MILF officers in a huddle, 2 September 2013. FILE PHOTO BY DENNIS ARCON
[Editor's note: Jose Antonio A. Custodio is a security and defense consultant and was a technical adviser for a US defense company working for the US Pacific Command. He also specializes in military history and has post-graduate studies in history from the University of the Philippines. He also teaches history and political science at several universities in Metro Manila.
After the Mamasapano tragedy, calls for all-out war against the MILF have been made. In the first installment of his piece, military analyst Jose Antonio Custodio reviewed Estrada’s all-out war campaign. Here, he tackles: Is the military prepared to go on an all-out war? In the third and last part, he will answer: What would be the MILF response? What are the internal and external repercussions of returning to a war footing with the Moros? The last part will come out February 19.]
In counterinsurgency, the rule of thumb is that the government side must have a very large numerical superiority over the rebels to overcome the latter’s flexibility in evading the military and in staging hit-and-run attacks. Five government soldiers to 1 rebel is considered to be the minimum but the larger the better. Such a large ratio in favor of the government also ensures coverage of territories thus defeating the “fish in water” strategy of the rebels.
If the Battle of Mamasapano is to provide any other lesson to be learned it is that the secessionists do enjoy the support of the community they are in when it comes to combat operations and thus the better trained battalion sized SAF force was routed by the sheer weight of the attack against them.
Estimate of secessionist strength is put at 11,000 for the MILF being the largest armed group as compared to the 500 or so strong Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters and the 300 or so Abu Sayyaf Group. Ironically, the remnants of the Moro National Liberation Front despite a peace agreement with the government still figured in a long drawn-out urban battle against government forces in 2013 and the City of Zamboanga has not fully recovered from it.
However as had been mentioned, these various groups can draw on local community support due to kinship reasons and gain rapid numerical strength during battles with government troops. These groups also sometimes have this habit of working side by side in temporary alliances of convenience when faced with military operations. They can also choose to be flexible and roll with the punches thrown by government force until personnel, materiel, and funding exhaustion affects the military and operations grind to a halt.
And there is also that problem posed by the 3,000 or so strong New People’s Army. The military has also to contend with this rebel formation that opportunistically takes advantage of government concentration in operations against the secessionists.
In short, if the Philippine government goes into large-scale military operations against the MILF and the BIFF, then it has to prepare against all eventualities in other fronts of the internal security situation of the country.
That pits approximately 35,000 up against various rebel formations one-third their number but able to draw on considerable community support thus managing to establish rebel supremacy in certain tactical situations.
Thus it is clear that the Philippine government does not have that decisive numerical advantage that is necessary to establish dominance in the battlefield and it runs the risk of seeing the military and police distracted and tied down by numerous operations conducted against it by Muslim secessionists and even communist rebels.
It is in these situations that the military should enjoy the advantage of possessing crew served equipment and weapons systems that are considered as force multipliers and should give them the flexibility and lethality against mainly foot slogging rebels.
Unfortunately since the abovementioned Abubakar Campaign of 2000, the same systems that saw service then and became quickly worn down by wear and tear are still in service. In the 15th Strike Wing of the Philippine Air Force which is the premier attack unit of that service, the same OV-10 Broncos and MG 520s still shoulder on more than a generation since they were purchased and are desperately in need of replacement.
To add some capability, light training aircraft such as the SF-260 are configured for ground attack roles. The 50-year-old UH-1H still remains the main utility helicopter of the PAF and there are approximately 60 to 70 depending on what open source is consulted but constant use will pare that down to 40 or so due to the advanced age of this type.
Attempts to replace this helicopter with later models have always fallen through due to one reason after another.
Furthermore, aside from combat use, the Huey is also a key asset in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief which year in and year out happen in the Philippines and such natural calamities also have the habit of exercising their own pull on the military assets of the government.
However, there are the 17,000 men of the Philippine Air Force of whom many appear to be surplus to the needs of the service who can be utilized as a source of additional combat reserves as long as they are properly re-trained.
The Philippine Army’s state of equipment is at least better off than the situation in the PAF. As of now, the PA is in a transition as it is replacing its old M16 rifles with the new M4s which are totally manufactured in the United States.
The PA has approximately 500 armored vehicles of all types of which the bulk come from American military assistance. Majority of these armored vehicles are wheeled lightly armored and armed types like the V-150 Commando of Vietnam War vintage. The most numerous tracked vehicle is the M113 Armored Personnel Carrier also of Vietnam War vintage and although supposedly amphibious it remains to be seen if they still retain that capability in the PA having been in service for so long.
The PA as well as the Philippine Marine Corps rely on towed artillery of 1940s to 1960s technology and are rather slow and cumbersome to deploy as compared to self-propelled types. Interestingly enough, the PA has never seriously invested in Self Propelled Artillery even in the current modernization program.
Hence although the PA has benefited from the focus on internal security that the previous capability enhancement programs had undertaken in the years following Abubakar, it remains to be seen if it can undertake flexible and quick operations and not the slow ponderous campaign it did in the 2000 campaign that although causing large casualties to the MILF when the secessionists chose to fight it out, eventually allowed the bulk of the rebel army to survive when they chose to evade, fall back, disperse, and engage in guerrilla warfare.
Much of the territory in Central Mindanao would confine the armored assets to roads and good ground which would limit their effectiveness in supporting infantry in difficult terrain and marshes. In order to establish a great degree of flexibility, the PA would need the entire fleet of Hueys of the PAF concentrated solely in operations against the secessionists.
The problem is that the UH1H, which had been an army asset in the US Army and thus allowed for quicker infantry and airborne operations due to a single service handling the units, belongs to another service in the Philippine context and thus will require more coordination and probable delays as it will be an inter-service operation. Each delay allows the rebels greater opportunity to escape and survive.
The Philippine Navy will provide transport, fire support, and interdiction to the overall effort against the secessionists in areas where it is needed. However doing this may result in stripping assets away from other high priority areas of which the most important is the West Philippine Sea and the Kalayaan Island Group.
http://www.interaksyon.com/article/105295/war-in-mindanao-how-prepared-is-the-military-part-2-of-3
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