From Rappler (Feb 3):
Inside Mamasapano: When the bullets ran out
Each of SAF troopers was armed with 300 rounds of ammunition, but this was no match for rebel firepower
BLOODIEST
OPERATION: Philippine police commandos unload body bags containing the remains
of their comrades killed in a clash with Muslim rebels. AFP PHOTO/Mark Navales
It was pitch dark
as it should be. Wearing night vision goggles, 36 elite cops of the 55th
Special Action Force Company infiltrated Mamasapano, Maguindanao, dawn of
Sunday, January 25.
Their mission was
clear: to serve as the blocking force that will protect and ensure the exit of
the first group of United States-trained Seaborne Unit of the 84th SAF company
that had already entered Barangay Pidsandawan to arrest top terrorists Zulkifli
bin Hir (better known as Marwan) and Abdul Basit Usman the night before.
It was shortly
past 4 am when the Seaborne Unit – 37 of them – got to Marwan’s hut in
Pidsandawan. They were greeted by a booby trap – a sort of improvised explosive
– that had served as Marwan’s warning device and which injured a SAF commando.
Marwan was able
to draw his gun, but the SAF troopers shot back and killed him. Marwan’s
security fought back, reinforced later by members of the Bangsamoro Islamic
Freedom Fighters. Faced with heavy gunfire, the troops left behind Marwan’s
body, taking only his finger for DNA testing.
They later sent a
text message to their commanders: “Mike 1, bingo,” referring to Marwan. They
also said Marwan’s body “was left behind because of the heavy volume of
gunfire.” (Authorities claimed the SAF troopers indeed killed Marwan on January
25, but they are awaiting DNA results for final confirmation.)
For many hours,
however, the Seaborne troopers could not be located. By mid-afternoon they were
presumed dead until they were extracted by an Army platoon Sunday evening. Nine
of the 37 Seaborne troopers were killed.
One of the
seabornes sought for artillery support, but the military was not able to
provide one because of unreliable grid coordinates.
The military
fired white phosphorous into the hilly area around 6 pm shortly before the Army
extracted them to safety. White phosphorous creates a loud bang that can scare
away enemies, but doesn’t kill. It only serves as a marker before the explosives
are fired.
Fatal
terrain
That early Sunday
morning, another SAF team – a blocking force of 36 troops – was waiting in a
corn field about 3 kilometers away, in Barangay Tukanalipao. They were supposed
to ensure the exit of the Seaborne unit and cover their path.
It was around
4:30 am when the SAF blocking force, using night vision goggles, spotted about
50 meters away a group of men in front of them. The SAF commandos took time to
observe, concealing themselves until the sun rose.
It turned out the
men had guns, all members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). “Nagkakitaan
na may baril. Nagkaputukan na (One side saw the other armed, so we fired
upon each other),” said the source. It’s not clear who fired first.
It seemed the
MILF forces were alerted about the entry of the Seaborne unit that targeted
Marwan. They must have thought the Seaborne unit and the blocking force were
one and the same.
A relentless
exchange of gunfire followed. Many more armed men came to reinforce the rebels,
trapping the SAF troopers in a flat terrain of cornfields that hardly provided
cover for them.
The elite cops
tried to seek refuge in the cornstalks and some of the elevated portions of the
soil by the river. They were well-trained and well-armed, each with 300 rounds
of ammunition. But this was no match for the number of heavily armed men who
surrounded them, pintakasi style (free for all). The bullets were
coming from all sides.
“They could not
exit because of the terrain. There was no way of getting out,” said one source.
The troops ran
out of ammunition. They waited for reinforcement that never came. When asked by
the Army for location details, they didn’t know what to say.
By sunset, 35 SAF
commandos in Barangay Tukanalipao were slaughtered.
Only one survived
to tell the tale. Police Officer 2 Christopher Lalan hid among the lilies in
the river. When he found the opportunity, he ran and changed his clothes and
ran again until he he reached the road where the 3rd batch of SAF troopers were
located.
There was a 3rd
group of SAF troopers in Mamasapano that day.
About 300 SAF men
remained by the roadside with the tanks of the Philippine military. Questions
are now raised why they failed to reinforce their comrades.
ENCOUNTER SITE:
Mamasapano residents survey the scene in Tukanalipao, Mamasapano Maguindanao
where 44 SAF members died and 11 others wounded during a clashed with combined
forces of MILF and BIFF
December
operation
Rappler learned
of a botched SAF operation to get Marwan in December 2014.
The SAF commandos
were already in Mamasapano but had to abandon the plan because they were
spotted by men believed to be MILF members. Firefight ensued and they pulled
out with the help of the military that immediately responded to help them.
There were no casualties.
This was
confirmed by a friend of a slain SAF commando who said the latter did mention
to him a cancelled December operation when they saw each other last Christmas.
(READ: Slain SAF talked about December operation)
One source said
they tried to get Marwan at least twice in December. Several Rappler sources
said there was an advice from high-level security officials to postpone the
hunt for Marwan until after the visit of Pope Francis on January 19, due to
concerns about possible retaliatory attacks from Marwan’s networks.
The January 25
attack came 6 days after the Pope’s return to the Vatican.
The SAF has
always been obsessed with Marwan. “Wala na kaming ginawa kung hindi
Marwan (We didn't do anything else except [those related to] Marwan),” said a
SAF commando.
He laughed but he
knows it’s for a good reason. “Kapag pinutol mo ang ulo, matagal ulit
tutubo ng bago (If you cut the head off, it will take some time before it
grows another).” Marwan, who settled in the Philippines in 2003, has been
training Filipino terrorists in bomb making. (READ: Marwan's ties that bind)
SAF reviewed its
December plan and made adjustments.
For the January
25 attack, they put road security forces to make sure they would not engage the
same group of MILF near their staging areas. The Seaborne team also jumped off
10 pm Saturday night, January 24, to make sure they wouldn't lose the element
of surprise.
Still, they were
delayed by the difficult marshland terrain.
All PNP
The PNP announced
there were a total of 392 SAF troopers inside Mamasapano, an indication that it
was meant to be an all-PNP operation.
They were
deployed there for road security, according to two sources privy to the plan.
They had to make sure that the other MIILF fighter units near the area of
operation did not get involved in the firefight.
It was on that
roadside that the military had positioned its tanks, too, the closest place to
the encounter area where the tanks could be placed. The marshland was not
“tankable.”
A COUNTRY IN
MOURNING: DILG Secretary Mar Roxas leads the welcoming of SAF members who were
killed in a clash with Muslim rebels at the Villamor Airbas. Photo by Dennis
Sabangan/EPA
Some 100 of the
SAF troopers supposedly tried to reinforce the 55th SAF Command, but they were
unable to penetrate the defenses of the MILF. “Makapal na kasi ang MILF (We
were surrounded by MILF),” said the source.
In the aftermath
of the tragedy, a lot of questions are raised about the SAF operation that was
kept a secret from the military, which was more familiar with the treacherous
terrain of the MILF territory, and even from the top echelon of the PNP.
Sacked SAF
commander Police Director Getulio Napenas Jr has taken full responsibility for
the operation, but various sources have confirmed to Rappler that it was
suspended PNP chief Alan Purisima who was on top of it.
A number of
probes have been set – the PNP Board of Inquiry, the Senate probe, the House
probe, the Ombudsman probe, and even a supposed Truth Commission.
An elite soldier
who has operated in Maguindao for years lamented that many of the questions are
distracting the country from the main issue. “The problem has always been: Why
are there terrorists inside MILF area?” he said. It is what prompted the SAF to
keep the operations a secret, but which the MILF has denied. (READ: MILF: We didn't coddle Marwan, Usman)
FROM MILF TO BIFF:
File photo shows BIFF leader Ameril Umbra Kato, former commander of the MILF
105th Base Command. AFP file photo
Strained
ties
The January 25
bloodbath also exposed the difficult relationship between the police and the
military. At camps, cops and soldiers have been assessing the operation and
blaming each other.
Soldiers are
questioning the SAF strategy and how the SAF commandos failed to reinforce
their own men. A military officer based in Maguindanao said the rest of the SAF
commandos could have engaged the MILF on the side to disperse the rebels. This
way, firepower would not have been concentrated on the trapped SAF members.
But SAF commandos
speak of usually quick reinforcements from the military, such as the Marines,
when they operate in other areas in Mindanao.
“Bakit 'yung Marines sa Basilan at Sulu, ang bilis mag-reinforce kahit
walang coordination? Ang iniisip namin magagalit sila, pero mag-reinforce pa
rin sila,” said a SAF trooper.
(Why could
Marines could quickly send reinformcement when in Basilan and Sulu even if we
didn't coordinate with them? We'd think they would get offended, but they would
still reinforce us anyway.)
http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/in-depth/82803-mamasapano-combat-zone-saf-story
