From InterAksyon (Nov 2): Careful study needed to find new arms suppliers - AFP
The Armed Forces of the Philippines said acquiring military weapons and equipment from other suppliers aside from the US needs careful study and research.
Before looking for a new supplier, AFP public affairs office chief Colonel Edgard Arevalo said the weapons and equipment for purchase must meet the military’s requirements.
"I think the Commander-in-Chief has already mentioned that there are other suppliers who are willing to provide for our needs but this needs a detailed study or research to determine whether they are readily adoptable to local conditions, availability of supply, reliable, efficient and dependable," Arevalo said.
Earlier, when asked if the scrapping of the US sale of 26,000 assault rifles to the Philippine National Police would affect the military, Arevalo said American supplies of weapons and other defense equipment will continue pending the abrogation of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.
The sale was stopped over concerns about human rights violations in the Duterte administration's war on drugs.
"The alleged US decision to halt sales of 26,000 assault rifles to the PNP will not have an effect on the AFP as our weapons and equipment are sourced through Foreign Military Sales, which is guaranteed under the MDT," Arevalo said.
Acquisitions through the FMS do not need approval from the US Congress, unlike contracts with American suppliers or manufacturers.
http://interaksyon.com/article/133936/careful-study-needed-to-find-new-arms-suppliers---afp
Wednesday, November 2, 2016
Opinion: Peace talks with CPP: From impasse to breakthrough to breakthrough
Opinion piece in the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Nov 2): Peace talks with CPP: From impasse to breakthrough to breakthrough (By Rene. V. Sarmiento)
Breakthrough. This best describes the current peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)/New People’s Army (NPA)/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), hosted and facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government at Oslo, Norway.
“Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace among men with whom he is pleased.”
– Luke 2:14
Breakthrough. This best describes the current peace talks between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP)/New People’s Army (NPA)/National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP), hosted and facilitated by the Royal Norwegian Government at Oslo, Norway.
A Big Breakthrough
Not a small but a big breakthrough because after an impasse of five (5) long years during the administration of former Pres. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, the two Negotiating Panels formally resumed their peace talks at Oslo, Norway on August 10, 2016, culminating in the issuance and signing of a Joint Oslo Statement on August 26, 2016.
The Joint Oslo Statement of August 26, 2016 cited the opening ceremonies on August 22, 2016 where the two Negotiating Panels expressed their commitment “to resume the formal talks in the peace negotiations in order to resolve the armed conflict by addressing its root causes.” For its part, the Royal Norwegian Government through Foreign Minister Borge Brende reiterated its firm resolve to support the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations.
Norway, a country of stunning natural beauty, blessed with deep fjords and glacier-covered valleys, high mountains, northern lights and the midnight sun, is a peace-living country and believes in negotiation as a means of settling conflicts. Every December 10 of each year, the Nobel Peace Prize is awarded in Oslo.
True to their commitment to resume the peace negotiations, the two Negotiating Panels, after serious but friendly four-day talks at Oslo, Norway agreed (a) to reaffirm previous agreements; (b) to reconstitute the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) list; (c) to accelerate the peace negotiations and set the timeline for the completion of the resuming substantive agenda for the talks, namely, socio-economic reforms, political and constitutional reforms; and end of hostilities and disposition of forces; (d) to cause the early release of prisoners (as listed by the NDFP) who are sick, elderly, overly long detained and women based on humanitarian grounds; (e) for the GRP Panel to immediately recommend to Pres. Duterte the issuance of an Amnesty Proclamation, subject to concurrence of Congress, for the release of prisoners who are listed by the NDFP and who have been arrested, imprisoned, charged, and/or convicted for alleged acts or omissions within the ambit of the Revised Penal Code or special laws in connection with alleged crimes in pursuit of one’s political beliefs; (f) for the CPP and the NDFP to declare and issue an indefinite unilateral ceasefire order to the NPA and its people’s militia, upon the end of their current ceasefire order on August 27, 2016, in response to Pres. Duterte’s unilateral ceasefire which was effective indefinitely from August 21, 2016; (g) for the two Panels to meet again on October 8-12, 2016 in Oslo, Norway.
Another Breakthrough
Less than two months after the formal resumption of peace negotiations in August 22-27, 2016, the two Negotiating Panels, eager to make advances in the peace talks, flew to Oslo, Norway on October 4 and 5, 2016 for the second round of peace talks.
For three days, the two Negotiating Panels discussed updates on the releases of detained prisoners listed by the NDFP, amnesty proclamation and proposed drafts on the framework and outline of the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER). They also agreed on a common outline for the Comprehensive Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms (CAPCR) and on a common outline for the Comprehensive Agreement on End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces CAEHDF), all of which would be enfleshed by the two Negotiating Panels’ Reciprocal Working Committees and reconcile them on the date and venue decided by the parties.
Finally, the Joint Monitoring Committee of the two Negotiating Panels discussed and agreed to undertake joint activities to popularize the 1998-signed Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) and the Parties’ ceasefire committees similarly agreed to reconcile their separate unilateral ceasefire orders into a single unified document within 60 days from August 26, 2016.
To conclude the successful second round of talks the two Negotiating Panels signed on October 9, 2016 the Joint Statement On The Second Round of Talks Between the GRP And The NDFP.
Six Reasons for the Breakthrough
The remarkable and upbeat resumption of peace talks between the GRP and the CPP/NPA/NDFP under the Duterte administration is not without good reasons. The first is Pres. Duterte’s stouthearted resolve to finish the peace negotiations in one year as shown by his immediate constitution of the Government’s Negotiating Panel when he took office, followed by the impressive speedy releases of the NDFP consultants totaling twenty-one, enabling them to participate in the formal resumption of peace talks in Oslo, Norway. And twice, Pres. Duterte welcomed to Malacanang Palace the visit of the NDFP delegation, the first led by Satur Ocampo on April 15, 2016 and the next by Luis Jalandoni on September 26, 2016.
The second is the politically astute appointment of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process in the person of Jesus G. Dureza (whom I fondly call “bus driver for peace”) and the appointment of the Chairman of the Panel, Silvestre H. Bello III, a tried and tested peace negotiator and Members of the Panel (Hernani A. Braganza, Rene V. Sarmiento, Angela Librado-Trinidad and Antonio B. Arellano), majority of whom had been engaged for years in peace talks with the NDFP at the Netherlands and Norway, had experienced the ups-and-downs, the detours and zigs and zags of peace talks and had earned a big dose of goodwill from the CPP/NPA/NDFP Negotiating Panel. The institutional memory of this Government’s Negotiating Panel is a prized possession, a treasured dividend.
The third is the heartwarming and active facilitation by the Royal Norwegian Government of the peace negotiations. For more than a decade now, from 2001 up to the present, the Royal Norwegian Government, through its able Peace and Reconciliation Section of the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, hosts and facilitates the talks between the GRP and the CPP/NPA/NDF and, through its generous support, the facilities of several hotels like Holmenkollen Park Hotel (site of the Israel-Palestinian Peace Accord, etc.) and Holmen Fjordhotell are made available to the two Parties for discussion, backroom talks, photo sessions, interactions, celebrations and accommodations. Oslo remains true to its title, “City of Peace.” Impressed by the facilitation of the Royal Norwegian Government, I gave its first Special Envoy to the Peace Talks, Torre Hattrem, the nickname “Mighty Thor” and its second Special Envoy, Elizabeth Slattum, the nickname “Super Woman.”
The fourth is the inspiration provided by the Colombian Final Peace Agreement that was formally negotiated for four years in Havana, Cuba (and nearly two years of talks about talks before that) and signed by the Government of Colombia and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), “Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-Ejercito del Pueblo,” on September 26, 2016 at Cartagena, Colombia. It brought to a close the biggest armed conflict in Colombia which lasted for fifty-two years and was responsible for most of the 220,000 deaths due to conflict and thousands of kidnappings seen over the past five decades, displacing about 6 million people. In its article entitled “A Chance to Clean up,” The Economist, October 1-7, 2016, writes that “For all its imperfections and complexities, the agreement between the government and the FARC can transform a country that has been at war for 52 years.” Although the agreement was rejected by the Colombian voters by a very slim margin of .05% and a low turn-out of voters (37%), the Government under Pres. Juan Manuel Santos, who won the Nobel Peace Prize because of this Agreement, is resolved to continue the peace process until accepted by the people of Colombia. The Government and FARC by now realize that any peace agreement without people’s support is a mirage.
The CPP/NPA/NDFP has been waging an armed struggle against the Government for almost five (5) decades now (the longest running communist armed struggle in Asia) and has resulted in the deaths of thousands, destruction to properties, disruption of businesses and displacement of many. Included in this death of thousands are combatants from both of the NPA, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)/Philippine National Police (PNP) and the civilians caught in the crossfire. A Colombia-like Final Peace Agreement between the Government and the CPP/NPA/NDFP will be the latter’s principled, peaceful and honorable exit out of the internal armed conflict, with neither blame nor surrender, but with dignity for all concerned.
The fifth is the Filipino people’s support. Peace organizations in the Philippines like SULONG CARHRIHL, PILGRIMS FOR PEACE, PHILIPPINE ECUMENICAL PEACE FORUM, etc., and the Filipino Community in Norway called FILCOM do not tire in urging and encouraging the Parties to talk. “To jaw-jaw is better than to war-war,” says Winston Churchill. I had spoken before these three Philippine-based groups and their steadfast common call and plea is for the two Parties to sit in the peace table, arrived at a just and lasting peace agreement and once-for-all end the almost 50-year old armed conflict. In Oslo, Norway the Filipino community visits the Panels, consultants and staff of the two Parties in the venues where talks are held and supply them with words of encouragement and Filipino food like “adobo,” “kare-kare,” “pansit,” “lumpia,” “paksiw,” pritong manok,” etc. as supplement to the nutritious Norwegian food. This remarkable supporting role was formalized when, on October 8, 2016, the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) inducted several of them as “Peace Ambassadors.”
The last but not the least was the useful role of prayer during the August formal resumption of talks. For the first time in the decades-long peace talks, the two Panels, in the presence of the Norwegian facilitators led by Special Envoy Elizabeth Slattum, prayed in front of each other, heads in solemn bow. This writer, acting on the request by GRP Chairman Silvestre H. Bello III, led the communal prayer by recalling the death anniversary of Mr. Erasto “Nonoy” Librado, a union leader, known to the two Panels and father of GRP Panel Member Atty. Angela Librado-Trinidad, and by beseeching Almighty God to guide the peace talks. God’s Word says that “For the ways of a man are before the eyes of the Lord, And He watches all his paths. (Proverbs 5:21)”
Inches To Kilometers
During my Peace Talks Briefing/Update to the AFP Command Conference led by Secretary of National Defense Delfin N. Lorenzana on October 14, 2016 at Camp Aguinaldo, I told the men in uniform that the Government’s accomplishment in the peace talks, though still in admirable inches can become amazing kilometers if the local stakeholders (the military/police included), the international community and the general public, join hands to ensure the completion of the peace negotiation and making it sure that the Filipino people, through widespread and varied communication, support the process from peace talks to the signing of the Final Peace Agreement to approval to implementation.
To this vast human web of cooperation and collaboration, I added the much-needed guidance from the God of Peace who can make all things peaceable and possible.
(Rene. V. Sarmiento is a member of the GRP panel negotiating with the CPP. He is also the chair of the Parish Pastoral Council for Responsible Voting.)
http://opinion.inquirer.net/98909/peace-talks-with-cpp-from-impasse-to-breakthrough-to-breakthroughDuterte threatens EDCA…and stability in Asia
From the conservative American Enterprise Institute (Nov 1): Duterte threatens EDCA…and stability in Asia (By Michael Mazza)
Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has been raising hackles across the Asia-Pacific since his inauguration in June. His Southeast Asian neighbors worry that he will unthinkingly upend the balance of power in the region, giving China both a boost in its quest to dominate the South China Sea and undue influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Japan shares similar geopolitical concerns. Washington, meanwhile, sees its forward defense perimeter—integral to defending the homeland since the close of World War II—at risk, to say nothing of its more recent “pivot” to Asia, an effort “to advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia Pacific,” as President Obama put it in his 2011 speech to the Australian Parliament.
Even Beijing has exhibited some wariness towards Duterte. When asked about the president’s announcement of a “separation” from the United States, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson noted, “countries should not hold a cold-war or zero-sum mentality in today’s international relations.”
In sum, Duterte’s ham-handed pivot to China threatens to throw the region into disarray. In his latest broadside directed at the United States, Duterte once again asserted that he wanted all foreign troops out of the Philippines and that he would eventually nix the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Although such a move does not appear to be imminent, it is worth considering its potential implications for the region.
The EDCA provides the U.S. military access to a number of navy, army, and air force facilities in the Philippines. The EDCA’s final approval by the Philippine Supreme Court earlier this year paved the way for the U.S. military to establish persistent presence on the eastern edge of the South China Sea for the first time in over two decades.
Whether or not Manila wished to admit it, that presence had been sorely missed. After U.S. forces were ejected from Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in the early 1990s, China took advantage of the vacuum to advance its own interests. Most notably, in 1995 China secretly occupied and built an outpost on Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands. The reef, which The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration recently found to be a low-tide elevation within the Philippine’s exclusive economic zone, has been built into an artificial island atop which sits a runway. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China is constructing reinforced hangars with space sufficient for 24 fighter jets and three or four larger aircraft.
It is impossible to know whether China would have neglected to take Mischief Reef—or, more recently, Scarborough Shoal—had the U.S. Navy and Air Force never been expelled from Subic and Clark. But we can safely say that China did not have to worry about American warships and aircraft being just a short sail or flight away; it would be folly to think that did not factor into Chinese decision making.
EDCA’s cancellation would complicate U.S. efforts to maintain persistent naval and air presence in the eastern and northern reaches of the South China Sea, once again providing China opportunities to act with greater impunity. For Duterte to terminate EDCA, moreover, would be to signal Beijing—intentionally or otherwise—that defense of disputed maritime territory is not a priority for his government.
Indeed, despite Duterte’s attempts to “make nice” with Beijing, Xi Jinping might be tempted to accelerate plans to fortify Mischief Reef and to commence dredging at Scarborough Shoal. Xi might assess that the Philippines would not put up a fight—in large part because Duterte has, at times, said as much—and that EDCA’s fate and Duterte’s repeated anti-American vitriol would create domestic political hurdles in the United States even if Manila did call on Washington for assistance.
The threat to EDCA also comes at a time when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is looking to move beyond bilateral training exercises with its American counterparts and to engage in more operational cooperation. In recent interviews in Manila, a variety of scholars and government officials made clear that the Philippines wants to see the alliance evolve along similar lines as that between the United States and Japan, with a defined division of roles and responsibilities. EDCA provided an opportunity to spur such an evolution as the agreement promised to accelerate the AFP’s fielding of a minimum credible deterrent by providing opportunities for more frequent, deeper military-to-military engagements. Withdrawing from EDCA would retard that progress, once again leaving the Philippines exposed to Chinese depredations.
Australia, Japan, and perhaps South Korea could help fill this void by deepening their own engagement with the AFP, which the United States should support. China, however, would look askance at, and seek to deter, such a development. Heightened tension between China and the U.S. alliance network could result from EDCA’s demise.
The implications of an EDCA cancellation, moreover, would extend beyond the South China Sea. As Malcolm Cook recently pointed out in the New York Times, for China’s new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines to “pose a first or second strike threat to the continental United States, they must transit the South China Sea and enter the Western Pacific,” most likely through the Luzon Strait. At present, EDCA puts U.S. forces in an ideal position to monitor and project power into the strait. The only effective alternative location from which to do so is Taiwan. In the wake of EDCA’s termination, Washington would be loathe to pursue that option as it would seriously complicate US-China and cross-Strait relations, but American leaders might also assess that defending against the Chinese nuclear threat is an overriding priority.
Fortunately, EDCA’s termination remains unlikely at this time. Aside from the mutual defense treaty itself, EDCA is Duterte’s greatest piece of leverage vis-à-vis China. He will not be quick to bargain it away.
Perhaps more importantly, Duterte faces significant domestic constraints on his ability to distance the Philippines from its American ally. Public opinion polling shows the Philippines to be the world’s most pro-American country (Filipinos view the United States even more favorably than Americans do), and also deeply distrustful of China. There are deep, long-standing institutional and personal relationships tying together the allies’ foreign policy, defense, and military establishments. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and AFP are not outwardly defying Duterte, but they are deeply invested in the alliance and continue to seek ways to enhance it.
Duterte, of course, knows this. His promises of pay raises and new handguns for soldiers are part of an effort to keep the military onside. Any move that alienates the AFP and the Manila elite could lead to agitation for a change in leadership before the end of the president’s six-year term.
Does Rodrigo Duterte want American troops out of the Philippines even more than he wants to remain in Malacañang Palace? Only time will tell.
http://www.aei.org/publication/duterte-threatens-edcaand-stability-in-asia/
Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has been raising hackles across the Asia-Pacific since his inauguration in June. His Southeast Asian neighbors worry that he will unthinkingly upend the balance of power in the region, giving China both a boost in its quest to dominate the South China Sea and undue influence within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Japan shares similar geopolitical concerns. Washington, meanwhile, sees its forward defense perimeter—integral to defending the homeland since the close of World War II—at risk, to say nothing of its more recent “pivot” to Asia, an effort “to advance security, prosperity and human dignity across the Asia Pacific,” as President Obama put it in his 2011 speech to the Australian Parliament.
Reuters
Even Beijing has exhibited some wariness towards Duterte. When asked about the president’s announcement of a “separation” from the United States, a Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson noted, “countries should not hold a cold-war or zero-sum mentality in today’s international relations.”
In sum, Duterte’s ham-handed pivot to China threatens to throw the region into disarray. In his latest broadside directed at the United States, Duterte once again asserted that he wanted all foreign troops out of the Philippines and that he would eventually nix the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Although such a move does not appear to be imminent, it is worth considering its potential implications for the region.
The EDCA provides the U.S. military access to a number of navy, army, and air force facilities in the Philippines. The EDCA’s final approval by the Philippine Supreme Court earlier this year paved the way for the U.S. military to establish persistent presence on the eastern edge of the South China Sea for the first time in over two decades.
Whether or not Manila wished to admit it, that presence had been sorely missed. After U.S. forces were ejected from Clark Air Base and Subic Bay in the early 1990s, China took advantage of the vacuum to advance its own interests. Most notably, in 1995 China secretly occupied and built an outpost on Mischief Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands. The reef, which The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration recently found to be a low-tide elevation within the Philippine’s exclusive economic zone, has been built into an artificial island atop which sits a runway. According to the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative, China is constructing reinforced hangars with space sufficient for 24 fighter jets and three or four larger aircraft.
It is impossible to know whether China would have neglected to take Mischief Reef—or, more recently, Scarborough Shoal—had the U.S. Navy and Air Force never been expelled from Subic and Clark. But we can safely say that China did not have to worry about American warships and aircraft being just a short sail or flight away; it would be folly to think that did not factor into Chinese decision making.
EDCA’s cancellation would complicate U.S. efforts to maintain persistent naval and air presence in the eastern and northern reaches of the South China Sea, once again providing China opportunities to act with greater impunity. For Duterte to terminate EDCA, moreover, would be to signal Beijing—intentionally or otherwise—that defense of disputed maritime territory is not a priority for his government.
Indeed, despite Duterte’s attempts to “make nice” with Beijing, Xi Jinping might be tempted to accelerate plans to fortify Mischief Reef and to commence dredging at Scarborough Shoal. Xi might assess that the Philippines would not put up a fight—in large part because Duterte has, at times, said as much—and that EDCA’s fate and Duterte’s repeated anti-American vitriol would create domestic political hurdles in the United States even if Manila did call on Washington for assistance.
The threat to EDCA also comes at a time when the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is looking to move beyond bilateral training exercises with its American counterparts and to engage in more operational cooperation. In recent interviews in Manila, a variety of scholars and government officials made clear that the Philippines wants to see the alliance evolve along similar lines as that between the United States and Japan, with a defined division of roles and responsibilities. EDCA provided an opportunity to spur such an evolution as the agreement promised to accelerate the AFP’s fielding of a minimum credible deterrent by providing opportunities for more frequent, deeper military-to-military engagements. Withdrawing from EDCA would retard that progress, once again leaving the Philippines exposed to Chinese depredations.
Australia, Japan, and perhaps South Korea could help fill this void by deepening their own engagement with the AFP, which the United States should support. China, however, would look askance at, and seek to deter, such a development. Heightened tension between China and the U.S. alliance network could result from EDCA’s demise.
The implications of an EDCA cancellation, moreover, would extend beyond the South China Sea. As Malcolm Cook recently pointed out in the New York Times, for China’s new nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines to “pose a first or second strike threat to the continental United States, they must transit the South China Sea and enter the Western Pacific,” most likely through the Luzon Strait. At present, EDCA puts U.S. forces in an ideal position to monitor and project power into the strait. The only effective alternative location from which to do so is Taiwan. In the wake of EDCA’s termination, Washington would be loathe to pursue that option as it would seriously complicate US-China and cross-Strait relations, but American leaders might also assess that defending against the Chinese nuclear threat is an overriding priority.
Fortunately, EDCA’s termination remains unlikely at this time. Aside from the mutual defense treaty itself, EDCA is Duterte’s greatest piece of leverage vis-à-vis China. He will not be quick to bargain it away.
Perhaps more importantly, Duterte faces significant domestic constraints on his ability to distance the Philippines from its American ally. Public opinion polling shows the Philippines to be the world’s most pro-American country (Filipinos view the United States even more favorably than Americans do), and also deeply distrustful of China. There are deep, long-standing institutional and personal relationships tying together the allies’ foreign policy, defense, and military establishments. The Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of National Defense, and AFP are not outwardly defying Duterte, but they are deeply invested in the alliance and continue to seek ways to enhance it.
Duterte, of course, knows this. His promises of pay raises and new handguns for soldiers are part of an effort to keep the military onside. Any move that alienates the AFP and the Manila elite could lead to agitation for a change in leadership before the end of the president’s six-year term.
Does Rodrigo Duterte want American troops out of the Philippines even more than he wants to remain in Malacañang Palace? Only time will tell.
http://www.aei.org/publication/duterte-threatens-edcaand-stability-in-asia/
Malaysian prince visits AFP headquarters
From ABS-CBN (Nov 2): Malaysian prince visits AFP headquarters
Malaysian Prince Tuanku Syed Faizuddin Putra Ibni Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin Jamalullail on Wednesday visited the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Quezon City, hinting at future joint projects between the two countries.
Prince Faizuddin, crown prince of Malaysia's state of Perlis, met with AFP Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Salvador Melchor Mison while on a four-day academic and military tour from Oct. 31 to Nov. 3.
In a speech, the prince said there are "possible avenues for collaboration" between the Malaysian and Philippine forces.
"It is significant for both countries to work out avenues or areas for future engagements as well as keeping in touch through various medium available, either via informal or formal means," he said.
Aside from being a prince, Faizuddin is also the commander of 504th Regiment of the Malaysian Territorial Army, holding the rank of brigadier general. He also heads the Malaysian Reserved Officers Training Unit or Pasukan Latihan Pegawai Simpanan.
During the visit, AFP Public Affairs Office chief Marine Colonel Edgard Arevalo said the Malaysian delegation wanted to learn how the AFP organizes, trains and deploys its reservists during disasters and other emergency situations.
The AFP, on the other hand, wanted to learn how the Malaysian Armed Forces recruits and manages all sorts of professionals into their Reservist Corps.
"The engagement envisions to learn from the experience and best practices of both Malaysia and the Philippines on the Reservist and Reserve Officers Training Program," Arevalo said in a statement Wednesday.
Prince Faizuddin is also expected to visit the University of the Philippines, which is home to one of the pioneers of the Reserved Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) in the country.
The visit came as Malaysia and the Philippines, which established diplomatic relations in 1959, seemed to be warming up to China and have been criticizing Western powers for supposedly lording over Asian countries.
"The visit of the Malaysian Crown Prince to our Armed Forces marks the robust and strong partnership between the AFP and the Malaysian Armed Forces. It signifies our modest but steady achievements in our effort to promote regional peace and stability through our Reservist Program," said AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ricardo Visaya.
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/02/16/malaysian-prince-visits-afp-headquarters
Malaysian Prince Tuanku Syed Faizuddin Putra Ibni Tuanku Syed Sirajuddin Jamalullail on Wednesday visited the headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in Quezon City, hinting at future joint projects between the two countries.
Prince Faizuddin, crown prince of Malaysia's state of Perlis, met with AFP Deputy Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Salvador Melchor Mison while on a four-day academic and military tour from Oct. 31 to Nov. 3.
In a speech, the prince said there are "possible avenues for collaboration" between the Malaysian and Philippine forces.
"It is significant for both countries to work out avenues or areas for future engagements as well as keeping in touch through various medium available, either via informal or formal means," he said.
Aside from being a prince, Faizuddin is also the commander of 504th Regiment of the Malaysian Territorial Army, holding the rank of brigadier general. He also heads the Malaysian Reserved Officers Training Unit or Pasukan Latihan Pegawai Simpanan.
During the visit, AFP Public Affairs Office chief Marine Colonel Edgard Arevalo said the Malaysian delegation wanted to learn how the AFP organizes, trains and deploys its reservists during disasters and other emergency situations.
The AFP, on the other hand, wanted to learn how the Malaysian Armed Forces recruits and manages all sorts of professionals into their Reservist Corps.
"The engagement envisions to learn from the experience and best practices of both Malaysia and the Philippines on the Reservist and Reserve Officers Training Program," Arevalo said in a statement Wednesday.
Prince Faizuddin is also expected to visit the University of the Philippines, which is home to one of the pioneers of the Reserved Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) in the country.
The visit came as Malaysia and the Philippines, which established diplomatic relations in 1959, seemed to be warming up to China and have been criticizing Western powers for supposedly lording over Asian countries.
"The visit of the Malaysian Crown Prince to our Armed Forces marks the robust and strong partnership between the AFP and the Malaysian Armed Forces. It signifies our modest but steady achievements in our effort to promote regional peace and stability through our Reservist Program," said AFP Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Ricardo Visaya.
http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/11/02/16/malaysian-prince-visits-afp-headquarters
The Limits of Rodrigo Duterte's Anti-Americanism
From The Atlantic (Nov 1): The Limits of Rodrigo Duterte's Anti-Americanism
The fiery president of the Philippines wants to bring his country out of Washington’s shadow. But how far can he go?
When Rodrigo Duterte, president of the Philippines, stood before an audience of Chinese businessmen at a trade function in the Great Hall of the People on October 20 in Beijing, he promised a “separation” from the United States. It wasn't clear exactly what he meant, but he implied it would entail dropping the United States—his country’s third-largest trade partner, security guarantor, and former colonizer—in favor of an ill-defined three-way alliance with China and Russia. This was consistent with his pledges to draw back U.S.-Filipino military relations by suspending joint military exercises, re-examining other security agreements, and drawing closer with China.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Duterte’s staunch anti-Americanism is how starkly it diverges from public opinion. In recent years, polls have shown that Filipinos love the United States even more than Americans do. Other surveys show that most Filipinos distrust regional rival China, and overwhelmingly trust the United States. Much of this amity stems from the long, shared history between the two countries, dating back to the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 when the United States replaced Spain as the the ruling colonial power, and to World War II, when U.S. forces liberated the Philippines from Japanese occupation and granted the country’s independence in 1946. After World War II, the United States and the Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty, giving the United States access to military bases in the country, including the massive Subic naval base.
In the modern era, American troops have assisted the Filipino government in battling Islamist insurgents. The U.S. government has also taken the lead in humanitarian assistance, providing over $37 million after Hurricane Yolanda in 2013, which killed over 10,000 Filipinos. This year, the U.S. navy began conducting joint patrols with the Filipino navy to challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea (Duterte has since suspended those exercises). And on the economic and cultural side, roughly half of the Philippines’s middle and upper classes have relatives in the United States.
Remittances from the United States—around $10 billion a year—are a major driver of the Philippines’s economy, according to Steven Rood, the the Asia Foundation’s country representative for the Philippines.
But whether these warm feelings actually matter when it comes to formal alliances between sovereign states is unclear. Duterte is currently enjoying a 76 percent approval rating. As long as he remains popular, Filipino affection for the United States, in of itself, won’t be enough to save the alliance between the countries.
Dominic Tierney, a political scientist at Swarthmore College and Atlantic contributing editor, argued that there is no iron law that countries whose citizens like each other will be allies—although it usually helps. The United States is most popular in Canada and Britain, two countries that support U.S. military operations around the world. But Tierney also added that “You can’t tease out a law of history that says popular support guarantees alliance decisions.” In the Middle East and Central Asia, the United States has often struck enduring alliances with regimes whose publics broadly dislike the United States—such as Egypt and Jordan—while antagonizing regimes like Iran's whose citizens view the United States more warmly.
Of course, the Philippines, unlike those other countries, is a functioning democracy. If Filipinos don’t like their country’s foreign policy, they can try to change it using avenues unavailable to Iranians. As Tierney pointed out, one example of a relatively democratic country that punished its leader for switching alliances is Ukraine. Following the Maidan Square protests of 2014, Ukrainian citizens furious with President Viktor Yanukovych’s move to scrap a bid for European Union membership in favor of a trade pact with Russia succeeded in ousting him and returning their country to its prior foreign policy orientation.
Still: It’s unclear whether the Philippines would ever follow suit. While Duterte hopes to source loans from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), he has not proposed any alliance with China nearly as far-reaching or detailed as the Ukrainian pact with Russia that sparked the Maidan. And besides, it’s far from clear whether ordinary Filipinos would be inclined to challenge Duterte over his foreign policy. “Most people, including Filipinos, don’t pay attention to foreign policy, so elites have considerable latitude,” Rood said.
There’s also the matter of Duterte’s popularity. “Duterte has a huge, passionate following, while the U.S. has a huge, passive following,” Richard Javad Heydarian, a political science professor at La Salle University in Manila, explained. Poorer Filipinos, especially those who, like Duterte, hail from the country’s underdeveloped south, feel that they finally have a decisive president who will improve their lives. “That is why Duterte can get away with it,” Heydarian added. No one is predicting pro-American rallies on the streets to challenge Duterte. Nor do they expect that his anti-American bluster will cut strongly against his popularity in a country that appreciates his nationalism.
That special brand of Dutertian nationalism diverges sharply with that of his predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who made defending Filipino territorial sovereignty against China, with the backing of the United States, central to his foreign policy. But Duterte also has a personal grudge. When he was mayor of Davao City, he was denied a visa to visit the United States, which he believed was due to his brutal anti-drug campaign. He also still has unanswered questions over an accidental bombing in Davao City in 2002, allegedly caused by a U.S. citizen who left the country afterwards, evading prosecution, with the help of the FBI. The shadowy nature of the bombing and the supposed involvement of U.S. officials confirmed Duterte’s stereotypes of a superior, meddling America. Following the bombing, Duterte refused to give the U.S. military access to airports in the city.
In Duterte’s view, the United States continues to treat the Philippines as its “little brown brother,” in the words of Perfecto Yasay, Duterte’s anti-American foreign affairs secretary. To that end, it invents or exacerbates security problems against Islamist insurgents in the South, or against China in the South China Sea, to justify its military presence. In the world according to Duterte (and, more broadly, the Filipino left), the United States endangers, rather than preserves, Filipino sovereignty.
But while Duterte’s vehement rhetoric is unprecedented, his presidency doesn’t mark the first time Filipinos have sought distance from the United States. In 1991, the Filipino senate passed a resolution forbidding American troops to be permanently stationed on the Philippines. In 2005, the Philippines and China announced a “golden age of partnership," which included a push by then-President Gloria Arroyo to increase military ties with China. Today, Arroyo advises Duterte on China policy. Malcolm Cook, a senior fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies Institute in Singapore, noted, however, that when it comes to ties with China, “Duterte’s taking it further” than Arroyo ever did. Still, as long as Duterte can frame his actions as part of a mission to preserve Filipino sovereignty, there’s reason to think the Filipino people, by and large, won’t object to drawing closer to China.
Far more worrying for Duterte is the prospect that his country’s powerful military and business groups, which maintain close ties to the United States, will turn against him. The United States is the Philippines’s largest source of foreign direct investment, especially in industries like electronics manufacturing and business-process outsourcing, which have contributed to the rapid expansion of the Filipino middle class. Investment into the Philippines has decreased by 41 percent since last June, and it isn’t clear whether the investment agreements Duterte inked in October with Chinese companies can reverse the trend, especially if nervous American investors start pulling out. The peso fell to a seven-year low against the dollar after Duterte’s anti-American comments and questioning of the rule of law. If Duterte ends up damaging the economy, business leaders could turn against him, as could a public that might suddenly connect his foreign policy views to worsening economic conditions in their own lives. Even then, it would not be Duterte’s rejection of the United States, but the overall decline of the economy, that would set Filipinos on edge.
And the military could pose just as big a risk as business interests. “No other country has a military as intertwined with and dependent on the U.S.,” Heydarian said. In a recent op-ed, former President Fidel Ramos, a mentor to Duterte with close ties to the military, condemned Duterte’s mishandling of U.S.-Filipino relations, declaring that his leadership has been a “huge disappointment and let-down to many of us.”
Duterte is, most likely, listening. Threats of military intervention have long cast a shadow over Philippines politics. In 2001, the military withdrew support for unpopular then-President Joseph Estrada, hastening his downfall. As recently as last year, credible reports suggested that some elements of the military were plotting a coup against President Aquino. Duterte, for his part, visited 14 different military camps in the opening weeks of his presidency, and has promised to give each of the Philippines’s 120,000 soldiers new, Israeli-made Glock pistols. And in response to a growing chorus of criticism from politicians at home, five days after his call for separation from Washington, he clarified that the U.S.-Philippines “alliances are alive,” and assured Filipinos that there “should be no worry about changes of alliances."
Of course, any concerns Duterte may have about his support among the military were not enough to stop him, on his return from a recent trip to Japan, to say that he wanted to see all U.S. troops gone within the next two years—a position unlikely to be popular with the top brass.
In the end, perhaps the safest bet is that U.S.-Philippines military-to-military relations will be downgraded, but the alliance itself will remain intact. Washington can tolerate a thin-skinned ally who bites the hand that feeds him through crass invective and accusation, even as he makes overtures to its rivals. The United States has plenty of experience with touchy allies around the world, from Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who accuses Washington of backing this summer’s failed coup attempt against him, or former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who called Americans “demons” who “committed satanic acts that will never be forgiven.” If Duterte doesn’t follow through with his promise to expel the U.S. military from the Philippines, and the economic relationship remains more or less on track, U.S. policy makers may be to block out Duterte’s rhetoric.
Tierney applies Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dictum on how to maintain a good marriage to how to maintain a good alliance: “It helps to sometimes be a little deaf.”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-united-states/506108/
The fiery president of the Philippines wants to bring his country out of Washington’s shadow. But how far can he go?
When Rodrigo Duterte, president of the Philippines, stood before an audience of Chinese businessmen at a trade function in the Great Hall of the People on October 20 in Beijing, he promised a “separation” from the United States. It wasn't clear exactly what he meant, but he implied it would entail dropping the United States—his country’s third-largest trade partner, security guarantor, and former colonizer—in favor of an ill-defined three-way alliance with China and Russia. This was consistent with his pledges to draw back U.S.-Filipino military relations by suspending joint military exercises, re-examining other security agreements, and drawing closer with China.
Perhaps the most puzzling aspect of Duterte’s staunch anti-Americanism is how starkly it diverges from public opinion. In recent years, polls have shown that Filipinos love the United States even more than Americans do. Other surveys show that most Filipinos distrust regional rival China, and overwhelmingly trust the United States. Much of this amity stems from the long, shared history between the two countries, dating back to the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898 when the United States replaced Spain as the the ruling colonial power, and to World War II, when U.S. forces liberated the Philippines from Japanese occupation and granted the country’s independence in 1946. After World War II, the United States and the Philippines agreed to a mutual defense treaty, giving the United States access to military bases in the country, including the massive Subic naval base.
In the modern era, American troops have assisted the Filipino government in battling Islamist insurgents. The U.S. government has also taken the lead in humanitarian assistance, providing over $37 million after Hurricane Yolanda in 2013, which killed over 10,000 Filipinos. This year, the U.S. navy began conducting joint patrols with the Filipino navy to challenge China’s claims in the South China Sea (Duterte has since suspended those exercises). And on the economic and cultural side, roughly half of the Philippines’s middle and upper classes have relatives in the United States.
Remittances from the United States—around $10 billion a year—are a major driver of the Philippines’s economy, according to Steven Rood, the the Asia Foundation’s country representative for the Philippines.
But whether these warm feelings actually matter when it comes to formal alliances between sovereign states is unclear. Duterte is currently enjoying a 76 percent approval rating. As long as he remains popular, Filipino affection for the United States, in of itself, won’t be enough to save the alliance between the countries.
Of course, the Philippines, unlike those other countries, is a functioning democracy. If Filipinos don’t like their country’s foreign policy, they can try to change it using avenues unavailable to Iranians. As Tierney pointed out, one example of a relatively democratic country that punished its leader for switching alliances is Ukraine. Following the Maidan Square protests of 2014, Ukrainian citizens furious with President Viktor Yanukovych’s move to scrap a bid for European Union membership in favor of a trade pact with Russia succeeded in ousting him and returning their country to its prior foreign policy orientation.
Still: It’s unclear whether the Philippines would ever follow suit. While Duterte hopes to source loans from the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), he has not proposed any alliance with China nearly as far-reaching or detailed as the Ukrainian pact with Russia that sparked the Maidan. And besides, it’s far from clear whether ordinary Filipinos would be inclined to challenge Duterte over his foreign policy. “Most people, including Filipinos, don’t pay attention to foreign policy, so elites have considerable latitude,” Rood said.
That special brand of Dutertian nationalism diverges sharply with that of his predecessor, Benigno Aquino III, who made defending Filipino territorial sovereignty against China, with the backing of the United States, central to his foreign policy. But Duterte also has a personal grudge. When he was mayor of Davao City, he was denied a visa to visit the United States, which he believed was due to his brutal anti-drug campaign. He also still has unanswered questions over an accidental bombing in Davao City in 2002, allegedly caused by a U.S. citizen who left the country afterwards, evading prosecution, with the help of the FBI. The shadowy nature of the bombing and the supposed involvement of U.S. officials confirmed Duterte’s stereotypes of a superior, meddling America. Following the bombing, Duterte refused to give the U.S. military access to airports in the city.
In Duterte’s view, the United States continues to treat the Philippines as its “little brown brother,” in the words of Perfecto Yasay, Duterte’s anti-American foreign affairs secretary. To that end, it invents or exacerbates security problems against Islamist insurgents in the South, or against China in the South China Sea, to justify its military presence. In the world according to Duterte (and, more broadly, the Filipino left), the United States endangers, rather than preserves, Filipino sovereignty.
But while Duterte’s vehement rhetoric is unprecedented, his presidency doesn’t mark the first time Filipinos have sought distance from the United States. In 1991, the Filipino senate passed a resolution forbidding American troops to be permanently stationed on the Philippines. In 2005, the Philippines and China announced a “golden age of partnership," which included a push by then-President Gloria Arroyo to increase military ties with China. Today, Arroyo advises Duterte on China policy. Malcolm Cook, a senior fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies Institute in Singapore, noted, however, that when it comes to ties with China, “Duterte’s taking it further” than Arroyo ever did. Still, as long as Duterte can frame his actions as part of a mission to preserve Filipino sovereignty, there’s reason to think the Filipino people, by and large, won’t object to drawing closer to China.
Far more worrying for Duterte is the prospect that his country’s powerful military and business groups, which maintain close ties to the United States, will turn against him. The United States is the Philippines’s largest source of foreign direct investment, especially in industries like electronics manufacturing and business-process outsourcing, which have contributed to the rapid expansion of the Filipino middle class. Investment into the Philippines has decreased by 41 percent since last June, and it isn’t clear whether the investment agreements Duterte inked in October with Chinese companies can reverse the trend, especially if nervous American investors start pulling out. The peso fell to a seven-year low against the dollar after Duterte’s anti-American comments and questioning of the rule of law. If Duterte ends up damaging the economy, business leaders could turn against him, as could a public that might suddenly connect his foreign policy views to worsening economic conditions in their own lives. Even then, it would not be Duterte’s rejection of the United States, but the overall decline of the economy, that would set Filipinos on edge.
And the military could pose just as big a risk as business interests. “No other country has a military as intertwined with and dependent on the U.S.,” Heydarian said. In a recent op-ed, former President Fidel Ramos, a mentor to Duterte with close ties to the military, condemned Duterte’s mishandling of U.S.-Filipino relations, declaring that his leadership has been a “huge disappointment and let-down to many of us.”
Duterte is, most likely, listening. Threats of military intervention have long cast a shadow over Philippines politics. In 2001, the military withdrew support for unpopular then-President Joseph Estrada, hastening his downfall. As recently as last year, credible reports suggested that some elements of the military were plotting a coup against President Aquino. Duterte, for his part, visited 14 different military camps in the opening weeks of his presidency, and has promised to give each of the Philippines’s 120,000 soldiers new, Israeli-made Glock pistols. And in response to a growing chorus of criticism from politicians at home, five days after his call for separation from Washington, he clarified that the U.S.-Philippines “alliances are alive,” and assured Filipinos that there “should be no worry about changes of alliances."
Of course, any concerns Duterte may have about his support among the military were not enough to stop him, on his return from a recent trip to Japan, to say that he wanted to see all U.S. troops gone within the next two years—a position unlikely to be popular with the top brass.
In the end, perhaps the safest bet is that U.S.-Philippines military-to-military relations will be downgraded, but the alliance itself will remain intact. Washington can tolerate a thin-skinned ally who bites the hand that feeds him through crass invective and accusation, even as he makes overtures to its rivals. The United States has plenty of experience with touchy allies around the world, from Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who accuses Washington of backing this summer’s failed coup attempt against him, or former Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who called Americans “demons” who “committed satanic acts that will never be forgiven.” If Duterte doesn’t follow through with his promise to expel the U.S. military from the Philippines, and the economic relationship remains more or less on track, U.S. policy makers may be to block out Duterte’s rhetoric.
Tierney applies Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s dictum on how to maintain a good marriage to how to maintain a good alliance: “It helps to sometimes be a little deaf.”
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/11/rodrigo-duterte-philippines-china-united-states/506108/
Joint efforts with Malaysia vs. Abu Sayyaf, piracy eyed
From the Manila Bulletin (Nov 2): Joint efforts with Malaysia vs. Abu Sayyaf, piracy eyed
Duterte bent on fighting security threats that ‘paralyze’ trade and commerce
Possible joint military and police operations to address piracy and fight the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf will be high on the agenda of President Rodrigo Duterte’s state visit next week to Malaysia.
Duterte told reporters on Tuesday evening, November 1, that he and Malaysian leaders, led by prime minister Najib Razak, will discuss measures to address the presence of the terrorists passing through Strait of Malacca, an important waterway between Malaysia and Indonesia.
“We have a lot to talk about piracy in Malacca Strait, kidnapping, criminality. It’s very important that Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines talk about these. Once and for all, come up with solution. We share the same coastline,” he said.
Duterte said the security threats there paralyzed the trade and commerce that it is “important that arterial channel there be safe and get rid of the troublesome guys.”
He added that the presence of the terrorists in Sulu, the Abu Sayyaf’s foothold, is worrisome, which poses an even greater threat to the present generation if not dealt with immediately.
When asked if he thinks there are other terrorists nearby Sulu seas, Duterte said “I think so, that’s the next problem. I said it is coming around and I would like to warn the country that we have this looming problem ahead but I do not want to cause unnecessary alarm but it is gonna be one of the biggest challenges that this generation will face.”
The president earlier discussed joint security measures with Indonesia, which he said was affirmed by President Joko Widodo.
Duterte confirmed that he will also head to Thailand after his visit to Malaysia to pay respects to the revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who died recently.
“It’s very important that we show our solidarity,” he said.
http://news.mb.com.ph/2016/11/02/joint-efforts-with-malaysia-vs-abu-sayyaf-piracy-eyed/
Duterte bent on fighting security threats that ‘paralyze’ trade and commerce
Possible joint military and police operations to address piracy and fight the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf will be high on the agenda of President Rodrigo Duterte’s state visit next week to Malaysia.
MILITARY ADVANCE – Soldiers wrap up an offensive as they stand guard over the bodies of Abu Sayyaf members killed in a recent encounter in Patikul, Sulu. (AFP | Manila Bulletin)
“We have a lot to talk about piracy in Malacca Strait, kidnapping, criminality. It’s very important that Malaysia, Indonesia and Philippines talk about these. Once and for all, come up with solution. We share the same coastline,” he said.
Duterte said the security threats there paralyzed the trade and commerce that it is “important that arterial channel there be safe and get rid of the troublesome guys.”
He added that the presence of the terrorists in Sulu, the Abu Sayyaf’s foothold, is worrisome, which poses an even greater threat to the present generation if not dealt with immediately.
When asked if he thinks there are other terrorists nearby Sulu seas, Duterte said “I think so, that’s the next problem. I said it is coming around and I would like to warn the country that we have this looming problem ahead but I do not want to cause unnecessary alarm but it is gonna be one of the biggest challenges that this generation will face.”
The president earlier discussed joint security measures with Indonesia, which he said was affirmed by President Joko Widodo.
Duterte confirmed that he will also head to Thailand after his visit to Malaysia to pay respects to the revered King Bhumibol Adulyadej, who died recently.
“It’s very important that we show our solidarity,” he said.
http://news.mb.com.ph/2016/11/02/joint-efforts-with-malaysia-vs-abu-sayyaf-piracy-eyed/
Duterte to sign EO on new Bangsamoro Transition Commission this week
From MindaNews (Nov 1): Duterte to sign EO on new Bangsamoro Transition Commission this week
President Rodrigo R. Duterte is expected to sign the executive order creating the new Bangsamoro Transition Committee (BTC) on November 3 in Davao City, an official said Monday.
In a chance interview, Patmei Ruivivar, communications director of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), said their officials and government (GPH) implementing panel members met in Clark, Pampanga last week to finalize the 10 members of the commission from the GPH side.
“We worked on it last week. We had a strategic planning with OPAPP execs, kasama ang implementing panel. We finalized the composition of the BTC members ng government side,” she said.
The BTC, an independent body, is tasked to consolidate all peace agreements and legislation into one bill on the Bangsamoro, call for an inclusive Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly to discuss such bill, and submit its new version to Congress not later than July 27, 2017.
Ruivivar said the draft EO is already with Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea for review.
In the August 13 meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, the implementing panels of the GPH and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) agreed to increase the BTC membership to 21.
Ruivivar added the GPH representative to the BTC will be known after the signing of the EO.
GPH peace implementing panel chair Irene Santiago said on September 22 during the Davao Peace Fair 2016 at SM Ecoland that Muslimin Sema’s faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) will be given two to three seats.
She said the president himself suggested the “convergence” of MILF and MNLF members so they may work together for peace.
She said the GPH is looking for “creative ways on how to do the convergence” to ensure inclusivity of the peace process in Mindanao.
Santiago said the new BTC will certainly refer to the old Bangsamoro Basic Law in crafting its new version “but it’s a new BTC and so we cannot predict what it is going to do but certainly those are available to them. It’s up to them to decide, it’s an independent commission.”
Congress sidelined the BBL after the Mamasapano encounter in January 2015 that claimed the lives of 44 police Special Action Force personnel, 17 MILF fighters and five civilians.
Some lawmakers used the incident to question the sincerity of the MILF in forging peace with government to end the almost 50-year conflict in Mindanao that has claimed the lives of around 120,000 combatants and civilians.
Despite the incident the government and the MILF vowed to pursue the peace process.
http://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2016/11/duterte-to-sign-eo-on-new-bangsamoro-transition-commission-members-this-week/
President Rodrigo R. Duterte is expected to sign the executive order creating the new Bangsamoro Transition Committee (BTC) on November 3 in Davao City, an official said Monday.
In a chance interview, Patmei Ruivivar, communications director of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP), said their officials and government (GPH) implementing panel members met in Clark, Pampanga last week to finalize the 10 members of the commission from the GPH side.
“We worked on it last week. We had a strategic planning with OPAPP execs, kasama ang implementing panel. We finalized the composition of the BTC members ng government side,” she said.
The BTC, an independent body, is tasked to consolidate all peace agreements and legislation into one bill on the Bangsamoro, call for an inclusive Bangsamoro Consultative Assembly to discuss such bill, and submit its new version to Congress not later than July 27, 2017.
Ruivivar said the draft EO is already with Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea for review.
In the August 13 meeting held in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, the implementing panels of the GPH and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) agreed to increase the BTC membership to 21.
Ruivivar added the GPH representative to the BTC will be known after the signing of the EO.
GPH peace implementing panel chair Irene Santiago said on September 22 during the Davao Peace Fair 2016 at SM Ecoland that Muslimin Sema’s faction of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) will be given two to three seats.
She said the president himself suggested the “convergence” of MILF and MNLF members so they may work together for peace.
She said the GPH is looking for “creative ways on how to do the convergence” to ensure inclusivity of the peace process in Mindanao.
Santiago said the new BTC will certainly refer to the old Bangsamoro Basic Law in crafting its new version “but it’s a new BTC and so we cannot predict what it is going to do but certainly those are available to them. It’s up to them to decide, it’s an independent commission.”
Congress sidelined the BBL after the Mamasapano encounter in January 2015 that claimed the lives of 44 police Special Action Force personnel, 17 MILF fighters and five civilians.
Some lawmakers used the incident to question the sincerity of the MILF in forging peace with government to end the almost 50-year conflict in Mindanao that has claimed the lives of around 120,000 combatants and civilians.
Despite the incident the government and the MILF vowed to pursue the peace process.
http://www.mindanews.com/peace-process/2016/11/duterte-to-sign-eo-on-new-bangsamoro-transition-commission-members-this-week/
2 Abu Sayyaf bandits killed
From the Mindanao Times (Nov 2): 2 Abu Sayyaf bandits killed
TWO alleged members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) were killed yesterday in an early morning encounter in Indanan town in Sulu.
The incident took place around 6:45 a.m.
According to the report, troopers from the 11th Scout Ranger Company were sent to the area after residents reported to the authorities the presence of armed men.
Two of the eight bandits were killed in the ensuing gunfight.
Seized from the site of the encounter were an M16 assault rifle with an attached M203 grenade launcher and an improvised bomb.
Col. Rodrigo Gregorio, spokesperson of Joint Task Force Sulu, said the latest killing of the ASG member brings to 38 the total of number of ASG members killed in the intensified military operations since July.
Soldiers also suffered 15 killed in action and 28 wounded in action in the same period.
Authorities believe that the ASG has splintered into small groups to evade soldiers and are planting IEDs to delay movements of government troops.
Brig. Gen. Arnel dela Vega, commander of Joint Task Force Sulu, said the successful pursuit is a “result of the cooperation of the community against the ASG.”
He also condemned the use of IED by the ASG saying “IEDs maim and kill individuals regardless whether they are soldiers or civilians and the main losers are the innocent people in the community. The use of IED is not only against the law but it is outright evil and un-Islamic.”
“The focused military operation will continue until we deal a crippling blow against the ASG and rescue the remaining hostages,” dela Vega said.
Dela Rosa: Arms deal with U.S. still a go
From CNN (Nov 2): Dela Rosa: Arms deal with U.S. still a go
The Philippine National Police's (PNP) assault rifle purchase with a U.S. supplier is still active – at least for now.
Based on the letter of the supplier to the PNP, the contract is still undergoing the normal process at the U.S. State Department.
For PNP chief Ronald "Bato" dela Rosa, in case the procurement deal is dropped: It's their loss not ours.
An earlier report by Reuters – citing U.S. Senate aides as sources – said the U.S. State Department halted the planned sale of some 26,000-27,000 M-4 assault rifles to the PNP. U.S. Senator Ben Cardin was reportedly opposing the sale due to concerns about allegations of human rights violations in the Philippines.
Related: Sources: U.S. stopped Philippines rifle sale that senator opposed
However, dela Rosa says he has not received any official notice from either the firearms supplier or the U.S. State Department about the deal's supposed cancellation. As far as he knows, the deal is pushing through.
The PNP says the procurement is worth P1.7 billion and they are expecting delivery of the M-4 assault rifles--early next year.
Each rifle costs P60,000.
Dela Rosa says the Philippines has yet to release money to pay for those rifles.
If the acquisition of M-4 rifles does not proceed, dela Rosa says they have to look for another supplier.
He says there are other local and international groups that can supply firearms to the PNP.
Related: PNP to find other suppliers after report of halted U.S. rifle sale
Dela Rosa says the additional 27,000 rifles will ramp up the PNP's capability to fight terror groups that he says are a "serious threat to global peace and security."
If the deal does get cancelled, Dela Rosa says it would be the first time that the U.S. government has done something like this to the PNP, since the Duterte administration announced it is adopting an independent foreign policy.
Dela Rosa also said U.S. officials should not listen to "biased" media organizations that only report the negative side of the war on drugs and not its positive impact on communities.
http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/11/02/philippine-national-police-ronald-dela-rosa-arms-deal-with-united-states.html
The Philippine National Police's (PNP) assault rifle purchase with a U.S. supplier is still active – at least for now.
Based on the letter of the supplier to the PNP, the contract is still undergoing the normal process at the U.S. State Department.
For PNP chief Ronald "Bato" dela Rosa, in case the procurement deal is dropped: It's their loss not ours.
An earlier report by Reuters – citing U.S. Senate aides as sources – said the U.S. State Department halted the planned sale of some 26,000-27,000 M-4 assault rifles to the PNP. U.S. Senator Ben Cardin was reportedly opposing the sale due to concerns about allegations of human rights violations in the Philippines.
Related: Sources: U.S. stopped Philippines rifle sale that senator opposed
However, dela Rosa says he has not received any official notice from either the firearms supplier or the U.S. State Department about the deal's supposed cancellation. As far as he knows, the deal is pushing through.
The PNP says the procurement is worth P1.7 billion and they are expecting delivery of the M-4 assault rifles--early next year.
Each rifle costs P60,000.
Dela Rosa says the Philippines has yet to release money to pay for those rifles.
If the acquisition of M-4 rifles does not proceed, dela Rosa says they have to look for another supplier.
He says there are other local and international groups that can supply firearms to the PNP.
Related: PNP to find other suppliers after report of halted U.S. rifle sale
Dela Rosa says the additional 27,000 rifles will ramp up the PNP's capability to fight terror groups that he says are a "serious threat to global peace and security."
If the deal does get cancelled, Dela Rosa says it would be the first time that the U.S. government has done something like this to the PNP, since the Duterte administration announced it is adopting an independent foreign policy.
Dela Rosa also said U.S. officials should not listen to "biased" media organizations that only report the negative side of the war on drugs and not its positive impact on communities.
http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2016/11/02/philippine-national-police-ronald-dela-rosa-arms-deal-with-united-states.html
PH signs loan for new Coast Guard vessels
From the Philippine News Agency (Nov 2): PH signs loan for new Coast Guard vessels
The Philippines has secured a P6.4 billion Japanese loan for large coast guard vessels.
Department of Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez said the loan would be for two large 90-meter vessels. This is on top of an earlier Japanese loan for the acquisition of 10 45-meter patrol ships.
Dominguez said the loan has a maturity period of 40 years would greatly enhance the maritime
capability of the Philippine Coast Guard. The signing were witnessed by President Rodrigo Duterte and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo, Japan last October 26.
The 90-meter vessels would be the biggest patrol ships of the Philippine Coast Guard, The current largest PCG vessels are the two 56-meter San Juan class patrol vessels which were sourced from Australia.
The country in August received the first of the 10 vessels funded from a Japanese Official Development Assistance loan. The first ship is BRP Tubbataha, one of the 10 coast guard ships classified as a modern Multi-Role Response Vessel (MRRV).
These MRRVs are capable of maritime search and rescue, pollution control, sea patrol, transport and rapid response platforms during disasters.
Aside from the ships, the country will also be a recipient of a P280-million Japanese grant to the Philippine Coast Guard.
The PCG will receive one 20-meter high speed vessel and 14 high-speed patrol boats.
http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1541478075638/ph-signs-loan-for-new-coast-guard-vessels
The Philippines has secured a P6.4 billion Japanese loan for large coast guard vessels.
Department of Finance Secretary Carlos Dominguez said the loan would be for two large 90-meter vessels. This is on top of an earlier Japanese loan for the acquisition of 10 45-meter patrol ships.
Dominguez said the loan has a maturity period of 40 years would greatly enhance the maritime
capability of the Philippine Coast Guard. The signing were witnessed by President Rodrigo Duterte and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in Tokyo, Japan last October 26.
The 90-meter vessels would be the biggest patrol ships of the Philippine Coast Guard, The current largest PCG vessels are the two 56-meter San Juan class patrol vessels which were sourced from Australia.
The country in August received the first of the 10 vessels funded from a Japanese Official Development Assistance loan. The first ship is BRP Tubbataha, one of the 10 coast guard ships classified as a modern Multi-Role Response Vessel (MRRV).
These MRRVs are capable of maritime search and rescue, pollution control, sea patrol, transport and rapid response platforms during disasters.
Aside from the ships, the country will also be a recipient of a P280-million Japanese grant to the Philippine Coast Guard.
The PCG will receive one 20-meter high speed vessel and 14 high-speed patrol boats.
http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1541478075638/ph-signs-loan-for-new-coast-guard-vessels
PH to lease maritime patrol aircraft
From the Philippine News Agency (Nov 2): PH to lease maritime patrol aircraft
The Philippines will lease five TC 90 aircraft from the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces.
Four TC-90 propeller driven aircraft will be leased for $7,000 a year and another TC 90 variant for $2,000 per year.
The aircraft are aimed at bolstering maritime patrol operations in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The current maritime patrol aircraft being used by the country is the Philippine Navy’s BN-2 Islander which has a range of only 1,349 kilometers. The TC-90 has a range of 2,446 kilometers.
The TC-90 with a maximum speed of 500 kilometers per hour is also faster than the Islander aircraft which can only cruise up to 315 Kph.
Aside from maritime patrol, the aircraft can be utilized for disaster response.
“The acquisition of our maritime and air capability assets are crucial in addressing traditional and emerging threats to our nations, including piracy, criminality at sea and terrorism, as well as in responding to disasters.” President Rodrigo Duterte said during his arrival speech at the Davao International Airport held last October 28.
The President came from Tokyo after a three-day official visit in Japan. The agreement to lease the aircraft was signed during the President’s visit to the East Asian country.
http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1541478077790/ph-to-lease-maritime-patrol-aircraft
The Philippines will lease five TC 90 aircraft from the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces.
Four TC-90 propeller driven aircraft will be leased for $7,000 a year and another TC 90 variant for $2,000 per year.
The aircraft are aimed at bolstering maritime patrol operations in the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). The current maritime patrol aircraft being used by the country is the Philippine Navy’s BN-2 Islander which has a range of only 1,349 kilometers. The TC-90 has a range of 2,446 kilometers.
The TC-90 with a maximum speed of 500 kilometers per hour is also faster than the Islander aircraft which can only cruise up to 315 Kph.
Aside from maritime patrol, the aircraft can be utilized for disaster response.
“The acquisition of our maritime and air capability assets are crucial in addressing traditional and emerging threats to our nations, including piracy, criminality at sea and terrorism, as well as in responding to disasters.” President Rodrigo Duterte said during his arrival speech at the Davao International Airport held last October 28.
The President came from Tokyo after a three-day official visit in Japan. The agreement to lease the aircraft was signed during the President’s visit to the East Asian country.
http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1541478077790/ph-to-lease-maritime-patrol-aircraft
Peace institute holds integrating conflict-sensitive journalism confab
From the Philippine News Agency (Nov 2): Peace institute holds integrating conflict-sensitive journalism confab
Conflict-sensitive reporting contributes to reconciliation and peacebuilding.
Thus, the Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao (IPDM) in partnership with the Forum Civil Peace Service (forumZED) spearheaded a three-day course which aimed to integrate the concept in communication-related programs, October 24-26.
It targeted around 100 students and 28 teachers from various schools and universities in Region 10 and the cities of Iligan, Cagayan de Oro, and Malaybalay, including Marawi of Lanao del Sur.
IPDM officer-in-charge Prof. Mark Anthony J. Torres, in an interview, laid down the four objectives of the seminar-workshop which include facilitate learning among communication teachers and students on the philosophy of conflict-sensitive journalism, and the need for integration in the curriculum vis-a-vis media realities.
Recall the role of journalism in empowering people and dealing with issues in Mindanao such as the Bangsamoro peace process and other conflict issues.
Also, introduce conflict analysis tools for journalistic practice; and Identify entry points of integration in specific communication subjects.
The seminar-workshop opened with a dialogue on the theory and practice of conflict-sensitive journalism; the role of journalists in providing a peace lens to their reports; and the nuances and differences between conflict-sensitive journalism and peace journalism.
Torres said that at the later part of the three-day activity, “the program would give way to an in-depth training on conflict analysis tools, which can be used by communications teachers in their subjects.”
Meanwhile, the forumZFD is an association of various German peace movement and non-profit organizations aimed at creating and strengthening the instruments of civilian conflict resolution by non-violent means.
It supported the seminar-workshop with a P200,000 grant, while the Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT) provided the venues and hosted the participants’ three-day stay.
Resource persons for the activity come from the forum ZFD and the Peace and Conflict Journalism Network (PECOJON).
The PECOJON is an international network of journalists and media practitioners, photographers, filmmakers and academicians, who develop, promote and implement high quality reporting of conflict, crisis and war.
Earlier in the year, MSU-IIT’s Office of Publication and Information (OPI) and the Department of English conducted a lecture on Culture-Sensitive Reporting: the Muslim, the Lumad, and the Media.
The April 8 lecture was given by Dr. Victorio N. Sugbo of the University of the Philippines-Visayas as part of the conference: Current Issues and Trends in Language and Literature: Globalizing the Local.
http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1511478020043/peace-institute-holds-integrating-conflict-sensitive-journalism-confab
Conflict-sensitive reporting contributes to reconciliation and peacebuilding.
Thus, the Institute for Peace and Development in Mindanao (IPDM) in partnership with the Forum Civil Peace Service (forumZED) spearheaded a three-day course which aimed to integrate the concept in communication-related programs, October 24-26.
It targeted around 100 students and 28 teachers from various schools and universities in Region 10 and the cities of Iligan, Cagayan de Oro, and Malaybalay, including Marawi of Lanao del Sur.
IPDM officer-in-charge Prof. Mark Anthony J. Torres, in an interview, laid down the four objectives of the seminar-workshop which include facilitate learning among communication teachers and students on the philosophy of conflict-sensitive journalism, and the need for integration in the curriculum vis-a-vis media realities.
Recall the role of journalism in empowering people and dealing with issues in Mindanao such as the Bangsamoro peace process and other conflict issues.
Also, introduce conflict analysis tools for journalistic practice; and Identify entry points of integration in specific communication subjects.
The seminar-workshop opened with a dialogue on the theory and practice of conflict-sensitive journalism; the role of journalists in providing a peace lens to their reports; and the nuances and differences between conflict-sensitive journalism and peace journalism.
Torres said that at the later part of the three-day activity, “the program would give way to an in-depth training on conflict analysis tools, which can be used by communications teachers in their subjects.”
Meanwhile, the forumZFD is an association of various German peace movement and non-profit organizations aimed at creating and strengthening the instruments of civilian conflict resolution by non-violent means.
It supported the seminar-workshop with a P200,000 grant, while the Mindanao State University-Iligan Institute of Technology (MSU-IIT) provided the venues and hosted the participants’ three-day stay.
Resource persons for the activity come from the forum ZFD and the Peace and Conflict Journalism Network (PECOJON).
The PECOJON is an international network of journalists and media practitioners, photographers, filmmakers and academicians, who develop, promote and implement high quality reporting of conflict, crisis and war.
Earlier in the year, MSU-IIT’s Office of Publication and Information (OPI) and the Department of English conducted a lecture on Culture-Sensitive Reporting: the Muslim, the Lumad, and the Media.
The April 8 lecture was given by Dr. Victorio N. Sugbo of the University of the Philippines-Visayas as part of the conference: Current Issues and Trends in Language and Literature: Globalizing the Local.
http://news.pia.gov.ph/article/view/1511478020043/peace-institute-holds-integrating-conflict-sensitive-journalism-confab
President Duterte set to choose Navy’s top leader for first time
From Update.ph (Nov 2): President Duterte set to choose Navy’s top leader for first time
Philippine Navy (PN) flag-in-officer-in-command Vice Admiral Caesar Taccad will formally retire from the service this coming Nov. 13 after reaching the mandatory retirement age of 56. Taccad, a member of Philippine Military Academy Class of 1982, will bow out of the PN after 34 years of service.
This is going to be the first time President Rodrigo Duterte will choose the Navy’s top leader.
Turn-over ceremony for Taccad’s successor is tentatively scheduled on November 12, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) public affairs office chief Col. Edgard Arevalo said.
Possible replacements for Taccad are Western Command head Vice Admiral Ronald Joseph Mercado and a member of PMA Class 1983; PN vice commander Rear Admiral Rafael G. Mariano, a member of PMA Class of 1984; Philippine Fleet commander Rear Admiral Gaerlan, another member of PMA Class of 1984 and Naval Education and Training Command head Rear Admiral Narciso Vingson, a member of PMA Class of 1985.
“Whoever becomes the next Flag Officer in Command among this list of very senior and competent flag officers of the Philippine Navy will surely serve our purpose well,” Arevalo said.
“They are all seasoned commanders and managers. They have gone all through the billets in the Philippine Navy from junior command at sea to their respective designations as staff and then other management positions as they rose from the ranks of the PN,” he added.
http://www.update.ph/2016/11/president-duterte-set-to-choose-navys-top-leader-for-first-time/10656
Philippine Navy (PN) flag-in-officer-in-command Vice Admiral Caesar Taccad will formally retire from the service this coming Nov. 13 after reaching the mandatory retirement age of 56. Taccad, a member of Philippine Military Academy Class of 1982, will bow out of the PN after 34 years of service.
This is going to be the first time President Rodrigo Duterte will choose the Navy’s top leader.
Turn-over ceremony for Taccad’s successor is tentatively scheduled on November 12, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) public affairs office chief Col. Edgard Arevalo said.
Possible replacements for Taccad are Western Command head Vice Admiral Ronald Joseph Mercado and a member of PMA Class 1983; PN vice commander Rear Admiral Rafael G. Mariano, a member of PMA Class of 1984; Philippine Fleet commander Rear Admiral Gaerlan, another member of PMA Class of 1984 and Naval Education and Training Command head Rear Admiral Narciso Vingson, a member of PMA Class of 1985.
“Whoever becomes the next Flag Officer in Command among this list of very senior and competent flag officers of the Philippine Navy will surely serve our purpose well,” Arevalo said.
“They are all seasoned commanders and managers. They have gone all through the billets in the Philippine Navy from junior command at sea to their respective designations as staff and then other management positions as they rose from the ranks of the PN,” he added.
http://www.update.ph/2016/11/president-duterte-set-to-choose-navys-top-leader-for-first-time/10656
US, Japan conduct joint amphibious operations
From Update.Ph (Nov 2): US, Japan conduct joint amphibious operations
United States forces is conducting a joint amphibious operations with the Japan Self Defense-Forces (JSDF) off of Guam and Tinian as part of Keen Sword 17 from November 1 to 11. US Navy said Keen Sword is a joint and bilateral exercise held between the US military and JSDF, in an effort to increase operational readiness and interoperability to enhance the Japan-US alliance.
“U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units and personnel will combine with Japanese Self Defense Force units to conduct a range of amphibious missions for the first time since the inception of Keen Sword,” US Navy said.
“Accompanying surface ships will conduct live-fire exercises and other maritime missions to simulate protecting the amphibious task force and providing supporting fires to ground forces ashore,” it added.
http://www.update.ph/2016/11/us-japan-conduct-joint-amphibious-operations/10652
United States forces is conducting a joint amphibious operations with the Japan Self Defense-Forces (JSDF) off of Guam and Tinian as part of Keen Sword 17 from November 1 to 11. US Navy said Keen Sword is a joint and bilateral exercise held between the US military and JSDF, in an effort to increase operational readiness and interoperability to enhance the Japan-US alliance.
“U.S. Navy and Marine Corps units and personnel will combine with Japanese Self Defense Force units to conduct a range of amphibious missions for the first time since the inception of Keen Sword,” US Navy said.
“Accompanying surface ships will conduct live-fire exercises and other maritime missions to simulate protecting the amphibious task force and providing supporting fires to ground forces ashore,” it added.
http://www.update.ph/2016/11/us-japan-conduct-joint-amphibious-operations/10652
Senator calls US a ‘bully’ for halting arms sale to PH
From Update.Ph (Nov 2): Senator calls US a ‘bully’ for halting arms sale to PH
It’s not a scare tactic but a bully attitude. This was how Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson described the decision of the US State Department to halt its planned rifle sale to the Philippine National Police (PNP).
“The United States’ decision to halt the planned sale of 26,000 rifles to the Philippine National Police was not a scare tactic but a bully attitude towards a longtime ally – which is not fair, the Philippines being an equally sovereign state,” Lacson said in a statement.
Lacson, who is a former PNP chief, earlier stressed that it has yet to be proven that there were human rights violations committed in the intensified anti-illegal drug campaign under the current administration.
He said that the US State Department should first show a “conclusive investigation that affirms what Sen. Benjamin Cardin has alleged” before issuing a statement banning the sale of assault rifles.
An exclusive report from Reuters noted that the US State Department is meaning to stop the planned sale of some 26,000 assault rifles to the PNP after US Senator Ben Cardin said he would oppose it.
Aides further said Cardin was “reluctant for the United States to provide the weapons given concerns about human rights violations in the Philippines.”
Although the US decision to halt its arms sale may disrupt the implementation of the PNP’s Capability Enhancement Program (CEP), Lacson said that the PNP should start shopping in other territories for weapons and ammunition.
Lacson cited Taiwan as an example of a country that has stopped buying police firearms from the US and is now procuring their standard 9mm pistols from Germany.
“There are other sources like Israel, Belgium, even Russia and China,” the senator said.
http://www.update.ph/2016/11/senator-calls-us-a-bully-for-halting-arms-sale-to-ph/10650
It’s not a scare tactic but a bully attitude. This was how Senator Panfilo “Ping” Lacson described the decision of the US State Department to halt its planned rifle sale to the Philippine National Police (PNP).
“The United States’ decision to halt the planned sale of 26,000 rifles to the Philippine National Police was not a scare tactic but a bully attitude towards a longtime ally – which is not fair, the Philippines being an equally sovereign state,” Lacson said in a statement.
Lacson, who is a former PNP chief, earlier stressed that it has yet to be proven that there were human rights violations committed in the intensified anti-illegal drug campaign under the current administration.
He said that the US State Department should first show a “conclusive investigation that affirms what Sen. Benjamin Cardin has alleged” before issuing a statement banning the sale of assault rifles.
An exclusive report from Reuters noted that the US State Department is meaning to stop the planned sale of some 26,000 assault rifles to the PNP after US Senator Ben Cardin said he would oppose it.
Aides further said Cardin was “reluctant for the United States to provide the weapons given concerns about human rights violations in the Philippines.”
Although the US decision to halt its arms sale may disrupt the implementation of the PNP’s Capability Enhancement Program (CEP), Lacson said that the PNP should start shopping in other territories for weapons and ammunition.
Lacson cited Taiwan as an example of a country that has stopped buying police firearms from the US and is now procuring their standard 9mm pistols from Germany.
“There are other sources like Israel, Belgium, even Russia and China,” the senator said.
http://www.update.ph/2016/11/senator-calls-us-a-bully-for-halting-arms-sale-to-ph/10650
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