From the Eurasia Review (Dec 4):
Peace Process In Mindanao, The Philippines:
Evolution And Lessons Learned – Analysis (By Kristian Herbolzheimer)
Map of the Philippines
with Sultan Kudarat, Mindanao, highlighted.
Source: Wikipedia Commons.
The Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (2014) marks the first
significant peace agreement worldwide in ten years and has become an inevitable
reference for any other contemporary peace process.
On March 27th 2014 the government of the
Philippines
and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) signed an agreement to end an
armed conflict that had started in 1969, caused more than 120,000 deaths and
forcibly displaced hundreds of thousands of people. The Comprehensive Agreement
on the Bangsamoro is the main peace agreement to be signed worldwide since the
agreement that stopped the armed conflict in
Nepal
in 2006.
Every peace agreement addresses a particular context and conflict. However,
the
Mindanao
process is now a crucial reference for other peace processes, given that it is
the most recent.
Of the 59 armed conflicts that have ended in the last 30 years, 44 concluded
with peace agreements (Fisas, 2015: 16). The social, academic, and
institutional capacities to analyse these processes and strengthen
peacebuilding policies have thrived in parallel (Human Security Report Project,
2012). However, no peace process has been implemented without some
difficulties. For this reason all peace processes learn from previous
experiences, while innovating in their own practices and contributing overall
to international experience of peacebuilding. The Mindanao peace process
learned lessons from the experiences of South Sudan, Aceh (
Indonesia) and
Northern Ireland,
among others. Currently, other countries affected by internal conflicts such as
Myanmar,
Thailand
and
Turkey are analysing the
Mindanao peace agreement with considerable
interest.
This report analyses the keys that allowed the parties to reach an agreement
and the challenges facing the
Philippines
in terms of implementation. The report targets an international audience and
aims to provide reflections that might be useful for other peace processes.
After introducing the context and development of the
Mindanao peace process, the report analyses
the actions and initiatives that allowed negotiations to make progress for 17
years and the innovations brought about by this process in areas such as public
participation. Particular attention is devoted to the security-related
agreements (including arms decommissioning by the insurgency) and to the
mechanisms accompanying and verifying the agreement’s implementation.
Context
The
Philippines
is an archipelago comprising around 7,000 islands. Remarkable among them are
the largest one, Luzon (where the capital,
Manila, is situated) and the second largest,
Mindanao. Together with Timor-Leste, this is
the only Asian country with a majority Christian popula- tion. Around 100
million people live in a territory covering 300,000 km2. The system of
government is presidential and executive power is limited to a single term of
six years.
The country owes its name to King Philip II of
Spain,
in whose service Magellan was sailing around the world when he arrived at the
archipelago in 1521. After being a Spanish colony for three centuries, in 1898
the
Philippines came under
U.S.
administration. A detail with far-reaching consequences is that
Spain never took real
control of the
island of Mindanao.
Islam had arrived three centuries before Magellan, and the Spanish found a
well- consolidated system of governance, mainly through the sultanates of
Maguindanao and Sulu.
In 1946 the
Philippines was the first
Asian country to gain independence without an armed struggle (one year before
India).
It was also a pioneer in putting an end to a despotic regime by peaceful means
when a non-violent people’s revolution overthrew the dictatorship of Ferdinand
Marcos in 1986. In 2001 a second people’s power revolution brought the
government of Joseph Estrada – who was accused of corruption – to an end. Even
so, the developments that have occurred over nearly 30 years of democracy have
been slow. Politics continues to be the feud of a few families who perpetuate themselves in power from generation to
generation. Relatives of deposed presidents remain active in politics and enjoy
significant support.
Some indicators show advances in poverty reduction, literacy and employment,
but neighbouring countries such as
Malaysia,
Indonesia and
Thailand
are far ahead in this regard (UNDP, 2015). The persistence of social
inequalities feeds the discourse of the New People’s Army, a Maoist- inspired
insurgency that has been active since 1968.
Apart from the armed conflict in Mindanao and the communist insurgency, in
recent years the
Philippines
has also suffered the onslaught of cells of Islamist terrorists linked to
transnational networks.
Roots and humanitarian consequences of the conflict
The Muslim population of
Mindanao has experienced harassment and
discrimination since the times of the Spanish colony (1565-1898). The
U.S.
colonial administration (1898-1945) initiated a process of land entitlement
that privileged Christian settlers coming from other islands of the
archipelago. This policy of land dispossession continued after independence,
coupled with government policies aimed at the assimilation of the Muslim
minority. Currently, the Muslim population is in the majority only in the
western part of Mindanao and in the adjacent islands that proliferate up to the
borders of
Malaysia and
Indonesia.
Ten per cent of the population in this area are non-Islamised indigenous
peoples.
In 1968 an alleged massacre of Muslim army recruits in
Manila
led to the creation of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which started
an armed struggle for independence. In 1996 the government and the MNLF signed
a peace agreement that granted autonomy to provinces with a Muslim majority.
The group demobilised as a result, but a breakaway subgroup, the Islamic Front,
rejected the terms of the agreement. However, this insurgency’s preference for
a negotiated solution led to the signing of a bilateral ceasefire in 1997 and
the start of formal peace negotiations in 1999.
The armed conflict in
Mindanao has caused around 120,000 deaths,
especially in the 1970s. In the 21st century it has been a low-intensity
conflict, but continuous instability has generated a phenomenon of multiple
displacements: thousands of people flee when there are skirmishes – which
sometimes involve other armed actors – and return to their homes once the
situation is stabilised. In 2008 the last political crisis in the peace process
triggered the displacement of around 500,000 people in a few weeks in what
became the most severe humanitarian crisis in the world at the time.
Structure and development of the negotiations
The negotiations lasted for 17 years (1997-2014) and were initially
conducted in the
Philippines
and without mediation. Since 1999 the negotiating teams comprised five
plenipotentiary members, with the support of a technical team of around ten
people (a variable number). The intensity and duration of the negotiations
oscillated over the years. In the last period (2009-14) the parties met in 26
negotiation rounds each lasting between three and five days.
The negotiations were halted on three occasions, triggering new armed
confrontations in 2000, 2003 and 2008. After each one the parties agreed on new
mechanisms designed to strengthen the negotiations infrastructure. In 2001 the
Malaysian government accepted the request of the government of the
Philippines
to host and facilitate the negotiations. In 2004 the parties agreed to create
an International Monitoring Team (IMT) to verify the ceasefire, comprising 50
unarmed members of the armed forces of
Malaysia,
Libya and
Brunei
cantoned in five cities in the conflict area. In 2009 this team was expanded
and strengthened: two officers of the Norwegian army reinforced the security
component, while the European Union (EU) provided two experts in human rights,
international humanitarian law and humanitarian response. In parallel, the IMT
incorporated a Civilian Protection Component comprising one international and
three local non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
In 2009 the negotiating parties agreed to create an International Contact
Group (ICG) to act as observers at the negotiations and advise the parties and
the facilitator.1
The ICG is formed by four countries (
Britain,
Japan,
Turkey and
Saudi Arabia),
together with four international NGOs (Conciliation Resources, the Community of
Sant Egidio, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue and Muhammadiyah).
Peace agreements
The negotiations started in 1997 with an agreement on a general cessation of
hostilities. In the Tripoli Agreement (2001) the parties defined a negotiation
agenda with three main elements: security (which had already been agreed on in
2001); humanitarian response, rehabilitation and development (agreed in 2002);
and ancestral territories (2008).
In October 2012 the parties finally adopted the Framework Agreement
establishing a roadmap for the transition. In the following 15 months the
parties concluded the annexes on transitional modalities (February 2013),
revenue generation and wealth sharing (July 2013), power sharing (December 2013),
and normalisation (January 2014). Finally, in March 2014 the Comprehensive
Agreement was signed in the Presidential Palace.
The central axis of the agreement is the establishment of a new
self-governing entity called Bangsamoro, which will replace the existing
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao after a transition led by the MILF. The
agreement envisages a process of reform in the new autonomous region that will
replace the presidential system that governs the rest of the country with a
parliamentary one. The objective is to promote the emergence of programmatic
political parties.
The government understands that the insurgency must be part of the solution
and must assume the corresponding responsibilities. To this end it has
encouraged the transformation of the insurgency into a political movement able
to take part in local and regional elections.
In terms of endorsement, the peace agreement must be transformed into a law
that will regulate the Statute of Autonomy, called the Bangsamoro Basic Law.
After parliamentary approval, a plebiscite will be held in the
conflict-affected areas. This plebiscite will also serve to determine the
territorial extent of the autonomous region, since the municipalities bordering
the current autonomous community will have the option to join the new entity.
Constitutional reform is a contentious issue. The MILF insists on the need
for reform in order to consolidate the agreements. However, the government has
been reluctant to initiate a process that could be tedious and could open a
“Pandora’s box”. But doubts about some of the agree- ments’ compliance with the
constitution suggest that such a reform process might eventually be discussed.
Beyond the agreement with the MILF, the peace process in
Mindanao
could contribute to opening a national debate about the territorial
organisation of the country, since important sectors in other regions are
demanding broad constitutional reform along federal lines.
Roadmap of the transition
A controversial issue during the negotiations was the expected time line for
implementation. The MILF suggested a six-year period, while the government
refused to make commitments beyond its presidential term (2010-16), since the
Philippine political system lacks guarantees in terms of the continuity of public
policies from one administration to the next. Finally, the MILF accepted this
argument and the 2012 Framework Agreement defined a roadmap for implementation
with a time horizon of the presidential elections of May 2016.
The key implementation institutions are as follows:
The Transition Commission comprises 15 people (seven appointed by each side,
under an MILF chairperson). Its main mission was the drafting of the Bangsamoro
Basic Law, which was submitted to Congress for approval in September 2014.
The Transitional Authority will be headed by the MILF and will comprise
representatives of various social, political and economic actors from the
autonomous region. It will be formally set up after the Basic Law is enacted by
Congress. Its mission will be to pilot the transformation of the existing
autonomous institutions until the holding of elections for a new autonomous
government (initially expected in May 2016, although they might need to be
postponed).
The Third Party Monitoring Team (TPMT) is in charge of monitoring the
implementation of the agreements. It comprises five members (two
representatives of national NGOs, two of international NGOs, and a former EU
ambassador to the
Philippines
who acts as coordinator). The TPMT issues periodic reports for both parties,
and public reports twice a year. But its most relevant role – and probably the
most controversial – will be to certify the end of the implementation process,
which, in turn, conditions the MILF decommissioning process.
Despite the fact that both parties are represented in all the relevant
organs, the negotiating teams remain an organ of last resort to resolve
potential problems or disagreements.
Malaysia – the facilitator country
– and the ICG continue to provide support at the request of the parties.
The challenge of normalisation
Apart from enacting the Bangsamoro Basic law and adapting the various
regional institutions to the new Statute of Autonomy, the main objective of the
transitional period is the consolidation of normalisation, which is understood
as “a process whereby communities can achieve their desired quality of life,
which includes the pursuit of sustainable livelihood and political
participation within a peaceful deliberative society”.2 The concept of
normalisation includes what is termed disarmament, demobilisation and
reintegration in other contexts, as well as additional elements aimed at the
consolidation of peace and human security.
The process of normalisation has four essential elements:
The first is socioeconomic development programmes for conflict-affected
areas. The MILF-led Bangsamoro Development Agency will be in charge of
coordination, together with the Sajahatra presidential programme of immediate
relief to improve health conditions, education and development.
Confidence-building measures include two key processes. Firstly, development
programmes will be aimed specifically at MILF members and their relatives in
their six main camps. Secondly, the government will commit to using amnesties,
pardons, and other available mechanisms to resolve the cases of people accused
or convicted of actions and crimes related to the Mindanao armed conflict.3 It
is worth noting that neither the MILF nor the government security forces face
pending accusations of gross human rights violations or crimes against humanity.
In matters of transitional justice and reconciliation, a three-person team
is mandated to elaborate a methodological proposal about how to address the
legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro (Muslim) people, correct historical injustices,
and address human rights violations, including marginalisation due to land
dispossession. The team can also propose programmes and measures to promote
reconciliation between conflict-affected communities and heal the physical,
mental and spiritual wounds caused by the conflict. This mandate includes the
proposal of measures to guarantee non-repetition.
The sensitive issue of security has four elements. The first is reform of
the police, since responsibility for public order will be given to a new police
force for the Bangsamoro that will be civilian in character and accountable to
the communities it serves. The negotiating parties commissioned the Independent
Commission on Policing to draft a report with recommendations in this regard.
This report was delivered in April 2015.
Secondly, the parties agreed to carry out a joint programme to identify and
dismantle “private” armed groups (paramilitaries), which are often controlled
by mayors and governors. The operational criteria for this task are still
awaiting development.
The third element is arms decommissioning by the MILF. This process is
defined as the activities aimed at facilitating the transition of the insurgent
forces to a productive civilian life. An Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB)
is in charge of registering the MILF’s members and weapons, and planning the
phases of collecting, transporting and storing weapons.4 There is as yet no
agreement among the parties on the final destination of the weapons
decommissioned by the insurgency, and they will be temporarily stockpiled in
containers and subject to joint supervision by the insurgency and security
forces under international coordination.
The MILF has committed to total decommissioning to be undertaken in phases
conditioned on the implementation of the agreements, as described in the
following table:
The
Agreement on Normalisation established a time frame of two years to complete
the process.
The fourth and last security-related element affects the armed forces, who
have committed to carrying out a repositioning to help facilitate peace and
coexistence. This repositioning will be based on a joint evaluation of the
security conditions.
Other normalisation-related elements
A Joint Normalisation Committee will coordinate the overall normalisation
process. In terms of financing, the government will assume the responsibility
to supply the funds necessary to sustain the process, while the MILF has the
right to procure and manage additional funds.
A Joint Peace and Security Committee has overall responsibility for the
supervision of all security-related matters of normalization until the full
deployment of the new Bangsamoro Police. On the operative side, Joint Peace and
Security Teams (comprising members of the armed forces, police and the MILF)
will handle law and order in the areas agreed by the parties. In parallel, the
existing mechanisms for ceasefire verification will remain operative (the
Coordination Committee for the Cessation of Hostilities, the Ad Hoc Joint
Action Group (AHJAG) to combat crime in MILF areas and the IMT).
The Agreement on Normalisation does not refer to the MILF cantonments
because this point was discussed in the framework of the 1997 bilateral
ceasefire agreement. After intense debates the parties identified major and
satellite camps where the combatants and their relatives had
a stable presence and formed rural communities. There was no registry of
members of these communities or their weapons, and free individual movement is
allowed.
The agreement also established that any movement of troops – by the
insurgency or security forces – should be coordinated with the other party.
A special agreement (the AHJAG) allows the police to maintain public order
in MILF-controlled areas in prior coordination with the MILF. The state
performs its administrative duties under normal conditions in the whole
territory.
A difference from the Final Agreement reached with the MNLF in 1996 is that
this agreement does not provide for the integration of MILF combatants into the
security forces, except for the new autonomous police.
In terms of de-mining, in 2002 the MILF adhered to the Geneva Call against
the use of anti-personnel mines. In 2010 the government and MILF agreed to
allow the Philippines Campaign against Land Mines to conduct civic education
and the identification and destruction of unexploded ordnance.
Enabling factors for the peace process
First and foremost, both parties have long acknowledged the limits of armed
confrontation. In 2000 the government broke off the ceasefire to launch
“all-out-war”, which led to the MILF’s military defeat in just four months.
However, both the government and the security forces realised that the root
causes of the problem were not resolved and that the Muslim population retained
an unbroken determination to fight for its identity and dignity. From the
perspective of the insurgency, since its creation the MILF recognised that
armed victory was not possible, and instead focused on the primacy of peace negotiations.
More recently, the reformist government of Benigno Aquino promoted a change
in the country’s military doctrine (AFP, 2010) in the framework of its
commitment to resolve internal armed conflicts and deal with the growing
geopolitical challenges resulting from
China’s emergence as
a regional power. The new objective is no longer to “win the war”, but to
“win the peace”, and the new doctrine emphasises the establishment of relations
of trust with the communities affected by the conflict. The overall goal is the
liberation of human and financial resources previously devoted to the internal
confrontation in order to be able to better deal with external threats.
Interestingly, the parties have also understood the limits of peace
negotiations. Both the government and the insurgency admit that the reforms
needed to acknowledge and respect the way of life and history of the Muslim and
indigenous peoples demand a wide national consensus. The problems that hampered
the implementation of past peace agreements highlight the need for a collective
ownership of the peace process and its results by society. For this reason both
parties have engaged in intensive consultations with the social, academic,
political and institutional sectors with the double objective of strengthening
the process with the inputs of those who support it, and listening and
responding to the concerns of those who are more sceptical and potentially
opposed to the negotiations. On several occasions the MILF has gathered
hundreds of thousands of followers in huge conventions to ratify the decisions
of its Central Committee.
Apart from these consultation processes, the government and the insurgency
have included civil society members in their teams and on several occasions
have invited civil society delegates and members of Congress to witness the
negotiations. The parties also agreed on the participation of civil society in
several of the bodies involved in the implementation of the agreements, notably
the TPMT.
These institutional efforts towards inclusion are largely a response to the
pressures of an organised civil society that has relentlessly promoted
peacebuilding initiatives parallel to the negotiations. These initiatives
include the creation of peace zones, inter-religious dialogues, capacity-building
in the theory and practice of conflict resolution, the consolidation of citizen
agendas, lobbying the armed actors, and the creation of ceasefire monitoring
mechanisms such as the Bantay Ceasefire or the Civil Protection Component of
the IMT.
Some additional elements help explain the progress of the negotiations:
The parties’ pragmatism and realism: The insurgency abandoned the
objective of total independence in the context of negotiations, while the
country’s various governments have all recognised the existence of the root
causes of the conflict and committed to a solution based on dialogue.
Confidence-building measures: The lengthy bilateral ceasefire
contributed to building trust between the insurgency and military and police
commanders, including at the personal level. This trust is currently the main
guarantor that there will be no relapse into armed confrontation. Furthermore,
both parties recognise international humanitarian law and international human
rights treaties (on the recruitment of child soldiers, the prohibition of the
use of anti-personnel mines, etc.). These factors have been fundamental in
reducing the levels of confrontation and generating trust between the parties
and civil society.
Strengthening of capacities: Both the government and the MILF are
well aware of the problems that emerged during the implementation of the 1996
agreement with the MNLF. The parties therefore decided early on to strengthen
the capacity of the MILF to manage civil institutions: in 2002 they created the
Bangsamoro Development Agency and in 2009 the Bangsamoro Leadership and
Management Institute, both led by the MILF.
Additional highlights
The main peacebuilding developments in the
Philippines emerged during the
presidency of Fidel Ramos (1992-98). Ramos was a retired general who had been
chief of staff of the armed forces during the Marcos dictatorship as well as
during the first democratic government, i.e. of President Corazón Aquino. In
1992 Ramos promoted an ambitious process of national dialogue (Coronel-Ferrer,
2002) for the drawing up of a national peace policy. The result of this
consultation was a conceptual framework that identified the structural problems
affecting the country and defined “six paths to peace”. The conceptual
framework emphasises negotiations between the government and the insurgency as
one of the paths to peace, but states that a peace process must necessarily be
wider and more inclusive than mere peace negotiations. This innovative national
peace policy has coexisted for years in contrast to (and in conflict with) a
classic national security doctrine focused on defeating the internal enemy.
In 2003 a crisis in negotiations and the return of violent incidents
mobilised civil society to promote an initiative of its own to verify the
ceasefire, known as the Bantay Ceasefire. The network was composed of around
200 voluntary members and, despite the financial constraints it faced, became
an essential complement to the formal verification commissions, receiving the
appreciation of both parties.
An additional element is the outstanding role played by women in the peace
process. The
Philippines
is possibly the country with the best implementation of UN Security Council
Resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security. Teresita Deles holds the
position of presidential adviser for peace, while Miriam Coronel was the first
woman to lead a negotiating team that eventually signed a peace agreement.
Women have also led the legal advi- sory teams of both the government and the
MILF. Similar to other contexts, women in the
Philippines have a wide presence
and leadership role in civil society, with Muslim and indigenous women playing
a fundamental role (Herbolzheimer, 2013; Conciliation Resources, 2015).
Implementation challenges
In spite of the positive developments, the implementation of the peace
agreement is facing multiple obstacles.
The first limiting factor is time. During the negotiation of the Framework
Agreement (2012) the government man- aged to link the transitional period to
the end of the presidential term in May 2016. But the negotiating teams have
not been able to keep up the agreed pace of negotia- tion and implementation.
As a result, the parties will have to agree to an extension of the
implementation period.
Responsibility for the delay is shared. On the one hand, the insurgency
lacks enough qualified and reliable/trustworthy personnel to take on all the
responsibilities derived from the transition. On the other hand, the government
negotiating team has to deal with limited buy-in on both the agreement and its
implementation by other sectors of the bureaucracy.
At the same time Congress has been dragging its feet in enacting the peace
agreements into law, while the judiciary must still assess whether the
agreements comply with the constitution. There is a high risk that these two
state institutions will raise issues that may further block the implementation
of the agreements that have been signed.
Furthermore, in the
Philippines,
prejudice against Muslims – a heritage from the colonial period – still runs
deep.
With less than a year remaining until the country’s presidential and
legislative elections (May 2016), some prominent politicians and media outlets
are turning to populist rhetoric to antagonise public opinion against the peace
process.
Even among better-intentioned political actors, a lack of knowledge about
the social, political, and cultural reality of the insurgency in particular and
the Muslim population in general results in faulty diagnoses and mistaken
responses. Successive governments have associated the Moro problem with poverty
and economic marginalisation, thus neglecting the relevance of identity and
parity of esteem. On its part, the insurgency has been unable to articulate a
political discourse that the whole country can understand and endorse. Only
after patient dialogue have the peace negotiators deconstructed some of these
erroneous imaginaries, but both the Christian and Muslim sectors of society
still distrust each other.
The main security-related problem is the proliferation of arms and armed
groups. One reason is that holding weapons is legal in the
Philippines.
Related to this, successive governments have failed in their attempts to
disband paramilitary groups run by local politicians. There is also a
proliferation of additional armed groups, which can be classified into three
categories: an MILF breakaway group that is sceptical about the government’s
political commitment (the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters); extremist cells
linked to international extremist violence (Abu Sayyaf, Jemaa Islamiyah); and
ordinary criminal organisations.
Other difficulties are inherent to any process of transition from war to
peace. Apart from political will, the government needs to prove its capacity to
transform words into deeds, which has historically proved to be a challenge. In
parallel, the insurgency needs a radical paradigm shift from a semi-clandestine
military structure to a social and political movement – a terrain in which it
has limited experience and where to some extent it is at a disadvantage
compared to more established political actors.
Lessons learned for other peace processes
Each peace process responds to a specific conflict that emerges for concrete
reasons and in concrete circum- stances (social, political, cultural and
temporal). However, comparative analysis is fundamental in every peace process.
Some of the lessons from the
Philippines
could be relevant to other contexts:
Peace is not a product, but a process. The transformative capacity of a
peace agreement and its sustainability over time depend on its legitimacy,
which in turn is dependent on the extent that social, political and economic
actors feel a sense of ownership of the deliberative process leading to the
peace agreements and their implementation.
Negotiations are just one among multiple paths to peace. In parallel to the
negotiations between the government and the insurgency, other dialogue
processes must build or restore relations between sectors of society that have
been or remained divided during the armed conflict. This is essential to
achieving the social, political, economic and cultural transformations needed
to overcome a protracted armed conflict.
The current context demands efforts to facilitate the participation of
historically excluded sectors such as women, victims and ethnic communities.
Including these sectors greatly contributes to raising the international
legitimacy of a peace process.
The crises that emerge during negotiations are also opportunities to improve
the mechanisms that support the talks.
A government involved in a peace process must include the legislature and
take into account the perceptions of the judiciary before the signing of an
agreement. Constitutional amendments are the best guarantee to consolidate a
country’s structural transformation.
Giving an insurgency the opportunity to transform itself into a political
movement free of coercion and threats is the best guarantee of the
non-recurrence of armed conflict. Such an evolution can be enhanced by
preventing the potential social and political isolation of the insurgency, as
well as agreeing on transitional measures for the political participation of
the insurgency before it can compete on equal terms with more established
political movements.
The decommissioning of arms by the insurgency, and the repositioning and
reform of the government security sector are gradual and interdependent
processes that contribute to confidence-building. The insurgency is aware that
the hard-earned legitimacy it has gained as a peace actor can be lost with just
one mistake in the management of its weapons, or if it does not allow the state
to be fully present and perform its social, administrative and public order
duties in the whole territory.
The implementation of a peace agreement can be as difficult as the
negotiations. In the
Philippines,
this has been managed through the creation of hybrid agreement implementation
bodies that allow the joint and complementary work of national and
international, civil and military, institutional and civil society actors.
The implementation of a peace agreement implies an asymmetric power
relationship that is favourable to the state. If an insurgent movement does not
comply with the agreement, it loses legitimacy. If the state does not comply,
the insurgency has limited means to apply pressure because a return to armed
conflict is not an option.
The international community plays a decisive role in accompanying and
supporting the peace process. But its role is always secondary and does not
replace national leadership. The agenda for negotiations, the time line, the
design of consultations, the terms of reference for international support, and
other fundamental elements of a peace process are exclusively in the hands of
national actors.
About the author:
[Kristian Herbolzheimer has more than 15 years of
experience in peacebuilding affairs, first as the director of the Colombia
Programme at the School for a Culture of Peace in Barcelona, and since 2009 as
director of the Colombia and Philippines programmes at Conciliation Resources.
As a member of the Mindanao International Contact Group he has acted as adviser
to the peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines and
the MILF insurgency for six years. He has a master’s in international peace
studies and is a qualified agricultural engineer.]
Source:
This article was published by NOREF as
December 2015 Report (PDF)
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http://hsrgroup.org/docs/Publications/ HSR2012/HSRP2012_Chapter%206.pdf>
ndependent Commission on Policing. 2015. Policing for the Bangsamoro. April
14th. Unpublished report commissioned by the peace panels of the government of
the
Philippines
and the MILF.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2015.
2015 Human Development Report: Rethinking Work for Human Development.<
http://hdr.undp.org/en/rethinking- work-for-human-development>
Notes:
1 For more information about this innovative ICG, see <http://www.c-r.org/resources/practice-paper-innovation-mediation-international-contact-group-mindanao>
2 See the Annex on Normalisation (2014), which is included in this report’s
list of references.
3 There is no official data about the numbers of detainees, but they are not
large.
4 In the
Philippines
it is legal to bear arms, and disarmament affects mainly illegal arms. Legal
weapons will need to be registered.
[The Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre/Norsk Ressurssenter
for Fredsbygging (NOREF) is an independent foundation established to integrate
knowledge, experience, and critical reflection into and thereby strengthen
peacebuilding policy and practice. NOREF supports the development of competence
and resources for peacebuilding efforts in the fields of conflict prevention,
conflict resolution and post-conflict rehabilitation, as well as mediation and
humanitarian actors in conflict-affected areas. In order to provide resources
on peacebuilding, mediation and humanitarian issues to the Norwegian and the
international peacebuilding community, the centre collaborates with a wide
network of researchers, policymakers and practitioners.]
http://www.eurasiareview.com/04122015-peace-process-in-mindanao-the-philippines-evolution-and-lessons-learned-analysis/
