'The otherwise exceptional book by the MILF peace negotiator lacks a critical view of the Moro ruling elite, who compromised principles and came into a mutual accommodation with the Filipino state'
(First of two parts)
People can go
nuts over Mohagher Iqbal’s many names and aliases to legally question his
ability to represent
the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in its negotiations with the
government. What fascinates me about the movement’s spokesperson is
a talent that is rare among many a revolutionary. Iqbal, or whoever he is, can
write.
One cannot say
this of the witless Vicente Sotto III (plagiarist), the public-spectacle
advocate Alan Peter Cayetano, and the well-endowed legatees of the Marcos
dictatorship and its minions, Ferdinand Jr and the Chiz. The jailed former
defense minister had a former activist write his hagiography while his
co-plotter and successor came up with a tome that diverges considerably from
the way he explains matters to a listening public.
Not Iqbal. The
fellow writes his own interpretation of Moro affairs and the minority group’s
fraught and even hostile relationship with the Philippine state. His first book
Bangsamoro, A Nation under Endless Tyranny: History of the Muslims in the Philippines is
the first ever attempt to write the history of the Bangsamoro from the
perspective of those fighting in their behalf. It is the Moro’s version of Jose
Ma. Sison’s Philippine Society and Revolution, if you will. (A free online copy
is available for the reading public at http://www.bangsamoro.org/)
The book’s reach
is ambitious, going as far back as 22,000 years ago, when communities began to
“migrate” into the archipelago, to the 1997 peace talks that laid the
groundwork for the succeeding negotiations. Iqbal/Jubair also devotes some
space to explaining why there is basis for Moros to call themselves as a nation
– including placing the emergence of Moro nationalism alongside, but parallel,
to that of Filipino nationalism. Here, Iqbal differs from scholars like Samuel
K. Tan and even Cesar A. Majul, who argue that these two processes were
intertwined with each other (hence: Filipino-Muslim struggle).
To critics that
point to the absence of unity within the Bangsamoro itself, Iqbal/Jubair writes
that what binds it together was “that throughout the 377 years of Spanish
presence…the Moros remained unconquered.” Of the American period, however,
Iqbal/Jubair hews closely to the argument by Filipino nationalists that the
combination of firepower and attraction “mesmerized the minds of the Moros”
with “the net result was no ‘moroizing’ (sic) the Moros but ‘filipinizing’
(sic) them in order to pave [their] integration…into one unified state once
independence is granted.”
Chapter 7 is the
most controversial as this is where Iqbal/Jubair lays out in a methodical
manner what Filipino colonialism was all about (again, a first since Nur
Misuari never even countenanced writing something similar). This and the
subsequent chapters should be the concern of everyone interested in the Moro
struggle, to weigh whether Iqbal’s/Jubair’s arguments have basis in fact and
are convincing in themselves.
In chapter 9 we
get a glimpse, an impartial one admittedly, of what the war was like, as the
book narrates some of the major encounters between the warring forces. These
engagements involved large numbers of forces and they were vicious. Moros, of
course, bore the brunt of the war, and here we see another reason why the
anti-Filipino sentiments among the Moros persisted.
Of the pundits
who have taken the MILF’s nationalism seriously, it was Rigoberto
Tiglao who has begun to poke holes into Iqbal’s/Jubair’s arguments.
The former chief of staff of President Gloria Arroyo is clearly biased against
the current regime, but his contentions cannot just be dismissed as the ranting
of a loyal subaltern – for it is in these chapters that the MILF anchors the
justification of its separatist cause.
My comments on
the book lie in the absence of a critical view of the Moro ruling elite, the
“traditional” and “modern” clans who compromised principles and came into a
mutual accommodation with the Filipino state. I’ve raised this in essays
written for favorite rags like Rappler and Mindanews, and in a number of
occasions Iqbal/Jubair responded to these commentaries. But I found them a tad
lame.
It is this nuance
that is absent in this otherwise exceptional book – like his rival Misuari,
Iqbal/Jubair is diffident in pointing his critical eyes at the political clans
that govern the Bangsamoro, sometimes with impunity. He mentions these elites
but only in the last pages of his book. And he was quite vague about them, the
immediate reason being strategic: like the Moro National Liberation Front, the
MILF is realistic enough to admit that it could never win its revolution
without at the very least the sympathies of the Moro elite. The latter
continues to hold sway over many a Moro community, can muster enough arms and
men to engage both state and revolution, and possesses the wealth and the
wherewithal to sustain the conflict.
But the Moro elite
has also had a long record of turning its back on the rebellion. The MNLF
collapsed after 1977 because Misuari could not prevent the elite from leaving
the coalition and then turning against him. Manila ’s
power in Moro Mindanao has also remained unchallenged because it was the likes
of Ali Dimaporo and, of late, the Ampatuans who remained loyal to Manila .
This leads one to
muse: will the next edition of Bangsamoro engage this problem (as well as those
raised by Tiglao)? Pass the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law so Mohagher Iqbal can
go back to his first love – being a historian – and thereby further enrich our
knowledge of Moro history and politics.
http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/90296-abinales-mohagher-iqbal-author?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rappler%2Fviews+(Rappler%3A+Views)
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