State-sponsored hate: The rise of the pro-Duterte bloggers

From Rappler (Aug 18): State-sponsored hate: The rise of the pro-Duterte bloggers

Pro-Duterte bloggers receive unusual privileges from the Presidential Communications Operations Office to consolidate support for the popular president and silence critics

AT A GLANCE

• The most high-profile, vitriolic pro-Duterte bloggers were given government positions or hired as consultants using public funds
• Pro-Duterte propagandists are being given special treatment by the PCOO, according to insiders, which includes Malacañang accreditation, use of government resources, and cash allowances
• An interim accreditation policy will allow pro-Duterte bloggers to continue using profanity in their posts, often targeting administration critics and media

---

 

“Leni, you are stupid. You and your whole staff are stupid. You’re all sons of bitches.”

 

These were the words of hardcore President Rodrigo Duterte supporter Mocha Uson during a national broadcast – directed toward no less than Vice President Leni Robredo, a leader of the opposition. Uson's hateful comments led to the cancellation of her radio show.

 

Another pillar of the propaganda machine, RJ Nieto, author of pro-Duterte Facebook page Thinking Pinoy, speaks in a similar vitriolic manner. In a Facebook Live Video addressing what he referred to as “the fucking Malacañang press corps” – the group of journalists accredited to cover the President – Nieto cursed at the media, and repeatedly flashed his middle finger.

 

“You Malacañang Press Corps, you act like you're for the Filipino people, but you're sons of bitches!” he said to the camera.

 

CURSING BLOGGERS. RJ Nieto, who is now a government consultant, has constantly cursed the media and Duterte's critics. Screenshot of Nieto's Facebook Live video.

Bruce Rivera, a lawyer and another staunch supporter of Duterte, does not mince his words either. Addressing the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), Rivera also used profanity to attack them.

 

“You sons of bitches, you are not above the President because he has the support of the people. So you have no right to speak to our constitutionally-elected President in such manner because we elected him and gave him the right to be bastos (rude) to the ills of this society, you included,” he said in a Facebook post.

 

Uson, Nieto, and Rivera are similar in various ways. Aside from their unwavering support for the President and their hateful tone and messaging, they are also bloggers that this administration has legitimized in various ways – profanity and all.

 

Uson has since been appointed assistant secretary of the Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO) on the basis of her number of Facebook followers. Duterte himself has confessed that the appointment was payment for a “debt of gratitude” for her backing his presidential bid.

 

Nieto has also been hired as a social media consultant by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) now headed by Foreign Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano. The former senator was Duterte’s running mate in the 2016 elections.

 

While Nieto did not originally support Cayetano’s vice presidential bid, the former senator strategically courted Nieto throughout the campaign, and gave him an attractive consultancy post to win his favor.

 

As for Rivera, he and his group, Status: Hot, appear to be easy candidates for accreditation based on the interim policy of the PCOO. The policy is the latest move of Communications Secretary Martin Andanar to legitimize blogger-propagandists who support President Rodrigo Duterte.

 

Under this administration, the bloggers, who refer to themselves as Diehard Duterte Supporters (DDS), are legitimized through various ways, including access to those in power, consultancy contracts, and “allowances” from the PCOO.

 

Sources familiar with PCOO operations said a budget has been set aside specifically for the bloggers, with priority given by Andanar to his DDS groups. The PCOO is also dependent on these bloggers to monitor and control online sentiment toward Duterte, the sources said.

 

It is a way to consolidate support for the popular president, harnessing influencers online much like what Duterte’s media strategists did during the presidential campaign.

“Whatever the bloggers were doing during the campaign, they’re still doing the same thing now that Duterte is president. Except now they have government support,” said a communications strategist who worked during the 2016 campaign. “It's propaganda.”

But this time, it’s sponsored and funded by the state.

 

Profanity welcome

 

The PCOO has also hired Carlos Munda, another Duterte supporter, propagandist, and administrator of the MindaNation website, as a communications consultant.

 

The amounts of Nieto’s and Munda’s government consultancies and copies of their contracts have not yet been made public, despite these being paid with government funds.

 

“I shall publish my contract, including details regarding compensation, on Thinking Pinoy as soon as it is available,” Nieto posted on his Facebook in early July, while talks for his role were ongoing.

 

“Actually, halos pang-taxi lang ang compensation, P20,000 a month lang tapos subject to tax pa yata, pero ipapublish ko pa rin para transparent.” (Actually, my compensation can barely pay for my taxi rides. Just P20,000 ($400) a month and subject to tax, I think, but I will still publish it for transparency.)

 

Over a month later, Nieto has yet to publicize his contract, but sources who are knowledgeable about similar government consultancies said the amount Nieto mentioned is much too small for his role, and estimated he can be paid significantly higher.

 

SPECIAL TREATMENT. Presidential Communications Secretary Martin Andanar has given bloggers special treatment, often using gov't resources. Photo by Toto Lozano/PPD

These insider-sources said the P20,000 amount is especially dubious since Nieto used to receive cash payments of P40,000 for past content creation jobs.

 

Uson and Nieto still regularly post content online, which are often filled with hate and anger directed at critics of the Duterte administration. They have also spread false accusations, and typically don't apologize for spreading disinformation.

 

(READ: Inside Martin Andanar's man cave)

A

s for its accreditation policy, the PCOO has said it won’t prohibit bloggers from using profanity online – yet another way to legitimize their hateful content and attacks. The policy will be tested over the next 6 months, managed by none other than Uson herself.

 

Backlash

 

Accreditation guidelines have already seen a backlash from non-DDS bloggers online.

“Apparently, the guidelines are meant as cover/justification for the formal entry and presence of DDS Media in functions involving PRRD (President Duterte),” blogger Tonyo Cruz said on his Twitter account @tonyocruz on August 9. Cruz is co-founder of @TweetUpMNL.

 

“As a blogger, I reject in absolute terms the PCOO’s implication that we bloggers are a cheap and unaccountable bunch,” he said in another tweet. “In Andanar's memo, no effort is made to ensure that accreditation wouldn’t be denied on the basis of political standpoint of the applicant.”

 

Jane Uymatiao of Blogwatch, who has been invited to cover past government events, also tweeted through her @citizenjaneph account: “I am NOT applying for social media accreditation. Why? Bec it was not crafted with citizen engagement in mind.”

 

She added: “PCOO totally misses the point. We are after CITIZEN ENGAGEMENT, not tailing the President nor mere reportage. Traditional media does that already.”

Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility (CMFR) trustee Vergel Santos had earlier expressed concern about accrediting bloggers.

 

“Blogging is an individualistic, free-wheeling operation – although some bloggers are known to follow common, if not collusive, lines of thinking. It’s the readiest, least discriminating (in fact, it’s open to anyone), widest-reaching, and therefore most tempting platform of free expression,” Santos told Rappler in February.

 

Journalism, on the other hand, is “both a profession and a trade governed by universal rules of practice and ethics and tradition,” he said. No such rules govern bloggers.

 

Special treatment

 

The special treatment given by the PCOO to DDS bloggers becomes evident especially in events that promote government programs, and to which they are often invited.

The expectation is for them to generate buzz online about government programs, and to make these trend on Twitter – a fixation of Andanar, and a measurement of success.

 

OPEN TO BLOGGERS. PCOO Assistant Secretary Mocha Uson's office is in charge of choosing bloggers who receive accreditation to cover President Rodrigo Duterte's events. Malacañang file photo

The DDS bloggers who faithfully attend these events and craft pro-government posts are treated well in exchange, insider-sources said. Andanar, according to a source who is familiar with his strategy, said, “He makes sure they are taken care of when they come to events.”

 

During the Dutertenomics forum hosted by the PCOO in April, for example, the favorable treatment accorded the DDS bloggers was apparent. Organized in partnership with the Department of Finance, the forum discussed the government’s infrastructure programs that seek to fuel economic growth.

 

In that forum, the bloggers were invited by the PCOO and were given a table to work from – unlike mainstream media.

 

“They’re always separated from regular media,” said a PCOO insider. “They’re given tables and mobile or pocket wifi.”

 

At the end of the event, the bloggers were also given an “allowance” of a few thousand pesos each, said another source familiar with the transaction.

 

‘So much power’

 

“Internally, the budget is often referred to as ‘pampakain (food budget) for our online friends’ or ‘allowance for our online friends,’” the PCOO insider said.

 

“To be sure, these DDS bloggers will support the President whether they are paid or not. But some individuals have used them for personal motives and for political ambitions.”

 

 

GOV'T RESOURCES. Status:Hot bloggers use RTVM resources for their global DDS party. Screenshot of livestream from Status:Hot Facebook page

 

In China and Singapore, pro-Duterte bloggers were able to ambush-interview the President in his hotel while Malacañang reporters were prohibited by the Palace’s Media Accreditation and Relations Office from doing this. Flouting such Palace rules could get Malacañang members barred from coverage.

 

Even before the Dutertenomics forum, DDS bloggers were given accreditation by the PCOO to join the Philippine delegation to some of the President’s foreign trips – an unprecedented move.

 

Sources we spoke to repeatedly expressed concern over the growing influence of DDS bloggers in Andanar’s office.

 

“They have so much power with the PCOO,” one of them said. “It's concerning.”

One insider agreed, “They also prioritize DDS bloggers over media."

 

Just over the weekend, the PCOO even offered government resources for a DDS thanksgiving party, organized by one of the pro-Duterte bloggers. The event was led by Rivera, who posted on his Facebook wall: “Thanks to the PCOO, Martin Andanar and Pebbles Duque for helping us with the broadcast of the event to the Philippines.”

 

News of Rivera and his group using government resources triggered a backlash, to which Rivera responded, “I am asking this basic question. What authority did Status: Hot usurp?”

 

“And whose authority are we undermining? Si Martin Andanar ang head ng PCOO so sino ang sinuway namin? (Andanar is the head of the PCOO, so who did we defy?)”

Rivera himself admitted using government resources offered by Andanar for broadcasting purposes.

 

“And for the record, the only time we used government resources is when we used the PTV studio for the SONA (State of the Nation Address), the time we used the ASEAN studio in Conrad and the RTVM coverage sa DDS Thanksgiving,” he wrote.

 

PTV refers to People’s Television, RTVM refers to Radio-TV-Malacañang. These, along with the ASEAN activities, are funded by taxpayers' money.

 

Yet despite Rivera’s own admission of Andanar’s permission to use PCOO’s resources for past events or panel discussions, Andanar denied it when asked by Rappler.

 

“It was a DDS worldwide event. It wasn’t broadcasted, he said, referring to the event on August 12.

 

He added, “We don’t have a budget for bloggers,” also denying any allowances being given to bloggers, or any special treatment being accorded them.

 

But at the Philippines’ hosting of ASEAN’s 50th anniversary in early August, the influence yielded by the blogger-propagandists was most noticeable: pro-Duterte bloggers were given accreditation and access to cover the event.

 

 

ACCREDITATION. Malacañang offers media access to pro-Duterte bloggers under a 'DDS' organization. Photo sourced from Facebook

   

Early this month, photos of pro-Duterte bloggers’ ASEAN media IDs went viral online – raising questions about the PCOO’s vetting process for media qualifications. While veteran bloggers – even before the DDS came to be – have long asked for access to presidential events under this administration, it was the PCOO itself that willingly offered them access. With priority, of course, given to the DDS bloggers.

 

IDs issued to online supporters of the President identified bearers as “Media” with a more specific designation of “DDS Philippines” or “Social Media Philippines.”

 

After the controversy blew up online, Andanar, in an interview on radio station dzRH on Monday, August 9, defended the IDs and said bloggers and “social media

influencers” were told to register online through a system of accreditation which also applied to mainstream media.

 

What accreditation?

 

But in a post by Rivera, who was accredited with a DDS Philippines badge, Rivera said they didn’t really need accreditation.

 

“And why do we need accreditation. We are bloggers. As the name implies, we blog. We post opinions, commentaries and literary work. WE DO NOT PRESENT THE NEWS. We are not a news outfit,” he said in a Facebook post on August 7.

 

“Hence we have no obligation to be impartial, objective and straightforward. It is about opinions. So why do we need accreditation?”

 

The accreditation, according to insiders, was pushed by the PCOO, and personally facilitated by the PCOO’s Pebbles Duque, who made sure DDS bloggers had access.

 

Aside from ascertaining they received media badges by endorsing them to the ASEAN National Organizing Committee (NOC), she also directly assisted them in broadcasting live from the Conrad hotel.

 

“The go-to person for bloggers is Pebbles Duque,” one of the insiders said. “She is Andanar’s trusted aide when it comes to social media operations.”

 

In another Facebook post, Rivera thanked Duque specifically for the unprecedented access given to DDS bloggers, specifically for his group, Status: Hot.

 

 

PROFESSIONAL SET-UP. The broadcast set-up prepared by PCOO for DDS bloggers. Photo from Pebbles Duque Facebook page

  

He wrote on August 6, “Come to think of it...MJ Quiambao Reyes, Rocky Gonzales, Francis Manalo and Mamshies (aka Renewel Basa), we are officially the first social media bloggers allowed to broadcast a live video in ASEAN history. Times have changed. Pebbles Duque, you rock!”

 

MJ Quiambao-Reyes, also a self-identified Duterte supporter, commented on the post as well. She thanked Duque for serving as “exec producer, director, writer” of their live panel from ASEAN. 

 

The post was accompanied by a link to the livestream of the panel, wherein the group sat on a professionally set up, makeshift studio – built and run through government funds.

 

(To be concluded)

 

https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/178709-duterte-die-hard-supporters-bloggers-propaganda-pcoo

Blogger-propagandists, the new crisis managers

From Rappler (Aug 20): Blogger-propagandists, the new crisis managers

In many ways, pro-Duterte bloggers do the job of the PCOO especially when it comes to managing backlash against the administration and promoting government programs

AT A GLANCE

• Pro-Duterte bloggers serve as crisis managers for the PCOO, alerting them about any negative sentiments about the administration
• The social media monitoring skills of the bloggers allow the PCOO to react in a timely manner, a huge boost to the disorganized government office
• Pro-Duterte bloggers are also invited to cover government forums and events to spread good news about the administration, but the PCOO does not rebuke bloggers when they spread false or hateful content

---

READ: Part 1: State-sponsored hate: The rise of the pro-Duterte bloggers

 

In the same way that President Rodrigo Duterte’s campaign depended on bloggers to evaluate online sentiment and generate online buzz in the lead up to the May 2016 presidential elections, the Presidential Communications Operations Office (PCOO) harnessed the bloggers’ dedication to Duterte, and to this day, depend on them to play the same roles – and more.

 

Aside from spreading pro-government propaganda, bloggers have become “crisis managers” for the PCOO, several sources familiar with their operations told Rappler.

 

(READ: Duterte's P10M social media campaign: Organic, volunteer-driven)

 

Part 1 of our series, State-sponsored hate: The rise of the pro-Duterte bloggers, focused on how the PCOO has legitimized pro-Duterte bloggers by giving them special access to government officials and resources, consultancy contracts, cash "allowances," and an interim accreditation policy for bloggers to cover the Palace.

 

These bloggers, who call themselves Diehard Duterte Supporters (DDS), are well taken care of by the PCOO and given unusual privileges, not just because of their constant defense of Duterte, but also because they serve as eyes and ears on the ground for the poorly-led agency under Communications Secretary Martin Andanar.

 

Fighting backlash

 

After Duterte's State of the Nation Address on July 24, the President held a press conference wherein he threatened to bomb Lumad schools for teaching subversion and communism.

 

“Umalis kayo dyan, sabihin ko sa mga Lumad. Bobombahan ko iyan, isali ko iyang mga istraktura. (I will ask the Lumad to leave. I will bomb their structures.) I will use the Philippine Air Force. You are operating illegally and you are teaching the children to rebel against government,” Duterte said.

 

The Lumad are indigenous people from Mindanao who have lost their ancestral land over time, have faced persecution, and have suffered human rights abuses as minorities.

 

Public response, at least among those who were vocal, was extremely negative.

The Communist Party of the Philippines, for instance, called Duterte “The lowest of the low” for his threat, and a “a madman with bombs.” The president of the National Union of People’s Lawyers, Edre Olalia, said the threat was “as monstrous as it can get.” The organization that operates Lumad schools, Alcadev, said the President made the accusations so he “can justify the attacks on our schools and threaten us to bomb our communities.”

 

Photo by Karlos Manlupig/Rappler

 

Social media was also abuzz with anger. A netizen labeled him a “terrorist”, another called his presidency a “regime of intimidation”, while still another said it felt like “Syria than the Philippines.”

 

The backlash was so widespread that pro-Duterte bloggers alerted the PCOO through social media officer Pebbles Duque, whose main role is to organize and mobilize bloggers.

 

The workflow between the pro-Duterte bloggers and the PCOO is as follows: bloggers see negative sentiment about Duterte or the administration online, they alert Duque, Duque relays the message to the PCOO officials, and the PCOO officials decide what to do.

 

“Pro-Duterte bloggers told Duque about [the Lumad backlash] and asked her for a government response,” a PCOO insider said. “Duque then asked PCOO officials. It was only then that they realized they needed to do damage control, and released a statement the next day.”

 

The statement from presidential spokesperson Ernesto Abella said the threat to bomb schools was because Duterte wanted to protect Filipino youth.

 

The President "highlights the need to protect our youth and doing so entails ensuring they get the correct education that reinforces the right values that instill love of country and respect for our laws among others, and not rebellion," read the statement.

 

By July 28, the President himself clarified his statement, saying that what he meant was he wouldn’t bomb the schools while the kids were inside because his main point was, he wanted to protect them.

 

Social media monitoring

 

Multiple sources knowledgeable about the workflow of the PCOO confirmed that Duque is the direct link between bloggers and PCOO officials on a day to day basis, making her valuable to Andanar.

 

The Lumad bombing statement of the President was only one of many issues bloggers managed for the administration. The pro-Duterte bloggers often alert Duque about issues that gain steam online and that need damage control – from trivial to major.

 

It was the bloggers, for instance, who called the PCOO’s attention to the recent gaffes of the Philippine News Agency, when it used the Dole pineapple logo as its photo for its recent article on the Department of Labor and Employment, and when it posted a pro-China story.

 

Both alerts allowed Andanar to respond fairly quickly.

 

“They monitor anti-DDS pages too,” an insider-source said. “Their monitoring is better than ours.”

 

COMMUNICATIONS TEAM. Presidential Spokesman Ernesto Abella (2nd from right) has been given content and messaging after repeated blunders by Communications Secretary Martin Andanar (1st from right). Photo by Ace Morandante/Presidential Photo

The insider also explained that Duque was the way through which Andanar managed to get the pro-Duterte bloggers into the PCOO's fold.

 

“Andanar uses her because she is friends with the bloggers from the campaign period. During the campaign, she helped unite online supporters. Now, he’s using her to get good publicity from the bloggers,” said the same source.

 

Asked whether the PCOO uses bloggers for crisis management, Andanar answered in the negative: “There is no such thing.”

 

Propaganda

 

Aside from monitoring the negative publicity surrounding the administration, the pro-Duterte bloggers are also used by the PCOO to spread positive news about the government.

 

In the PCOO, Duque is the one in charge of inviting and gathering bloggers to cover government events like the Dutertenomics forum, the Real Numbers forum, and forums announcing the government’s tax reform program, e-power program, and #BangonMarawi event, among others.

 

The bloggers are expected to post on their Facebook pages about the government events – as public relations officers would – to spread the message and praise government programs and initiatives.

 

“In every event, about 10-15 seats are reserved for Duque’s bloggers. Sometimes, they don’t fill it up, so bloggers bring their friends instead,” said a source knowledgeable about the PCOO's strategy.

 

Like social media monitoring, this is also something bloggers can do better than the PCOO, given their online followers.

 

For the tax reform forum on July 5, Duque gathered pro-Duterte bloggers including RJ Nieto, author of Thinking Pinoy; and Status: Hot’s Rocky Gonzales, Renewel Basa, and MJ Quiambao-Reyes.

 

Others invited by Duque were pro-Duterte brothers Greco and Jeremiah Belgica; Ronald Cardema who leads the Duterte Youth movement; Luis Azcona, an admin of the Daily Duterte Facebook page; and Arpee Lazaro, a former Liberal Party supporter turned pro-Duterte.

 

A look at the posts of some of the invitees indicate striking similarities. Most share information on what tax reform is and rally netizens for their support for the bill, sharing a link to the government's FAQ page.

 

But there was also propaganda tactics and misinformation spread widely by pro-Duterte groups on tax reform. On the day of the forum, a group called Thinking Minds posted a video on YouTube entitled: "Shameful Yellowtard strategy: Starve the country of cash by OPPOSING TAX REFORM."

 

The message was simple: if you don't support tax reform, then you support the opposition.

 

It also alleged that the reason the Liberal Party opposed tax reform was because of a destabilization plot to oust Duterte.

 

The video starts with soft, heartfelt music, appealing to the emotions. Sentences are then slowly flashed on the screen one by one:

 

President Duterte has a problem.
He wants to reform taxes…
So he can help the middle class and the poor.
Duterte also needs money to build our infrastructure...
To attract investors to make our country prosperous.
But the YELLOWTARDS are STOPPING the REFORMS.
They are spreading lies to stop the reforms…
...so that Duterte will fail and they will return to power.
He needs our help more than ever.
Support TAX REFORM.

 

The video then goes on to show spliced clips of the President talking about tax and asking for support; an interview by hardcore Duterte supporter and blogger turned PCOO Assistant Secretary Mocha Uson with a tax expert; and news clips on tax reform from state-channel PTV.

 

The video was shared by Daily Duterte Facebook page – the admin of which was invited by the PCOO to the forum – to its over 300,000 followers.

 

 

It accompanied the post with the accusation: "The Philippines needs to reform its tax system to seize opportunities that will enable us to realize our potential as a 'tiger' economy but the Yellowtards will never allow this to happen because a Tiger Economy will prove how inutile YELLOW liberal politics is."

 

Interestingly, at least 6 other pro-Duterte groups shared the video as well, with the exact same post as the Daily Duterte page. Other pages that shared it include DU30 Correspondents, Duterte Speaks Now, Balitangbalita Duterte, OFW Global Movement for Duterte, Duterte, and President Rody Duterte.

 

IDENTICAL POSTS. Several pro-Duterte pages shared the exact same video with the exact same hashtag and false allegation. Screenshots from Facebook

While the PCOO invites pro-Duterte bloggers to attend events and share information about government programs, it does not correct them when they share wrong information nor rebuke them for hateful content that they post online. Nor does the PCOO exact accountability when the bloggers they've tapped to disseminate information, share false statements.

 

The allegations in the video are unproven; nor does the video provide any facts about a so-called destabilization plot.

 

Additionally, it is not only Liberal Party senators, who oppose the Malacañang version of the tax reform bill. Other majority senators against it are Sonny Angara and Win Gatchalian because of concerns over its being "anti-poor."

 

Controlling the narrative

 

Asked whether pro-Duterte bloggers are treated differently from media or other non-DDS bloggers, Andanar denied it.

 

"No, there’s none," he said, referring to special treatment. "Actually, we’re just really open. Even bloggers from the other side, they’re all invited."

 

A small number of bloggers who don’t identify as DDS bloggers are also invited to government forums like members of Blogwatch, but they are invited supposedly to “legitimize” the bloggers’ invites.

 

“Inviting a few non-DDS bloggers is a strategy by Andanar to show that neutral bloggers are also welcome,” said the PCOO insider.

 

However, compared to pro-Duterte bloggers, multiple sources who work with Andanar said that the content of these non-DDS bloggers is closely monitored to make sure they are “not anti-government.”

 

It is also the pro-Duterte bloggers themselves who monitor content from other bloggers who are viewed as being more neutral.

 

Aside from local bloggers, Duque also helps organize Duterte supporters from across the world.

 

On August 1, she welcomed them to Malacañang for a Museum tour and an interactive session led by the Office of the Presidential Adviser for OFWs and Muslim Concerns Secretary Abdullah Mama-o.

 

“Finally met the DDS leaders worldwide," Duque posted on her Facebook page. "Countries represent from USA, Europe, New Zealand, Australia, Middle East and Asia came all the way here to visit us."

 

The same sources with PCOO experience said, the DDS OFWs are a solid, active, and engaged online force, who are deeply devoted to the President and who play the same roles as the bloggers in the Philippines – except on different time zones.

 

Dependence on bloggers

 

According to an insider, Andanar depends on pro-Duterte bloggers, because within the department, there is no established crisis communication group – aside from Viber messages among official PCOO staff.

 

“No one takes charge during a crisis,” one source said. “There is no point person, no go-to individual when a crisis ensues. Andanar himself asks various officials to take charge or take over, but only as issues arise, and when he hears that bloggers raise questions.”

 

The response is reactive, rather than proactive, said the same source.

 

 

ACCESS AND RESPONSIBILITY. PCOO chief Martin Andanar attends a forum where bloggers voice their opposition to restrictions in PCOO's draft social media policy. Malacañang file photo

 

This is unlike during the presidential campaign when media strategists met regularly and agreed on the message for the day or for the week. Efficient and professional, they also anticipated issues that could blow up and prepared messages to deal with and counter them.

 

At present, various PCOO officials talk about and vet messaging on the fly only through Viber, before it is turned into a written statement by Assistant Secretary for Content and Messaging Rachel Queenie Rodulfo.

 

Its current disorganization and lack of coordination means Andanar has relied heavily on bloggers, who monitor what is being talked about online. This is also what led him to tap Duque, who was close to the bloggers from the campaign.

 

"When Andanar realized her clout, that's when he took her in his inner circle," said a source.

 

“There is no need for PCOO to monitor social media themselves, because the bloggers do it. This is why he keeps the DDS bloggers close.”

 

With the pro-Duterte bloggers also spreading information on government programs – regardless of whether they are factual or not – it is easy to understand why Andanar is pushing for their accreditation in Malacañang as well.

https://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/178972-blogger-diehard-duterte-supporters-crisis-manager

PMA holds entrance exam today

From the Manila Times (Aug 20): PMA holds entrance exam today

THE Philippine Military Academy (PMA) administers its entrance examination for aspiring officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 40 examination centers nationwide today.

The PMA Entrance Exam (PMAEE) is the first stage in the selection process for cadetship in the country’s premier military school.

Cadets enjoy a full government scholarship during their entire stay in the PMA.

Upon earning a bachelor’s degree, they will be commissioned as second lieutenants and ensigns in the AFP.

Today’s examination will measure applicants’ mental ability in Mathematics (Algebra and Geometry), English (Grammar and Reading Comprehension) and Abstract Reasoning (Verbal, Numerical Reasoning and Pattern Analysis).

Pioneering batches of senior high school students under the K to 12 Basic Education Program who will have graduated before April 2018 are allowed to take the PMAEE.

The academy particularly accepts Grade 12 and even college-level students who graduated from the 4th year High School of the old curriculum.

Qualified applicants must be natural-born Filipino citizens, have a minimum height of 5 feet for both male and female, single and have never been married, physically fit and of good moral character, must have not committed any administrative or criminal case and should have been born between April 1, 1996 and April 1, 2001.

Successful applicants would be officially received in the academy on April 1, 2018 and would be part of PMA Class of 2022.

http://www.manilatimes.net/pma-holds-entrance-exam-today/345745/

ISAFP chief next 4th ID head

From the Manila Bulletin (Aug 20): ISAFP chief next 4th ID head

The chief of the Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) will take over as commander of the Army’s Northeastern and Northern Mindanao 4th Infantry Division (4th ID) on Wednesday.

Maj. Gen. Ronald Villanueva will replace Maj. Gen. Benjamin Madrigal Jr.

Madrigal, a member of Philippine Military Academy Class of 1985, assumed leadership of the Southern Luzon (Solcom) based in Camp Nakar, Lucena City, last Friday, replacing Lt. Gen. Ferdinand Quidilla who is retiring after reaching the mandatory retirement age of 56 on August 30, 2017.

Madrigal served as 4th ID’s commander for 17 months and his new assignment as Solcom chief is a promotion, said 4th ID spokesman Capt. Joe Patrick A. Martinez.

Villanueva is Madrigal’s batchmate at PMA.

Villanueva is the son of Brig. Gen. Rogelio F. Villanueva who commanded the 4th ID from March 28, 1988 to March 19, 1990.

The father was assigned as brigade commander in Agusan provinces before his promotion as the 4th ID chief.

http://news.mb.com.ph/2017/08/20/isafp-chief-next-4th-id-head/

CPP/NPA-Negros: Victories in Armed Struggle in Negros

NPA Negros propaganda statement posted to the Communist Party of the Philippines Website (Aug 18): Victories in Armed Struggle in Negros



Juanito Magbanua, Spokesperson
NPA-Negros Island (Apolinario Gatmaitan Command)

18 August 2017
Press Release

The Negros NPA Regional Operational Command launched a total of 17 armed actions since late January this year which netted for the people’s army 10 high-powered rifles, 15 short arms and assorted ammunition and other military materiel. These were carried out through the five guerrilla fronts in the the island.

Ka Juanito Magbanua, spokesperson of the NPA Apolinario Gatmaitan Regional Operational Command said the most significant was the ambush last July 21 in barangay Magsaysay, Guihulngan City, which finally punished C/Supt. Arnel Arpon, five other policemen and a Cafgu militiaman.

“This tactical offensive was long overdue in the face of the revolutionary masses’ clamor to punish the fascist PNP unit in Guihulngan who, for years, have been committing extra-judicial killings against ordinary civilians, aside from protecting drug lords and criminal gangs while being guns-for-hire themselves,” he added.

During the last six months, the NPA also successfully implemented punitive measures against fourteen land-grabbers, criminal elements and intelligence assets of the 303rd Brigade responsible, just this year, for a host of human rights violations and anti-peasant activities, including the salvaging of four legal activist-leaders. Their punishment hit at the capability of the AFP/PNP to inflict further harm upon the people’s lives, rights and livelihood within and outside the guerrilla areas in the island.

The enemy also suffered further damage in the three defensive actions so far this year, with the 62nd IB losing two of its men in June 22 at barangay Cambayobo, Calatrava town, and the 79th IB four of its own in June 30 at barangay Binobohan, Guihulngan City.

In all these offensive and defensive actions, the people’s army had only one fighter slightly wounded.

Ka Juanito Magbanua said “these demonstrate the NPA’s increasing capability in launching armed struggle that is integrated with agrarian revolution and base building; nevertheless, we must constantly improve ourselves as the US-Duterte regime strips itself of all progressive trappings and intensifies its brutal reactionary war against the armed revolutionary movement.”

In this regard, the NPA Regional Operational Command also conducted two politico-military trainings during the last six months aimed at improving the fighting skill, political capability, combat discipline and revolutionary militance of NPA commanders and fighters. The first was the 40-day Basic Politico-Military Course-Instructors Training, which had 27 graduates. The second was the 50-day Basic Politico-Military Course, with 67 graduates. At least 80% of the trainees were aged 18-30, while around 15% were of petty-bourgeois class origin.

Ka Juanito Magbanua said these trainings provide added impetus for Red commanders and fighters to better implement the Party’s three-year program aimed at, among others, building more and bigger NPA formations at all levels, intensifying armed tactical offensives to seize arms and other military equipment mainly from the AFP/PNP, and waging an extensive and intensive guerrilla warfare based on an ever-widening and ever-deepening mass base.

The trainings were the first held since 2008, when Negros became one of the national priority targets for sustained counterrevolutionary campaigns under Oplans Bantay Laya 2 and Bayanihan. The people’s army in the island had to make do with politico-military crash courses in the face of sustained search-and-destroy operations of the enemy until 2013, while prioritizing rebuilding work of the revolutionary mass base thereafter.

As the fourth major island in the country and the second in the Visayas, it is necessary for the armed revolutionary movement in Negros to overcome its weaknesses and rectify its errors in order to help frustrate the US-Duterte regime’s Oplan Kapayapaan and contribute in the national development of the strategic defensive of the people’s war towards a new and higher stage, Ka Juanito Magbanua concluded.

https://www.philippinerevolution.info/statements/20170818-victories-in-armed-struggle-in-negros

NPA-Southern Tagalog propaganda statement poste do the Communist Party of the Philippines Website (Aug 17): Patio ang karahasan ng DSSP Kapayapaan sa Timog Katagalugan


Jaime “Ka Diego” Padilla, Spokesperson
NPA-Southern Tagalog (Melito Glor Command)
17 August 2017



Mariing kinukondena ng Melito Glor Command – New People’s Army Southern Tagalog ang walang habas na militarisasyon ng AFP-PNP (Armed Forces of the Philippines-Philippine National Police) sa ilalim ng DSSP Kapayapaan ng rehimeng US-Duterte. Tahasang niyuyurakan ng rehimen ang karapatang tao ng mamamayan sa Timog Katagalugan sa walang habas na militarisasyon sa kanayunan sa ilalim ng DSSP Kapayapaan gamit ang iba’t ibang tabing tulad ng “gera kontra terorismo” at “gera laban sa droga”.

Laganap ito sa Palawan, Mindoro, Batangas, Quezon at Rizal kung saan pawang mga sibilyan ang target ng pananakot, panghuhuli, sapilitang interogasyon, intimidasyon at mga pagpatay sa layuning ihiwalay ang NPA sa mamamayan. Sa bawat pagkatalo ng AFP-PNP sa kamay ng NPA, mga sibilyan ang kanilang nilalapastangan at pinahihirapan.

Sa Palawan, ang buong pamilya ni Chieftain Polog, katutubo sa So. Marinsyawon, Brgy. Bonobono, Bataraza, ay hinuli, maging ang mga buntis na asawa, at dinala sa kampo. Binugbog ang mga kalalakihan habang iniinteroga sa kampo. Si Chieftain Polog naman ay inihulog sa truck at pinalabas na nagtangakang tumakas. Kasalukuyan siyang nasa ospital.

Samantala, sa North Palawan, hinuli at ikinulong ang mag-asawang Labaho at dalawa pang kasamahang mangingisda dahil sa mariin nilang pagtutol sa PCSD AO#5. Sinampahan sila ng gawa-gawang kaso habang pinalalabas na mga myembro ng NPA.

Pinalalabas ring may naganap na labanan noong July 27 sa pagitan ng mga nag-ooperasyong marines at NPA upang bigyan katwiran ang military operations sa buong Palawan na naghahasik ng takot sa buong mamamayan sa lalawigan.

Sa Mindoro at Batangas naman, nagpapatuloy ang ginagawang panghaharas sa mga mamamayang nakikibaka para sa kanilang kabuhayan. Patuloy ang karahasan, pananakot at pagpapalayas sa Hacienda Almeda sa Sta. Cruz at Mamburao, Mindoro Occidental, Hacienda Roxas at Hacienda Looc sa Nasugbu, Batangas, Brgy. Coral ni Lopez, Calaca, Batangas, at Brgy. Patungan, Maragondon, Cavite.

Sa Quezon, walang tigil ang operasyon ng 85th IB sa buong Bondoc Peninsula at sa mga bayan ng Mauban, Lucban at Gen. Nakar. Patuloy rin ang kanilang operasyong psywar, pananakot at intimidasyon sa mamamayan ng Quezon. Sa layuning itigil ang paglaban ng mga magsasaka sa Hacienda Uy, sinampahan ng gawa-gawang kaso si Roldan Tayactac, lider-magsasaka at 21 pang mga magsasaka na nakikibaka para sa kanilang karapatan sa lupa.

Samantala, pinatay si Burgos Idaño sa Sitio Umagos, Brgy. Camflora, San Andres upang takutin ang mga magsasakang lumalaban para sa kanilang karapatan sa lupa sa pastuhan ng isang panginoong maylupa sa lugar. Noong Hulyo 30 naman, pinatay si Edgar Tabien, isang empleyado ng munisipyo at caretaker ng sementeryo sa Brgy. Magisian, Lopez. Kilala si Tabien bilang alyado ng mga magsasaka sa Lopez na nagsusulong ng kanilang pakikibaka sa lupa.

Sa Rizal, tuluy-tuloy ang isinasagawang military operations sa mga komunidad ng Dumagat. Hinuhuli at tinatakot ang mga katutubong Dumagat. Pilit silang pinasasama sa mga combat operations at sinasaktan ang hindi sasama.

Kaugnay nito, nananawagan ang Melito Glor Command sa lahat ng yunit ng NPA sa rehiyon na maglunsad ng mga opensibang militar bilang bahagi ng pagtatanggol sa buhay at ari-arian ng mamamayan ng Timog Katagalugan. Dapat pagbayarin ang AFP-PNP sa kanilang mga krimen sa mamamayan. Nanawagan din ang MGC sa mamamayan na i-ulat sa alinmang himpilan ng NPA ang iba’t ibang atrosidad ng AFP-PNP upang bigyang hustisya ang mga biktima ng DSSP Kapayapaan at iba pang atake sa mamamayan ng rehimeng US-Duterte.###

https://www.philippinerevolution.info/statements/20170817-patuloy-ang-karahasan-ng-dssp-

Water Wars: a “Suspicious” Flotilla that May “Not Mean Anything”

From Lawfare (Aug 18): Water Wars: a “Suspicious” Flotilla that May “Not Mean Anything”


Some Philippine Leaders Herald a New Era of Cooperation with China, while Others Warn of a Buildup of Chinese Naval and Civilian Vessels near Philippine territory



Satellite photograph showing Chinese ships near Thitu (Pag-asa) Island (Photo: AMTI)

The week began with signs that the détente between the Philippines and China was coming along smoothly. Philippine Defense Minister Delfin Lorenzana told a congressional hearing on Monday that China had promised to stop occupying new features in the South China Sea and to stop building new installations in the Scarborough Shoal. According to Lorenzana, the two countries had reached a “modus vivendi,” or a “way of getting along,” in the South China Sea that would involve an end of China’s building projects.

The next day, Foreign Affairs Secretary Alan Peter Cayetano told the Philippine House of Representatives that the government is considering working with China to develop petroleum resources in the disputed waters between the two countries. Cayetano said that the project, if confirmed, would not cede any Philippine territory or sovereignty to China – perhaps a response to earlier remarks by Senior Justice Antonio Carpio that an oil and gas joint venture in Philippine territory would endanger the country’s sovereignty. “I will assure you, any legal framework will conform with local laws and the Constitution,” Cayetano said.

But the very same day, Congressman Gary Alejano reported that a number of Chinese PLA Navy ships had been deployed near Thitu, or Pag-asa, Island, a large island in the Spratly Islands that the Philippines occupy. According to Alejano’s “military sources,” a pair of Chinese frigates, a coast guard ship, and some fishing ships affiliated with China’s maritime militia were located a few miles north of Thitu Island. In a press conference, the Congressman described the ships as “suspicious,” and said: “I call on the Philippine government officials to be transparent in what is happening in the West Philippine Sea. We must assert our rights in the midst of talks with China.”

On Wednesday, Secretary Cayetano responded to Congressman Alejano’s report: he could not confirm the presence of the Chinese ships, but added that “[t]he presence of ships alone does not mean anything…the situation in the area is very stable.” Cayetano said that China was not an enemy and should not be treated as such. “It’s good we have people like Congressman Alejano who reminds us to monitor the situation,” he said. “But there’s a thin line between informing us and stirring up the situation.” Responding to Cayetano’s remarks, Alejano expressed dissatisfaction with Cayetano for “brushing aside the unusual and suspicious presence of several huge military and Chinese ships…in the vicinity of our largest island.”

Though neither Lorenzana or Cayetano confirmed the presence of the ships, Alejano released photographs of what he claimed were Chinese ships operating near Thitu Island. The Washington-based Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) released satellite images that seem to indicate that Chinese naval and civilian waters were indeed present in the area. According to AMTI’s report, “On that day, there were nine Chinese fishing ships and two naval/law enforcement vessels visible near Thitu…with others possibly under cloud cover. It is impossible to know if any of those ships might be affiliated with the maritime militia, but at least two appear to be actively fishing…” The report added that the flotilla’s presence was “highly provocative” and speculated that Beijing might have intended to “dissuade Manila from planned construction on Thitu.”

In Other News…
United States
On Monday, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford arrived in Beijing for talks with top Chinese military leaders. At the opening of the dialogue, Gen. Dunford said that the two sides intended to discuss “difficult issues where we will not necessarily have the same perspective,” but that they “shared a commitment to work through these difficulties.”

On Tuesday, Gen. Dunford met with PLA Gen. Fang Fenghui to sign an agreement announcing a new communication mechanism between the two militaries. According to U.S. Joint Staff officials, the agreement would “enable us to communicate to reduce the risk of miscalculation” and to mitigate potential crises. The two sides agreed to work together to develop the framework, with the first meeting scheduled for November. Few details were released about how the mechanism would work or when it would be used, but both sides spoke of the need to develop trust and openness. Gen. Dunford said that crisis communications between the United States and China is critical, but that avoiding miscommunication was “the minimum standard.” Rather than simply working to avert a crisis, he said, “We should also try to see areas to cooperate.” Gen. Fang agreed, stating that the American and Chinese armies could work together to cooperate as partners.

Japan

Meanwhile, the United States was deepening its military ties with Japan as well. The two countries commenced a series of joint military operations on and around the Japanese island of Hokkaido on August 10. On Tuesday, the two countries’ air forces conducted drills near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which Japan occupies but China and Taiwan claim. In a statement, the U.S. Pacific Air Forces said, “These training flights with Japan demonstrate the solidarity and resolve we share with our allies to preserve peace and security in the Indo-Asia-Pacific.”

Vietnam

The Deepsea Metro I, a drilling ship contracted by Vietnam’s PetroVietnam and the Spanish firm Repsol to drill for oil in disputed waters claimed by China, arrived near the Malaysian port of Labuan on Monday. The ship was last reported at the drilling site on July 30. Vietnam canceled its plans to explore for petroleum in the disputed waters under intense pressure from China. Gregory Polling, the director of the AMTI, argued that the departure of the drilling ship signaled that Vietnam was unable to stand up to China without support from the United States or the regional powers of the South China Sea.

Taiwan

Taiwan placed its military on high alert after the Chinese air force conducted operations around – and sometimes within – Taiwan’s air defense identification zone over the weekend and on Monday. Taiwanese Defense Ministry Spokesman Chen Chung-ji stated, “Our air force and navy will stay on high alert to prevent them from intruding upon our territorial waters or airspace or even engaging in hostility.” The drills included bombers and surveillance aircraft and marked the eighth time that Chinese military aircraft have trained near Taiwan since July.


Analysis, Commentary, and Additional Information

Mark Valencia argues in the South China Morning Post that China and the United States should develop guidelines for naval operations off of each other’s’ shores. According to Valencia, the two sides have reached a sort of settled pattern in which the United States conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in Chinese-claimed waters, and Beijing expresses disapproval. However, he says, this status quo is not stable. For example, if China tried to interfere with the American patrols, or if Japanese naval forces joined the U.S. Navy’s FONOPs, a conflict could easily break out. To avoid this outcome, Valencia argues that the two sides should work together to establish norms and rules governing how their navies will operate in contested waters.

Writing in The Diplomat, Tuan N. Pham claims that China’s aggressive naval and air operations in the South China Sea are increasingly at odds with its own interpretations of international maritime law. He points out that Beijing regularly claims that intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights conducted by the United States and other countries in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) are unlawful, while the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly conducts similar operations in other countries’ EEZs. Pham predicts that “[a]s the PLAN continues to operate in distant waters and in proximity to other nations’ coastlines, Beijing may have no choice but to eventually address the inconsistency between policy and operations — and either pragmatically adjust its standing policy or continue to assert its untenable authority to regulate military activities in its EEZ. The former is more likely, while the latter carries more risks in terms of the legal validity of its own maritime sovereignty claims, international credibility, and world standing.”

Robert Manning of the Atlantic Council and James Przystup of the National Defense University argue in Foreign Policy that American politicians and commentators overstate the importance of the South China Sea to America’s national interests. They argue that America’s interests in the South China Sea have always been limited to freedom of navigation and freedom of maritime commerce. On the other hand, “Beijing’s interest in the South China Sea is political and strategic in nature,” key to both the legitimacy of the Communist Party and China’s overall security. Manning and Przystup conclude that the United States should acknowledge that, due to this “asymmetry of respective Chinese and U.S. geopolitical interests,” it must accept a larger Chinese role in the South China Sea.

[Water Wars is our weekly roundup of the latest news, analysis, and opinions related to ongoing tensions in the South and East China Seas. Please email Sarah Grant with breaking news, relevant documents, or corrections]

https://lawfareblog.com/water-wars-suspicious-flotilla-may-not-mean-anything

China Raises Temperature Again in Spratly Islands

From The Maritime Executive (Aug 18): China Raises Temperature Again in Spratly Islands


Thitu Island and outlying reefs (file image from Landsat 7 / NASA)


Something significant is happening in the South China Sea. Philippine media has reported that, over the past week, a flotilla of Chinese fishing vessels, accompanied by PLA Navy frigates and Chinese Coast Guard vessels, have maintained a presence very close to Thitu (which Manila calls 'Pagasa'), the largest feature occupied by the Philippines in the Spratly Islands.

While none of the territorial claimants to the Spratly Islands have formalised claims to territorial seas from the features they occupy, a close-in naval and paramilitary presence of this nature is still highly provocative, and totally at variance with China's official narrative that the South China Sea is enjoying a period of relative tranquility following the recent adoption of a framework Code of Conduct between Beijing and ASEAN.

According to a timeline published by GMA News, the Chinese vessels began arriving on 11 August. Since 15 August at least one PLA warship has conducted shipboard helicopter overflights of a number of sand bars immediately to the west of Thitu. Thitu is situated just over 12 nautical miles away from Subi Reef. Subi is now host to one of seven artificial bases built up by China since 2013, but in its natural state is a submerged feature at low tide and therefore incapable of generating its own territorial sea.

The Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), based at the Washington think tank CSIS, has posted an analysis of the situation, including satellite photographs. Philippine parliamentarian Gary Alejano has released similar photographs, and has alleged that 'the Chinese may have a sinister plan to occupy sandbars just west of Pagasa that belong to us.' He also told GMA news that 'a Philippine government ship from BFAR (Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources) was prevented by Chinese fishing vessels from going near our sandbars located generally west of Pagasa Island, around two to seven miles away'.

One plausible (though hardly reassuring) interpretation of the Chinese activity, offered by AMTI, is that Beijing is engaging in a coercive demonstration around Thitu in order to dissuade the Philippine authorities from carrying out long-planned repairs and extensive infrastructure upgrades. Thitu is the site of the only runway among the Philippine-occupied features in the Spratlys, but it is in poor condition.

However, there remains a possibility that China is preparing to blockade or even to land on one or more of the unoccupied sand bars to which Alejano refers. If it is indeed the case that a BFAR vessel has been turned away by Chinese vessels, that would suggest a similar modus operandi to the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012, which triggered sustained tensions between Manila and Beijing as well as prompting questions about the effectiveness of US policy in the South China Sea.

One of the sand bars in question is Sandy Cay, which came to prominence in the aftermath of the first US Navy freedom of navigation operation in the area, conducted by the USS Lassen, in the vicinity of Subi Reef and other nearby features, in October 2015.

As I flagged in a post back then, one potential inadvertent consequence of the US emphasis on 'innocent passage' for that initial FONOP was to shine a strategic spotlight on Sandy Cay as an unoccupied high-water feature that could hold the key to legal title over Subi Reef. Subi cannot generate its own territorial sea, but it has the potential to 'bump out' out a territorial sea claimed from Sandy Cay, because the distance between them (unlike Thitu) is less than 12 nautical miles. Beijing is certain to have taken note of this.

China’s ongoing maritime activity around Thitu is worrisome in its own right because it is coercive in nature. However, if the objective of the operation is to occupy Sandy Cay, that would mean a significant escalation in tension in the South China Sea. Asia has acquired yet another flashpoint it could well do without. Moreover, it appears to be one that China has deliberately picked at a time and location of its choosing.

[Dr Euan Graham is Director, International Security Program at the Lowy Institute. Euan has been a close observer of East Asian security affairs for more than twenty years, in academia, the private sector, and for the British Government. Euan joined the Institute from the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore where he was a Senior Fellow specialising in maritime issues. Prior to this he was a research analyst in the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and served as Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy in Pyongyang.

This article appears courtesy of the Lowy Interpreter, and it may be found in its original form here. 

https://maritime-executive.com/editorials/china-raises-temperature-again-in-spratly-islands

Armed group attacks military camp near Marawi City

From GMA News (Aug 20): Armed group attacks military camp near Marawi City

An armed group attacked a military detachment near Marawi City early on Sunday, a radio report said.

Reporting from Marawi City, dzBB's Benjie Liwanag said that the detachment of the 55th Infantry Battalion was manned by members of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU).
No militia was reported hurt in the attack by the group believed to be supporting the pro-ISIS Maute terrorists in Lanao del Sur, the report said.

A joint police and military team is in pursuit for the group that harassed the military camp, and security around war-torn Marawi City has been heightened.

Meanwhile, in Marawi City, fierce fighting between the holdover Maute terrorists and government soldiers has continued to rage nearly three months after the pro-ISIS jihadists laid siege to the city on May 23.

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/news/nation/622566/armed-group-attacks-military-camp-near-marawi-city/story/

Maute terrorists holed up in Marawi grand mosque (Video)

ABS-CBN (Aug 19): Maute terrorists holed up in Marawi grand mosque

 

The remaining members of the Maute group in Marawi City are holed up in the grand mosque with their civilian hostages.

 

In an exclusive video provided to ABS-CBN News, the war-torn buildings near the grand mosque can be seen.

On the background, the nonstop exchange of gunfires between the military and the Maute group can be heard.

According to the source of the video, the war torn establishment is only 60 to 70 meters away from the grand mosque, which has become the center of the firefight between government forces and the terrorist group.

It is believed that the remaining members of the Maute are inside the grand mosque, where they are also reportedly keeping around 40 civilian hostages.
With their number getting smaller everyday, the military said that that Maute is desperate to get help from supporters outside the main battle area.

Just recently, 2 alleged Maute supporters were killed by military while trying to get inside the main battle area through the Lake Lanao.

On the 89th day of the Marawi clash, a total of 128 soldiers have been killed while the death toll for the terrorists has now reached a total of 573. Dateline Philippines, 19 August 2017.

 

http://news.abs-cbn.com/video/news/08/19/17/maute-terrorists-holed-up-in-marawi-grand-mosque

Funds sought for wounded MILF guerillas who fought with BIFF

From the Philippine Star (Aug 19): Funds sought for wounded MILF guerillas who fought with BIFF

Commander Rambo 6 of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is among the guerillas wounded in the MILF’s latest encounter with armed men in Maguindanao operating in the fashion of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. STAR/John Unson

Officials are urging the public to help in the medical needs of Moro guerillas injured in their effort to neutralize violent extremists in Maguindanao province.

More than a dozen guerillas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front had been wounded in encounters with a third faction in the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters since late July.

 

Socrates Piñol, member of the North Cotabato provincial board, said on Saturday that he will propose a resolution, subject to approval by his colleagues, recommending to the government the allocation of fund for the treatment of the injured guerillas.

 

He said he will sponsor the drafting of the resolution during the session next week of the provincial board.

"(In the) meantime, kind-hearted people may provide help. It is for us all, the Muslims, Christians and the Lumads, that the MILF is helping the government prevent the spread of these militants," Piñol said.

The breakaway BIFF group the MILF is trying to purge is led by Esmael Abdulmalik.

 

He was trained in fabrication of improvised explosive devices by the slain Malaysian terrorist Zulkifli bin Hir, most known as Marwan.

Four MILF guerillas, among them a senior commander, Rambo 6, were wounded in firefights with the militant group early Friday in Barangay Tee in Datu Salibo town in the second district of Maguindanao.

Five others, Mahmod Laguiab, Darix Kendag, Kuzak Ali, Anwar Maulana and Kalidin Ulama, who all belong to the MILF's Task Force Ittihad, were killed in the encounter.

 

It was the MILF's seventh encounter with the BIFF since it started operating against Abdulmalik three weeks ago in support of President Rodrigo Duterte's anti-terror campaign.

Local officials and barangay leaders have confirmed that 12 of Abdulmalik's men, among them his son, Hamdi, were killed in Friday's hostilities.

 

Neighbors of Abdulmalik's daughter residing in Barangay Lapok in Sharif Aguak town in Maguindanao told reporters that Hamdi died from multiple gunshot wounds in the upper torso.

 

Abdulmalik has been claiming allegiance to the terror organization Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

The two larger factions in the BIFF, one led by Imam Karialan and the other by Imam Bongos, have separately disowned the group of Abdulmalik for fear of being targeted next by the MILF.

 

Lt. Col. Gerry Besana, commanding officer of the Army's 6th Civil-Military Operations Battalion, said helping the wounded MILF guerillas now confined in hospitals will boost the morale of their companions hunting for Abdulmalik.

"It is good to give them recognition by way of helping them and the families of those killed in their campaign against ISIS-inspired militants," Besana said on Saturday.

Five MILF fighters were killed last week when one of them stepped on a trip wire attached to a powerful landmine while chasing Abdulmalik and his followers at the swampy boarder of Datu Piang and Salibo towns.

The landmine, laid by the fleeing militants, was fashioned from explosive powders packed with bent nails and fragments of metals with jagged edges.

http://www.philstar.com/nation/2017/08/19/1730671/funds-sought-wounded-milf-guerillas-who-fought-biff

Notorious Abu Sayyaf member, 7 others nabbed by gov’t forces in separate ops

From the Manila Bulletin (Aug 20): Notorious Abu Sayyaf member, 7 others nabbed by gov’t forces in separate ops
A notorious Abu Sayyaf member and seven other lawless elements were arrested by government forces in separate operations in Sulu.


Abu Sayyaf (Manila Bulletin File Photo)

Abu Sayyaf member Fahar Ismael, alias Putoh Taron, was arrested in a checkpoint set up by troops of the 41st Infantry Battalion and the police in Barangay Timbangan, Indanan, Sulu on August 16 at about 7 a.m.

Ismael is said to be involved in the kidnappings of Engr. Marso Salinas and Evelyn Chan. He also has an arrest warrant for murder as co-accused of his leader, Idang Susukan.

Ishmael is now under custodial investigation.

Meanwhile, seven lawless elements were also arrested by the military and police in Lugus municipality, Zulu on Friday at 7:16 a.m.

Seized from the lawless elements were three M14 rifles, two M16 rifles, an M1 Garand rifle, a caliber .45 pistol, six clips for Garand rifle, assorted magazines, 13 magazines for M16, assorted ammunition, and assorted ammunition pouches and uniforms.

The lawless elements were arrested for illegal possession of firearms by troops of the Philippine Marine Ready Fleet Sulu and the Marine Battalion Landing Team 1 under Lt. Col. Stephen Cabanlet, and the 52nd Special Action Company, Special Action Force.

The persons and firearms were turned over to Sulu Provincial Police Office for proper disposition.

“Law enforcement support operations, in collaboration with the police, will continuously be conducted by the Joint Task Force Sulu to contain lawless elements operating in the area,” said Lt. Gen. Carlito G. Galvez Jr., commander of the Western Mindanao Command.

“It is with pride that I congratulate the soldiers of the Joint Task Force Sulu headed by Brig. Gen. Cirilito Sobejana and the policemen of Sulu Province Police Office for this recent commendable accomplishment,” he added.

http://news.mb.com.ph/2017/08/20/notorious-abu-sayyaf-member-7-others-nabbed-by-govt-forces-in-separate-ops/

ISIS brags about battle for Marawi, claims over 300 Philippine troops dead

From AMN Al-Masdar News (Aug 19): ISIS brags about battle for Marawi, claims over 300 Philippine troops dead



Amaq Agency released an infographic on Friday detailing alleged losses sustained by the Philippine Army during the three-month battle for Marawi, a large city on the island of Mindanao in the southern part of the country.

If one is to believe Amaq Agency, 335 government soldiers have been killed in 86 days of fighting. In addition, 8 armored vehicles have been destroyed and one more heavily damaged.

The Islamic State also emphasised the role of its snipers, stating 37 deaths to have been inflicted by them. One church has also been burnt down by the jihadists, represented on the ground by the ISIS-linked Maute and Abu Sayyaf groups.

The official army death toll is less than half according to government officials. Capt. Jo-ann Petinglay, spokesperson of the Task Force Marawi, said that since the fighting began, 128 soldiers and policemen have been killed.

The figure included those killed in what the military dubbed as “friendly fires.”

On the other hand, some 500 ISIS insurgents have been killed during the battle for Marawi, army officials claim. At the moment, between 70 and 80 jihadist militants remain bogged down in an urban area measuring about 800 by 600 meters in downtown Marawi.

Thus far, Amaq Agency has released a handful of videos showing urban warfare in Marawi.

https://www.almasdarnews.com/article/isis-brags-battle-marawi-claims-300-philippine-troops-dead/