In Photo: In this December 24, 2015, photo, provided by Filipino fisherman Renato Etac, a Chinese Coast Guard boat approaches Filipino fishermen near Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea.
FOR the past six years, the military has steadily shifted its focus to territorial from internal defense with President Aquino’s modest, but nevertheless, billions of pesos worth acquisition of jet fighters and warships—something that was not accomplished by the previous three administrations combined.
The spin toward the territorial defense posture was influenced by two factors: the urgent need for the country to secure its stakes in the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) in the face of an aggressive and determined China and the “illusion” that the Maoist-inspired insurgency that has pestered and tormented the country for decades is on the retreat and will be over in a couple of years.
The deceiving belief was etched under and buttressed by the Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan, a counterinsurgency campaign that was crafted by former Military Operations Chief Emmanuel Bautista, who was later catapulted to chief of staff.
IPSP Bayanihan is designed to break the three-pronged war that the Armed Forces has been waging against communist rebels, Moro separatists and the bandit Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and even other lawless groups.
However, just two months before the end of the term of the Aquino administration and Bautista already retired for nearly two years, the whole-of-government approach that is Bayanihan is following the track of the other previously military-initiated operational plan—a failed experiment.
At least two reasons were offered by some why the internal security plan Bayanihan—which was supposed to end the country’s domestic threats, more particularly from the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army (NPA)-National Democratic Front—was a failure or is failing.
One, because defense and military planners have put too much emphasis on the country’s territorial-defense needs that they have negated or failed to balance the equally pressing need for the country to address its internal security threats, reacting only when the government is attacked by NPA rebels, Abu Sayyaf bandits and even by other lawless groups.
Two, because the Armed Forces is already lost in the notion that IPSP Bayanihan is successfully breaking the backbone of all the threat groups and even showing the exit to the rebels and to the terrorists and bandits in Mindanao.
While it may be true that the memberships of the NPA and the ASG are on the decline as constantly drumbeated by military apologists—owing to the figures of neutralized personalities and key leaders—both groups, though smaller in number, were, however, bolder and more daring, as shown by their encounters with the government during the past couple of weeks.
“The problem with the government is it is totally sold to the idea that Bayanihan is winning. It refuses to reexamine or reevaluate it to the point that it rejects or gloss over facts,” one military observer said.
The government has already scored an initial victory against Moro secessionism, archiving it through the peace agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), but its conflict with the NPA and the Abu Sayyaf remains, with the two groups escalating it.
From north to south, the rebels tagged by the government as “terrorists” scored successful attacks, even detonating homemade bombs in 11 areas in Masbate on a single day and engaging troops in Catanduanes, Camarines Sur, Oriental Mindoro, some places in the Bicol region and the rebel-infested areas in Southern Tagalog.
On the occasion of the NPA’s 47th anniversary in late March, the rebels put up at least seven checkpoints in broad daylight in Agusan del Sur, Agusan del Norte and in Bukidnon, something that the NPA has not done in many years.
In February eight policemen were killed and several others were wounded in a series of ambushes and attacks in Cagayan, Bukidnon and Negros, which the military said were part of the rebel group’s extortion activities.
On April 16 the rebels also raided a military detachment in Paquibato District, Davao City, taking away several high-powered firearms and five policemen who had the misfortune of passing a checkpoint that they have put up.
In a surprise move, the military, which has been calling the NPA for years as a “terrorist group” and does so whenever it encounter its members, branded those behind the Davao City attack as a “lawless group.”
The Abu Sayyaf, on the other hand, killed at least 18 soldiers and wounded 57 others in a series of skirmishes just two weeks ago in Basilan, while recently in Tawi-tawi and even Sabah, it has snatched more than a dozen of Malaysian and Indonesian boat crewmen in three separate kidnappings.
During the encounter in Basilan, the government killed a Moroccan jihadist, while two months ago, an Indonesian militant was killed in a massive military operation in Lanao del Norte. The operation in Lanao del Norte uncovered the operations and existence of what the military said was a “foreign-affiliated terrorist group” in the country.
The deaths of the two foreign jihadists and even the acts of the Abu Sayya and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) in pledging their allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Isil) has confirmed directly or indirectly the presence of the Arab-based terrorist group in the country.
However, for the sake of IPSP Bayanihan, the military refused to acknowledge the presence and existence of Isil in the country, even when reports tell it so. The BIFF broke away from the MILF during the implementation of the “cure all” IPSP Bayanihan.
On assets and equipment, most, if not all, of the acquisitions made by the military was for territorial defense, with the exceptions of M-4 carbines, refurbished armored vehicles and seven alleged poorly repaired UH-1D helicopters, one of which even crashed under questionable circumstances.
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