Troops return to barracks as gov’t declares truce with CPP-NPA

From GMA News (Aug 21): Troops return to barracks as gov’t declares truce with CPP-NPA

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) on Sunday started the implementation of the indefinite ceasefire declaration of President Rodrigo Duterte, a day before peace talks between the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People's Army (CPP-NPA) start in Oslo, Norway.

"All combat operations have been cancelled, suspended. All combat operations have already stopped," Philippine Army spokesperson Col. Benjamin Hao said in an interview.

"We are now going back to the barracks. Some field units are still on their way [to barracks]. But definitely we no longer have ongoing combat operations," Hao added.

Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process Jesus Dureza on Saturday announced that Duterte has declared an indefinite unilateral ceasefire with the CPP-NPA after the communist group issued a seven-day ceasefire order to its units ahead of the resumption of peace talks in Oslo, Norway.

The CPP-NPA's ceasefire will be effective from 12:01 a.m. of August 21 until 11:59 p.m. of August 27.

Duterte declared a unilateral ceasefire with the communist rebels in his State of the Nation Address but lifted it several days later later when NPA forces killed one militiaman and injured four others in an ambush in Davao del Norte.

No pullout

Hao, meanwhile, said the military will continue routine law enforcement operations and patrols to ensure the safety of its bases and the community.

"There is no instruction (from higher authorities) for us to pullout from the communities. The instruction is for us to combat operations so we will stop our combat operations. Focused military operations have corresponding orders so these were already cancelled," Hao said.

The Army official noted that the AFP heavily favors the possibility of a peace agreement and an end to the long conflict with the CPP-NPA.

"The Philippine Army is one of the groups in favor of the peace talks because we are in the ground, fighting the rebels," Hao said.

"It's also favorable to the soldiers because we've been fighting this war for so long and we hope its going to be over," he added.

Hao mentioned that soldiers will remain on alert from possible incidents similar to the one in Davao del Norte.

"We already have an experience on this…We don't want our troops getting killed so we already alerted them, make sure that they are secured. We have adopted personnel security measures," Hao said.

Hao said they are hoping for the CPP-NPA's commitment to the peace talks, which will run from August 22 to 28.

"We hope they are sincere. We hope they are happy with that. We hope they will extend it. We hope we can achieve a lot, especially when it comes to peace in our country," he said. 

http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/578445/news/nation/troops-return-to-barracks-as-gov-t-declares-truce-with-cpp-npa

Gov’t, NDF key negotiators meet and greet in Oslo; talks start today

From the Manila Bulletin (Aug 21): Gov’t, NDF key negotiators meet and greet in Oslo; talks start today

OSLO, Norway — Communist leaders, spouses Benito and Wilma Tiamzon, arrived before noon yesterday (5:30 p.m., Philippine time), a day ahead of the historic resumption of the formal peace talks between the Philippine government and the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army-National Democratic Front (CPP-NPA-NDF).

Barely 48 hours after their release at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Custodial Center in Camp Crame, Quezon City, the Tiamzons, together with the main bulk of the Philippine government contingent, traveled for 18 hours, with stopovers in Taiwan and Amsterdam.

RIGHT TONE, WINNING NOTE — Spouses Benito and Wilma Tiamzon (wearing black and red jackets, respectively) are met by fellow communist leaders Alan Jasminez (white-haired) and Renante Gamara, and representatives of the Royal Norwegian government. The couple was fetched at the Oslo Airport by Norway’s Special Envoy for Peace Process Elizabeth Slattum using the Karaoke taxi in the background. (Rocky Nazareno)

The Tiamzons were met at the Scandic Holmenkollen Hotel by an advanced group of Philippine panel members, led by Labor Secretary Silvestre Bello III and former Agrarian Secretary Hernani Braganza, as well as other released political prisoners that included former CPP chairman Alan Jasminez.

There was not a tinge of animosity between representatives from the government and the communist group when they gathered at the hotel lobby. Bello even recalled how a hotel executive asked them if they had really gone to the Scandic Hotel for peace talks. “(The hotel executive) was surprised that we could be cordial with each other, not like the Israelis and Palestinians who also had peace talks here,” Bello said.

Emotional reunion CPP founding chairman Jose Maria Sison was not expected to be at the hotel until later in the day, and the Tiamzons were expecting nothing less than an emotional and historic reunion between them and the 76-year-old leader. Benito recalled that he and his wife were among the first to welcome Sison on the day he was set free by President Corazon Aquino in 1986. Benito was only a 35-year-old national leader of the CPP then. Benito would go on to become CPP chairman; and Wilma, CPP secretary general. “It’s the other way around this time. It’s Manong Jo’s turn to welcome us from detention,” Benito told the Manila Bulletin.

The formal resumption of the peace talks starts today at 9 a.m. (3 p.m., Philippine time) with both parties picking up from the joint agreement signed during the exploratory talks held last June 14 and 15. Among the salient points to be discussed would be the reconstitution of the Joint Agreement of Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) list; the amnesty proclamation for the release of all detained political prisoners; and the mode of an interim ceasefire that would be called by both parties.

As it is, unilateral ceasefires declared separately by the government and the leftist group, as well as the release of 20 political prisoners who will act as NDF consultants, have formed the backbone of the resumption of the talks. “The gestures of goodwill are unprecedented. And this bodes well for what we are to embark on this week,” said presidential peace adviser Jesus Dureza before the groups departed for Oslo Saturday. Lawyer

Paul Montejo, chairman of the Philippine panel’s working group on releases, said the Tiamzons and the other NDF consultants, who were allowed to post bail, will remain free throughout the duration of the peace process, and not just for the duration of next week’s formal resumption of the talks.

However, in not posing any objections to the release of the political prisoners, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) laid down certain conditions. For the duration of the peace negotiations in Oslo, the released political prisoners should report to the Philippine embassy or consulate “whenever required.” “That the DOJ and OSG did not oppose the bail application (of the political prisoners), that was a very big help so that the peace talks could start,” Montejo acknowledged.

http://www.mb.com.ph/govt-ndf-key-negotiators-meet-and-greet-in-oslo-talks-start-today/

No more political prisoners to be freed – Rody

From the Philippine Star (Aug 22): No more political prisoners to be freed – Rody



Released communist rebel leaders, from left, Adelberto Silva, Wilma and Benito Tiamzon, Alan Jasminez and Renante Gamara, pose with their clenched fists, as they wait for their departure for Oslo, Norway for peace talks with the Government Saturday, Aug. 20, 2016 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport in suburban Pasay city south of Manila, Philippines. On Saturday Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte reimposed an indefinite cease-fire after communist guerrillas declared their own truce as both sides set the stage for a resumption of talks aimed at ending one of Asia's longest-running rebellions. AP Photo/Bullit Marquez

President Duterte said no more political prisoners will be released despite the resumption of formal peace talks with the Communist Party of the Philippines/National Democratic Front (CPP/NDF) today in Oslo, Norway.

In a press conference early yesterday morning, Duterte said that the 19 political prisoners, including couple Benito and Wilma Tiamzon, who were released to enable them to participate as consultants in the peace negotiations was enough gesture of goodwill to the CPP/NDF.

The President explained he would no longer have any cards left if he frees all political prisoners.

“No, I will not release. It is enough for the meantime… If you think that I will release all prisoners, all NPAs in custody, huwag na lang tayong mag-usap kasi released naman sila (then let us not talk because all of them are released),” he said, referring to other New People’s Army rebels in state detention.

“Do you want this republic to surrender to them or the communists surrendering to us?” he added.

The 19 political prisoners released to serve as consultants for the peace talks are Ma. Concepcion Araneta-Bocala, Tirso Alcantara, Ariel Arbitrario, Kennedy Bangibang,  Alex Birondo, Winona Birondo, Renante Gamara,  Eddie Genelsa,  Alan Jazmines,  Ernesto Lorenzo, Alfredo Mapano,  Ruben Saluta, Jaime Soledad, Adelberto Silva, Loida Magpatoc,  Porferio Tuna Jr.,  Pedro Codaste,  and the Tiamzon couple.

http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/08/22/1616063/no-more-political-prisoners-be-freed-rody

FAST FACTS: The CPP-NPA-NDF and the Oslo talks

From Rappler (Aug 22): FAST FACTS: The CPP-NPA-NDF and the Oslo talks

After 40 rounds of talks under 5 Philippine governments, the peace process with communist guerrillas begins on a high note in Oslo

 

POLITICAL SETTLEMENT? The latest round of peace talks between the government and communist rebels is set to take place in Oslo, Norway. Graphic by Ernest Fiestan/Rappler

Is a political settlement already on the horizon for one of the world's longest running insurgencies?

After failed attempts at peace under 5 Philippine presidents, the government of President Rodrigo Duterte is set to return to the negotiating table with the National Democratic Front (NDF), the political arm of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP).

 

From August 22 to 28, negotiators from both sides will hold peace talks in Oslo, Norway in an attempt to hammer out an acceptable solution to end the armed struggle that has claimed thousands of lives since 1969. (READ: Joma Sison, Tiamzons reunited after 30 years)

 

Here's a brief explainer on the communist movement in the Philippines and the many attempts – spanning years – to craft a peace agreement with communist rebels.

What is the CPP-NPA-NDF?

Founded in 1968 by former student activist Jose Maria Sison, the CPP seeks to establish a new democratic state in the Philippines that will be led by the working class and be free from the influence of the United States. The group modeled its armed struggle and protracted people's war after China's Maoist movement.

 

The CPP has two related units: its armed wing, the New People's Army (NPA), which was established in 1969; and its political arm, the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDF). The NDF is the umbrella organization of communist-run organizations, and it represents the CPP-NPA in negotiations with the Philippine government.

 

The armed struggle of the CPP-NPA is Asia's longest-running communist insurgency. Since its establishment, the group has engaged in guerrilla warfare against government forces, believing armed revolution to be the solution to replace what it considers the current oppressive system. It funds its activities primarily through "revolutionary taxes," forcing businesses to pay the group to avoid being attacked.

 

From 60 members in 1969, the group attracted followers all over the country, reaching its peak of about 25,000 members in 1987, according to military estimates. The group's numbers have since declined following years of military operations and internal purges within the CPP-NPA, with less than 4,000 rebels estimated as of present. But the CPP continues to gather support in poor rural areas around the country.

What attempts have been made for peace talks?

For the past 3 decades and 5 Philippine presidents, there have been attempts to hold peace negotiations with the CPP and hammer out a political settlement to end the armed conflict.

 

According to the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, over 40 rounds of talks have been held, but snagged on contentious issues on sovereignty, the release of political prisoners, and the CPP's inclusion in terrorist lists. Over 1,300 political detainees were released by the government, and 20 agreements have been signed – yet no final peace settlement has been agreed upon.

 

In 1986, the administration of former president Corazon Aquino began peace talks with the CPP, but this was unsuccessful. Another attempt was made in 1995 under the administration of former president Fidel V. Ramos, which culminated in the signing of two agreements: the Joint Agreement on Safety and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG), which guarantees free and safe movement for those involved in peace negotiations; and the Comprehensive Agreement to Respect Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL).

 

Negotiations once again stalled after this, with alternating periods of conflict and negotiations during the term of Ramos' successor, former president Joseph Estrada. Under former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, the government returned to the negotiating table with the CPP-NPA, but this also broke down after the US listed the group as a terrorist organization.

 

Under former president Benigno Aquino III, several meetings and informal talks were held in Manila, Norway, and the Netherlands. Aquino's term, however, ended at an impasse due to the NDF's demand for the release of political prisoners. (TIMELINE: Arrest of CPP-NPA leaders under Aquino)

What is the Oslo meeting about?

The meeting in Oslo from August 22 to 28 will be the first formal peace talks under the Duterte administration. This comes on the heels of informal talks earlier held in Norway, where the rebels agreed to resume negotiations with the government.

 

The agenda of the first meeting in Oslo will cover 5 major points:

• Affirmation of previously-signed agreements
• Accelerated process for negotiations, including the timeline for the completion of the remaining substantive agenda for the talks: socio-economic reforms; political and economic reforms; and end of hostilities and disposition of forces
• Reconstitution of the Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (JASIG) list
• Amnesty Proclamation for the release of all detained political prisoners, subject to concurrence by Congress
• Mode of interim ceasefire

The CPP also wants to discuss a general amnesty proclamation to cover the 550 detained members of the CPP-NPA.

 

But even before the formal start of the Oslo talks, tension flared between the two camps: in his first State of the Nation Address, Duterte declared a unilateral ceasefire, but quicky revoked it after the NPA attacked government militias in Davao del Norte. The NPA, however, said the military was to blame for violating the government-declared truce.

 

Sison and Duterte engaged in a brief word war, with the communist leader saying Duterte lacked prudence with his hasty decision to end the truce, and Duterte hitting back by criticizing the CPP for overestimating its power.

 

 

Who will be there?

On the side of the government is Labor Secretary Silvestre "Bebot" Bello III, who had previously served as government panel chair in the negotiations during the Arroyo administration. (READ: Dureza, Bello, and the previous peace talks)

 

Representing the Left is NDF chief negotiator Luis Jalandoni. Joining the Oslo peace talks are 20 detainees, who were temporarily released to take part in the talks as consultants.

 

Among those released were NPA leaders Benito Tiamzon and wife Wilma Tiamzon, and communist rebel leader Alfredo Mapano, also known as “Ka Paris." (READ: Top NPA leaders go on 1st overseas trip for Oslo talks)

 

The Tiamzons were arrested in Cebu on March 22, 2014, for multiple crimes against humanity, while Mapano faces multiple counts of criminal charges including murder, robbery and frustrated murder.

 

Meanwhile, the Supreme Court confirmed as valid the bail of former Bayan Muna Representative Satur Ocampo, Vicente Ladlad, and Randall Echanis. The 3 were NDF consultants in the failed peace talks during the Aquino administration.

 

The High Court's order said their participation in the peace talks talks is valid up to 6 months or until the talks are terminated.

 

http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/iq/143551-cpp-npa-ndf-peace-talks

Kidnap leader arrested in Zamboanga Sibugay

From the Manila Times (Aug 21): Kidnap leader arrested in Zamboanga Sibugay

Authorities have arrested a sub-leader of a gang linked to the 2011 kidnapping of Australian adventurer Warren Rodwell in the southern province of Zamboanga Sibugay, police said on Sunday.

The police added Hasim Calon alias Husien, who belongs to the kidnap-for-ransom group of Barahama Alih, was arrested by security forces over the weekend in his hideout in Tenan village in Ipil town.

“Hasim Calon was involved in several kidnapping incidents in the province, particularly the abduction of Joel Indino in Ipil on January 29, 2011 and Richard Warren Rodwell, an Australian who was abducted in December 2011,” said Supt. Rogelio Alabata, a regional police spokesman.

He added that policemen, backed by Army soldiers, who took part in the operation, seized crystal meth, locally known as shabu, from Calon, also a notorious drug dealer in the province.

Calon’s group also has links with the Abu Sayyaf and other bandit groups in the southern region.

Early this year, police forces killed Waning Abdulsalam – who was a former leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front – in a firefight in the village of Singkilon in the town of Naga in Zamboanga Sibugay.

Abdulsalam was one of the most wanted criminals in southern Philippines and connected also to the Abu Sayyaf. He was linked to the kidnappings of Rodwell, Irish missionary Michael Sinnott on October 12, 2009 in Pagadian City, and Italian Catholic priest Giancarlo Bossi in Zamboanga del Sur’s Payao town on June 10, 2007.

In 2012, security forces also raided Abdulsalam’s hideout in Naga and captured three of his followers after a clash in the village of Mamagon.

Last year, Senior Police officer 2 Jun Malban alias Michael Zoo, also tagged as involved in Rodwell’s kidnapping, was arrested in Lahad Datu in Malaysia’s eastern state of Sabah where he fled after being linked by authorities to the crime.

Rodwell, a former soldier in the Australian Army, was kidnapped by gunmen who posed as policemen from his seaside house in Ipil town and freed on March 2013 after his Filipino wife Miraflor Gutang paid $94,000 ransom to the Abu Sayyaf, which originally demanded $2 million.

http://www.manilatimes.net/kidnap-leader-arrested-in-zamboanga-sibugay/281241/

ISAFP agent inasinta

From Abante (Aug 21): ISAFP agent inasinta (ISAFP agent targeted)

SANTA ROSA, Nueva Ecija — Dalawang tama ng baril sa ulo ang ikinamatay ng isang 32-anyos na aktibong miyembro ng Intelligence Service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) noong Huwebes ng gabi sa Purok 4, Brgy. Liwayway sa bayang ito.

 

Sa ulat ni PC/Inspector Jeffrey Alivia sa tanggapan ni Mayor Marita Chua- Angeles, nakilala ang biktima na si Carmelita Malagenio Pine, tubong Brgy. Metolza, Naujan, Mindoro Oriental, na nasawi noon din.

 

Nabatid sa imbestigasyon ni PO2 Daniel Villanueva na dakong alas-8:30 nakaangkas ang biktima sa motorsiklong minamaneho ng hindi nakilalang lalaki at huminto sa madilim na bahagi na pinangyarihan ng krimen.

 

Ayon sa ilang saksi, nakarinig sila ng tatlong umaalingawngaw na putok ng baril at nakita ang naka-motorsiklong lalaking papalayo sa lugar sabay ng pagbagsak sa lupa ng babaeng biktima.

 

Tumakas ang salarin padiretso ng Santa Rosa Town Proper at nakarekober ang SOCO team ng tatlong basyo ng bala sa pinangyarihan ng krimen.

 

Kasalukuyang inaalam ang pagkakakilanlan sa salarin at ang posibleng motibo sa pamamaslang.

 

http://www.abante.com.ph/isafp-agent-inasinta.htm

Truce: Troopers in ‘passive defense’

From The Standard (Aug 22): Truce: Troopers in ‘passive defense’

COMBAT operations have been stopped since midnight Saturday but troops will stay put in their areas of operation and have strict orders not to launch offensives against the New People’s Army in view of the truce declared by the government and the Communist Party of the Philippines, which begin formal peace talks Monday in Oslo, Norway, Army spokesman Col. Benjamin Hao said Sunday.

“All combat operations have been already canceled. Just like the last time after the Sona [State of the Nation Address] announcement, we are now going back to barracks,” Hao said.

But Hao said law enforcement operations against criminal groups including the campaign against illegal drugs will continue.

 “There is no instruction for our troops to pull out. The only instruction is to stop combat operations. In effect, we are in passive defense mode to protect communities from lawless attack together with the police,” he said.

Two days before the start of the Olso negotiations, the NPA declared a seven-day ceasefire that begins Monday.

This was followed by Malacañang’s declaration of an indefinite ceasefire that Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (OPAPP) Secretary Jesus Dureza said shows that Duterte is willing to “walk [the] extra mile” to achieve genuine peace.

On Monday, the government peace panel led by Dureza and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) peace panel led by Luis Jalandoni will start peace talks brokered by the Norwegian government.

But while ceasefire is in effect, Hao said the military will not let their guard.
 “We do not operate but we are also on alert and that includes personal security measures,” Hao said.

 “We hope they are sincere. We hope they are happy with that. And we hope we can achieve a lot, especially about peace this time,” he added.

On the eve of the peace talks, Senator Antonio Trillanes IV said he believes communist rebels will not lay down their arms because of their deeply rooted ideology.

In an interview on radio dwIZ, Trillanes added that the rebels would just take advantage of the peace talks to strengthen their forces.

“If they become strong again, they will ask demands which are impossible to be given. They would then use failure to heed their demands as basis to turn their back from the peace talks,” Trillanes said.

http://thestandard.com.ph/news/-main-stories/top-stories/214000/truce-troopers-in-passive-defense-.html

3 extortion gang men killed in Sarangani

From Malaya Business Insight (Aug 22): 3 extortion gang men killed in Sarangani

THREE members of a local group that has linked itself to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria were killed in a firefight with government forces in Maasim town, Sarangani province Saturday afternoon.

But the leader of the Ansar Khilafah Philippines (AKP), identified as Mohammad Jaafar Sabiwang Maguid alias Tokboy, managed to escape, said Maj. Gen. Rafael Valencia, commander of the Army’s 10th Infantry Division.

The AKP is blamed for some atrocities in Mindanao, including bombings and extortion.

“This group is trying to affiliate itself with the ISIS but we have not seen any concrete links that they are recognized by the ISIS or they are moving under the direction of the ISIS. They (AKP members) are just trying to ally themselves with the ISIS,” said Valencia.

Valencia said troops from the Army’s 1002nd Brigade and policemen conducted an operation after receiving reports that Maguid was seen in Sitio Lebe, Barangay Daliao visiting his relatives. But Maguid has left when the soldiers arrived at around 5 p.m. Saturday.

They engaged only Maguid’s rear guards, composed of about five to seven men. The main party was composed of about 17 men, purportedly including some foreigners.

“We have some reports that he was with some foreigners but we cannot confirm this immediately,” Valencia said.

Recovered at the clash scene were the bodies of the still unidentified AKP members, a Carbine rifle, an M19 grenade launcher, a rifle scope, an M203 grenade ammunition, and a black flag with the ISIS logo.

The AKP, along with the Abu Sayyaf and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters, pledged allegiance to the ISIS last year.

Capt. Rhyan Batchar, 10th ID spokesman, said an AKP member identified as Mustapha Gansing was arrested by government troops at around 4:25 a.m. yesterday also in Barangay Daliao.

Batchar said the troops seized from Gansing’s possession an Uzi machine pistol with loaded magazine, and documents that included diagram lectures on improvised explosive device.

http://www.malaya.com.ph/business-news/news/3-extortion-gang-men-killed-sarangani

Gang leader behind Aussie kidnapping arrested in Zamboanga

From the Mindanao Examiner (Aug 21): Gang leader behind Aussie kidnapping arrested in Zamboanga
 

Philippine authorities have arrested a sub-leader of gang linked to the 2011 kidnapping of Australian adventurer Warren Rodwell in the southern province of Zamboanga Sibugay, police said Sunday.

Police said Hasim Calon alias Husien, who belongs to the kidnap-for-ransom group of Barahama Alih, was arrested by security forces over the weekend in his hideout in Tenan village in Ipil town.

“Hasim Calon was involved in several kidnapping incidents in the province, particularly the abduction of Joel Indino in Ipil on January 29, 2011 and Richard Warren Rodwell, an Australian national who was abducted in December 2011,” said Superintendent Rogelio Alabata, a regional police spokesman.  

He said policemen, backed by army soldiers, who took part in the operation, seized crystal meth from Calon, who is also a notorious drug dealer in the province. Calon’s group also has links with the Abu Sayyaf and other rebel groups in the southern region.

Just early this year, police forces killed Waning Abdulsalam – who was a former leader of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front – in a fire fight in the village of Singkilon in the town of Naga in Zamboanga Sibugay.

Abdulsalam was one of the most wanted criminals in southern Philippines and connected also to the Abu Sayyaf. He was linked to the kidnappings of Rodwell, and Irish missionary Michael Sinnott in October 12, 2009 in Pagadian City, Italian Catholic priest Giancarlo Bossi in Zamboanga del Sur’s Payao town in June 10, 2007.

In 2012, security forces also raided Abdulsalam’s hideout in Naga and captured three of his followers following a clash in the village of Mamagon.

Last year, a Filipino policeman SPO2 Jun Malban alias Michael Zoo, also tagged as involved in Rodwell’s kidnapping was arrested in Lahad Datu in Malaysia’s eastern state of Sabah where he fled after being linked by authorities to the crime.

Rodwell, a former soldier in the Australian army, was kidnapped by gunmen who posed as policemen from his seaside house in Ipil town and freed on March 2013 after his Filipino wife Miraflor Gutang paid $94,000 ransom to the Abu Sayyaf, which originally demanded $2 million.

http://mindanaoexaminer.com/gang-leader-behind-aussie-kidnapping-arrested-in-zamboanga/

ComVal to be declared 'conflict-manageable, development-ready' province

From the Philippine News Agency (Aug 21): ComVal to be declared 'conflict-manageable, development-ready' province

The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is set to declare the province of Compostela Valley as “conflict-manageable and development-ready area” or CMDRA.

The declaration will be held on Tuesday, Aug. 23.

The event will be graced by top officials of the AFP, led by Lt. Gen. Rey Leonardo Guerrero, commander of the Eastern Mindanao Command (Eastmincom), and Maj. Gen. Rafael Valencia, commander of the 10th Infantry (Agila) Division of the Philippine Army.

Top officials of Compostela Valley province led by Governor Jayvee Tyron Uy, the municipal and barangay officials are also expected to join the declaration.

Private groups, especially those coming from the business sector as well as the academe and religious groups, will also participate in the event.

In a statement to the media, the provincial government said that the declaration is a very significant event given that Compostela Valley province is identified as the operational area of the guerrilla fronts of the communists New People’s Army (NPA).

The signing of the CMDRA will be held at the National Comprehensive High School Gymnasium in Nabunturan town.

The Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) of CMDRA will be signed by Governor Uy together with Maj. Gen. Valencia and 1001st commander Col. Macairog S. Alberto.

The CMDRA MOA was already approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley during its 6th Regular Session last Aug. 10.

The contents of the CMDRA MOA include cooperation between the provincial and local governments, the AFP, line agencies and the private sector in working towards the attainment of peace and development in Compostela Valley province.

Various line agencies, particularly the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) from the regional and provincial offices are also expected to grace the occasion.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=2&sid=&nid=2&rid=915932

Book on PHILCAG’s feats in Vietnam launched

From the Philippine News Agency (Aug 21): Book on PHILCAG’s feats in Vietnam launched

A book dedicated to all Vietnam War veterans entitled “Warriors for Peace: The Saga of the Filipino Soldiers in the Vietnam War” penned by veteran journalist Ben Cal was launched on Aug. 16, 2016 at the AFP Museum in Camp Aguinaldo, Quezon City.

Present in the event were former Philippine Civic Action Group (PHILCAG) members such as former Defense Secretary Eduardo Ermita, Col. Francisco T. San Miguel, Gen. Triunfo Agustin, Gen. Raul S. Urgello, Mr. Jesus Dizon, Gen. Jose Maria G. Solquillo, BGen. Sinforoso Duque, Gen. Clemente Mariano, Gen. Ernesto Calupig, Gen. Roberto Manlungat, Gen. Jose C. Lapus, Gen. Miguel Sol, Gen. Mitch Templo, Gen. Ramon Ong, and Gen. Lisandro Abadia.

Also in the event were Undersecretary Eduardo Del Rosario, Undersecretary for Civil, Veterans, and Retirees Affairs; former Senator Edgardo Ilarde, Gen. Jose P. Magno, Mr. Manoling Morato, and Gen. Ramon Farolan.

Leaders of various veterans organizations, representatives of line bureaus of the Department of National Defense, and officials and staff of Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (PVAO) led by Usec. Ernesto G. Carolina also attended the event.

In his welcome remarks, Usec. Carolina recognized Ben Cal’s efforts in helping PVAO in its mission to propagate the heroic deeds of Philippine veterans.

“Once again, Ben showcases the valuable contribution of Philippine veterans through humanitarian efforts conducted by the PHILCAG at the height of the Vietnam War. He gives a human face on PHILCAG’s accomplishments during the war to fulfill its noble mission 'To build and not to destroy' in the midst of raging conflict that won the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people,” he said.

The author himself gave the guests an overview of his book.

“The book was conceived virtually out of the blue one morning at USSC coffee shop early last year shortly after I launched my other book, Victory at Bessang Pass. Over breakfast, Gen. Magno and Gen. Carolina encouraged me to write another book about the PHILCAGs in Vietnam. Without batting an eyelash, I accepted the challenge. The following day, I started researching and friends gave me photocopies about their PHILCAG experience. When I read them page by page, I discovered the great sacrifices our PHILCAG troopers had made despite the risk and ever present danger,” Ben Cal said.

“Warriors for Peace” was about the success of the PHILCAG Contingents in their civic action work in Vietnam at the height of the war. Said success was duly recognized not only by Allied nations that sent combat troops but also the Vietnamese people, including the Viet Cong who were given equal medical treatment by PHILCAG doctors and nurses conducting medical missions.

The officers and men of PHILCAG made great sacrifices of their safety by pursuing their work deep inside Viet Cong territories. Their mission in Vietnam “To Build and Not to Destroy” was the defining moment of their military career. Many of them occupied high positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) when they came home from Vietnam.

These PHILCAG officers also produced great leaders of this nation, such as the 12th President of the Republic of the Philippines in the person of Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who also became AFP Chief of Staff.

Other PHILCAG officers who became AFP Chief of Staff are Gen. Renato S. De Villa, Gen. Lisandro Abadia, Gen. Arturo Enrile, Gen. Clemente Mariano, and Lt. Gen. Eduardo R. Ermita who served as the guest of honor in the book launch.

“My two-year stint in Vietnam with the mission to extend humanitarian aid was the most remarkable moment in my 35 years in the military. I thank the Lord for giving us the opportunity to serve the people who needed our service the most during those times of conflict,” said Gen. Ermita.

The date of the launch was equally significant as the event because Aug. 16 was the date of PHILCAG’s departure for Vietnam 50 years ago.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=1&sid=&nid=1&rid=915879

Mindanao prelates support Pres. Duterte's reimposition of ceasefire with CPP-NPA

From the Philippine News Agency (Aug 21): Mindanao prelates support Pres. Duterte's reimposition of ceasefire with CPP-NPA

Mindanao prelates expressed support on President Rodrigo R. Duterte's reimposition of ceasefire with the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (CPP-NPA) as it would help attain peace in the region.

Basilan Bishop Martin Jumoad said that the Church always supports efforts to achieve peace by encouraging insurgents to sit down and talk.

"We always welcome efforts which are meant to forge peace," he said.

Jumoad added, "I am happy the President is again doing his best to attain peace. There is no other way to peace but only doing peace."

For his part, Marbel Bishop Dinualdo Gutierrez lauded the decision of the Chief Executive.

"Good, I hope it would last," he said.

Over the weekend, President Duterte approved the offer of the rebel group for a unilateral ceasefire.

Late last month, the President took back his announcement during his maiden State-of-the-Nation Address (SONA) declaring a unilateral ceasefire with the CPP-NPA, when the group attacked government troops in Davao del Norte days after the announcement was made.

http://www.pna.gov.ph/index.php?idn=1&sid=&nid=1&rid=915904

The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence?

From the Council of Councils (Aug 19): The Hague Tribunal’s South China Sea Ruling: Empty Provocation or Slow-Burning Influence? (By Euan Graham, Lowy Institute for International Policy)



Philippine Marines fold a Philippine national flag during a flag retreat at the BRP Sierra Madre, a marooned transport ship in the disputed Second Thomas Shoal, part of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, March 29, 2014. (Erik De Castro/Reuters)

Last month’s ruling by a tribunal at the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) on the dispute brought by the Philippines against China has earned its place in maritime legal annals. Its precedent is likely to be felt beyond the South China Sea, but whether it will influence China is open to question.

Sweeping Victory

Unlike previous territorial disputes put before the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or International Court of Justice in The Hague, this tribunal did not adjudicate on sovereignty. That would have required both parties’ agreement. Furthermore, China’s reservations after ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) against compulsory dispute settlement under the Convention being binding effectively precluded such a direct approach. The Philippines was able to seek arbitration by focusing its case on the legal status of disputed maritime features, rather than a determination on who owns what. On these more limited terms, the Philippines obtained a sweeping victory, with the panel finding unanimously in its favor on almost all fifteen submissions.

The panel found that China’s claims of historic rights within the nine-dash line, which Beijing uses to demarcate its claims in the South China Sea, were without legal foundation. The panel also concluded that Beijing’s activities within the Philippines’ two-hundred-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), such as illegal fishing and environmentally ruinous artificial island construction, infringed on Manila’s sovereign rights.

No Islands in the Spratlys

While these aspects of the ruling garnered headlines, the boldest implications flow from the judges’ opinion that none of the maritime features in the Spratly Islands are entitled to maritime zones beyond twelve nautical miles. UNCLOS accords the full suite of maritime jurisdiction privileges (territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf rights) to islands. Rocks, however, are only entitled to twelve nautical miles of territorial sea, and freestanding low-tide elevations have no jurisdictional entitlement at all.

The tribunal ruled that the Spratly Islands are not islands in the legal sense, but rather, rocks or low-tide elevations. This includes the aptly named Mischief Reef, a maritime feature that China has occupied since 1995; it is one of seven features upon which Beijing has heaped thousands of tons of sand and concrete since the case was lodged in 2013. Although Mischief Reef now accommodates a military-grade runway and port facilities, the ruling is unambiguous that it falls within the Philippine EEZ. This means China is in a state of unlawful occupation.

The implications of the ruling are less clear for Scarborough Shoal, an isolated feature several hundred miles northeast of the Spratly Islands that is much closer to Manila. It was declared a rock above water at high-tide and therefore entitled to a territorial sea. Based on the tribunal’s ruling, the shoal is wholly within the Philippines EEZ. While it is unoccupied, it has been under de facto Chinese control since 2012, a highly unusual situation.

Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries were not parties to the arbitration, but their sovereign EEZ rights in the South China Sea have been bolstered by the ruling. This includes Indonesia and Malaysia, which have recently experienced aggressive encroachment into portions of their EEZs by Chinese fishing and maritime law-enforcement vessels in area Beijing claims as traditional fishing grounds.

China can no longer justify such claims with reference to UNCLOS. This affirmation of Southeast Asian countries’ land-based maritime resource rights in the South China Sea reflects the geographical fact that their coastlines are much closer to the disputed area than China’s. Removing the Spratlys from the jurisdictional picture beyond a handful of enclaved territorial seas potentially eases the path towards a cooperative high-seas resource-sharing solution in the future. Getting there, however, will still be very difficult.

An Overall Verdict?

The legal picture is one thing, but strategic realities exist on a different plane.
One month on, is it possible to pass an overall verdict on this groundbreaking, island-diminishing case? It is probably too early to tell. It has always been difficult to quantify impact in the slow-burning world of international law, even though the arbitration is considered final and legally binding on China.

Realist commentators marvel at the Philippines’s pluck in attempting to level the asymmetrical playing field in the South China Sea, but are skeptical that China will bend. Where big powers are concerned, might trumps right. Without an enforcement mechanism, the tribunal’s ruling is destined to be ignored, or worse still, constitute an empty provocation to a vengeful Beijing bent on turning the South China Sea into a Chinese lake, according to this point of view.

Nonetheless, the Philippines is currently enjoying calm weather at the eye of the South China Sea storm. While China has directed invective at supporters of the tribunal ruling, including Australia, the new Philippine government of Rodrigo Duterte has been spared the worst. Thus far Manila has held its post-tribunal-ruling cards closely, avoiding the twin pitfalls of hubris or submission to China. One can even imagine the basis for a bilateral grand bargain with Beijing, including a swap of Scarborough Shoal for, say, Second Thomas Shoal. But Philippine policy under Duterte remains unpredictable, with the potential to undercut the effect of the tribunal’s ruling.

Some have questioned the importance of the ruling by suggesting that the tribunal has a lower status than that of international courts, such as the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea. The judges have even been criticized for failing to show sufficient political sensitivity to the implications of their ruling.

International maritime lawyers, almost by definition liberal institutionalists, are more persuaded that the tribunal’s ruling could be a game changer. Some point to a record of great-power compliance with international court decisions, even in cases where the verdict was initially contested. The influence of international law in shaping norms should not be ignored. However, the impact is not always felt immediately, a point worth stressing in the age of instant analysis and event fatigue.

Regional Reactions

China issued a position paper in 2014 preemptively rejecting arbitration, so its public tantrum following the ruling was predictable. Taiwan’s negative reaction, however, is worthy of attention as a “control group” from which to gauge China’s reactions. Unlike China, Taiwan is not a party to UNCLOS, nor is it bound by the tribunal’s ruling. But the Republic of China’s 1940s-era nine-dash-line map is the precursor and mirror image of Beijing’s claims.

Taiwan’s disappointment springs from the tribunal’s rejection of island status for Itu Aba, the largest naturally formed feature in the Spratly Islands and a remote Taiwanese outpost. Taiwan’s rejection of the ruling is not surprising. Since the tribunal’s ruling does not impinge on sovereignty claims, once the disappointment of Itu Aba’s classification wears off, scope remains for Taiwan to change its position. A claim based on newly clarified maritime features in the South China Sea would allow Taipei to distinguish itself from Beijing’s dubious attachment to the nine-dash line, moving it closer to conformity with international law without having to renounce claims of sovereignty.

Beijing maintained a frosty attitude throughout the tribunal proceedings while attempting to enlist a motley coalition of supposedly supportive states. Since the ruling was released on July 12, China has shifted tack, aiming to splinter international support for the tribunal’s award.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has borne the brunt of these wedge-driving efforts. Cambodia is widely perceived to be acting at Beijing’s behest as Southeast Asia’s chief spoiler, vetoing overt references to the tribunal’s ruling in the various communiqués from ASEAN’s recent multilateral summits. Chinese pressure appears to have borne neutralizing fruit more widely among ASEAN’s membership. Within ASEAN, apart from the Philippines itself, Vietnam alone endorsed the ruling. If Vietnamese fishermen are subjected to physical harassment, Hanoi could launch its own legal case against China, buoyed by the Philippine precedent. But it will take a significant incident to trigger such an action, such as another oil rig deployment deep into disputed waters.

China was also suspected of applying a hidden hand to water down an EU statement on the ruling. In fact, to date, no European state has backed the ruling as binding.

Hardening Trend

While Beijing has waged a war of words since the tribunal ruling was released, it didn’t immediately step up military action in the South China Sea. Although this appears to be changing, with Chinese Air Force combat patrols flying over the Spratly Islands and Scarborough Shoal and a planned joint exercise with Russia scheduled for the South China Sea in September, the epicenter of China’s maritime aggressiveness appears to have reverted for now to the East China Sea.

Recent statements from the People’s Liberation Army leadership confirm a hardening trend, something that President Xi Jinping may have instrumental reasons for supporting.

However, based on Beijing’s own post-ruling pronouncements, there is still a possibility that China will attenuate its future claims. Since the tribunal did not rule on any questions of sovereignty, Beijing could even continue to use the nine-dash line as a cartographical shorthand for its claims based on high-tide features without relinquishing its territorial claims within the Spratlys. But that depends on China living up to its vaunted long view.

Policy Implications

Next steps in moving forward from the ruling lie squarely with China and the Philippines. Much will depend on the progress of their bilateral relations and potential negotiations.

External parties with an interest in the region, including the United States, should focus on fostering cooperation. Directing policy and capacity-building efforts toward fisheries protection and conservation in the South China Sea would be consistent with the tribunal’s findings and could draw on a broad coalition of actors, including environmental groups that have yet to show much interest in the sea. This approach likely has the best prospects for rallying wider support within ASEAN especially Indonesia, given the priority it accords to thwarting illegal fishing. This could extend to impromptu or sideline discussions at the upcoming Group of Twenty summit in Beijing, although China is widely expected to block any mention of the South China Sea in the summit's communiqués.

One month on, China’s hardline reaction and successful splintering efforts have taken off the initial shine from the Philippines’s legal triumph in The Hague. The leadership change in the Philippines has injected a wild card into the mix. However, it is too early to discount that the award will have a moderating influence on China’s claims. Hard-line statements out of China need to be scrutinized for evidence of subtle changes in the weeks and months to come.
http://www.cfr.org/councilofcouncils/global_memos/p38227

Armed Forces to honor Olympic medalist Hidilyn Diaz

From Rappler (Aug 20): Armed Forces to honor Olympic medalist Hidilyn Diaz

The celebratory tour continues for Hidilyn Diaz, the country's first Summer Games medalist in 20 years



ACCOMPLISHMENT. Hidilyn Diaz won silver for the Philippines during the Rio Olympics. File photo by EPA/NIC BOTHMA

Following her silver medal-winning performance during the 2016 Rio Olympics in Brazil, Hidilyn Diaz, 25, will be honored by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) upon her arrival at the general headquarters on Monday, August 22, according to a press release.

Diaz, an Airwoman First Class, finished second in the 53kg women’s division of the weightlifting event at the Olympics after lifting more than 200kg.

 

According to the news release, Diaz will be given an Outstanding Achievement Medal and a Plaque of Recognition for her “extraordinary achievement and distinguished service rendered as the first female Filipino athlete to win a silver medal.”

 

Diaz was also the first Filipino to win a medal at the Summer Olympics since the 1996 Atlanta Summer Games. So far, her incentives have included cash north of P7.5 million and a housing unit from 8990 Holdings Inc - Deca Homes.

 

“Airwoman First Class Diaz brought national pride which merited public recognition of the highest order for her accomplishment as the coutnry’s lone athlete-delegate to the said international event to win a medal for the Philippines,” it was written in the press release.

 

Diaz, who had a motorcade in her hometown of Zamboanga City following her triumph, was also given a hero’s welcome by the Philippine Air Force this week during an awarding ceremony at the Villamor Air Base. The weightlifting athlete was additionally promoted to Airwoman Second Class.

 

“Diaz’s world-class achievement earned recognition for the country. I extend my congratulations to her and to the other soldier-athletes who continue to work hard in their own fields to bring honor and pride to the AFP and to the Filipinos,” AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo R. Visaya said.

 

http://www.rappler.com/sports/specials/olympics/143649-armed-forces-honor-diaz

South China Sea: Fishing in Troubled Waters

From The Diplomat (Aug 18): South China Sea: Fishing in Troubled Waters (By Kerry Lynn Nankivell)

Could partnered fisheries enforcement be the best follow up to the recent PCA ruling?

Image Credit: DVIDSHUB

 

The United States Navy does fisheries enforcement.

That’s not a headline, a recommendation, or a prediction for the future. It’s a practiced fact.

Today, the United States Navy and the United States Coast Guard routinely operate together under the Oceania Maritime Security Initiative (OMSI) to conduct fisheries enforcement missions in partnership with other countries, embarking their representatives on U.S. platforms for enforcement patrols within non-U.S. EEZs.

The Navy’s innovative interagency and mutinational experience in fisheries enforcement is not widely noted. (After all not much is sexy about fish policing.) But it might be the appropriate model for a low-risk, high-impact operational response to the recent Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) ruling in the South China Sea. Partnered fisheries enforcement in the Philippine EEZ might consolidate both the PCA ruling and demonstrate Manila and Washington’s joint commitment to the rule of law in a tangible and effective way.

The Deafening Silence of the Status Quo

Since the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) tribunal issued its ruling on the landmark Philippine-China arbitration on July 12, there has been a deafening silence from most of the primary stakeholders in the outcome. China, of course, has been an exception: Immediately following the ruling (and arguably before) Beijing moved quickly to maintain political, diplomatic, and operational momentum. Dismissing the ruling as “waste paper,” calling for a “people’s war at sea,” and continuing to make infrastructural improvements on its artificial installations in the Spratlys, Beijing’s escalatory activities have remained steady — this despite confirmation from the Court that many of China’s activities have no basis in law.

For its part, Vietnam has not been left flat-footed. Keeping pace with Beijing’s activities, Vietnam contributed to a hardening of positions by placing new rocket launchers on several of its holdings in the Spratlys. Though Vietnam’s capabilities are much more modest and its operational position at great disadvantage to Beijing’s, Hanoi has clearly signaled that it won’t accept a fait accompli in the South China Sea, at least while it has some wherewithal to resist. Vietnamese resolve means that its artillery and Chinese missiles now sit less than 200 nautical miles from one another in what must surely be the world’s most dangerous sea.

Meanwhile, the Philippines’ newly minted President Rodrigo Duterte has mounted a diplomatic initiative that reaffirms the ruling of the PCA while also recognizing the need for continued dialogue; Indonesia’s government has recently set up a legal task force to explore Jakarta’s options in the same vein. Malaysia has remained curiously silent on the ruling and the ongoing maneuvers by Vietnam and China, but no less silent than ASEAN, which (incredibly) failed to mention the South China Sea or the arbitral ruling in its Summit communiqué last month.

The anemic response isn’t only disappointing, it’s dangerous. While it is entirely understandable that all parties remain prudent and cognizant of the dangers of escalation, neither does it pay to acquiesce to Chinese behavior, which has clearly been destabilizing. Beijing’s intransigence has been significant: rejecting international law and legal procedure out of hand and encouraging other governments to do the same, reckless military posturing despite its diplomatic commitments under the 2002 ASEAN Code of Conduct, and incitement of nationalist fervor at sea outside the traditional military chain of command and control. Acquiescence to what can only be interpreted as China’s reckless disregard for regional stability will not only encourage Beijing to believe that it alone sets the rules for regional waters, but might also set legal precedent that undermines the broader rule of law.

Between Escalation and Acquiescence?

An appropriate response by stakeholder nations would underscore and extend the ruling of the PCA by means that are as non-escalatory as possible without being acquiescent. So far, most insightful commentaries have focused exclusively on the military or legal aspects of this dispute alone. Unfortunately, neither discussion permits much room for creative policymaking, one being excessively escalatory, the other being excessively normative and, so far at least, unable to influence Beijing. But there’s a forgotten policy space that lies between those two poles. Constabulary power offers a tantalizing prospect for progress here, that is, fisheries enforcement in confirmed areas of EEZ.

It should be acknowledged that the PCA ruing left many things unresolved – most notably, ultimate sovereignty of the features in the Spratly Islands. It clarified a few things as well, but these are dauntingly difficult to enforce, such as the validity of the nine-dash line and the illegality of Beijing’s construction on Mischief Reef. However, the ruling did undeniably confirm two things: that Mischief Reef is not capable of generating maritime zones, and so falls within Manila’s EEZ; and second, Scarborough Shoal only generates a 12 nautical mile territorial sea within the larger Filipino EEZ, and that all traditional (including Filipino) fishermen should retain access.

In principle, these rulings are easily consolidated through maritime law enforcement activity in confirmed areas of Philippine EEZ. But with a high volume of Chinese-flagged and -subsidized fishing vessels regularly fishing in the zone with the apparent rear-guard support of the China Coast Guard, Manila couldn’t mount an uncontested operation alone. The Philippine Coast Guard and even the Philippine Navy have limited capacity. But acting with the United States under a partnered agreement suited to the circumstances is an option worth exploring. Such a framework might be modeled after Washington’s existing fisheries partnerships in the Pacific Islands under OMSI. Regular credible fisheries patrols in Philippine waters (including those around Mischief Reef and near Scarborough Shoal) would operationalize the spirit and the letter of the least controversial parts of the PCA ruling.

For the United States, a fisheries pact with the Philippine Coast Guard would be a natural and non-escalatory activity under its alliance with Manila in line with its stated commitment to the rule of law in Southeast Asian waters. And, as the United States Navy already has both a near-consistent presence in Philippine waters and direct experience in partnered fisheries enforcement, the operation is “shovel-ready.” It should be noted that partnered fisheries enforcement in the Pacific represents a best practice in innovative governing. There are two enablers: an operating agreement between the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard on the one hand, and bilateral ship-rider agreement between the United States and the partner nation on the other. The result is that today, a U.S. Navy vessel carrying U.S. Coast Guard personnel and partner authorities can detain, inspect, confiscate, and arrest foreign fishing vessels operating illegally in partner EEZs. This creative interagency and international framework has been successfully operating in the Pacific for half a decade, putting some much-needed muscle behind fisheries management there. Is this the model for U.S.-Philippine partnership going forward?

There are downsides to this proposition. It is well known that “commercial” fishermen around the nine-dash line are affiliated with and perhaps directed by Chinese government authorities, which means that confronting these trespassers carries some risk. To say nothing of the fact that the U.S. Navy cannot and should not be Southeast Asia’s fish police for the long-run; that mission properly belongs to the region’s residents. But in the immediate term, limited use of U.S. Navy platforms for this purpose is a proposal that has much to commend it. It will unequivocally underscore Manila and Washington’s joint commitment to abide by the PCA ruling while demonstrating that the Philippines’ sovereign right to police its own jurisdiction is sacrosanct, no matter its size or capability. It will signal to Beijing that it does not have a free hand in Southeast Asia, particularly in the sovereign jurisdictions of Southeast Asia’s smaller states. It may reduce the volume of official and semi-official activity undertaken by China’s maritime services in Philippine EEZ, diminishing the operational risks of confrontation or dangerous unintended encounters around the Spratly Islands. And it may also provide some badly needed deterrence to ongoing construction projects on and around Mischief Reef.

All things considered, strengthened fisheries enforcement – partnered, legal, and effective – may be the best way to extend the PCA ruling with the least possible risk to regional stability. The baseline reality is that the United States Navy knows how to do partnered fisheries enforcement. That capability is badly needed in the Philippine EEZ. And the apparent alternatives, either military posturing or de facto acquiescence to Chinese behavior, might prove the riskier options in the not- so-long-run.

[Kerry Lynn Nankivell is an Associate Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI. The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and do not represent the official view of U.S. Pacific Command, the U.S. Department of Defense or the United States government.]

http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/south-china-sea-fishing-in-troubled-waters/