motives identified in media reports. ACLED data show 79% of violence targeting local government members between 2018 and 2022 was committed by unidentified actors. While the identity of those who carry out such violence is often unknown, much of this violence is thought to be committed by hired killers acting at the behest of local political players, and also possibly by members of private armed groups associated with political families.5 Peace Research Institute Frankfurt Professor Peter Kreuzer found that political players are more likely to engage hired guns for one-off or rare operations, rather than utilizing a private army that might be better known to law enforcement and thus easier to connect to the mastermind. As such, Kreuzer notes that “in the vast majority of cases it cannot be proven who actually ordered the killings.”6

Political competition drives spikes in the targeting of local officials in the Philippines, as evidenced by increases in such violence during election seasons.7 ACLED data show a significant increase in the targeting of local officials around midterm elections in May 2019 and around presidential elections in May 2022 that saw the transition from President Rodrigo Duterte to new President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, Jr. (see figure below). Over 30 such violent events were seen in May 2019, followed by an even higher peak of nearly 35 events in August 2019, fresh into the election winners’ new terms. The May 2022 election period was even more violent, with over 35 violent events targeting local officials during that election month alone.



This electoral violence is partly driven by electoral competition between political dynasties. The Philippine political landscape is characterized by the proliferation of political dynasties, as well as the system of political patronage they depend on for survival. Political dynasties, or the capture of multiple or successive elective posts by members of the same family, are technically banned by the Philippine 1987 Constitution. However, this ban has not been operationalized due to the lack of a required enabling law8 – one that has a poor chance of passing in a House of Representatives dominated by political dynasties.9 As of 2016, 78% of the members of the House of Representatives were part of political dynasties.10

The 2019 attack on Amado Espino, Jr., a former governor and representative of Pangasinan province in the Ilocos Region, is a typical example of such violence involving political dynasties. Espino is the patriarch of a powerful clan that has seen several members in top elected positions, such as his son who was then the incumbent governor. In an ambush on 11 September 2019, assailants injured Espino and killed a police officer serving as Espino’s aide. Hired assailants, including a former scout ranger from the Philippine Army, perpetrated the ambush.11

Police investigators later identified the attack’s mastermind as Raul Sison, a provincial board member from a smaller political dynasty whose son was also serving as a town mayor. The alleged mastermind died due to COVID-19 in March 2020 and the motive for the attack is still unclear.12 Nonetheless, Sison was described in a media report as a ‘deserter’ of the Espino camp, which was engaged in fierce electoral battles.13 Espino again ran for governor in 2022, though he lost in an upset.14

These dynamics in local politics have led some observers of Philippine society to note the outsized impact of ‘strong families,’ representing a dominant oligarchic class who thrive on political patronage vis-à-vis the ineffectual presence of the so-called ‘weak state’ in their localities.15 Such a reality, coupled with the weakness of political parties in the Philippines, also means families play an outsized role in the political landscape, taking on the role played by parties in other contexts as vectors for political movement.16 When multiple oligarchic families find themselves competing for the same set of elective posts, all promising access to lucrative local budgets and discretionary funds, some end up finding recourse in political violence to secure desired political outcomes. This phenomenon was referred to by Kreuzer as ‘violent self-help,’ which appears to have been accepted as a political reality in certain settings in the Philippines.17 The prevalence of violent self-help among political families collapses the lines separating the institutional and personal, whereby extra-institutional means are used to secure the dynasty’s hold on power.

Further, recent research into the impact of political dynasties on Philippine society shows that political violence is a manifestation of both political and socioeconomic inequality. In areas outside the capital Manila and the main island of Luzon, which enjoy greater distance from close institutional surveillance, the persistence of political dynasties is associated with greater poverty.18 Such areas are commonly dominated by local ‘bosses’ who seize control over an area’s resources, partly through coercion and partly through institutional legal means.19

The poverty in these areas has helped generate a prevalence of actors willing to take up political violence. However, it is not just dejected, impoverished citizens who turn toward violence as an appealing alternative to their current reality. Rather, segments of the elite, usually dynastic political families, try to secure their interests by actively turning toward such actors to do their bidding.20 The concentration of political violence in areas far removed from national centers of power is, thus, a sign of the weakness of institutions and inadequately established government accountability.

Local Officials in BARMM at Higher Risk

The targeting of local officials in the Philippines is concentrated mostly in rural areas. ACLED data show that between 2018 and 2022, just under 86% of events tagged in the ACLED data set as violence targeting local officials occurred in rural areas. For the purposes of this report, rural areas are defined as all areas in the Philippines outside of 33 cities described as “highly urbanized” in the 2020 census, which include 16 cities in the National Capital Region (NCR) and 17 cities outside the NCR.21

The prevalence of this phenomenon in the Philippines, particularly in rural areas, is rooted in certain rural dynamics that facilitate an easy recourse to political violence. One relevant characteristic of the rural Philippines is the power and influence of local politicians in charge of and competing for positions in the local government unit. Such power and influence derive largely from a decades-long governmental push toward devolution. This process was definitively ignited by the enactment of the Local Government Code of 1991, which delegated most basic governmental functions and services to the different levels of local government.22

Violence is often seen in the very lowest levels of Philippine governance. ACLED data show that a significant portion of violence targeting local authorities is committed against officials in barangays (sub-city or sub-town districts), such as barangay chairpersons and barangay councilors. A smaller number of attacks concern other local administrative positions – from the municipal or city levels, all the way to the provincial level.

The geographical patterns of violence against local officials largely track with the general population of the country. As such, the eight regions comprising the country’s largest island group of Luzon – home to nearly 60% of the country’s population – make up the largest share of violent events against local officials between 2018 and 2022. Mindanao and the Visayas followed. However, some regions have a disproportionately higher share of such violence relative to their population, particularly the BARMM. While BARMM falls in the middle of the pack in terms of its national population share, at 4%,23 it sees the second highest number of violent events against local officials between 2018 and 2022 (see map below). Slightly over 10% of violence targeting local officials occurred in BARMM, trailing only slightly behind Calabarzon – the country’s most populous region – at nearly 11%.



Within BARMM, the two Maguindanao provinces comprised nearly three-fourths of all violent events targeting local officials between 2018 and 2022. Maguindanao del Norte saw 44% of such violent events in the region, while Maguindanao del Sur recorded 32%. Lanao del Sur and Basilan (excluding Isabela City, which is not part of BARMM as per the 2019 Bangsamoro plebiscite) also see elevated levels of violence.

The intersection of multiple issues characterizes the situation in BARMM. In particular, the Maguindanao provinces – a single province until a 2022 referendum – are beset by rivalries between dynastic families caught in rido, a term for clan feuds in BARMM.24 These deeply rooted disputes extend from issues over land, to the contestation of political positions. In rido-related disputes, militias affiliated with rival clans sometimes engage in clashes, or carry out attacks against the rival clan, in some cases leading to the deaths of prominent rival clan members, including those working in local government. Such conflict occurs amid a difficult security landscape defined by the presence of armed groups, such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and Islamic State-inspired breakaways, such as the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters. A telling manifestation of this interplay between preexisting local conflict dynamics and violence targeting local officials is the fact that the masterminds behind the Maguindanao Massacre of 2009 initially tried to pass the blame on to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.25

Notably, data from the 2019 midterm elections show that the former single Maguindanao province also had the highest national rank in terms of the share of ‘fat dynasties,’ defined as families with two or more members in elected office. There, 51% of elected posts were occupied by members of fat dynasties.26 In this context, where actors from different conflicts often associate with powerful families and vice versa, and where ongoing issues have generated an abundance of firearms,27 fighting can involve the killing of local officials who happen to be an obstacle to the interests of a local boss.

Violent Recourse for Elite Interests

Violence against local officials in the Philippines is a multifaceted issue, reflecting long-standing, historically rooted political and socioeconomic realities. Other ongoing issues of political violence in the Philippines also influence the way such realities play out, therefore comprising a complex web of political violence in the country. This political violence was recently again dramatically brought to the spotlight through the aforementioned killing of Negros Oriental Governor Degamo on 4 March 2023. The incident, which followed a high-profile electoral dispute, again illustrated some common aspects of such events: hired killers carrying out an operation after allegedly being contracted by members of a rival political family.

Degamo had faced off in the Negros Oriental gubernatorial race in May 2022 against a member of the powerful, dynastic Teves family, whose dominance in Negros Oriental resembles the Espinos’ position in Pangasinan. While Pryde Henry Teves was initially declared the winner in that May 2022 race, the Commission on Elections later nullified his win after ruling that thousands of additional votes were rightfully awarded to Degamo.28 Degamo thus took over as governor – though his time in office was cut short. The killing was carried out professionally by at least 16 ‘highly skilled’ and heavily armed assailants, including former dishonorably discharged soldiers and even a former New People’s Army rebel.29

The Degamo case is somewhat atypical in that the assailants and the mastermind were identified with relative speed. State prosecutors are considering Arnolfo Teves, Jr., the brother of Pryde Henry and a sitting member of Congress, the top mastermind in the killing.30 The Degamo killing thus demonstrates how some locally powerful elites continue to feel emboldened to engage in violent self-help. Such violence secures an elite’s continued political and economic interests – against not only those of a rival elite, but the public interest at large.

Tomas Buenaventura is a Philippines Senior Research Assistant at ACLED.

https://acleddata.com/2023/06/22/special-issue-on-the-targeting-of-local-officials-the-philippines/

The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: A ‘Protracted People’s War’ Continues

Posted to the possible left-of-center Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) Website (Jul 13, 2023): The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: A ‘Protracted People’s War’ Continues (By Tomas Buenaventura)

13 July 2023

Introduction

When Philippine President Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos, Jr. came to power on 30 June 2022, he confronted a decades-long communist insurgency that began during the regime of his father, the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, Sr. Notably, this insurgency had a mixed fate under Marcos, Jr.’s predecessor, former president Rodrigo Duterte, who initially oversaw ambitious peace talks before a dramatic about-face toward all-out war. Consistent with Duterte’s later turn, Marcos, Jr. has shown little interest so far in resuming formal peace talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), alongside its armed wing, the New People’s Army (NPA), and its political wing, the National Democratic Front (NDF), collectively referred to as the CPP-NPA-NDF.1 That disinterest, coupled with the death of CPP founder Jose Maria Sison due to natural causes in December 2022 and the killings of several high-profile rebel leaders in the last three years, raises questions about the road forward for the insurgency.

This report examines the fighting between the state and the communist rebels under the Duterte and current Marcos, Jr. administrations. ACLED data show that fighting between state forces and the communist rebels has persisted since the end of the Duterte-era peace talks and into the new Marcos, Jr. regime, though dipping toward the end of 2022 amid the loss of top rebel leaders. A resurgence in fighting occurred in March 2023, while Marcos, Jr. moved to further empower a Duterte-era anti-communist body in May 2023. The report also looks at attacks targeting civilians in the context of the communist insurgency, particularly attacks on activists and other civilian actors related to the state’s practice of red-tagging. Amid this charged political environment, this report concludes by considering the prospects for peace under the Marcos, Jr. regime.

History and Ideology of the CPP-NPA-NDF

The ongoing rebellion being waged by the CPP-NPA-NDF dates back to the early presidency of the late Marcos, Sr., the current president’s father, when Sison reestablished the CPP under a Maoist line on 26 December 1968. The establishment of its armed wing, the NPA, followed on 29 March 1969. Sison’s CPP, which broke away from the older Moscow-aligned Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) established in 1930, would quickly eclipse PKP in significance and provide a formidable challenge to the Marcos military establishment, growing the NPA to a peak of around 26,000 fighters in the 1980s.2

The CPP’s basic analysis of Philippine society, largely based on Sison’s writings – an application of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the Philippine context – has remained largely unchanged since the rebellion started in the late 1960s. The CPP believes the Philippines is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country, meaning one where formerly feudal structures have been transformed to serve neo-colonial monopoly capitalism. The CPP holds that there are three basic problems in Philippine society: imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism – to which the answer is a national democratic revolution with a socialist perspective. Their revolution is to be waged in the Maoist vein of a “protracted people’s war,” which involves the gradual encirclement of cities from the countryside, carried out primarily by workers as its leading class and peasants as its main force.3

The basic goals and the fundamental strategy of the protracted people’s war pursued by the CPP-NPA-NDF have remained the same since the insurgency’s inception, and they continue to characterize the movement today. This continuity exists despite a schism in the post-Marcos, Sr. environment of the 1990s that led to a division between the party’s ‘reaffirmists’ (RAs) and the ‘rejectionists’ (RJs), following deadly purges against military infiltrators within the party that brought it to near collapse. The RAs, who reaffirmed Sison’s basic analysis of Philippine society and the strategy of protracted people’s war,4 continue to lead the CPP-NPA-NDF today. The RJs have dispersed into other leftist groupings, often with testy relations with the CPP-NPA-NDF and their allies in the legal, activist, and parliamentary arenas.5 The communists’ specific political program today is expressed in the NDF’s 12-point agenda, which also forms the backbone of the communists’ basic demands in the peace process.6

The endurance of the communist insurgency through several decades is an oft-raised question. By the rebels’ own account, however, this endurance reflects the persistence of the basic problems of Philippine society, which provides fertile ground for the recruitment of peasants and other supportive classes, such as workers and even students from the cities. The strong ideological character of the insurgency seems to ensure an ample supply not only of occasional fighters, but of revolutionaries committed to pursuing their vision for Philippine society long term.7

The national government itself has long acknowledged that the root causes of the armed conflict are related to long-standing socio-economic issues. In the comprehensive Philippine Development Plan of the Duterte administration, the government resolved to implement “peace-promoting and catch-up socio-economic development in conflict-affected areas” as a key measure toward a “just and lasting peace.”8 Meanwhile, the succeeding plan under Marcos, Jr. emphasizes the importance of a reintegration program for surrendering rebels and of socio-economic interventions in barangays (sub-city or sub-town districts) affected by conflict, such as the Barangay Development Fund managed by the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC).9

The continuing sustainability of the NPA insurgency, then, seems to be the result not only of the revolution’s very design as a protracted people’s war, but also of the persistence of conditions that create impoverished rural communities receptive to the CPP-NPA-NDF’s message of revolutionary change.

Rural Unrest and Armed Insurgency

The CPP’s strategy of protracted people’s war stresses the peasantry’s role in providing the revolutionary army’s main force, which then aims to gradually encircle the cities from the countryside as the rebels win over rural communities. This strategy explains the NPA’s scant activity in the biggest urban centers, particularly Metropolitan Manila. Conversely, most clashes between the NPA and the military occur in remote, mountainous terrain in rural agricultural areas, particularly in the western islands of the central Philippines, and in the northern part of the main southern island of Mindanao (see map below).



ACLED data illustrate that the NPA is most active in Negros Occidental province in Western Visayas and Bukidnon province in Northern Mindanao (see inset maps above). This does not come as a surprise for a revolution with an agrarian base. Western Visayas and Northern Mindanao are both known for agrarian unrest, being two of the country’s most important agricultural centers, and therefore serve as ideal staging grounds for the CPP’s revolution. As of 2019, Western Visayas had the largest number of persons employed in agriculture in the country at 873,000, while Northern Mindanao ranked third with 776,000 persons employed in agriculture.10 Additionally, Northern Mindanao and Western Visayas rank among the top three regions in terms of their share of national agricultural production.11

Negros Occidental in Western Visayas is particularly well-known for being the bastion of sugar hacenderos, owners of thousands upon thousands of hectares of sugarcane plantations or haciendas that have provided immense wealth to the local elite since the Spanish colonial era.12 The province continues to have the most haciendas in the Philippines, despite decades of a formal government-sponsored agrarian reform program aiming to solve the problem of farmer landlessness.13 The province still dominates sugar production, accounting for 50.8% of national sugar production in 2014.14

Despite this wealth from sugar production, the province continues to be associated with profound inequality, notorious for widespread famines in the 1980s and continuing abuse, maltreatment, and even outright violence against farm workers during times of unrest.15 A characteristic example is the massacre by unidentified assailants of nine sugarcane farmers of Hacienda Nene, unemployed during the tiempo muerto (the ‘dead season’ between planting and harvesting) in Sagay in October 2018. The incident demonstrates the intersection of agrarian unrest and the communist insurgency. Security forces accused the victims of the Sagay Massacre of being NPA-affiliated provocateurs due to their participation in a bungkalan (collective cultivation work, specifically tilling, on idle lands for survival) as members of the National Federation of Sugar Workers (NFSW).16 Just a month later, the lawyer of the Sagay Massacre victims, also accused by authorities of being a communist, was also murdered.17

Meanwhile, Northern Mindanao also harbors its share of agrarian issues. Bukidnon, for example, is particularly well-known for its vast pineapple and banana plantations operated by leading transnational corporations such as Del Monte and Dole. However, human rights groups have sounded the alarm over abuses and attacks committed against local farmers and Indigenous peoples in the province by actors with ties to the largest agribusiness players in the region.18

These deep-seated socio-economic issues in Western Visayas and Northern Mindanao continue to persist against the backdrop of widespread poverty among agriculture workers. The latest poverty statistics in the Philippines show that farmers and fishers continue to be the poorest sectors nationally, respectively recording poverty rates of 30.0% and 30.6% in 2021,19 against the national figure of 18.1%.20

Despite the higher levels of fighting between the NPA and state forces in Western Visayas and Northern Mindanao, fighting between both sides was seen in practically all parts of the country from the start of the Duterte regime and into the Marcos, Jr. regime. This means that the NPA has been present in every region, mirroring the prevalence of agrarian issues across the country and widespread poverty of agricultural workers. Sometimes, fighting has even spilled over to the cities, with two of 33 cities classified as highly urbanized – Davao City and Butuan City in Mindanao21 – seeing considerable NPA activity. There is also elevated NPA activity in smaller regional cities, such as Himamaylan, Guihulngan, Gingoog, and Malaybalay.

The NPA’s expansive reach notwithstanding, the military and the communists publicly disagree on the strength of the NPA. In its latest anniversary statement in December 2022, the CPP claimed that the NPA had established 110 fronts across the country, while the party itself had set up committees of leadership and branches in more than 70 out of 82 provinces.22 The military, meanwhile, claimed that the number of NPA fronts is down to 22 as of December 2022.23 In May 2023, the Philippine national security adviser said that of these 22 fronts, the number of “active” guerrilla fronts had gone down to two, while 20 have been “weakened.”24

The NPA’s operations against the state go beyond armed clashes with state forces (see figure below). The rebel group also carries out ambushes and executions against individuals perceived to be state collaborators, as well as government officials and off-duty soldiers or police officers. NPA attacks against civilians, which human rights groups have condemned, are usually pronounced by the rebels as ‘revolutionary justice’ for supposed offenses against the people or the revolution. However, the ‘people’s court’ trials that make judgments “don’t meet the most basic standards of fairness,” according to Human Rights Watch.25 From the start of the Duterte regime on 30 June 2016 to 30 June 2023 under Marcos, Jr., ACLED data show over 270 events of NPA violence targeting civilians, consisting mostly of physical attacks but also including incidents of forced disappearances, sexual violence, and the use of explosives.



Duterte and the Communists: From Peace Talks to All-Out War

In June 2016, Rodrigo Duterte took office as president and promised to pursue peace with the communists. Duterte also made significant overtures to leftist social movements, appointing prominent leftist politicians to key positions in his government. Duterte’s outreach to the communists and leftist politicians reflected the good relations he had with the rebels as longtime mayor of Davao City.26 These good relations were rooted in Duterte’s involvement in leftist politics in his younger years, when he first became part of the leftist Kabataang Makabayan (Patriotic Youth) and BAYAN (New Patriotic Alliance). Duterte was also a student of Sison during his university years.27

Duterte and the CPP-NPA-NDF had initially set on reviving the dormant peace process as he was about to take power following his election in May 2016. The peace negotiations, which started on 22 August 2016 in Oslo, were initially promising. The peace negotiators reaffirmed agreements from previously aborted peace talks and started to pen further agreements on socio-economic issues.28

Coinciding with four rounds of peace talks held in Oslo, Rome, and Amsterdam, both the government and the CPP-NPA-NDF declared multiple unilateral ceasefires. The government also freed several rebel leaders so that they could participate in the peace process, most notably the husband and wife serving as the highest-ranking CPP officials, Executive Committee Chair Benito Tiamzon and Central Committee Secretary-General Wilma Tiamzon, last arrested in 2014.

However, talks broke down and the ceasefires were later terminated after the release of more political prisoners became a sticking point, with Duterte saying he conceded “too much, too soon.”29 The actual termination of the ceasefires was then followed by an intense surge in fighting (see graph below), with Duterte declaring an “all-out war” against the rebels. In February 2017, the highest level of fighting between the two sides during the Duterte regime was recorded. Duterte also ordered the rearrest of the freed rebels, many of whom had gone into hiding. Additionally, Duterte soured on the leftist politicians he had earlier appointed to his government (who were not confirmed by the Commission of Appointments), even accusing them of funneling funds to the NPA.30



Multiple attempts to salvage the talks in the following months through backchannels failed, as Duterte and Sison engaged in tirades against each other.31 Backchannel talks were canceled in July 2017 amid a surge in fighting. Duterte officially canceled the peace process in November 2017. By December 2017, Duterte signed a proclamation designating the CPP-NPA as a ‘terrorist’ group.32 A year later, in December 2018, Duterte established the NTF-ELCAC. This new body was tasked with leading a “whole-of-nation” strategy against the communist insurgency, coordinating between state forces and civilian government offices.33 Another new body, the Anti-Terrorism Council established by the controversial anti-terror law of 2020,34 gave ‘terrorist’ group designations to the CPP-NPA in December 2020,35 and to the NDF in July 2021.36 Thus, fighting continued largely unabated, with an average of nearly 22 clashes per month between state and rebel forces from February 2017, the end of the ceasefire, to June 2022, the end of Duterte’s regime.

In Duterte’s last few months in office, the military leadership said that it wished to cap the Duterte years by doing its best to quell the remaining rebels.37 Thus, the last few months of the Duterte regime saw an upward trend in fighting between the military and the NPA. This upward trend saw highs in December 2021, the 53rd anniversary month of the CPP, and in April 2022, right before the May elections.

An Uncertain Path Under Marcos, Jr.

As Duterte marked his last year in office, and as the country geared up for voting in the May 2022 elections, ACLED records an uptick in violence related to the communist rebellion (see graph above). This uptick coincided with the killings or arrests of several rebel leaders, which would continue beyond the elections into the first few months of the Marcos, Jr. administration. The military also frequently reported the large-scale surrenders of rebels, though some of these surrenders were later questioned as supposedly forced or fake surrenders. In any case, these developments, alongside the death of Sison at the end of 2022, have contributed to government claims that the communist insurgency is nearly crushed.38 Accordingly, violent interactions between state forces and the NPA decreased slightly in the latter half of 2022.

The biggest blow to the NPA came on 22 August 2022 when the two highest-ranking CPP-NPA-NDF leaders, the aforementioned couple Benito Tiamzon (also known as Ka Laan) and Wilma Tiamzon (also known as Ka Bagong-tao), were reportedly killed in an explosion during a waterborne clash between the rebels and state forces. The CPP only confirmed the deaths on 20 April 2023 after a supposed months-long investigation. In the CPP’s announcement, they disputed earlier military accounts, claiming that the Tiamzons were tortured and killed on 21 August 2022, a day earlier than the military claims, before being set on a boat that exploded the next day.39

The Tiamzons’ deaths were preceded by other major losses during the Duterte regime. One of the party’s supposed intellectual stalwarts, Menandro Villanueva (also known as Ka Bok), was killed by state forces in Mindanao on 5 January 2022. Before this, the NPA’s top leader in Mindanao and nationally prominent rebel spokesperson, Jorge Madlos (also known as Ka Oris), was killed on 30 October 2021. Additionally, on 13 March 2020, state forces killed the chair of the CPP’s National Military Commission and acting chair of the CPP Politburo, Julius Giron (also known as Ka Nars).

All these losses were then capped by Sison’s death on 16 December 2022 while in exile in the Netherlands. While Sison had long been uninvolved in the day-to-day operation of the insurgency, he maintained an important role as the chief political consultant of the NDF in peace negotiations with the government, and, in general, by providing revolutionary guidance to the movement, as the CPP confirmed in tributes to Sison upon his death.40

ACLED data show a slight general downward trend in armed interactions between state forces and the NPA in the immediate months following the Tiamzons’ deaths in August 2022. Fighting was even more muted in December 2022, the month of Sison’s death, especially compared to the Decembers of previous years. Fighting normally spikes in the last month of the year as the communists mark the CPP anniversary on 26 December – though less so some years when both sides declare a Christmas ceasefire for about two weeks. However, the last time such a Christmas ceasefire was declared was in December 2019, although later both sides traded accusations of ceasefire violations.41 Since then, both sides have rejected Christmas ceasefires, and in the last few years, the lead-up to the December anniversary usually sees intensified offensives by both state forces and the NPA.

While the lower volume of fighting in the last few months of 2022 perhaps reflected the immediate aftermath of the Tiamzons’ and Sison’s deaths, possibly indicating weakened communist forces, fighting again rose in the first quarter of 2023. This upward trend reached a high in March 2023, which saw the largest number of armed interactions since December 2018. Much like in December, March sometimes sees an intensified push by both state and rebel forces, as the communist movement marks the NPA’s anniversary on 29 March. The volume of NPA activity in March 2023 suggests that the rebels might have been able to regroup and re-strategize following their losses in 2022. This latest peak in March 2023, however, was again followed by a downward trend in fighting from April to June 2023.

As things stand, the war waged by the communists in the Philippines remains the world’s longest-running communist insurgency,42 continuing to defy military pronouncements of their defeat as they have several times in the past. Nevertheless, the military asserts that the Tiamzons’ and Sison’s death has created a “leadership vacuum” that “leaves the underground movement without a sense of strategic and operational directions and the reason for its existence.”43 However, while the CPP acknowledged the “great loss” and “heavy impact” of losing the Tiamzons, Sison, and other rebel leaders, the party said that “the Central Committee and other leading organs of the Party were quickly reconstituted and revitalized.”44

Red-Tagging and the Communist Insurgency

The Philippine armed forces’ campaign against the communist insurgency has been accompanied by acts of violence targeting civilians, particularly in the context of ‘red-tagging.’ Red-tagging, also sometimes referred to as red-baiting, is the practice of vilifying or labeling groups or individuals critical of the government, such as human rights defenders, labor leaders, public interest lawyers, journalists, the political opposition, religious groups, and other targeted individuals as ‘communists’ or ‘terrorists.’ In the Philippines, authorities also often conflate the terms ‘communist’ and ‘terrorist.’45

The 1957 Anti-Subversion Law, which outlawed membership in the Communist Party, was repealed in 1992 in order to legalize the party and pave the way for peace talks. Thus, mere membership in the CPP is no longer a crime, as acknowledged in 2019 by the Department of Justice.46 Nevertheless, many of those red-tagged by authorities are exposed to physical violence, with some being killed or wounded.47 In the past few years, particularly under Duterte, red-tagging has become a fraught political issue in the Philippines. In the May 2022 national elections, for example, even opposition politicians not usually identified with the main leftist formations, such as de facto leader of the opposition and then Vice President Leni Robredo of the Liberal Party, were red-tagged.48 International non-partisan organizations such as Oxfam have also not been spared.49

Between 2020 and 30 June 2023, ACLED records nearly 50 red-tagging related violent events targeting civilians, dispersed throughout the country (see map below). Thirteen of these events took place after Marcos, Jr. took power on 30 June 2022. These numbers include events where a person is physically harmed or killed. In line with ACLED’s methodology, this count is not inclusive of cases of arrests, imprisonment, or other intimidation, and thus offers insight into only one component of the red-tagging phenomenon.



Western Visayas and Calabarzon lead the count of violent events related to red-tagging as recorded by ACLED, with at least 12 such events each over the time period. While Western Visayas is a hotspot for agrarian unrest, as discussed above, Calabarzon, a largely urban region to the south and east of Metropolitan Manila, is also a busy area for activist organizing, especially in its significant rural pockets and industrial zones. Activists in Calabarzon faced heightened pressure from the Duterte administration in the latter part of his presidency, at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Government and military officials openly used red-tagging to suppress those organizing for labor rights amid pandemic-related hardships, as well as those opposing large-scale government projects feared to negatively impact Indigenous peoples.50

Such violence targeting civilians in Western Visayas and Calabarzon led to the two deadliest months for red-tagging-related attacks from 2020 to 2023. The deadliest month for red-tagging-related attacks was December 2020, largely due to state forces’ killing of nine red-tagged leaders of the Tumandok tribe in Capiz province in Western Visayas on 30 December, in operations that were intended to only be executions of search warrants. State forces accused tribal leaders, who belonged to a local farmer association that opposed a dam construction project in the area, of being NPA members.51 A few months later, on 3 March 2021, a lawyer representing the survivors of the attack was wounded in a stabbing attack by unidentified assailants. The lawyer had written on the issue of red-tagging as state policy, which was published around the time of his stabbing.52 This contributed to the second deadliest month for red-tagging – March 2021, which also saw what was later called in the media the ‘Bloody Sunday’ killings of 7 March, where nine local activists were reportedly killed in joint police and military operations across the Calabarzon region.53

Human rights groups have raised the issue of red-tagging numerous times. In a September 2022 report, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) said red-tagging has been linked to many reports of “killings, arbitrary detention, physical, and legal intimidation” against members of civil society, such as human rights and environmental defenders, journalists, lawyers, labor rights activists, and humanitarian workers.54 Meanwhile, in its submission to the UN Human Rights Committee in 2022, Amnesty International noted that the breakdown of peace talks between the government and the rebels in 2017 and the establishment of NTF-ELCAC in December 2018 have “led to an increase in red-tagging and security operations.”55 This coincides with the International Commission of Jurists’ observation that red-tagging was “applied with greater intensity” in President Duterte’s government.56 Amnesty International noted that red-tagging continues under the Marcos, Jr. administration, whom it asked to “end the vicious and at times deadly practice.”57 In January 2023, Human Rights Watch also raised concern about the Philippine government’s use of red-tagging to silence Indigenous opposition to projects sponsored by the government.58

Legal persecution is also a major part of the red-tagging phenomenon, with those red-tagged often subjected to dubious cases without substantial basis, or based on evidence alleged to be planted outright by state forces.59 In its 2022 year-end report, Karapatan said it had documented 4,298 illegal arrests (with or without detention) effected by state forces under Duterte from July 2016 to June 2022, and a further 197 under Marcos, Jr. from July to December 2022. Many of these arrests were described as being related to red-tagging. Karapatan also counted 591 political prisoners arrested under Duterte, and 26 under Marcos, Jr. as of December 2022.60 Public scrutiny has thus also been directed toward the Philippine justice system, with human rights groups and legal organizations expressing concern that a small number of courts have become search warrant ‘factories’ targeting red-tagged activists.61

Another manifestation of red-tagging is the allegedly forced or fake surrenders of those identified by the military as having ties to the NPA. Often, the supposed surrenders reported by the military are not of actual NPA armed combatants, but rather of those the military calls NPA ‘supporters’ or of members of activist or sectoral organizations which the military has connected to the communist insurgency. This explains why the number of surrenders reported by the military is often difficult to reconcile with the number of NPA fighters as also reported by the military. The military sometimes reports thousands of surrenders in a single region for a limited timeframe, even though the latest military estimate of the number of NPA fighters nationwide is 2,112 as of December 2022.62

The dubious surrenders thus disproportionately implicate members of red-tagged workers’ unions or farmers’ associations. Some farmers’ groups have objected to the alleged ‘fake surrenders,’ which they brand as another form of red-tagging that compels farmers to self-identify as NPA fighters against their will in highly publicized official ceremonies.63 The government’s Commission on Human Rights has launched inquiries into the supposed fake surrenders.64 Karapatan documented 3,991 “forced and fake surrenders” under the Duterte administration from July 2016 to June 2022, and 151 under the Marcos, Jr. administration from July to December 2022.65 It is worth noting that such surrenders, forced or not, carry a significant reward for the local government units involved, because barangays are incentivized when they can show that they are ‘NPA-free.’ In 2021, the NTF-ELCAC released 16.4 billion pesos (around US$324 million) to barangays that are supposedly cleared of communists, as part of the NTF-ELCAC’s Barangay Development Fund.66

Prospects for Peace

As fighting between the government and communist rebels continues unabated, and civilians continue to be caught in the crossfire, the prospects for peace under the new Marcos, Jr. regime are dim. Formal peace talks between the government and the communist leadership, which have taken place in over 40 rounds since 1986,67 look unlikely to be revived under Marcos, Jr. This would make Marcos, Jr. the first Philippine president after the fall of his father’s dictatorship not to seek peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA-NDF.68

Marcos, Jr., however, looks keen to pursue the NTF-ELCAC’s favored style of ‘localized peace talks,’ where the government negotiates directly with individuals identified as communist rebels in local areas, rather than with the CPP-NPA-NDF leadership.69 The government has described the NTF-ELCAC’s localized peace talks as effective, saying that this approach has convinced rebels to surrender and avail themselves of government assistance.70 The government’s full backing of the NTF-ELCAC’s activities was further signaled by Marcos, Jr.’s high-profile appointment of Vice President Sara Duterte, daughter of former President Duterte, as co-chair of the anti-communist body in May 202371 – a development that has worried activist groups mindful of the vice president’s alleged history of red-tagging.72

For its part, the CPP has repeatedly rejected the NTF-ELCAC-backed localized peace talks, asserting that this approach is “a smokescreen for psychological warfare, pacification, and suppression operations” and does not address the “long-standing problems of landlessness, oppression, and exploitation.”73 Instead, the CPP continues to demand national-level peace talks. In February 2022, months before his death, Sison gave an interview as the NDF chief political consultant. In this interview, he asserted the CPP’s view that the peace talks should conform with previous agreements between the two sides and hew to the agreed agenda already set forth in the Hague Joint Declaration of 1992,74 meaning basic social, economic, political, and constitutional reforms.75 The last substantial agreement signed between the Philippine government and the communists dates back to 1998 and was the first item in the Hague Joint Declaration agenda: the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law.76 The CPP insists that the next step in the peace process should be to negotiate the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms, followed by the Comprehensive Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms, and finally the Comprehensive Agreement for the End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces.77 By the latter half of Duterte’s term, however, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process had begun to question the constitutionality of the previous agreements between the government and the NDF.78

The fate of the communist insurgency under the Marcos, Jr. presidency is of particular interest given the long history between the Marcos family and the communists. The elder Marcos often invoked the threat of communist rebellion for the severe military measures he implemented during his dictatorship, particularly when he placed the country under martial law.79 The younger Marcos would repeat this claim in 2022 to defend his father’s strongman rule.80 However, such military measures greatly contributed to the widespread violation of human rights under the Marcos dictatorship.

In 2022, amid the younger Marcos’s rise to power, Amnesty International warned against a “disturbing revisionist narrative” that minimized the human rights abuses under the elder Marcos as a necessary response to the communist threat. Against this narrative, the human rights group reminded the public that it had documented “tens of thousands of people arbitrarily arrested and detained, and thousands of others tortured, forcibly disappeared, and killed” during Marcos, Sr.’s dictatorship, targeting individuals “critical of the government or perceived as political opponents.”81 The government’s very own Human Rights Violations Victims’ Memorial Commission, established by law in 2013 to provide for state reparations for abuses under the Marcos, Sr. regime, also lists 11,103 officially recognized victims of human rights violations under Marcos’s martial law to date.82 The revisionist narrative, which obscured these facts and enabled the political rehabilitation of the Marcos family, plays into the hands of those in the present security establishment who wish to return to martial law-era approaches to peace and order. The CPP-NPA-NDF’s existence is thus invoked anew as justification for red-tagging and other human rights abuses.

Now, with Marcos, Jr.’s campaign against the communist insurgency bolstered by the vast powers of the Duterte-era NTF-ELCAC, and with the communist insurgency vowing to march on despite recent setbacks, the two sides look further than ever from a peaceful resolution.


Visuals in this report were produced by Christian Jaffe.

Tomas Buenaventura is a Philippines Senior Research Assistant at ACLED.

SECTIONS

Philippine troops kill 10 communist rebels in a clash, in the latest blow to decades-long insurgency

Posted to the Washington Post (Jun 28, 2024): Philippine troops kill 10 communist rebels in a clash, in the latest blow to decades-long insurgency (By Associated Press)

Philippine troops have killed at least 10 suspected communist guerrillas in a clash in a remote northern area, in the latest blow to a decades-old insurgency that has weakened considerably

https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-apps/imrs.php?src=https://arc-anglerfish-washpost-prod-washpost.s3.amazonaws.com/public/CE765IBVE4I67BZKDURPISQNSU.jpg&w=916

In this handout photo provided by the Armed Forces of the Philippines Public Affairs Office, bags from suspected communist rebels are placed together after an encounter with Philippine troops near a village in Pantabangan town in Nueva Ecija province, Philippines Wednesday June 26, 2024. Philippine troops killed several suspected communist guerrillas in a clash in a remote northern area in the latest blow to a decades-old insurgency that has weakened considerably, with only about a thousand guerrillas remaining, military and security officials said Friday, June 28. (Armed Forces of the Philippines Public Affairs Office via AP) (Uncredited/ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES PAO)

MANILA, Philippines — Philippine troops killed at least 10 suspected communist guerrillas in a clash in a remote northern area in the latest blow to a decades-old insurgency that has weakened considerably, with only about a thousand guerrillas remaining, military and security officials said Friday.

Army troops caught up with about 20 New People’s Army guerrillas who were withdrawing from an earlier clash with government forces last week, sparking a firefight Wednesday that killed 10 rebels, including three commanders, near a village in Pantabangan town in Nueva Ecija province, the army said.

Thirteen rifles and a pistol were recovered from the area of the fighting, which was near a key dam, it said. Troops were pursuing about 10 other guerrillas who withdrew from the remote area, regional army spokesperson Maj. Jimson Masangkay said by telephone.

Brig. Gen. Norwin Joseph Pasamonte, an army infantry brigade commander, commended the troops but expressed sadness over the rebel deaths. “The government did not fail in appealing to them to surrender and return to normal life,” Pasamonte said in a statement, adding that the deaths should help convince the remaining guerrillas to give up.

Nueva Ecija, a rice-growing region in the north, used to be a hotbed of the communist insurgency decades ago, but less than 50 Maoist guerrillas remain in the area, Masangkay said.

Last November, the government and the communist rebels agreed to resume talks aimed at ending the armed insurgency, one of Asia’s longest, after meeting in the Norwegian capital of Oslo to address key obstacles to intermittent peace negotiations, according to Norwegian mediators.

Actual peace talks, however, have not restarted under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.

Philippine officials say about 1,000 communist fighters remain after years of rebel setbacks, surrenders and factionalism. Peace talks brokered by Norway collapsed under previous President Rodrigo Duterte after both sides accused the other of continuing deadly attacks despite the negotiations.

https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/06/28/philippines-communist-rebels-norway-peace-talks/edd7363e-3522-11ef-872a-1d22f44a0d95_story.html

Philippine peace talks

Posted to the Government of Norway Website (Jun 27, 2024): Philippine peace talks

Renewed hope in the peace process – the Philippine government and the Communist Movement signed a joint vision for peace in Oslo on 23 November 2023.

The armed conflict between the Philippine government and the Communist Movement (Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP); National Peaople's Army (NPA); National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP)) has lasted for over 50 years. The parties have repeatedly tried to negotiate for peace. Social and economic inequalities in society are one of the motivations behind the communist armed rebellion. It is estimated that more than 40,000 lives have been lost during the conflict.

Norway has been facilitating the negotiations since 2001. During this period, Norway has played an active role in the process, with rounds of negotiations and confidential talks held in Oslo and other cities. However, negotiations have broken down several times, reflecting the complexity of addressing deep-seated issues within a tense political landscape. Despite the challenges, both parties have nevertheless recognized the need for a negotiated political solution to end the armed conflict and achieve lasting peace in the Philippines.

The last round of formal talks was called off by the then president in November 2017. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the conflict reached a historic low, and prospects for resuming negotiations remained uncertain.

Renewed hope for talks

During 2022 and 2023, Norway facilitated confidential talks between the parties. A breakthrough was recently achieved when the parties agreed on a common vision for peace that paves the way for the start of formal negotiations. The agreement was signed in Oslo City Hall on 23 November 2023.

Norway will continue as facilitator and assist the parties in the negotiations ahead.


The signing of a joint vision for peace in Oslo City Hall on 23 November 2023. Credit: Mathias Rongved/Norway Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The peace process with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

In 2014, the Philippine government and the Muslim rebel movement Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao entered into a peace agreement that resulted in the creation of the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao in 2019. Disarmament and the reintegration of former soldiers back into civilian life have been crucial for ensuring lasting peace. The disarmament process started in 2019. Norway has played a central role in the independent mechanism for the disarmament of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. So far, 25,000 of the 40,000 former combatants have been demobilized, and 15,000 remain.

https://www.regjeringen.no/en/topics/foreign-affairs/peace-and-reconciliation-efforts/norways_engagement/talks_philippines/id2522232/

Basilan marks peace milestone

Posted to the Daily Tribune (Jun 28, 2024): Basilan marks peace milestone (By Nonoy Lacson)

TABUAN LASA, Basilan Province — The island town of Tabuan Lasa celebrated a major achievement last Thursday after being declared free of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) influence.

Municipal Mayor Moner S. Manisan stressed that they are celebrating not just the end of a threat but the beginning of a new chapter for Tabuan Lasa.

The mayor said that the journey to peace was challenging, but the town’s resolve never wavered as he pledged continued collaboration with stakeholders to ensure lasting security and prosperity for the community.

A highlight of the event was the surrender of 14 loose firearms, including high-powered rifles and pistols.


Meantime, 101st Infantry Brigade commander Brigadier General Alvin V. Luzon commended the community for its unwavering commitment to peace and security, adding that the voluntary surrender of firearms exemplified this dedication.

Luzon stressed the importance of collective effort.

“The declaration of Tabuan Lasa as ASG-Free is a testament to what we can achieve when we work together,” said Luzon, adding that the bravery and cooperation of residents, combined with the commitment of security forces, made this achievement possible, Luzon added.

“We have stood united in our commitment to maintaining peace and ensuring a secure future for Tabuan Lasa,” the provincial military chief said.

On the other hand, Basilan Governor Jim Hataman-Salliman said the declaration is part of a broader provincial initiative to address the root causes of conflict, which includes efforts to eradicate clan feuds and promote responsible firearms ownership through the Small Arms and Light Weapons program.

https://tribune.net.ph/2024/06/28/basilan-marks-peace-milestone

Indonesian And Philippine Warships Joint Patrol On Border

Posted to VOI (Jun 28, 2024): Indonesian And Philippine Warships Joint Patrol On Border (By Editorial Team)


ANTARA/HO-Dinas Information Fleet Command II TNI AL.

JAKARTA - The warship of the Republic of Indonesia KRI Kakap-811 and the Philippine warship BRP Artemio Ricarte PS37 patrolled together at the sea border of two countries, namely the Sulawesi Sea on the Indonesian side and the Mindanao Sea on the Philippine side.

Head of the Information Service (Kadispen) Fleet Command (Koarmada) II Marine Colonel (P) Widyo Sasongko explained that the joint patrol was packaged in routine activities of the Philippines-Indonesian Coordinated Patrol (Patkor Philindo) XXXVIII-2024 (Pahap 2), Thursday (27/6).

"The exercise aims to secure the Indonesia-Philippine border area from all forms of the threat of piracy, as well as strengthen the interoperability of relations between the two countries," said Head of the Indonesian Navy's Second Koarmada Office, as reported by ANTARA, Friday, June 28.

In this coordinated patrol activity, two countries warships also train together at the Indonesian-Philippine sea border. The series of exercises that KRI Kakap-811 participated in and Philippine warship BRP Artemio Ricarte PS37 included maneuvering exercises (mannex), passenger exercise, formation training for aerial photos (PhotoEx), and closed with respect from each ship before the two continued patrols.

In the same activity, the Philippine Navy also deployed its aircraft, namely the NV394 Aircraft District Court.

https://voi.id/en/news/394110

Troops trek to Bud Daho in Sulu

From the Sun Star-Zaamboanga (Jun 28, 2024): Troops trek to Bud Daho in Sulu



ZAMBOANGA. Hundreds of participants comprising of officers and enlisted personnel from various 11th Infantry Division (ID) units join the first-ever trekking activity on Wednesday, June 26, in Bud Daho, Talipao, Sulu. A photo handout shows some of the participants posed for souvenir pictorial after the trek. (SunStar Zamboanga)

HUNDREDS of participants comprising officers and enlisted personnel from various 11th Infantry Division (ID) units joined the first-ever trekking activity at Bud Daho, Talipao, Sulu, the 11ID said Friday, June 28, 2024.

The 11ID said the trekking activity was held on Wednesday, June 26. The activity started at 6 a.m. in Buroh village, Talipao, and concluded at 9:30 a.m.

Major General Ignatius Patrimonio, 11ID and Joint Task Force (JTF)-Orion commander, said the trekking activity signified the improved security situation in the province of Sulu.

“We were able to trek Bud Daho, which was once known for being a battleground and an ASG (Abu Sayyaf Group) lair for years,” Patrimonio said in a statement.

“This demonstrates the success of our peace and security campaign and our collaboration with the local government, as Sulu is now experiencing relative peace,” Patrimonio added.

Additionally, he said the event provided an opportunity to connect with the residents, who expressed their gratitude for the improved peace and development in their communities.

He noted that the historic Bud Daho symbolizes the resilience and resistance of “our forefathers against foreign forces and serves as a reminder to honor their heroism.” (SunStar Zamboanga)

https://www.sunstar.com.ph/zamboanga/troops-trek-to-bud-daho-in-sulu#google_vignette

PNP obtains court nod to examine Chinese 'hacker' devices

From the Philippine News Agency (Jun 28, 2024): PNP obtains court nod to examine Chinese 'hacker' devices (By Christopher Lloyd Caliwan)



SEIZED. The firearms and purported hacking equipment seized from a Chinese national by the Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Makati City on May 29, 2024. An investigation is underway to determine the kind of equipment seized from the suspect, identified as Yuhang Liu. (PNA file photo)

MANILA – The Philippine National Police (PNP) has 10 days to conduct a forensic examination on the gadgets and other devices seized from a Chinese national who was apprehended in Makati City last month.

This came after the Quezon City Regional Trial Court 90 issued a warrant to examine computer data (WECD) on the equipment seized from Yuhang Liu.

"We have turned over [these equipment] to the ACG (Anti-Cybercrime Group), specifically to the digital forensic unit of that office for examination," Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (CIDG) chief Maj. Gen. Leo Francisco said in a press briefing in Camp Crame, Quezon City.

“So the process is after the examination, the ACG will provide us the result. But if 10 days will not suffice, we will apply for additional time for this examination.”

The equipment include three mobile phones, one radio receiver/transmitter, one Huawei router, one Apple tablet, an Honor laptop, an aerial drone, an inverter unit, a computer central processing unit and other computer accessories.

Francisco said the suspect is currently detained at the CIDG - National Capital Region pending a court order on his transfer to the PNP Custodial Center in Camp Crame.

Liu was arrested on May 29 in Barangay San Isidro in response to a gun-toting complaint.

The complainant said Liu coerced him into delivering unidentified communication hacking devices to the suspect's residence.

This equipment would allegedly be placed in vital installations to hack or access mobile phones' international mobile equipment identity.

https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1227896

MARPOLEX 2024 concludes with high hopes for better maritime future

From the Philippine News Agency (Jun 28, 2024): MARPOLEX 2024 concludes with high hopes for better maritime future (By Nanette Guadalquiver)



SEND-OFF. Personnel of the Philippine Coast Guard wave the flags of the Philippines, Indonesia, and Japan during the send-off ceremony of the Regional Marine Pollution Exercise (MARPOLEX) 2024 at the Bredco port in Bacolod City on Friday (June 28, 2024). The three countries conducted exercises on firefighting, search and rescue, and oil spill response along the Guimaras Strait on Wednesday (June 26). (Photo courtesy of Philippine Coast Guard)

BACOLOD CITY – The Regional Marine Pollution Exercise (MARPOLEX) 2024, hosted by the Philippines, concluded after four days with high hopes of a better maritime future for Southeast Asia.

As the final activity, the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) rendered a send-off ceremony for Japan Coast Guard’s PLH 02 Tsugaru and Indonesia Directorate General of Sea Transportation's (DGST) KN Trisula P.111 at the Bredco port in this city Friday morning.

Vice Admiral Rolando Punzalan Jr., PCG deputy commandant for operations, said although the MARPOLEX 2024 has ended, the work continues since “the threats of marine pollution are real and ongoing.”

“It is up to us to continue our efforts to reduce, prevent, and mitigate the impacts of pollution on our oceans. The Regional MARPOLEX 2024 is more than just a formal agreement; it is a commitment to action,” he added.

On Wednesday, the three countries conducted exercises on firefighting, search and rescue, and oil spill response along the Guimaras Strait, with observers from the Coast Guards of the United States and the Republic of Korea as well as from the National Southern Oil Spill Response Center of Vietnam, International Tanker Owners Pollution Federation Limited of United Kingdom and Oil Spill Response Limited from Singapore.

According to the PCG, the MARPOLEX 2024 is a “new avenue for cooperation to maintain protection of the vital seas like the Sulu Sea and Celebes Sea, following the agreement with Indonesia, Philippines, and partner Japan.”

It aims to maintain a rules-based order to include maintenance of the ability to respond to oil spills and other maritime activities along the major sea lanes.

Punzalan said he hopes the bonds forged during the exercise continue to grow stronger as the participating countries work together towards a healthy ocean and flourishing environment that would result in “a brighter, cleaner, and safer maritime future for all.”

“Our ability to collaborate, communicate effectively, and mobilize resources has been truly inspiring and demonstrates our shared commitment to safeguarding our oceans for future generations,” he added.

During the closing ceremony held at Negros Residences Thursday night, Vice Admiral Roy Echeverria of PCG, Rear Admiral Jon Kenedi of Indonesia DGST, and Capt. Sase Koichi of the Japan Coast Guard, the exercise co-directors, signed the joint declaration of the termination of exercises.

In his message as the guest of honor, Negros Occidental Governor Eugenio Jose Lacson lauded what he calls the “remarkable demonstrations of skill, coordination, dedication, and collaboration among our nations.”

“To our distinguished guests from Japan and Indonesia, thank you for your unwavering commitment and for traveling great distances to be here. Your contributions have enriched this exercise, and we look forward to continued collaboration in the years ahead,” the governor said.

https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1227904

Dev’t funds pushed for 43 insurgency-cleared villages in Negros

From the Philippine News Agency (Jun 28, 2024): Dev’t funds pushed for 43 insurgency-cleared villages in Negros (By Nanette Guadalquiver)



BACOLOD CITY – The Negros Occidental Provincial Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict (PTF-ELCAC) is pushing for development funds for the additional insurgency-cleared villages in 18 local government units (LGUs) in the province next year.

As of Friday, 43 more barangays are considered free from the influence of the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA), whose five guerrilla fronts in Negros Island have already been dismantled since last year.

Under the Support to the Barangay Development Program (SBDP) of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), each village is proposed to receive PHP10 million for infrastructure projects for inclusion in the 2025 National Expenditure Program, which shall serve as the basis of the General Appropriations Act.


“The consolidated priority projects proposed by the 43 beneficiary barangays were submitted to the DILG Region 6, which they have endorsed to the National Secretariat of the National TF-ELCAC,” the DILG-Negros Occidental said in a report during the PTF-ELCAC first semester meeting on Thursday.

There are 66 total proposed projects, including 41 farm-to-market roads, 18 electrification projects, four health centers, and three school buildings.

The SBDP is a hallmark program of NTF-ELCAC with the end goal of bringing development to former conflict-prone communities.


In Negros Occidental, the latest insurgency-cleared barangays are Canmoros, Bagroy, Enclaro, and Paglaum in Binalbagan; Lalong in Calatrava; Caningay in Candoni; Lumbia in Cauayan; Alicante and Batea in E.B. Magalona; Cambaog, Gargato, and Nanunga in Hinigaran; and Bacuyangan, Talagacay, and Alim in Hinobaan.

Also included are Cansalongon, Guintubhan, Lima-Lima, and Rumirang in Isabela; La Granja in La Carlota City; Barangay 7 and Crossing Magallon in Moises Padilla; Alegria, Minoyan, and Santa Rosa in Murcia; and Bulanon, Divina Colonia, and Rafaela Barrera in Sagay City.

The rest are Pandanon and Pinowayan in Don Salvador Benedicto; Prosperidad and Rizal in San Carlos City; Bagtic, E. Lopez, and Guimbalaon in Silay City; Cayhagan in Sipalay City; Katilingban and San Fernando in Talisay City; and Bagumbayan, Bayabas, Pacol, Palaka, and Paloma in Valladolid.


https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1227929

Bodies of 3 female NPA rebels found in N. Ecija clash site

From the Philippine News Agency (Jun 28, 2024): Bodies of 3 female NPA rebels found in N. Ecija clash site (By Jason De Asis)



RECOVERED. The firearms and ammunition recovered on Thursday (June 27, 2024) after an encounter between government soldiers and New People's Army members in Barangay Malbang, Pantabangan town in Nueva Ecija the day before. The Philippine Army's 84th Infantry Battalion also found three bodies of female rebels in the encounter site. (Photo courtesy of Philippine Army)

BALER, Aurora – The Philippine Army’s 84th Infantry Battalion (84IB) found the bodies of three female New People's Army (NPA) rebels in the hinterlands of Barangay Malbang, Pantabangan town in Nueva Ecija province on Thursday, the 703rd Infantry Brigade (703IBgde) based in the municipality of Bongabon said Friday.

Brig. Gen. Joseph Norwin Pasamonte, 703IBgde commanding officer, said in an interview that the 84th Infantry Battalion (IB) found the three cadavers
along with four firearms, a day after an encounter in the area.

He said the
two slain rebels were identified as Andrie dela Cruz (alias “Lay/Rowen/Lunti), political instructor of Platun Silangan Gitnang Luzon, and Azase Galang (alias “Cha”).

The other female was yet to be identified.

Pasamonte added that the bodies were found a few meters away from the exit route of the encounter site.


It was believed that they were abandoned by their comrades from the Komiteng Rehiyon Gitnang Luzon of the NPA when they withdrew from the encounter site on Wednesday.

The latest development brought to 10 the total number of slain rebels.

All the slain rebels were brought to funeral homes in Pantabangan and will be turned over to their families.

Pasamonte reiterated his call to the remaining members of the NPA to surrender and give peace a chance.

He also commended the 84IB troops for their victory against the communist terrorist group and for their commitments to preserve the peace and security.

“We would like to express our sympathy to the bereaved families of those who died and I am saddened that they reached this point. Hindi nagkukulang ang gobyerno sa panawagan na sumuko na at magbagong buhay. Handa ang gobyernong tanggapin ang may gustong yakapin ang kapayapaan para makapiling ang kanilang pamilya. Nawa’y magsilbi itong aral sa mga natitirang CTG na ipinaglalaban ang kanilang huwad na ideolohiya (The government is not remiss in calling on them to surrender and lead a new life. The government is ready to accept those who want to embrace peace in order to be with their family. May this serve as a lesson to the remaining CTG members who are fighting for their false ideology),” Pasamonte said.

https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1227886

Thursday, June 27, 2024

China is testing the limits of a critical U.S.-Philippines defense pact — will Washington respond?

 Posted to CNBC (Jun 27, 2024): China is testing the limits of a critical U.S.-Philippines defense pact — will Washington respond? (By Dylan Butts)

KEY POINTS
  • China has ramped up actions towards the Philippines in a disputed shoal in the South China Sea, using “gray zone tactics” to skirt a U.S.-Philippines defense pact.
  • Other nations will watch the U.S. response as an indicator of American deterrence strength in the South China Sea, experts say.


An aerial view shows a Philippines Navy vessel that has been grounded since 1999 to assert the nation’s sovereignty over the Second Thomas Shoal, a remote South China Sea reef also claimed by China.
Jay Directo | Afp | Getty Images

China has stepped up its aggression against the Philippines in the contested waters of the South China Sea, calling into question the strength of American deterrence, according to policy analysts.

Last week, the Chinese coast guard seized two Filipino ships on a resupply mission to an outpost on the Second Thomas Shoal in the Spratly Islands, severely injuring a navy personnel, according to Philippine officials. The shoal is claimed by both Manila and Beijing.


The area has seen several clashes over the past months. Experts say the latest incident represents an escalation and shows the limitations of the U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty signed in 1951.

“The failure of the MDT to deter the [latest confrontation] shows the vagueness in the conveyed commitments of the two parties,” said Chester Cabalza, president and founder of the Philippines-based think tank International Development and Security Cooperation.



Analyst discusses festering China-Philippine tensions in the South China Sea

Last year, the Philippines and U.S. released new “Bilateral Defense Guidelines ,” reaffirming that an “armed attack” in the South China Sea on Filipino vessels would invoke mutual defense obligations of the U.S.

China, on its part, has been careful not to trigger the MDT by avoiding the use of guns, instead employing ” gray zone” tactics — coercive actions that fall short of an armed conflict — at the Second Thomas Shoal. These reportedly have included the use of water cannons and ramming into Philippine boats.

U.S. ‘gray zone’ conundrum

Beijing’s actions aim to stop resupply missions to a rusted Philippine vessel grounded on the shoal since 1999, as its existence there appears to lend credence to the Philippines’ claim on the reef.

According to Cabalza, unless Manila and Washington do more to increase deterrence, Beijing will continue to employ “gray zone” tactics in its attempt to win the shoal and other areas contested by the Philippines.

“The usage of these tactics should be classified as an armed attack [in the MDT] if the U.S. is serious about helping the Philippines in its strategic and asymmetrical warfare with China,” he said.



GP: Philippine Coast Guard personnel ride a rubber boat past a Chinese Coast Guard vessel during a resupply mission to troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal, on March 05, 2024 in the South China Sea.  Ezra Acayan | Getty Images News | Getty Images


n expanded definition of an “armed attack” in the treaty could include “any willful act to inflict injury or that leads to fatality on Filipinos,” said Richard Heydarian, policy adviser and senior lecturer of international affairs at the University of the Philippines.

Those guidelines are consistent with the interpretation of the MDT in a report by the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command that was unclassified last year.

However, according to Heydarian, a muted Philippine reaction to last week’s clash could be a sign of its apprehensions with regard to invoking the mutual defense treaty.



China-Philippine tensions: China may go beyond gray zone tactics, analyst says

“The Philippine Government is confronted with a huge dilemma. It wants greater reassurance from the United States, but it’s likely not getting that, and it also wants to avoid unwanted escalation,” said Heydarian.

“It’s extremely important for the Philippines and U.S. to signal that Filipino troops are empowered and sanctioned to use live firearms to defend themselves, and that usage of live firearms by China would immediately trigger the MDT,” he added.

However, according to Abdul Rahman Yaacob, a research fellow at the Lowy Institute’s Southeast Asia Program, the U.S. is unlikely to widen the scope of the defense pact, as doing so could draw them into a wider military conflict.

Self-reliance

Amid a “sober assessment on the risk of U.S. non-involvement,” the Philippines will also look to step up its own deterrence and strategy in asserting its territorial claims, according to Matteo Piasentini, China and Indo-Pacific analyst at Geopolitica, an Italian think tank.

Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. said on Thursday that while the latest incident at the shoal was not an “armed attack,” the country needs to “do more” than protest China’s actions.



A Chinese Coast Guard ship fires a water cannon at Unaizah May 4, a Philippine Navy chartered vessel, conducting a routine resupply mission to troops stationed at Second Thomas Shoal, on March 05, 2024 in the South China Sea.  Ezra Acayan | Getty Images News | Getty Images

“The Philippines will continue to resupply the Sierra Madre, and hopefully invest in more outposts in their Exclusive Economic Zone in the South China Sea ... There is no illusion that China will give up; what Manila is trying to do is not to give up on its own,” Paisentini said.

The Philippines defense chief has reiterated that the military would not announce its resupply missions to the shoal in advance. According to the Lowy Institute’s Yaacob, this could help it outmaneuver Beijing while avoiding direct confrontations.

The country has also been working to bolster its own defense capabilities in the South China Sea with the support of the U.S.

What’s at stake?

The Second Thomas Shoal is emblematic of how great powers are becoming involved in the security architecture in Asia, with states such as the Philippines increasingly turning to the U.S. and other powers to increase deterrence and security, according to Geopolitica’s Paisentini.

“Non intervention [ if China gets more aggressive] would cause a massive blow not only in U.S.-Philippines relations, but also in the relationship between the U.S. and other key regional allies,” he added.
 


The ‘Taiwan question’ is as worrying as ever, academic says

From China’s viewpoint, the shoal represents its ability to enforce territorial claims under its “9-dash line” and to delegitimize rulings from organizations such as the UNCLOS, which determined the Second Thomas Shoal to fall under Philippine sovereignty in 2016, experts told CNBC.

It also wants to prevent the U.S. from using the Philippines as a critical part of the “first island chain”- a chain of islands encompassing portions of Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines and Indonesia- seen as strategically important to contain the reach of the PLA, said researcher Muhammad Faizal.

The research fellow at Singpore-based S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies added that “every ally and partner is probably watching how committed the U.S. really is to its military alliances and planning ahead if the commitment falters.”

https://www.cnbc.com/2024/06/28/china-is-testing-the-limits-of-us-philippines-defense-pact-.html