Monday, April 3, 2017

Philippine soldiers kill 'more than 10' militants in bid to free captives

From InterAksyon (Apr 4): Philippine soldiers kill 'more than 10' militants in bid to free captives

A soldier is treated at Camp Bautista after being wounded in an encounter with the Abu Sayyaf in Talipao, Sulu. REUTERS

Philippine soldiers killed "more than 10" Islamic State-linked Abu Sayyaf militants in an attempt to free Vietnamese captives held on a remote southern island as troops fired howitzer shells on rebel positions, an army general said on Monday.

The small but violent militant group, known for extortion, beheading and kidnap-for-ransom activities, is holding more than two dozen captives on Jolo island. It beheaded a German captive two months ago when no ransom was paid for his release.

Major-General Carlito Galvez, military commander of western Mindanao, said 32 soldiers were also wounded in Sunday's assault on an Abu Sayyaf hideout in Talipao town, where the militants were believed to be holding six Vietnamese captives.

"The 105mm howitzer directly hit enemy positions," Galvez told reporters, saying four rounds were fired when advancing troops were pinned down.

"More than 10 were killed. Our troops had discovered mangled bodies in the area, but we continue to pursue them."

There was no word on the fate of the captives. Four of the wounded soldiers were airlifted to a hospital while 28, among them a battalion commander, had minor shrapnel wounds from grenade blasts.

Galvez said troops had clashed for more than an hour with about 100 Abu Sayyaf rebels led by Radullan Sahiron, a one-armed militant leader who figures on the US State Department's wanted list, with a $1-million bounty.

Last month, five Malaysians were freed on Jolo and two Filipino sailors were rescued on nearby Basilan island by soldiers chasing the Abu Sayyaf militant group.

Sayyafs inflict heavy casualties on military in Sulu

From the Mindanao Examiner (Apr 3): Sayyafs inflict heavy casualties on military in Sulu

At least three dozen soldiers were wounded in fierce clashes with Abu Sayyaf rebels in the southern Filipino province of Sulu, various reports from there said on Monday.

It said the weekend fighting broke out in the remote village of Upper Laus in Talipao town where troops clashed with about 150 rebels under Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan. There were no reports of Abu Sayyaf casualties, but many of the wounded soldiers were members of the 41st Infantry Battalion.

The military’s Western Mindanao Command did not release any information about the casualties, although security forces have been battling the ISIS-affiliate rebel group whose members are fighting for a caliphate in the restive Muslim autonomous region.

Just recently, security forces captured a notorious Abu Sayyaf rebel – Amilton Tammang – at the port of Zamboanga City after he escaped military operation in Sulu, one of 5 provinces under the autonomous region.

The 29-year old Tammang is wanted by the police and military for the brutal murder of a construction worker in Sulu’s Patikul town in 2016.

Tamang was handed over by the military to the police and is currently being interrogated. It was not immediately known whether Tammang escaped Sulu with other rebels or whether he was planning an attack in Zamboanga.

The Abu Sayyaf is still holding about two dozen Asian sailors kidnapped off Malaysia’s Sabah state and in Basilan and Tawi-Tawi provinces, all in the Muslim region.

Philippines Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 3 | April 2017

From the Relief Web (Apr 3): Philippines Humanitarian Bulletin Issue 3 | April 2017


• Over 1,800 children were formally disengaged from the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces and Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade in a landmark agreement between the armed groups and the United Nations in the Philippines.

• The Community of Practice on Community Engagement puts the Rapid Information Communication Accountability Assessment (RICAA) tool into practice in Antequerra, Bohol.

• Almost a year after the Grand Bargain pledge at the World Humanitarian Summit, an Asia-Pacific dialogue reviews progress made and challenges of the commitments.


Surigao Earthquake
# of displaced persons 9,585
# of damaged or destroyed houses 10,873
(Source: DSWD as of 25 March)

Flooding in Mindanao and Visayas
# of displaced persons 29,489 (Source: DSWD as of 26 March)

Zamboanga Crisis
# of IDPs in transitional sites 10,234
(Source: Zamboanga City Social Welfare and Development Office as of 13 March)

1,800 children formally disengaged from non-state armed group

"As children, you should be in school holding pens, not guns.” Wilma Madato, a training officer for the Bangsamoro Islamic Women Auxiliary Brigade (BIWAB) and member of the UN-MILF Action Plan Five-Person Panel, delivered a firm message to 36 children, along with their families and soldiers of the Field Guard base command of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Maguindanao province. She was speaking at one of dozens of ceremonies that took place in February and March to formally disengage over 1,800 children from association with the MILF’s military arm, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF) and its counterpart BIWAB.

Disengagement efforts in the Philippines

The United Nations, led by UNICEF’s country office in the Philippines, supported this process, which began with the UN-MILF Action Plan to address the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict in Mindanao. The 2009 action plan, extended in 2013, commits the MILF to end the recruitment and use of children within their ranks. These ceremonies signify the culmination of years of initiatives to raise awareness and sensitize MILF members from the highest levels to front-line soldiers and families on the implications and impact on children who are recruited and used by their military arm.

At the field level in Mindanao and the national level in Manila, the UN Security Councilmandated country team for monitoring and reporting grave violations of children’s rights in situations of armed conflict has been central to the disengagement process. OCHA actively participates in this multi-lateral team chaired by UNICEF, which tracks incidents involving children and works with all parties involved to halt these grave violations. Additionally, OCHA advocates their protection through various media and means, including meetings with stakeholders and partners.

Lotta Sylwander, UNICEF Philippines Representative, says, “Children affected by armed conflict are among the most vulnerable in the world. Right here in the Philippines, children are affected by armed conflict in different ways. They can be recruited as soldiers and engaged in direct combat or simply be helpers at the camp. In any case, there are seriously harmful consequences threatening their life and well-being.”

Philippine Navy ship deal: Indonesians arrested

From the Philippine Star (Apr 3): Philippine Navy ship deal: Indonesians arrested

The two-unit SSV procurement project of the Navy reportedly has an approved budget contract of P4 billion sourced from the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Modernization Act Trust Fund. AP Photo/Bullit Marquez
DAVAO CITY, Philippines — Ranking officials of an Indonesian state shipbuilder were reportedly apprehended before the weekend by anti-corruption authorities over a bribery case involving the sale of two warships to the Philippine Navy worth at least P4 billion.

PT. PAL Indonesia president director Firmansyah Arifin and corporate secretary Elly Dwiratmanto were taken for questioning by elements of Indonesia’s Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) or Corruption Eradication Commission regarding the sale of two strategic sealift vessels (SSV) to the Philippine Navy.

Arifin and Dwiratmanto were reportedly taken in Thursday by KPK after several personnel of PT. PAL’s finance department were also questioned earlier by KPK.

Arifin and Dwiratmanto were reportedly picked up from the company’s headquarters in Surabaya, East Java, around 11 p.m. local time, according to a Jakarta Post report.

PT. PAL Indonesia had reportedly won a tender for the construction of two strategic sealift vessels (SSV) worth Rp 1.1 trillion ($82.57 million) for the Philippine Navy.

The first warship delivered to the Philippines, named BRP Tarlac, arrived on May 14, 2016 after a five-day journey from the PT PAL shipyard in Surabaya. It was commissioned in short ceremonies at Pier 13, Manila South Harbor on June 1, 2016.

The second vessel, christened BRP Davao del Sur, is scheduled to be delivered this month or by May.

The two-unit SSV procurement project of the Navy reportedly has an approved budget contract of P4 billion sourced from the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ (AFP) Modernization Act Trust Fund.

Sources in Indonesia maintained that the bribery case against PT. PAL officials does not involve any officials of the Philippine Navy or AFP.

“What I understand is that the bribery case was between the Indonesian broker company and the PT. PAL officials, and does not involve anyone from the Philippines,” a source of The STAR said.

As of press time, however, the non-involvement of Philippine officials in the alleged bribery case could not be confirmed.

Likewise, the delivery of BRP Davao del Sur as scheduled amid the issue could not be ascertained.

BRP Davao del Sur was launched and christened in ceremonies also held in Surabaya and attended by Philippine officials in September 2016.

Just like BRP Tarlac, BRP Davao Del Sur is also a Makassar-class landing platform dock.

Both BRP Tarlac and BRP Davao del Sur serve as floating command-and-control ships, especially in the conduct of humanitarian assistance and disaster response, and will also serve as a military sealift and transport vessel.

BRP Davao del Sur has an overall length of 120 meters, breadth of 21 meters and draft of five meters. It carries a payload of 2,800 tons.

Army commander in Bicol pushes localized peace talks

From the Philippine News Agency (Apr 3): Army commander in Bicol pushes localized peace talks

A top official of the 903rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army operating in Bicol said they are working out a localized peace talk between between the military and the New People’s Army with the Army taking the initiative.

Col. Fernando Trinidad, commanding officer of the 903rd Infantry Brigade, in an interview, has called on the members of the communist rebel organization to return to the fold of the law.

He said he has started the ball rolling for a possible talk with local guerrilla leaders even as he expressed full support to the ongoing informal peace talks between the government and National Democratic Front (NDF) peace panels.

“We can stop fighting to talk and if we fail to reach an agreement then we can resume fighting again,” Trinidad said.

He added he has initially coordinated with some sectors, including the church, non-government organizations and community leaders who could help push the local peace talk.

Trinidad said the government still has the Comprehensive Local Integration Program (CLIP) wherein rebel returnees are provided with cash grants and livelihood programs.

“Rebels who surrender with their firearms are given an additional amount,” he added.

However, Trinidad’s idea was shot down by Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN)-Sorsogon which also supports the peace negotiations between the government and the NDF at the national level.

Rey Hababag, BAYAN-Sorsogon spokesperson, said engaging in a local peace talk would only muddle the peace process.

“Even as we speak, we hear statements from the military which are different or opposed to the statements of the government peace panel or even MalacaƱang,” Hababag stressed.

He said holding a separate peace talk at the local level would only complicate the issues and would just cause confusion.

Hababag said they are only fully supportive of the peace talks now ongoing in Utrecht, the Netherlands.

The peace negotiation bogged down earlier this year after President Rodrigo Duterte ordered government negotiators to discontinue the talks with the NDF panel.

Immediately after the negotiation was severed, both sides also discontinued the ceasefires declared by both sides which had resulted in encounters between government troops and communist guerrillas.

In Sorsogon, the latest encounter between Army troops and the rebels occurred last March 16 at Barangay (village) Tugas, Matnog.

Trinidad said sporadic skirmishes between the two sides are still to be expected despite the declaration of Sorsogon province as a “conflict-manageable, development-ready” area.

He said although the clashes could not be totally eliminated, he expressed confidence that development projects could be carried out in the province because the rebel forces have been reduced to an insignificant level in Sorsogon.

Trinidad said this means the projects could be carried out with lesser apprehension of harassment from the NPA.

Army vows continued offensives vs NPA in Davao region

From the Philippine News Agency (Apr 3): Army vows continued offensives vs NPA in Davao region

While they called on the communist rebels to return to the fold of the law, top officers of the Philippine Army in the Davao region on Monday vowed to continue the military offensive against the New People’s Army (NPA).

Major General Rafael Valencia, commander of 10th Infantry (Agila) Division, also lauded the efforts of the 25th Infantry Battalion (IB) and the 28th IB for quelling the attempts of the rebels to sow fear and atrocities to civilian communities and business establishments in the region.

"Our military offensives will continue to hit the NPA harder until they (will) realize to finally abandon the armed struggle," Valencia said.

Brig. Gen. Macairog Alberto, commander of 1001st Infantry Brigade, also called on the remaining members of NPA in the region to avail of the government’s integration program.

Alberto said government troopers will intensify their military operations against the rebels in Compostela Valley province, one of the areas of operation of the brigade.

He also assured the people in the province of “unhampered development" as the brigade “will ensure that communities will be peaceful and conflict free.”

On Sunday, elements of 25th IB recovered four high-powered firearms left by fleeing and wounded NPA rebels in Montevista, Compostela Valley.

The recovered firearms include an AK-47 rifle, two M653 baby armalite rifles and an M203 grenade launcher, said 10th ID chief information officer Capt. Rhyan Batchar.

Troopers of 28th IB also recovered backpacks, a handheld radio and shirts marked with BHB after an encounter in Don Salvador, Mati City, Davao Oriental last Saturday.

Batchar also reported that two soldiers were wounded when hit by an improvised explosive devise launched by NPA rebels in Barangay Tagbinunga, Mati City late last week.

The wounded soldiers were identified as PFC Jouie Oliveros and PFC Anatoly Lechoncito.

NPA claims to arrest, judge ex-President Aquino, other officials illegal -- AFP

From the Philippine News Agency (Apr 4): NPA claims to arrest, judge ex-President Aquino, other officials illegal -- AFP

Attempts of the New People's Army (NPA) to arrest and judge former President Benigno Aquino III and other officials are illegal and will not be tolerated.

This was stressed by Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) spokesperson Brig. Gen. Restituto Padilla in a briefing Monday where he said that only recognized courts of the country are given such powers.

"(Only) courts that are recognized by the Republic of the Philippines and under the Republic of the Philippines that can rightfully render judgement on anyone brought to its sala," he added.

"And the charges that they have brought to the former president and his other officials are baseless, they are illegal and not honored," the AFP spokesperson further revealed.

In the same vein, Padilla said the military only recognizes judgment that comes from recognized courts and will work together with other agencies to provide protection for Aquino and officials who were accused by the NPAs of allegedly ordering the violent dispersal of protesting farmers in Kidapawan, North Cotabato which left two dead and more than a dozen protesters wounded.

Aside from Aquino, the rebels also tagged North Cotabato Governor Emmylou Talino-Mendoza, Kidapawan City Mayor Joseph Evangelista, North Cotabato Rep. Nancy Catamco.

AFP doing a commendable job in HADR

From the Philippine News Agency (Apr 4): AFP doing a commendable job in HADR

Aside from its mandate to protect the country from all forms of internal and external threats, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is also doing a creditable job in responding to disasters and calamities.

This can be attributed to its training and posture, AFP spokesperson Brig. Gen. Restituto Padilla said in a message to the PNA Tuesday.

In the same vein, the AFP also plays a lead role in the country's search, rescue, retrieval and recovery cluster.

"The AFP is also trained and has a readiness posture in all HADR missions," he added.

As this develops, Defense public affairs office chief Arsenio Andolong said HADR is also one of the core missions of the AFP.

"It is well trained and equipped for disasters. It is also the most organized compared to other agencies and it has units in disaster prone areas," he added.

The AFP is the among the traditional responders during disasters or calamities that strike the Philippines, with its troops providing the first form of assistance to devastated communities and individuals.

"It also has a long standing institutional memory insofar as disaster response is concerned," Andolong pointed out.

DWDD: Diplomatic Reception held aboard BRP Andres Bonifacio (FF17)

From DWDD AFP Civil Relations Service Radio Website (Apr 3): Diplomatic Reception held aboard BRP Andres Bonifacio (FF17)

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 Port Klang, MalaysiaThe Office of the Philippine Ambassador to Malaysia led by His Excellency J. Eduardo Malaya hosted a diplomatic reception aboard BarkongRepublikangPilipinas BRP Andres Bonifacio (FF17) while docked at the National Hydrographic Center in Port Klang, Malaysia on March 31, 2017.
Ambassador Malaya was joined by his better half Madame Ren Cristina Koa-Malaya, MD. The Guest of Honor (GOH) during the reception was Malaysian Armed Forces Chief of StaffLt Gen Dato’ Abdul Halim bin Hadji Jalal. The Philippine Navy (PN)led by the Head of Contingent, Commo Albert A Mogol AFP, attended the reception.
There were more or less ninety (90)dignitaries from the diplomatic community present during the occasion to include the US Ambassador to Malaysia H.E. (Madam) Kamala ShirinLakhdhirand Ambassador Syed MdHasrinTengkuHussin, Undersecretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Malaysia. Also present were members of the Filipino community in Kuala Lumpur.
From the words of the Lt Gen Abdul Halim, “I was informed that this is your (FF17) first international voyage. As a Malaysian, I am very proud you have chosen Malaysia as your first destination.”
This reception hosted by Ambassador Malaya aimed to stimulate the sense of pride among Filipinos in Malaysia for our Armed Forces and the Filipino nation. It was also a way of soliciting appreciation and support for the PN’s modernization programs.
“To the Philippine Navy delegation, we are truly proud and deeply honored of your presence here in Malaysia. You made us proud as Filipinos”, said Phil Ambassador Malaya.

DWDD: Top CARAGA NPA surrenders to Army

From DWDD AFP Civil Relations Service Radio Website (Apr 3): Top CARAGA NPA surrenders to Army


Camp Makapandong, Prosperidad  – CARAGA NPA’s  Estelito Camino Jr  @ Ka PUMA surrendered to the 401st Brigade on Sunday, April 2, 2017. He cited hardship and disillusionment with the NPA as reasons for his surrender.
KA PUMA was the CO of the Sub-Region Sentro de Grabidad of the North Eastern Mindanao Regional Committee of the NPA operating on the tri-boundaries of Surigao del Sur and Agusan provinces.  He wants to be an example to his sub-commanders to pursue with their surrender plan after he has proven that no maltreatment is committed by government forces to those who surrender contrary to the stories told them by their older cadres.
He was with the NPA for 14 years where he earned several Warrants of Arrest including those for Murder Cases for the atrocities they committed. He revealed that his being with the NPAs left him no chance of being with his wife and 3 kids who are also hard-up after the NPAs failed to give their promised monthly support to his family. He also bared that “most of his comrades are already thinking of laying down their arms at an opportune time as they accordingly believe that the Duterte administration is their best chance to have a peaceful life. As top ranking NPA, he accordingly saw how corruption is in the NPA by citing top ranking leaders pocketing extorted money from the businesses and farmers.
Meanwhile, COL CRISTOBAL N ZARAGOZA of the 401st Infantry Brigade also credited the surrender of Ka Puma to the relentless pressure exerted by the 402nd Brigade and PNP in Surigao and Agusan to arrest Ka Puma. He revealed that Ka Puma is willing to face his criminal cases and hopes that his surrender will mitigate his legal cases.
MAJOR GENERAL MADRIGAL of the 4th ID congratulated the two Brigades, the CARAGA PNP and the Intelligence Units of the Army. He instructed them to prepare for the influx of surrenders as Ka Puma has a following in the NPAs in CARAGA.

DWDD: Government troops clash with Abus in Sulu

From DWDD AFP Civil Relations Service Radio Website (Apr 3): Government troops clash with Abus in Sulu


Headquarters, Western Mindanao Command, Camp Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga City- Heavy encounter ensued between operating troops of the Joint Task Force Sulu and about a hundred Abu Sayyaf bandits in Sulu yesterday (April 2) as the rescue operations for the kidnap victims continue.

Soldiers of the 41st Infantry Battalion were acting on an intelligence information from sources to possibly rescue the Vietnamese kidnap victims who were with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) when the firefight ensued in Barangay Upper Laus, Talipao, Sulu at around 9:30 am yesterday.

Troops were advancing towards their target when M203 rounds were directed towards them, causing shrapnel wounds to the forward flank of the operating troops. However, the soldiers were still able to maneuver and take the advantage, pushing the bandits to scamper to different directions after hours of the firefight.

After the clearing operation, reports from the Joint Task Force Sulu disclosed that the Abu Sayyaf suffered heavy casualties as focused military operations are being intensified. Bloodstains were also seen in the areas where the bandits previously positioned during the encounter.

Troops were also able to find the body of one (1) Abu Sayyaf who was killed during the firefight. His identity is yet to be known.

Meanwhile, two (2) M16 rifles belonging to the fleeing bandits were seized by the 41IB.

Close air support and casualty evacuation were being provided by the Air Force, while clearing operations were subsequently conducted by the engaged troops.

Four soldiers sustained gunshot wounds and were promptly airlifted yesterday afternoon to Zamboanga City for further medical attention. Three of the wounded soldiers were brought to the Camp Navarro General Hospital in Camp Navarro, Calarian, Zamboanga City, while another soldier was brought to a private hospital in the city. The four soldiers, however, are already stable as of press time.

Twenty-eight others suffered slight splinter wounds and are currently recuperating at the Kuta Heneral Teodulfo Bautista Hospital in Busbus, Jolo, Sulu.

“Our Joint Task Force Sulu continues to exhaust all efforts and means to contain the Abu Sayyaf and constrict its movement. We are continuously intensifying the conduct of focused military operations, in coordination with the local government and the people of Sulu, to rescue the kidnap victims and to neutralize the terrorist group,” said Major General Carlito G. Galvez, Jr., Commander, Western Mindanao Command.

“We are confident that we can achieve this with the support of the people of Sulu and the local government.”

DWDD: New Zealand’s Frigate visits the Philippines

From DWDD AFP Civil Relations Service Radio Website (Apr 4): New Zealand’s Frigate visits the Philippines


Pier 15, South Harbor, Manila – Her Majesty’s New Zealand Ship (HMNZS) Te Kaha (F77), the first Anzac class frigate operated by the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and skippered by Commander Stephen John Lenik, arrived here earlier today for a goodwill visit to the Philippines that will conclude on April 7, 2017.
Philippine Navy (PN) vessel BRP Rajah Humabon (FF11) rendered customary meeting procedures at the vicinity of Corregidor Island and escorted the vessels to its designated berthing area. PN representatives then accorded the visiting navy a welcome ceremony upon arrival followed by a port briefing related to security and health aboard F77.
The four-day visit will include series of confidence building engagements between PN and RNZN personnel such as courtesy call on the Flag Officer In Command, PN by the Commander of Joint Forces, Major Gen. Tim Gall and Maritime Component Commander, Commodore James Gilmour, wreath laying ceremony at Rizal Monument in Luneta, shipboard tour, reciprocal receptions and goodwill games of basketball, volleyball, football and tug of war.
The engagement between the Philippine and New Zealand navies will cap off with a send-off ceremony and a customary Passing Exercise (PASSEX) between F77 and a designated PN vessel in the vicinity of Corregidor Island.
This visit by a foreign navy and the fitting reception bestowed by PN manifest a sustained promotion of peace and stability, and enhancement of maritime cooperation through naval diplomacy and camaraderie.

MILF: BLMI, PAHRODF conduct Training on Administration and Management, visit training facilities’ sites

Posted to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Website (Apr 2): BLMI, PAHRODF conduct Training on Administration and Management, visit training facilities’ sites

The Bangsamoro Leadership and Management Institute (BLMI) in partnership with Philippines Australia Human Resource and Organizational Development Facility (PAHRODF) has conducted a six -day training on Administration, Management and Benchmarking visit on different training facilities’ sites in Davao city and Tagaytay City from March 23-28. 2017.

The ten (10) trainees who participated were BLMI Officers headed by Executive Director, Sheikh Mahmod S. Ahmad, Unit heads and BLMI Volunteers.

The first two-day activity was held in Bahay Alumni, Brokenshire, Compound, Madapo Hills, Davao city. The two-day sessions focused on BLMI Training Centre Administration and Management as well as orientation on benchmarking visit.

Ms. Ermarie A. Mondejar “Ems”, DAP Vice President/ Managing Director for Conference Center lectured on Module 1 and 2 on the first day. She touched on Planning and Marketing the Training Centre. She presented significant concepts and practices on planning and marketing strategies.

For her part, Ms. Pag-asa Lubag-Dogelio “Page” DAP Program Officer for Conference Center lectured on Module 3 and 4 tackled on Managing the Training Centre and Best Practices. She elucidated the principles and practices of Management of Learning and Facility Management and its processes.

Both resource persons and the facilitators were from the Development Academy of the Philippines (DAP) an institution expert on administrative concepts, organizational management among others. Ms. Theresa Sarona (Maam Inday) from PAHRODF was also present to oversee the flow of activities.

In a bid to acquire more relevant knowledge through in-depth inquiry and observation, the BLMI Trainees made a benchmarking visit to different Training sites in Davao city and Tagaytay City. The first three (3) site visits were in Davao city on March 23 at Brokenshire Alumni Foundation Inc. Another benchmarking visit was in Mindanao Training Resource Centre (MTRC) and Davao Episcopal Training Centre.

On March 26, the BLMI Trainees took an extra mile travel to Tagaytay City where DAP Training Centre and other sites are located. The trainees were warmly welcomed by DAP Officials during their courtesy call and spent their remaining days from March 26-28 at DAP Training Center by making an ocular tour on DAP Conference Centre facilities and engaged in cordial inquiry with its different units’ heads related to administrative and management of DAP Training and Conference Centre.

On the last-day of Benchmarking visit, the BLMI Trainees were also able to meet DAP President Antonio D. Kalaw, Jr, exchanged jovial conversation and gained valuable inputs from the DAP Executive.

Dr. Kalaw said that it was a strange to him that his first assignment as DAP executive in 2006 was to help the BLMI getting developed, so BLMI is no longer new to him.

The last Benchmarking visit was made on March 28 at Helena Z. Benitez National Program and Training Centre also in Tagaytay along Calamaba Road. The BLMI Trainees were welcomed by the Administrator and had a conversation and tour of its training facilities.

In his culminating message, Sheikh Ahmad expressed his profoundest gratitude to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) through PAHRODF and Maam Inday for the technical assistance extended to BLMI. He also thanked the DAP management, the resource speakers and facilitators who provided viable skills and valuable inputs to BLMI trainees that can be applied in managing the BLMI Training Center.

Mr. Alan S. Cajes, DAP Managing Director and Maam Inday of PAHRODF also expressed their respective message of appreciation to BLMI Management and Trainees for having a high passion of updating to new knowledge and openness to new learning environment for the betterment of BLMI and the Bangsamoro as a whole.

The six-day series of session and Benchmarking visits were facilitated by Ms. Cheng Rasco, Ms. Avon Sinajon, Maam Page” and Ms. Justine Imbag, all employees of DAP Davao City Regional Office and Central Office in Pasig City and Tagaytay City.

MILF: KPI holds Focus Group Discussion

Posted to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Website (Apr 3): KPI holds Focus Group Discussion

The Kalilintad Peacebuilding Institute Inc. (KPI) jointly held Focus Group Discussion (FGD) with a group of Overseas Bangsamoro Workers who are on vacation in the Bangsamoro homeland on the gains of the GPH-MILF Peace Process on April 1, 2017 at Cotabato City.

Professor Esmael A. Abdula, Executive Director of KPI and BLMI Steering Committee member who served as resource person told the participants that the main agenda of the peace process is ‘How to Solve the Bangsamoro Problem? “The peace process is a political means to achieve the Bangsamoro’s right to self-determination”, Abdula stressed.

Abdula explained the stages of the Bangsamoro Struggle for Right to Self Determination, and the gains of the GPH-MILF Peace Process.

He narrated the Bangsamoro armed struggle from 1968-1997 and cited the bloody war during Martial Law, the Estrada – All-out war of April 2000, Gloria Arroyo’s– All-out war of February 11, 2004 and the 2008 offensive launched by Comdr. Bravo and the late Aleem Ameril Umbra at the aftermath of Supreme Court’s junking of the MOA-AD.

Abdula also mentioned the two major signed agreements, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) that recognized the legitimate cause of the Bangsamoro people and provided for the creation of a Bangsamoro new political entity in Southern Philippines.

"Last February24, 2017, the government and the MILF launched the expanded Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) composed of 21 members. It was held at the Waterfront Insular Hotel, Davao City.

The new BTC is composed of 11 members nominated by the MILF and 10 members nominated by the government.

MILF 1st Vice Chair Ghazali Jaafar has been chosen by the MILF Central Committee to chair the

expanded commission.

The 10 members who were nominated by the government panel are lawyers Jose Lorena, Maisara Damdamun-Latiph, Hussin Amin, Atty. Firdausi Abbas and Omar Yasser Sema; Samira Gutoc, Dr. Susana Anayatin, Datu Mussolini Lidasan, Romeo Saliga and Hatimil Hassan. Saliga represents the Indigenous Peoples (IP).

The 11 members nominated by the MILF are Jaafar, Mohagher Iqbal, Abdulraof Macacua, Ibrahim Ali, Atty. Raisa Jajurie, Said Shiek, Hussein Munoz, Timuay MelanioUlama, Gafur Kanain, Ammal Solaiman and Haron Abas.

Iqbal, Ali, Jajurie, Ulama, Munoz and Shiek were members of the previous BTC with Iqbal as the chairman. None of the former members nominated by government has been reappointed.

MILF: BDA-ZamBas, PO’s pay visit to LARBECO, Basilan

Posted to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Website (Apr 3): BDA-ZamBas, PO’s pay visit to LARBECO, Basilan

Bangsamoro Development Agency- Zamboanga-Basilan Region (BDA-ZamBas), Peoples Organizations paid a visit to Lamitan Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (LARBECO) on March 27, 2017.

LARBECO, formerly known as Yakan Plantation was bought by former Senator Juan Ponce Enrile in 1980 and was its owner until 1988. Its major products are coconut, cacao and rubber. It is one of the most successful and lucrative cooperatives in the island.

Darul Hidaya Association (DHA) and United Ulitan Association (UUA), the peoples’ organizations organized by BDA-ZamBas sought to learn from LARBECO’s success story such as management and operation.

Mr. Edilberto S. Martinez, the Coop chairman said, “Trust and support of the members to the leadership of the cooperative is of paramount importance and this has been practiced by our members and employees since the company was turned over by the government to the beneficiaries in 1994. The government bought it from Enrile.

“Yakan Plantation was very successful during Enrile’s ownership. When the government took over from 1988-1994 it went bankrupt. After the cooperative was turned over to the cooperative in 1994, it started to ascend again and got successful”, Martinez said.

However, Martinez admitted that the cooperative inherited some debts”.

Ustadz Abdulaziz Andoang, a PO Officer appreciated the tour and said, “We will apply the knowledge we gained from this visit especially the inter-cropping of cacao and rubber in between coconuts, coffee and abaca”.

Martinez told the PO officers that he is willing to help them in terms of technical know-how and provide seedlings too.

Mr. Tawab S. Kararon, BDAZamBas Manager explained to the Coop officers about BDA as it is a humanitarian and development aspect of the GPH-MILF Agreement signed in Tripoli, Libya in 2001. The coop leadership and management appreciated and acknowledged BDA’s vision and mission and willing to partner with it on development from now on and onward.

MILF: BDA- ZamBas Region turns-over Warehouse and Two Solar dryers to Peoples’ Organizations in Basilan

Posted to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front Website (Apr 4): BDA- ZamBas Region turns-over Warehouse and Two Solar dryers to Peoples’ Organizations in Basilan BDA- ZamBas Region turns-over Warehouse and Two Solar dryers to Peoples’ Organizations in Basilan 

BDA ZamBas Region turned-over a warehouse and two solar dryers to peoples’ organization in Barangay Ulitan of Ungkaya Pukan and Guiong of Sumisip, Basilan on March 29.

The projects fall under the Bangsamoro Assistance and Development for Community Empowerment with the acronym BM-ADVANCE is one of MTF-RDP funded by World Bank with the objectives to assist in the economic recovery of the conflict affected communities in Mindanao and support the confidence building measures of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Moro Islamic Liberation Front as provided for in the Comprehensive Agreement on Bangsamoro (CAB).

The Sub-Projects were turned over to Ulitan United Association (UUA) of Barangay Ulitan and Darul Hidayah Association (DHA) of Guiong. The keys of the warehouse were given to its presidents by Ustadz Hashim Mantikan, Project Officer-BDA Central Management Office based in Cotabato City and accepted by the two POs’ Presidents Mr. Adzhar Malangka of UUA and Ustadz Musliman D. Usman of DHA.

Mantikayan said in his message “I want to ask an apology for being late due to unpredictable incident and that is part of sabr (sobriety) just like our struggle needs sabr which has been inherited from our forefathers until now we are still in the state of sabr. But it does not mean we are going to stop rather, we should continue until we attain our main objective. Unity is very important to gain our objective and success of this community and the Bangsamoro as a whole”.

Vice Mayor Ramiz Balahim of Ungkaya Pukan informed the community of Ulitan to be united as project is pouring in “as unity is very crucial for its success especially at this time when concreting of its road is underway as a manifestation of your unity, you were heard by the Local government.”

Mr. Tawab S. Kararon, Manager of BDA-ZamBas Region advised the officers and members of the two People organizations’ to take care of the solar dryers as they have been handed over to you now that the responsibilities especially the operation and maintenance are in your hands.

The turn over activities was made at Ulitan, Ungkaya Pukan in the morning of March 29, while the one in Barangay Guiong, Sumisip was held in the afternoon of the same day.

Sumisip just like Ungkaya Pukan is an impoverished Moro town where some bloody encounters between the military and the notorious Abu Sayaaf Group (ASG) took place in the past.

NDF: NDFP, GRP determined to resolve snags, move talks forward

Propaganda statement posted to the National Democratic Front Website (Apr 4): NDFP, GRP determined to resolve snags, move talks forward  

NDFP Media Office
Press Release

 3 April 2017

The fourth round of formal peace talks between the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) formally opened this morning at Noordwijk, The Netherlands, with both Parties expressing determination to resolve current problems and move the talks forward.

Shaky start

 The talks were off to a shaky start, with the formal opening postponed twice–first to give the GRP panel time for internal caucus, and second for the two Parties to hold informal discussions on a bilateral interim ceasefire agreement. The fourth round of talks should have opened yesterday morning, as agreed upon in the

The GRP and NDFP panels last night agreed to go ahead with the formal opening today and continue talks this afternoon on the bilateral ceasefire. At the open forum, both Parties declined to comment on questions regarding the status of the talks on the bilateral interim ceasefire, preferring to wait for the final outcome at the end of this round of talks.

The atmosphere of uncertainty comes in the wake of the impasse last February after GRP Pres. Rodrigo Duterte cancelled the talks after the New People’s Army lifted its unilateral ceasefire. Duterte also ordered the rearrest of Philippine-based NDFP consultants released on bail in order to participate in the talks. One of the consultants, Mindanao-based Ariel Arbitrario, was arrested at a checkpoint in Davao City on February 5 following Duterte’s verbal orders. He was released on 29 March and is part of the NDFP delegation for this round.

The talks resumed after backchannel talks were held in Utrecht, The Netherlands last 10-11 March. Both Parties agreed to work on a bilateral ceasefire agreement in the fourth round. Meantime, they agreed to reinstate their respective unilateral ceasefires.

However, the GRP announced last 31 March that it would no longer declare a unilateral ceasefire, saying it would push for a bilateral ceasefire agreement ahead of further talks on other items in the agenda.

Common ground on social and economic reforms

 In his opening remarks, Prof. Jose Ma. Sison, the NDFP’s chief political consultant, highlighted the importance of the ongoing negotiations for a Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER), observing that the parties’ respective drafts have enough concurrences and similar positions as common ground to be able to forge an agreements by yearend. He stressed, however, that as a matter of principle, CASER must be a step ahead of the joint ceasefire agreement being demanded by the GRP, unless both can be signed at the same time.

NDFP panel chair Fidel Agcaoili shared Professor Sison’s positive views and reiterated the wisdom of securing the approval of the CASER ahead of any single joint ceasefire agreement. He noted that ceasefires are just a means to an end, with their main purpose being to create conditions conducive to reaching agreements on basic reforms that are satisfactory to both sides.

Violations of rights accord

 Agcaoili moreover raised the NDFP’s concerns over the implementation of the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) signed in 1998, citing, among others, the promised release of 19 ailing and elderly political prisoners, the continued detention of six NDFP consultants, the unresolved cases of enforced disappearance and murder of JASIG-protected personnel under the Arroyo regime, and escalating military operations that terrorize communities. He cited statistics from the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas, stating that up to 46 farmers have been killed under the Duterte government, half of them after the AFP declared its all-out war policy last February 2.

Agcaoili, however, acknowledged the progress made by the Duterte government in providing compensation to victims of the Marcos dictatorship.

Finally, he expressed appreciation for the efforts exerted by the Royal Norwegian Government as Third Party Facilitator, in helping the parties overcome the obstacles and realize the continuation of the formal talks as scheduled.

NDF: NDFP RWC-SER alarmed with escalating killing of farmers engaged in agrarian struggles

Propaganda statement posted to the National Democratic Front Website (Apr 3): NDFP RWC-SER alarmed with escalating killing of farmers engaged in agrarian struggles  

The National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) Reciprocal Working Committee on Social and Economic Reforms (RWC-SER) has expressed utmost concern and alarm with the series of extrajudicial killings of farmers and peasant activists actively engaged in agrarian struggles.

The fourth round of talks is underway when reports came in on the killing of farmer-activist Danilo Nadal, 37 years old, a member of Hugpong sa Mag-uuma sa Pantukan (HUMAPAN). Based on initial reports, Nadal was shot and killed while on board his single motorcycle in Barangay Tibagon in Pantukan, Compostela Valley last April 2. Nadal reportedly sustained ten gunshot wounds. He is active in land struggles and campaign against human rights violations and militarization of peasant communities. Perpetrators are suspected agents of the 46th IBPA operating in Compostela Valley.

He is the 11th farmer killed in Compostela Valley, bringing to 47 the number of farmers, indigenous people and workers killed under the Duterte administration.

This latest incident of agrarian-related killing happened days after farmers called the government’s attention on the successive killings of peasant leaders and farmers which escalated after the termination of the unilateral ceasefire agreements and as a direct result of Armed Forces of the Philippines’ all-out war declaration against the CPP-NPA that also indiscriminately targets and harms civilians.

Violations of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights and International Law (CARHRIHL) including but not limited to political killings, human rights violations and massive evacuation of peasant communities due to intense military operations will be raised as ‘urgent matters of concern’ by the NDFP panel to its GRP counterpart during the formal talks.

RWC-SER Consultant Randall Echanis said there is a need to accelerate discussion on the provisions of CASER’s agrarian reform and rural development to address landlessness and agrarian unrest.

The NDFP RWC-SER will propose the free land distribution of the following: lands targeted by government for distribution, big landholdings and land estates including haciendas that are under the control of private individuals or entities, disputed lands with local agrarian reform and peasant struggles and lands already occupied by farmers through various forms of land cultivation and collective farming activities.

Echanis said the breaking up of land monopolies and free land distribution are just, necessary and urgent corrective measures to the centuries-old social injustices suffered by farmers as a result of exploitative relations of production. During the third round of talks, the GRP agreed on principle to free land distribution but both reciprocal working committees are expected in this round to work intensively to come up with a common agreement.

NDF/Agcaoili: Opening speech for the fourth round of talks in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations

Propaganda statement of Fidel V. Agcaoili posted to the National Democratic Front Website (Apr 3): Opening speech for the fourth round of talks in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations 

Noordwijk an Zee, The Netherlands 3 April 2017
By Fidel V. Agcaoili
Chairperson Negotiating Panel of the NDF

Your Excellencies from the Royal Norwegian Government, specifically Special Envoy Ambassador Elisabeth Slattum and her team of facilitators,
Compatriots in The Netherlands and the Negotiating Panels and Delegations of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP),
Esteemed guests,

I think it is significant to note that the fourth round of formal talks in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations opens on the heels of the 48th founding anniversary of the New People’s Army (NPA). On March 29, just four days ago, the NPA, the armed force of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which is an allied organization of the NDFP, marked its 48th year of revolutionary armed struggle.

Today, we have new generations of Filipinos, spread across the country, taking up arms to address the same basic problems that have hounded our history as a people – poverty, inequity, injustice, oppression. The resilience of the NPA is as much a testament to the inexhaustible participation and support of the people as it is an indictment of the failure of the system and its successive governments to address the socio-economic roots of the armed conflict.

This is why the NDFP Negotiating Panel comes to this fourth round of formal talks determined as ever to push and accelerate the negotiations in the hopes of forging a comprehensive agreement on social and economic reforms by the end of 2017.

The NDFP’s chief political consultant, Prof. Jose Ma. Sison, has already raised key points of the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms or the CASER in rela- tion to a roadmap for the peace process.

I share Professor Sison’s positive views and reiterate the wisdom of securing the approval of the CASER ahead of any bilateral ceasefire agreement, unless both agreements can be signed simultaneously. It is important to stress this as the issue of ceasefire should not be pursued as an end in itself.

Ceasefires, whether unilateral or bilateral, are just a means to an end. Its main purpose is to create conditions conducive to reaching agreements on basic re- forms that are satisfactory to both sides.

However, let me note that the NDFP rues the GRP’s sudden announcement not to restore its unilateral ceasefire, which is an unexpected departure from the March 11 backchannel agreement. Yet the NDF Negotiating Panel, in the spirit of flexibility and openness, desirous of fostering a positive climate for continuing the peace talks and building on the gains achieved in the last three rounds, is willing to discuss with its counterpart what kind of bilateral ceasefire agreement is desired by the GRP in place of the unilateral ceasefire.

The NDFP believes it is possible to have a bilateral ceasefire agreement that conforms to the position that simultaneous and reciprocal declarations of unilateral ceasefire can be agreed upon and bound by a Memorandum of Understanding that shall be issued at the end of the fourth round of formal talks.

We trust and hope that our counterparts in the GRP side will be as open and resolute in ad- dressing the long drawn-out issues concerning the implementation of an already existing agreement – the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law or CARHRIHL.

These outstanding issues concern the promised release of 19 ailing and elderly political prisoners; the continued detention of six NDFP consultants—four arrested under the Arroyo regime and two under the Duterte government; the unresolved cases of enforced disappearance and murder of JASIG-protected NDFP personnel during the Arroyo regime; escalating military operations that terrorize communities under the guise of peace and development projects of Oplan Bayanihan; human rights violations and lack of due process in the anti-drugs campaign; and the political rehabilitation of the Marcos family, among others.

In relation to escalating militarization in the countryside, 46 farmers have already been killed under the Duterte administration, according to the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilip- inas. Fifty percent of these killings were perpetrated following the Armed Forces of the Philippines’ implementation of an “all-out war” policy on February 2, or a rate of one farmer killed every two days.

On the other hand, the NDFP welcomes the progress made in the issue of compensation for victims of martial law and hopes that the process of indemnifying the victims can be further accelerated to ensure that justice is rendered to the victims.

Before I end, on behalf of the NDFP Panel, I sincerely thank the Royal Norwegian Govern- ment for its continuing and crucial support to the peace negotiations, especially as these took a difficult turn in the last two months. It was a wrenching experience for the NDFP consultants in the Philippines as they faced intensified harassment and imminent arrest, with one consultant actually being jailed. We commend the RNG for walking the extra mile to push the backchannel talks and put the peace process back on track.

Today, we welcome back arrested NDFP consultant Ariel Arbitrario into our fold, and we hope that no more such arbitrary incidents will recur to obstruct the advance of the peace process under the Duterte administration.

We look forward to fruitful discussions in the next four days in the common effort to find solutions to seal an enduring and just peace for our country through mutually acceptable comprehensive agreements on necessary reforms.

Thank you, and a good morning to all.

NDF/Sison: Remarks at the opening ceremonies of the 4th round of formal talks in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations

Propaganda statement of Jose Maria Sison posted to the National Democratic Front Website (Apr 3): Remarks at the opening ceremonies of the 4th round of formal talks in the GRP-NDFP peace negotiations  

By Prof. Jose Maria Sison
Chief Political Consultant, NDFP Negotiating Panel
Noordwijk aan Zee, The Netherlands
03 April 2017

Her Excellency Elisabeth Slattum, Special Envoy to the Philippine Peace Process,
Hon. Secretary Jesus Dureza, Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
Hon. Secretary Silvestre Bello III, Chairperson, Negotiating Panel of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
Comrade Fidel V. Agcaoili, Chairperson, Negotiating Panel of the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP)
Dear compatriots in the GRP and NDFP Panels and Delegations
Distinguished guests and friends from various countries,

As Chief Political Consultant of the National Democratic Front in the peace negotiations with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, I welcome you to this opening ceremony of the 4th round of peace talks as agreed upon in the 3rd round of talks in Rome on January 25, 2017. I thank you for your attendance and for your interest in the process to resolve the 48-year long civil war in the Philippines and establish a just and lasting peace.

We all are highly appreciative of both the GRP and NDFP principals and their respective negotiating panels in their determination to pursue the peace negotiations for the benefit of the Filipino people and in accordance with their own demand for peace, national unity and reconciliation. We have therefore been able to overcome some challenges, communication glitches and hitches.

President Duterte has been gracious to let the GRP negotiators go to the backchannel talks of March 10 and 11 in Utrecht and now to the fourth round of formal talks. The NDFP is most interested in the soonest possible forging of the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms to respond to the people’s demand for substantive reforms. By its own public pronouncement, the GRP is most interested in obtaining a bilateral ceasefire agreement with the NDFP.

This is soon possible if President Duterte can put forward the amnesty and release of all political prisoners listed by the NDFP. The GRP and NDFP Negotiating Panels can validate and bind declarations of unilateral ceasefire as the interim bilateral ceasefire agreement in the Joint Statement to be issued at the end of the fourth round, pending the forging of a single joint ceasefire agreement co-signed by the conflicting parties. This joint ceasefire agreement, more elaborate and more stable than the interim bilateral ceasefire agreement can be immediately consequent to the signing of CASER by the two Negotiating Panels.

We are desirous that through the peace negotiations we can create and develop the conditions to build a strong sovereign and independent nation, with expanded democracy and social justice for the oppressed and exploited people, enjoying the bounty of economic and social development through genuine land reform, national industrialization, ample social services and benefits, and solidarity with all peoples and countries.

The GRP-NDFP peace negotiations are necessary to address the roots of the armed conflict and to agree on the social, economic, political and constitutional reforms in order to lay the basis for a just and lasting peace. We are clearly advancing within the framework set by The Hague Joint Declaration on September 1, 1992. I mention the date to let you anticipate and prepare for the 25th anniversary of this historic document.

The GRP and NDFP have availed of and reaffirmed the major agreements that have been forged within the framework of The Hague Joint Declaration in order to overcome problems and even disruptions and impasses in the peace process.

So far, the Comprehensive Agreement on Respect for Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law (CARHRIHL) as the first item in the substantive agenda had been approved and signed by the GRP and NDFP principals since 1998. It is within the broad framework of international law, especially the International Bill of Rights and the Geneva Conventions.

I continue to be optimistic that within this year, it is possible for the GRP and NDFP Negotiating Panels to forge and sign the Comprehensive Agreement on Social and Economic Reforms (CASER) and the consequent joint ceasefire agreement. I have read and studied the drafts of the proposed agreements from the GRP and NDFP and I have also examined the comparative matrices. I observe that there are enough concurrences and similar positions as common ground for forging the agreements. But I wish to stress as a matter of principle that the people demand that CASER be a step ahead of the joint ceasefire agreement, unless these agreements can be signed at the same time by the panels and then by the principals.

The Comprehensive Agreement on Political and Constitutional Reforms (CAPCR) can be forged and signed by the panels within three months after CASER because the drafting is already done in advance by the Reciprocal Working Groups on CAPCR. As I stated previously, the NDFP is willing to co-found the Federal Republic of the Philippines with the GRP and cooperate in making the necessary amendments in the 1987 GRP Constitution, provided provisions are retained to prevent dictatorship, dynasties and corruption, uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity, respect human rights, realize social justice and ban foreign military bases, forces and weapons of mass destruction.

The Reciprocal Working Committees on CASER can proceed to unify their respective drafts at an accelerated pace during rounds of formal talks and work meetings of bilateral teams between said rounds. After signing by the panels and principals, the ultimate common draft should be the guide and framework of executive orders and legislation to carry out genuine land reform, lay the foundation of national industrialization, ensure the protection of the environment and wise utilization of natural resources, uphold the people’s rights, improve the wage and living conditions, expand the social services (especially free public education at all levels and free public hospitals and clinics) and develop international economic relations within the context of an independent foreign policy.

All previous land reform programs in the Philippines are bogus because the scope is limited and the landless tillers cannot pay for the redistribution price. It is necessary that this early the negotiating parties find out how much land has been grabbed under various pretexts for so many decades from the indigenous people and poor settlers, especially in logged over areas.

Such land can be returned for free to millions of rightful owners and their successors who also need to be provided with credit, technical assistance and infrastructure support to increase production and cooperation in agriculture and related occupations like handicraft, animal husbandry, poultry, fishing, forestry, horticulture, arboculture and food processing.

Idle or abandoned agricultural lands are almost always the result of violent conflict between the landgrabbers and the dispossessed tillers and must be returned to the latter as the rightful owners. In cases of land expropriation, landlords who did not acquire their lands through land-grabbing can be paid in cash to a certain extent and in larger part in industrial bonds for investing in the industries.

The backbone of feudalism and land-grabbing by bureaucrats and corporations must be broken. It is a matter of social justice that such principle of voluntary sale by the landlord under the 1987 GRP Constitution as well as the equivalence of just compensation to fair market value under EO 228 (July 17, 1987) must be nullified. The stock distribution option in the CARP law must be struck down as a device of corporate swindle, as we have seen in Hacienda Luisita and elsewhere.

With increased agricultural and related production and development in the rural areas, the domestic market for industrial production expands in a self-reliant economy. We can begin in earnest to break the vicious cycle and chronic crisis of underdevelopment, unemployment and poverty. The pattern of exporting raw materials, semi-manufactures and cheap labor, importing finished products and depending on foreign loans and portfolio investments from abroad to cover trade deficits must be broken. We must lay down the foundation for our national industry, process our own natural resources and prevent the extreme and rapid loss of these and the devastation of our environment.

We must reclaim our economic sovereignty, conserve our national patrimony and carry out an independent investment and trade policy, realize the substance of national sovereignty, put in the principal position the combination and cooperation of the public sector and the private sector of Filipino entrepreneurs and managers and put into full play the Filipino scientists, engineers, technologists and mass of workers. We resort to foreign suppliers of capital goods and a minority of foreign investors only to effect needed technology transfer within reasonable periods of time.

The GRP and NDFP must cooperate to achieve the social, economic, political and constitutional reforms that the people need. These require the agencies, documentation and public funding that the GRP can provide. They also require the GRP and NDFP to form a Joint Social and Economic Council to ensure the implementation of CASER. The most important role of the NDFP and its revolutionary components is to avail of their long intimate relations with the people and their ability to further arouse, organize and mobilize the people for the adoption and implementation of reforms, especially against the forces of imperialism and the local reactionaries.

I hope that my remarks can somehow help to illuminate and accelerate the forging of the CASER and CAPCR. If these are indeed signed by the principals soon enough, we might even be able to see their initial two years of implementation before the signing of the End of Hostilities and Disposition of Forces by the principals.

CPP: Ipag­bun­yi ang Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so ng Par­ti­do! Isu­long ang dig­mang ba­yan sa mas ma­ta­as na an­tas!

Propaganda statement published by Ang Bayan posted to the Communist Party of the Philippines Website (Mar 30): Ipag­bun­yi ang Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so ng Par­ti­do! Isu­long ang dig­mang ba­yan sa mas ma­ta­as na an­tas!  (Celebrate the Second Party Congress! Advance the people's war to a higher level)


 Men­sa­he ng Ko­mi­te Sentral ng PKP sa Ba­gong Huk­bong Ba­yan sa ika-48 ani­ber­sar­yo ng pag­ka­ka­ta­tag ni­to

Ipi­naaa­bot ng ba­gong-ha­lal na Ko­mi­te Sentral ng Par­ti­do Ko­mu­nis­ta ng Pi­li­pi­nas (PKP) ang mai­nit na re­bo­lu­syonaryong pag­ba­ti sa la­hat ng ku­mand at yu­nit ng Ba­gong Huk­bong Ba­yan (BHB) sa oka­syon ng ika-48 ani­ber­sar­yo na pag­ka­ka­ta­tag ni­to. Sa nga­lan ng ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no at la­hat ng mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa, nag­pu­pu­gay ang Par­ti­do sa ba­wat Pu­lang ku­man­der at Pu­lang man­di­rig­ma ng BHB sa pa­gi­ging hu­wa­ran ng wa­lang pag-iim­bot na sak­ri­pi­syo at ga­nap na de­di­ka­syon sa pag­li­ling­kod sa api at pi­nag­sa­sa­man­ta­la­hang ma­ma­ma­yan.

Pa­ra­nga­lan na­tin ang la­hat ng ba­ya­ni at mar­tir ng BHB at ma­ging ang iba pang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ma­ma­ma­yan na nag-a­lay ng ka­ni­lang bu­hay sa pag­ta­ta­gu­yod sa BHB at sa ar­ma­dong re­bo­lu­syo­n. Big­yan din na­tin ng pag­ki­la­la ang la­hat ng be­te­ra­nong BHB, ga­yun­din ang mga Pu­lang man­di­rig­mang na­su­ga­tan o na­pin­sa­la sa la­ba­nan na nag­pa­pa­tu­loy ng pag­ki­los sa huk­bong ba­yan o iba pang la­ra­ngan ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ga­wa­in.

Ipag­di­wang na­tin ang ma­ta­gum­pay na pag­da­os ng Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so ng Par­ti­do sa ma­ka­say­sa­yang pet­sa ng Oktub­re 24 hang­gang Nob­yembre 7, 2016 sa isang ba­seng ge­ril­ya. Sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so, na­ka­mit ng Par­ti­do ang iba­yong pag­ka­kai­sa at hi­git na de­ter­mi­na­syon na isu­long ang pam­ban­sa-de­mok­ra­ti­kong re­bo­lu­syon sa mas ma­ta­as na an­tas.

Na­ti­pon ng Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so ang na­mu­mu­nong mga kad­re ng Par­ti­do mu­la sa sentral hang­gang pan­re­hi­yon at pamproubinsyang mga ko­mi­te nito. Na­ga­wa ito ba­tay sa la­kas at ka­ka­ya­han ng Ba­gong Huk­bong Ba­yan. Inam­yen­da­han ng Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so ang konsti­tu­syon at prog­ra­ma ng Par­ti­do sa la­yu­ning iba­yong bigyang-liwanag ang lan­das sa pag­su­su­long ng re­bo­lu­syong Pi­li­pi­no. Na­ka­pag­ha­lal ito ng ba­gong pa­mu­nu­ang bu­mubuo ng Ko­mi­te Sentral.

Na­na­na­wa­gan ang Par­ti­do sa BHB na su­mu­long sa lan­das ng ma­ta­ga­lang dig­mang ba­yan. Ang in­ter­na­syu­nal at lo­kal na mga ka­la­ga­yan ay la­ging pa­bo­rab­le sa pag­lu­lun­sad ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pag­la­ban at pag­sa­sa­ga­wa ng mga de­mok­ra­ti­kong pang­ma­sang pa­ki­ki­ba­ka.

Pag­ya­ma­nin na­tin ang na­ti­pong mga ta­gum­pay at aral na na­ha­law sa pro­se­so ng pag­lu­lun­sad ng ar­ma­dong re­bo­lu­syo­n. Sa ga­bay ng Marxis­mo-Le­ni­nis­mo-Maois­mo, kum­­­­­­­pyan­­sa­do ang Par­ti­do na ma­pa­mu­mu­nu­an ni­to ang ma­la­ga­nap at ma­sin­sin na pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya at mai­su­su­long ang dig­mang ba­yan sa mas ma­ta­ta­as na an­tas sa da­ra­ting na mga taon.

I. Sam­pung taon ng pan­da­ig­di­gang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang dep­re­syon

Mag-iisang dekada na ang pan­da­ig­di­gang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang dep­re­syo­n. Ang dep­re­syon nga­yon ay mas ma­la­wak at mas ma­la­lim na kay­sa Gre­at Dep­res­si­on ng de­ka­da 1930. Ang pag­ka­wa­sak sa mga pro­duk­ti­bong pwer­sa ay ma­la­yong mas ma­la­la at mas ma­lub­ha at ni­ya­ya­nig ang buong ka­pi­ta­lis­tang sis­te­ma.

Pa­tu­loy na lu­ma­la­ga­nap ang dis­­­­emple­yo at inaa­sa­hang uma­bot sa 201 mil­yon sa 2017. La­bis na ma­ta­as ang tan­tos ng di­semple­yo sa ha­nay ng ka­ba­ta­an. Ang mga ka­la­ga­yan sa pag­ga­wa at kun­di­syon sa pag­t­ra­ba­ho ay la­long na­ging ma­pang-a­pi kung saan 1.4 bil­yon ang tumatanggap ng napakababang sa­hod at walang katiyakan sa trabaho.

Ang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang kontra­dik­syon sa pa­gi­tan ng pan­li­pu­nang pro­duk­syon at pri­ba­dong aku­mu­la­syon ng tu­bo ay pa­tu­loy na umi­ig­ting. Ii­sang por­sye­nto ng po­pu­la­syon ng daig­dig ang ku­mu­kontrol sa $110 tril­yon o ka­la­ha­ti ng pan­da­ig­di­gang ya­man. Ti­na­ta­yang ang ya­mang ki­na­mal ng wa­long pi­na­ka­ma­la­la­king mo­no­pol­yo ka­pi­ta­lis­ta ay ka­sing la­ki ng pag-aa­ri ng mas ma­ba­bang ha­ti ng po­pu­la­syon ng mun­do. Mu­la 2009, 95% ng pang-e­ko­nom­yang pag­tu­bo ng US ay sak­mal ng pi­na­ka­ma­ta­as na isang por­sye­nto, ha­bang 90% ng mga Ame­ri­ka­no ay la­long naghi­rap.

Pa­tu­loy ang ma­bi­lis na pag­ka­bu­lok ng pan­li­pu­nan at pam­pub­li­kong imprastru­ku­ra. Ang mga ka­la­ga­yan sa pa­mu­mu­hay ng ma­sang anak­pa­wis ay pa­tu­loy na lu­ma­la­la, kap­wa sa Ikat­long Daig­dig at ma­ging sa ma­hi­hi­rap na pook at mga syu­dad at ko­mu­ni­dad ng mang­ga­ga­wa sa mga ka­pi­ta­lis­tang sentro. Ang pag­ba­was sa gas­tos pa­ra sa ser­bi­syong pan­li­pu­nan ay nag­re­sul­ta sa pag­ka­si­ra ng pam­pub­li­kong ser­bi­syong pang­ka­lu­su­gan, edu­ka­syo­n, transpor­ta­syon at iba pa.

Ang pan­li­pu­nan at pang-e­ko­nom­yang ka­la­ga­yan ng mga mang­ga­ga­wa at ma­ma­ma­yan sa mga ka­pi­ta­lis­tang ba­yan ay pa­tu­loy na su­ma­sa­ma. Bi­na­ba­ta ni­la ang ma­ba­bang sa­hod, kal­tas sa pen­syo­n, at pu­ma­pa­im­bu­log na gas­tos sa pa­mu­mu­hay. Noong 2016, uma­bot sa ka­buuang US$12.58 tril­yon ang utang ng mga pa­ma­ma­hay, tu­ma­as nang ha­los 60% mu­la sa si­nun­dang taon, at ha­los ka­sin­la­ki ng 2008. Mil­yong mang­ga­ga­wa sa US ang wa­lang ta­ha­nan sa git­na ng pag­dag­sa ng mga pa­ba­hay.

Ang lu­ma­la­lang pan­li­pu­nang ka­la­ga­yan ng mga pro­duk­ti­bong pwer­sa ay nag­du­lot ng ka­ni­lang ka­wa­lang-ka­ka­ya­hang kon­su­mu­hin ang mga pro­duk­to ng ka­ni­lang pag­ga­wa na tu­mu­tu­ngo sa pag­tu­mal ng mga pa­mi­li­han. Nag­bu­nga ito ng mga pa­mi­li­hang umaa­paw sa mga pro­duk­tong pang­kon­su­mo tu­lad ng mga cellpho­ne, com­pu­ter electro­nics, ka­suo­tan at sa­pa­tos. Bu­mag­sak ang in­ter­na­syu­nal na ka­la­ka­lan sa pi­na­ka­ma­ba­bang an­tas sa loob ng tat­long de­ka­da at tu­mu­ngo sa pag­ka­lu­gi ng ma­la­la­king kum­pan­ya sa ship­ping (kar­gong pan­da­gat) at mga ope­rey­tor ng dau­ngan.

Na­na­na­ti­li ang pan­da­ig­di­gang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang kri­sis da­hil sa di-ma­lu­tas na prob­le­ma ng la­bis na pro­duk­syon sa ila­lim ng ka­pi­ta­lis­mo. May ka­buuang pag­ba­gal ang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang pro­duk­syo­n. Lu­ma­la­ki ang im­ben­tar­yo ng mga pro­duk­tong in­ter­med­ya at ka­pi­tal tu­lad ng mga me­tal at ke­mi­kal, ma­ki­nar­yang elektri­kal, pro­duk­tong pet­rol­yo, ga­yun­din ng ase­ro at se­men­to. Mayroong mas maig­ting na kum­pe­ti­syon at pag­ka­lu­gi sa mga ka­pi­ta­lis­tang empre­sa na du­mu­du­lo sa in­ter-im­per­ya­lis­tang mga ri­ba­lan at dig­ma­an.

Pa­tu­loy na gu­ma­ga­pang ang mga eko­nom­ya ng US at mga ba­yang Eu­ro­pe­an sa su­nud-su­nod na taon ng ma­ba­gal na pag­la­ki, ha­bang inuu­ga ang Chi­na ng mag­ka­ka­su­nod na pampinansyang pag­ya­nig. Na­sa 2.3% ang pag­la­go ng pan­da­ig­di­gang GDP ng 2016, ang pi­na­ka­ma­ba­gal mu­la noong 2008. Na­bi­go sa pang­ka­la­ha­tan ang pan­da­ig­di­gang sis­te­mang ka­pi­ta­lis­ta na pasiglahin ang pro­duk­ti­bong pag­la­go mu­la 2008 at la­long na­gi­ging pi­nan­sya­li­sa­do. Ka­ra­mi­han sa ti­na­gu­ri­ang pag­la­go ay tu­lak ng utang at ng ti­na­ta­wag na “we­alth-ma­king pro­ducts” (mga pro­duk­tong pan­lik­ha ng ya­man) o di-pro­duk­ti­bong is­pe­ku­la­ti­bong ins­tru­men­tong pi­nan­sya­l. Ang pan­da­ig­di­gang utang ay na­sa US$230 tril­yon, hi­git 325% ng pan­da­ig­di­gang GDP at tat­long be­ses na mas ma­la­ki kay­sa noong 2000.

Noong 2016, lu­ma­ki nang 1.9% ang US GDP, pi­na­ka­ma­ba­gal sa loob ng li­mang taon. Na­bi­go ang re­hi­meng Oba­ma na lu­ta­sin ang mga prob­le­mang pang-e­ko­nom­ya sa na­ka­ra­ang wa­long taon sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng bail-outs (pag­sa­gip) at gas­tos-mi­li­tar. Nag­ta­gum­pay lang ito sa pag­pu­no sa mga ka­ban ng ma­la­la­king oli­gar­ki­yang pam­pi­nan­sya ng mga pon­dong pan­sa­gip na sa pag­ta­ya ng iba ay hu­mi­git ku­mu­lang US$29.5 tril­yon mu­la 2008 sa ka­pin­sa­la­an ng ma­sang anak­pa­wis na pi­nag­pa­san ng mga hak­bang sa pag­ti­ti­pid.

Na­nga­ko ang ba­gong-luk­lok na re­hi­meng Trump na “i­ba­ba­lik ang mga tra­ba­ho” sa pagpapagana ng idi­nek­la­ra ni­yang pa­ta­ka­rang “Ame­rica Mu­na”. Bi­nak­las na ni­to ang Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) at na­ka­han­dang mu­ling ma­ki­pag-ne­go­sa­syon sa iba pang ti­na­gu­ri­ang ka­sun­du­ang “ma­la­yang kala­ka­lan” upang “i­ba­lik ang mga tra­ba­ho” sa US, na nag­ta­ta­kip sa pun­da­men­tal na kri­sis ng la­bis na pro­duk­syo­n. Ngu­nit ang pro­tek­syu­nis­mo ng gub­yer­nong US ay ma­ta­gal nang lu­ma­la­kas ka­la­kip ang mga pag­la­la­an ng sub­sid­yo ng gub­yer­no pa­ra sa mga lo­kal na empre­sa at pag­ti­ti­bay ng mga had­lang sa ka­la­ka­lan. Ga­yun­pa­man, ma­ta­gal nang si­na­sa­bo­ta­he ng gub­yer­nong US ang mul­ti­la­te­ral na mga ka­sun­du­ang pang­ka­la­ka­lan tu­lad ng GATT-WTO sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng su­por­ta at sub­sid­yo sa mga empre­sa, ta­ni­man at pi­nan­syang US. Ang pa­nga­ko ni­yang “ga­ga­wing da­ki­lang mu­li ang Ame­rica” ay ti­yak na ma­ka­pi­pin­sa­la sa uring mang­ga­ga­wang US sa paghahabol niyang iba­ba ang presyo ng paggawang Ame­ri­ka­no. Bi­na­ti­kos na ni­ya ang Chi­na, at ka­hit Eu­ro­pe­an Uni­on, sa pag­ma­ni­pu­la ng pe­ra, na nag­la­la­tag ng ba­ta­yan pa­ra sa pag­la­la­gay ng mga had­lang sa ka­la­ka­lan at restrik­syon sa pa­mu­mu­hu­nan at iba pang hak­bang. Mag­bu­bun­sod ang mga ito ng kontra-hak­bang mu­la sa mga ka­ri­bal na im­per­ya­lis­ta.

Sa pag­ka­las sa Eu­ro­pe­an Uni­on, igi­ni­it ng Uni­ted King­dom ang pag­ka­tig sa pam­ban­sang pang-e­ko­nom­yang in­te­res ni­to, sa par­ti­ku­lar, upang ma­ka­pag­ta­tag ng ba­gong mga pa­mi­li­han at pang­ka­la­ka­lang partner na hin­di na­ha­had­la­ngan ng mga tun­tu­ning tak­dang-EU. Pa­pa­la­ki ang pang-e­ko­nom­yang pre­syur sa ba­ta­yang in­dustri­yal ni­to mu­la sa mu­mu­ra­hing la­bis na pro­duk­to mu­la sa Chi­na. Isa­sa­ga­wa ng UK ang mga hak­ba­nging Brexit nga­yong taon, ha­bang pi­nag-aa­ra­lan din ng iba pang ba­yang myembro ng EU ang ka­ha­lin­tu­lad na pag­ka­las.

Inin­da ng Rus­sia ang ma­ba­bang pre­syo ng kru­do bi­lang re­sul­ta ng la­bis na pro­duk­syo­n. Sa ilang ba­ha­gi, ang pa­gpa­pa­bag­sak ng pre­syo ay si­nad­ya ng US at Sau­di Ara­bia sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­pa­pa­la­ki ng pro­duk­syon ng sha­le oil at pag­pi­gil sa OPEC na mag­li­mi­ta ng pro­duk­syo­n. La­yu­nin ni­tong pa­hi­na­in ang nag­lu­lu­was ng la­ngis at gas na eko­nom­yang Rus­si­an ma­ging ng iba pang an­ti-US na eko­nom­yang lu­mi­lik­ha ng la­ngis tu­lad ng mga ba­yang Ve­nezue­la at Iran.

Ang pro­duk­ti­bong ka­pa­si­dad ng eko­nom­yang Chi­ne­se ay pi­na­hi­hi­na ng im­ben­tar­yo ng di-mai­ben­tang mga ka­la­kal (a­se­ro, se­micon­ductor at pang­kon­su­mong electro­nics, appli­ances, sa­sak­yan, te­la, real es­ta­te) bu­nga ng pan­da­ig­di­gang pag­tu­mal ng eko­nom­ya. Pi­na­hi­hi­na rin ito ng pa­pa­la­wak na re­la­ti­bong la­ki ng di-pro­duk­ti­bong eko­nom­ya. Nag­sa­ga­wa na rin ito ng sa­ri­ling ber­syon ng quan­ti­ta­tive ea­sing (pag-iimprenta ng pe­ra) mu­la 2009.

Noong 2015, pu­mai­lan­lang sa US$28 tril­yon o 282% ng GDP ni­to ang pam­pub­li­ko at pri­ba­dong utang sa Chi­na, di ba­ba­ba sa li­mang be­ses sa na­ka­ra­ang de­ka­da. Umu­tang ang Chi­na ng dag­dag na US$3 tril­yon sa unang tat­long kwar­to ng 2016, na nag­palaki ng utang ni­to nang hanggang 390% ng GDP.

Bi­na­ba­ha ng ti­na­gu­ri­ang wealth­-ma­na­ge­ment pro­ducts o pa­pa­ta­as-ang-ris­gong mga instrumen­tong pinansyal ang sis­te­mang pi­nan­syal ng Chi­na. Bi­nu­buo ng mga ito ang sobra sa pro­por­syong la­ki ng eko­nom­ya ng Chi­na, na ti­na­ta­yang mas ma­ba­ba lang ng ba­hag­ya sa 45% ng GDP. Ilang be­ses nang pu­mal­ya ang pa­ngu­na­hing mga stock mar­ket ng Chi­na mu­la 2015 na nag­la­lan­tad sa mga la­mat ng lu­mu­lo­bong sis­te­mang pi­nan­syal ng Chi­na. Lu­ma­la­ki ang mga pa­ngam­ba na pa­tu­ngo ang Chi­na sa isang pang­ka­la­ha­tang pag­gu­ho na ka­ha­lin­tu­lad sa US noong 2008.

Ha­bang tu­ma­ta­gal at lu­ma­la­la ang pan­da­ig­di­gang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang kri­sis, pa­tu­loy na tu­mi­tin­di ang in­ter-im­per­ya­lis­tang mga kontra­dik­syon sa ila­lim ng isang mul­ti­po­lar na daig­dig. Nag-ii­ba­yo ang ri­ba­lan sa pa­gi­tan ng pi­na­ka­ma­la­la­king im­per­ya­lis­tang ka­pang­ya­ri­han na nag-aa­ga­wan sa estra­te­hi­kong kontrol ng mga pa­mi­li­han, pi­nag­ku­ku­nan ng hi­law na ma­ter­ya­les, at sak­law ng implu­wen­sya. Lu­ma­la­ki ang pag­gas­tos mi­li­tar na uma­bot sa US$1.7 tril­yon noong 2015.

Sa git­na ng ka­bi­gu­ang ma­lu­tas ng ilang-dekadang mga pa­ta­ka­rang neo­li­be­ral ang estra­te­hi­kong pag­lu­bog ng sis­te­mang ka­pi­ta­lis­ta, may ma­la­kas na tu­ngu­hing pa-Ka­nan nga­yon sa ha­nay ng mga par­ti­do pu­li­ti­kal ng mga mo­no­pol­yo ka­pi­ta­lis­ta na may ma­la­kas na aw­to­ri­ta­ry­an at ultra-na­syu­na­lis­tang re­to­ri­ka sa US, ga­yun­din sa UK at iba pang ba­yang EU. Gi­na­ga­tu­ngan ng mga par­ti­dong ito ang xe­nop­ho­bia la­ban sa mga im­mig­rant at refu­gee, ga­yun­din ang ra­sis­mo, re­li­hi­yo­song pa­na­ti­sis­mo at pa­sis­mo. Na­gas­gas na ng nag­ha­ha­ring mga uri ang as­tang neo­li­be­ral na ma­la­yang ka­la­ka­lan at nga­yo’y nag­ha­ha­ngad ng dagdag na pag­ga­mit ng ma­ra­has na ka­pang­ya­ri­han ng es­ta­do pa­ra pag­sa­man­ta­la­han ang mga uring anak­pa­wis ni­to at ipi­lit ang mas nakabe­bentaheng mga kun­di­syon pa­ra sa mga ka­partner sa ka­la­ka­lan at pa­mu­mu­hu­nan.

Sa bi­gong pa­nga­rap na ma­pa­na­ti­li ang estra­te­hi­kong pan­da­ig­di­gang do­mi­na­syon ni­to, ipi­nag­pa­pa­tu­loy ng US ang he­ge­mo­ni­kong pag­sak­law sa buong daig­dig upang mag­pa­na­ti­li ng mga kli­yen­teng es­ta­do ni­to, mag­sa­ga­wa ng “pag­ba­ba­go ng re­hi­men,” su­ber­syon la­ban sa mga gub­yer­nong nag­gi­gi­it ng ka­sa­rin­lan at pa­na­ti­li­hin ang pre­sen­syang mi­li­tar sa pa­ngu­na­hing mga ru­ta ng ka­la­ka­lan. Gu­ma­gas­tos ang gub­yer­nong US ng hu­mi­git-ku­mu­lang $600 bil­yon taun-ta­on sa mi­li­tar ni­to, na lam­pas sa pi­nag­sa­mang gas­tos ng sumu­su­nod na sam­pung ba­yan (ka­bi­lang na ang Chi­na at Rus­sia).

Na­ba­ba­nat ang mi­li­tar ng US. Si­ni­si­kap ni­tong pa­la­ka­sin ang ha­wak sa Middle East at idep­loy ang mga pwer­sa ni­to sa hang­ga­nan ng Eu­ro­pe sa Rus­sia at sa ti­mog na ka­ra­ga­tan ng Chi­na. Akti­bo ito sa mga ge­ra sa Middle East, par­ti­ku­lar sa Iraq, Syria, Lib­ya at Ye­men. Nag­lu­lun­sad ito ng in­ter­ben­syong mi­li­tar sa Pa­les­ti­ne, Le­ba­non, Egypt, Pa­kis­tan, Pi­li­pi­nas, Ni­ge­ria, Tur­key, Ye­men, Ukrai­ne at ma­ra­mi pang ibang ba­yan. Na­ka­pag­dep­loy ito ng mga pwer­sa sa es­pe­syal na ope­ra­syon sa ma­hi­git 130 ba­yan sa diu­ma­no’y mga an­ti-te­ro­ris­mong ope­ra­syo­n. Mu­la 2013, ini­lun­sad ng US ang “Asia Pivot” ni­to upang idep­loy ang ma­hi­git ka­la­ha­ti ng tro­pang na­bal ni­to sa Asia.

Sa nga­lan ng “o­pe­ra­syong ka­la­ya­an sa na­bi­ga­syo­n,” naigiit ng US ang pre­sen­sya mi­li­tar ni­to sa South Chi­na Sea sa na­ka­ra­ang mga taon. Iti­nu­lak ni­to ang Chi­na na ag­re­si­bong magi­it ang so­be­ran­ya, na gu­ma­wa ng may ka­la­bi­sang mga pang-ang­kin ng so­be­ran­ya sa exclu­sive eco­no­mic zo­ne at te­ri­tor­yong da­gat ng Pi­li­pi­nas at mag­ta­yo ng mga mi­li­tary out­post at iba pang istruk­tu­ra na ga­nap na nag­ba­ba­le­wa­la sa mga ka­ra­pa­tan ng Pi­li­pi­nas.

Tan­da ng tu­mu­tu­bong im­per­ya­lis­tang am­bi­syon ni­to, nag­si­mu­la nang mag­ta­yo ang Chi­na ng sa­ri­ling mga ba­se mi­li­tar sa iba­yong da­gat, par­ti­ku­lar sa Africa at sa Middle East, upang ipag­tang­gol ang mga pa­mu­mu­hu­nan sa eko­nom­ya at pa­la­wa­kin ang implu­wen­sya. Na­ka­han­da na ring ma­kumple­to ng Chi­na ang unang plo­ta ng mga aircraft car­ri­er ni­to sa su­su­nod na mga taon.

Pa­tu­loy na igi­ni­gi­it ng Rus­sia ang la­kas mi­li­tar sa mga re­hi­yon ng East Eu­ro­pe, Middle East at Central Asia. May estra­te­hi­kong kontrol ito sa mga re­kur­song la­ngis sa Cas­pi­an at Black Sea. Nag­si­mu­la na itong mag­pa­ki­ta ng pre­sen­sya sa South Chi­na Sea sa pag­bi­si­ta sa mga dau­ngan sa Pi­li­pi­nas.

Upang ma­pa­sak­law ang implu­wen­sya sa pu­li­ti­ka at ma­la­ba­nan ang he­ge­mon­ya ng US, nag­lun­sad ng pang-e­ko­nom­yang open­si­bang dip­lo­ma­ti­ko ang Chi­na sa pag-a­lok ng ma­ba­bang in­te­res na pau­tang pa­ra sa imprastruk­tu­ra sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng Asi­an Infrastructu­re Investment Bank (AIIB) sa ila­lim ng ti­na­ta­wag ni­tong “New World Eco­no­mic Blu­ep­rint” (Ba­gong Pan­da­ig­di­gang Pla­no sa Eko­nom­ya) at “One Belt, One Road” na ba­lang­kas ng pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga engkla­bo at pa­si­li­dad sa transpor­ta­syo­n. Estra­te­hi­kong la­yu­nin ng Chi­na na ga­mi­tin ang mas ma­la­wak na da­gat ng wa­lang emple­yong lakas-pag­ga­wa upang la­lo pang iba­ba ang pre­syo ng pag­ga­wa.

Pa­tu­loy na nag­pa­pa­un­lad ng estra­te­hi­kong koo­pe­ra­syong mi­li­tar ang Rus­sia at Chi­na sa iba pang ba­yang Eu­ra­si­an, ka­bi­lang ang India at Pa­kis­tan, sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng Shang­hai Coo­pe­ra­ti­on Orga­niza­ti­on.
Ang estra­te­hi­kong kontrol sa mga re­kur­song la­ngis at tu­bong da­lu­yan, la­lu­na sa Middle East, ay na­na­na­ti­ling isa sa mga pa­ngu­na­hing nag­pa­pa­sik­lab ng in­ter-im­per­ya­lis­tang mga ri­ba­lan. Nag­ha­ra­pan na ang mag­ka­ka­tung­ga­ling im­per­ya­lis­ta sa Syria kung saan nais ng US na pa­bag­sa­kin ang re­hi­meng al-Bas­had sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pam­bo­bom­ba at sa pag-aar­mas sa mga ti­na­gu­ri­ang re­bel­de, ha­bang na­nin­di­gan ang Rus­sia (na may su­por­tang Chi­ne­se) sa gub­yer­nong Syri­an sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng mga kontra-pam­bo­bom­ba la­ban sa mga re­bel­deng su­por­ta­do ng US.

Ha­bang umi­ig­ting ang in­ter-im­per­ya­lis­tang mga ri­ba­lan, ang pro­le­tar­ya­do at aping ma­ma­ma­yan sa buong daig­dig ay da­pat mag­pa­sig­la ng ka­ni­lang mga pa­ki­ki­ba­ka pa­ra sa pam­ban­sa at pan­li­pu­nang pag­la­ya. Iti­nu­tu­lak ng pa­pa­la­lang pan­li­pu­nang ka­la­ga­yan sa ila­lim ng kaa­yu­sang neo­li­be­ral ang mga mang­ga­ga­wa, mag­sa­sa­ka at ma­ma­ma­yang anak­pa­wis na mag­lun­sad ng pang­ma­sang mga pa­ki­ki­ba­ka at ar­ma­dong pag­la­ban.

Bu­ma­ba­ngon ang mga mang­ga­ga­wa at ma­ma­ma­yang anak­pa­wis sa mga at­ra­sa­dong ba­yan. Ma­ra­mi­han si­lang bu­ma­ba­ngon sa mga wel­ga at iba pang an­yo ng pa­ki­ki­ba­ka la­ban sa pag­sa­la­kay ng mga pa­ta­ka­rang neo­li­be­ral sa mga tra­ba­ho, sa­hod at ser­bi­syong pam­pub­li­ko. Sa Chi­na, puu-pu­ong li­bong mang­ga­ga­wa sa mga engkla­bo ng pag­ga­wa ang nag­lu­lun­sad ng mga pa­ki­ki­ba­kang ma­sa la­ban sa ma­pang-a­pi at ma­pag­sa­man­ta­lang mga ka­la­ga­yan. Ma­la­la­king wel­ga ng mga mang­ga­ga­wa ang pu­mu­tok na sa India at iba pang lu­gar.

Sa US, ang uring mang­ga­ga­wa, kap­wa pu­ti at may ku­lay, ay ma­ra­mi­hang bu­ma­ba­ngon la­ban sa ba­gong-luk­lok na re­hi­meng Trump na nag­dek­la­ra ng ge­ra la­ban sa mga im­mig­rant. Ma­la­la­king wel­ga ang pu­mu­tok na sa buong ba­yan pa­ra sa taas-sa­hod at iba pang is­yu.

Sa mga ba­yang na­paii­la­lim sa im­per­ya­lis­tang ag­re­syong mi­li­tar at pa­na­na­kop ng US, nag­lu­lun­sad ng ar­ma­dong pag­la­ban ang ma­ma­ma­yan, nag­sa­sa­ri­li man o su­por­ta­do ng ka­ri­bal na mga im­per­ya­lis­tang ka­pang­ya­ri­han. Ini­lu­lun­sad ang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pag­la­ban sa India, Pi­li­pi­nas, Pa­les­ti­ne, Kur­dis­tan at iba pang ba­yan.

Da­pat samantalahin ng mga pro­le­tar­yong re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yo­ng pwer­­sa ang pa­bo­rab­leng mga ka­la­ga­yan upang mag­ta­tag ng mga par­ti­dong Marxis­ta-Le­ni­nis­ta-Maois­ta na ma­la­lim na na­kau­gat sa ma­ma­ma­yan at may ka­ka­ya­hang ma­ra­mi­hang mag­mu­lat, mag-or­ga­ni­sa at mag­mo­bi­li­sa sa ma­ma­ma­yan at sa pa­mu­mu­no ng ka­ni­lang ar­ma­dong pag­la­ban upang ma­ka­mit ang pam­ban­sa at pan­li­pu­nang pag­la­ya at mag­lun­sad ng so­sya­lis­tang re­bo­lu­syo­n.

II. Na­na­na­ti­li ang kri­sis ng ma­la­ko­lon­yal at ma­lap­yu­dal na sis­te­ma sa ila­lim ng re­hi­meng Du­ter­te

Patuloy na lumulubha ang mga ka­la­ga­yan sa ila­lim ng ma­la­ko­lon­yal at ma­lap­yu­dal na sis­te­ma ng Pi­li­pi­nas sa bi­gat ng pan­da­ig­di­gang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang kri­sis. Na­na­na­ti­li ang Pi­li­pi­nas sa ka­ta­yu­an ng kro­ni­kong kri­sis. Lu­mi­lik­ha ito ng an­ta­go­nis­ti­kong kontra­dik­syong ma­kau­ri sa pa­gi­tan ng ma­pag­sa­man­ta­la at pi­nag­sa­sa­man­ta­la­hang mga uri, ga­yun­din ng ma­tin­ding pak­syu­nal na mga ri­ba­lan sa loob ng nag­ha­ha­ring mga uri.

Ang di-in­dustri­yal, ag­rar­yo at at­ra­sa­dong ka­la­ga­yan ng eko­nom­yang Pi­li­pi­no ay lu­ma­la sa ma­hi­git tat­long de­ka­da ng mga pa­ta­ka­rang neo­li­be­ral. Pa­tu­loy na lu­mi­li­it ang ka­ka­ya­han ng eko­nom­yang Pi­li­pi­no na lumikha ng produkto at ma­ka­sus­ti­ne sa sa­ri­li. Inaang­kin ng reak­syu­nar­yong gub­yer­no ang 6.8% GDP na pag­la­go noong na­ka­ra­ang taon, ngu­nit nang­ya­ri ito pa­ngu­na­hin da­hil sa pan­sa­man­ta­lang pag­la­wak ng konstruk­syon at real es­ta­te. Bu­ma­ba ang pro­duk­syong ag­ri­kul­tu­ral nang 1.3% noong 2016 mu­la sa wa­lang pag­la­go sa si­nun­dang taon, ha­bang ang ba­ha­gi ni­to sa GDP ay bu­ma­ba sa 8.8% mu­la 9.5%. Sa ka­buuan, ang ba­ha­gi ng pro­duk­ti­bong mga sek­tor (ag­ri­kul­tu­ra, ma­nu­pak­tu­ra, pag­mi­mi­na at konstruk­syo­n) ay la­lo pang bu­ma­gsak sa 39.2%. Ang sek­tor ng ser­bi­syo, na pa­ngu­na­hing nag­si­sil­bi sa sir­ku­la­syon ng da­yu­hang mga ka­la­kal, ay lu­ma­wak hang­gang 49.9% ng eko­nom­ya.

Hi­git na na­kaa­sa ang Pi­li­pi­nas nga­yon sa pag­lu­lu­was ng hi­law na ma­ter­ya­les, mga ma­nu­pak­tu­rang may ma­ba­bang dag­dag-ha­la­ga, at la­kas-pag­ga­wa ng mga mig­ran­te. Da­hil wa­lang so­li­dong ka­pa­si­dad sa in­dustri­ya, du­ma­ra­nas ang ba­yan ng wa­lang ti­gil na de­pi­si­to sa ka­la­ka­lan, na tu­mu­tu­ngo na­man sa ma­tin­ding pag­sa­lig sa pa­ngu­ngu­tang at da­yu­hang pu­hu­nan, pa­ngu­na­hin sa portfo­lio investments na gi­na­ga­mit sa is­pe­ku­la­syong pi­nan­sya­l.

Wa­lang ma­ki­ki­ta lam­pas sa ki­nang ng im­port na pang­kon­su­mo, pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga imprastruk­tu­ra at mga call cen­ter na na­ka­kon­sentra sa pam­ban­sang ka­pi­tol­yo at ma­ki­ki­tid na ko­ri­dor ng ilang sentrong pro­bin­sya o ba­yan.

Pa­tu­loy na nag­du­ru­sa ang ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no sa pa­pa­la­lang so­syo­-e­ko­no­mi­kong ka­la­ga­yan sa ila­lim ng ma­la­ko­lon­yal at ma­la­pyu­dal na sis­te­mang pan­li­pu­nan. Lu­ma­la­ki ang pat­lang sa pa­gi­tan ng nag­ha­ha­ring gru­pong pang-e­ko­nom­ya at ng ma­la­wak na ma­yor­ya ng mga mang­ga­ga­wa at mag­sa­sa­ka. Batay sa in­de­pen­dyen­teng mga pag­ta­ya, ha­los 70% ng mga Pi­li­pi­no, o mga 66 mil­yon, ay na­bu­bu­hay sa ba­ba ng hangganan ng ka­ra­li­ta­an, ku­mi­ki­ta ng mas ma­ba­ba sa P125 sa isang araw. Sa ka­bi­lang ban­da, ang ya­man ng 40 pinakamayayamang Pi­­li­pi­no ay lu­ma­ki nang 14% mu­la 2015 hang­gang 2016, ha­bang ang tu­bo ng pi­na­ka­ma­la­la­king mga empre­sang na­ka­lis­ta sa Phi­lip­pi­ne Stock Excha­nge ay lu­ma­ki nang 18% sa ga­yon ding pa­na­hon, na la­long nag­pa­la­ki ng pat­lang sa pa­gi­tan ng nag­ha­ha­ring gru­pong pang-e­ko­nom­ya at ng ma­la­wak na ma­yor­ya ng mga mang­ga­ga­wa at mag­sa­sa­ka.

Pa­tu­loy na nag­hi­hi­rap ang mga mang­ga­ga­wa sa ma­la­wa­kang di­semple­yo, mga pa­ta­ka­ran sa plek­sib­leng pag­ga­wa at ma­ba­bang sa­hod. Ang lawak ng di­semple­yo at ka­ku­la­ngan ng emple­yo ay na­sa hu­mi­git-ku­mu­lang 11.5 mil­yon o ha­los 27% ng ka­buuang la­kas-pag­ga­wa. Hu­mi­git-ku­­­mu­­lang 1.3 mil­yong mang­­ga­ga­wa ang na­tang­gal mu­la sa ka­buuang la­kas-pag­ga­wa noong 2016. Da­hil sa ma­lub­hang ka­wa­lan ng tra­ba­ho, pa­tu­loy na des­pe­ra­dong nag­ha­ha­nap ng tra­ba­ho sa iba­yong da­gat ang mga mang­ga­ga­wa. Taun-ta­ong lu­ma­la­ki ang tan­tos ng pag­pa­pa­da­la ng de-kontra­tang mga mang­ga­ga­wa sa iba­yong da­gat.

Pa­tu­loy na du­ma­ra­nas ang mga Pi­li­pi­nong mang­ga­ga­wa ng pa­pa­lub­hang an­yo ng pang-aa­pi at pag­sa­sa­man­ta­la sa ila­lim ng kontraktwa­li­sa­syon at ka­ha­lin­tu­lad na mga pa­ka­na ng plek­sib­leng emple­yo. Sa ilang engkla­bo ng pag­ga­wa, ang tan­tos ng kontraktwa­li­sa­syon ay ka­sin­ta­as ng 90%. Pa­tu­loy na lu­ma­la ang mga ka­la­ga­yan sa pagtra­ba­ho sa ila­lim ng de­re­gu­la­syon ng mga pa­man­ta­yan sa pag­ga­wa tu­lad ng nang­ya­ring ma­la­la­king su­nog sa pab­ri­ka.

Na­na­na­ti­ling ma­ba­ba ang sa­hod. Ang mi­ni­mum na sa­hod na P491 pa­ra sa mga mang­ga­ga­wa sa NCR ay ma­ka­sa­sa­got lang sa 43% ng ha­la­gang gas­tu­sin pa­ra sa pang-a­raw na pa­nga­ngai­la­ngan ng anim-ka­ta­ong pa­mil­ya. Ang mga sa­hod ay pa­tu­loy na hi­ni­hi­la pa­ba­ba ng mga pa­ta­ka­ran tu­lad ng re­hi­yu­na­li­sa­syon ng sa­hod, da­la­wang-an­da­nang sa­hu­ran at iba pa.

Pa­tu­loy na pi­na­hi­hi­ra­pan ang ma­sang mag­sa­sa­ka ng laganap na ka­wa­lan ng lu­pa at pa­nga­ngam­kam ng lu­pa at lu­ma­la­lang mga an­yo ng pyu­dal at ma­lap­yu­dal na pag­sa­sa­man­ta­la at ma­lub­hang ka­wa­lan ng tra­ba­ho. Na­pa­tu­na­yan nang hu­wad at isi­nan­ta­bi na ang re­por­ma sa lu­pa sa ila­lim ng reak­syu­nar­yong gub­yer­no. Mo­no­po­li­sa­do pa rin ang lu­pa sa ma­la­la­king as­yen­da at ma­ging sa mga ti­na­ta­wag na mga is­ke­ma ng contract-gro­wing at ma­la­la­king plan­ta­syong pag-aa­ri ng da­yu­han na na­ka­tak­da pa­ra sa mga ta­nim na pang-eksport.

Pa­tu­loy na su­ma­sa­ma ang mga pam­pub­li­kong imprastruk­tu­ra at ser­bi­syo sa ila­lim ng neo­li­be­ral na pa­ta­ka­ran ng pri­ba­ti­sa­syon at de­re­gu­la­syo­n. Ang ma­la­wak na ma­sa ay pi­na­hi­hi­ra­pan ng pan­li­pu­nang pa­kal­tas o ka­ku­la­ngan ng alo­ka­syong bad­yet na nag­tu­tu­lak sa mga os­pi­tal pam­pub­li­ko at mga eskwe­la­hang es­ta­do, ga­yun­din sa iba pang ahen­sya pa­ra sa ser­bi­syo pub­li­ko na pu­ma­sok sa ope­ra­syong ko­mer­syal at is­ke­mang kor­po­ra­ti­sa­syon sa kapin­sa­laan ng ma­ma­ma­yan. Sa ha­los sam­pung taon na nga­yon, ang ti­na­ta­wag na prog­ra­mang con­di­tio­nal cash-transfer na di­ni­sen­yo at pi­non­do­han ng World Bank ay ga­nap na na­bi­go sa pag­lu­tas ng mga ugat ng ma­la­wa­kang ka­ra­li­ta­an.

Ang lu­ma­la­lim na kri­sis ng ma­la­ko­lon­yal at ma­lap­yu­dal na nag­ha­ha­ring sis­te­ma at ang lu­ma­la­lang mga kontra­dik­syong du­lot ni­to ang nag­pa­li­taw sa re­hi­meng Du­ter­te, na sa ma­ra­ming ba­gay ay nakatakdang maiba sa mga nau­na ri­to. Isa, si Rod­ri­go Du­ter­te ang unang pre­si­den­te ng GRP na uma­kong si­ya ay isang “Ka­li­wa” at “so­sya­lis­ta” at ha­yag na nag­pa­ki­ta ng ma­pag­kai­bi­gang paki­ki­pag-ug­na­yan sa re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong ki­lu­san. Ha­bang me­yor, nagpakilala siyang tu­tol sa pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga pa­si­li­dad mi­li­tar ng US sa Davao City.

Na­ngi­ba­baw si­ya sa elek­syong 2016 sa­kay nang ma­la­wa­kang dis­kun­ten­to ng ma­ma­ma­yan sa nag­ha­ha­ring sis­te­ma at mit­hi­in ni­la pa­ra sa ma­pag­pa­syang pag­ba­ba­go. Nang ma­na­lo bi­lang pre­si­den­te, inia­lok ni Du­ter­te sa Ka­li­wa ang mga pu­si­syon sa ga­bi­ne­te at pumili mu­la sa lis­ta­han ng mga re­ko­men­da­do ng NDFP mu­la sa ha­nay ng prog­re­si­bo at pat­riyo­ti­kong mga li­der ma­sa upang pa­mu­nu­an ang mga ka­wa­ni­han sa re­por­ma sa lu­pa at social welfa­re, at ang pre­si­den­ti­al an­ti-poverty com­mis­si­on. Bi­nig­yan si­la ng na­ta­ta­nging pag­ka­ka­ta­on pa­ra ibigay ang to­dong su­por­ta sa mga pa­ki­ki­ba­ka ng mga mag­sa­sa­ka, mga mang­ga­ga­wa at ang ma­sang anak­pa­wis sa buong ba­yan, par­ti­ku­lar pa­ra itu­lak ang pa­ma­ma­ha­gi ng lu­pa sa Hacien­da Lui­si­ta at iba pang as­yen­da, pag­wa­wa­kas sa kontraktwa­li­sa­syo­n, pag­ti­gil ng mi­li­ta­ri­sa­syon sa mga ba­ra­ngay at iba pa.

Ga­yun­pa­man, sa ka­buuan ay do­mi­na­do ang ga­bi­ne­te ni Du­ter­te ng mga ta­ga­pag­ta­gu­yod ng mga pa­ta­ka­rang neo­li­be­ral ng na­ka­ra­ang mga re­hi­men ma­ging mga mi­li­ta­ris­tang pro-US. May mga kontra­dik­syon sa loob ng nag­ha­ha­ring pang­ka­tin, na na­ka­ug­nay rin sa pak­syu­nal na mga ri­ba­lan sa ha­nay ng mga nag­ha­ha­ring uri. Si­na­sa­la­min ng ga­yong mga ri­ba­lan ang ma­la­lim na kri­sis ng na­bu­bu­lok na na­ha­ha­ring sis­te­ma ga­yun­din ang mga kontra­dik­syong nag­mu­mu­la sa isang mul­ti­po­lar na daig­dig.

Ang mga ma­sugid na per­so­na­li­dad ng Yel­low Army ng Li­be­ral Party, ka­bi­lang ang mga Aqui­no ng Hacien­da Lui­si­ta, ay na­sa una­han ng mga pag­si­si­kap na ugain ang nag­ha­ha­ring re­hi­men. Inuu­pa­tan at si­nu­sul­su­lan si­la ng im­per­ya­lis­mong US bi­lang pam­pi­gil sa mga kontra-US na pos­tu­ra ni Du­ter­te. May mga upi­syal sa AFP na han­dang ku­mi­los la­ban kay Du­ter­te oras na utu­san si­la ng ka­ni­lang mga among Ame­rikano.

Ma­ta­pos ang ha­los wa­long bu­wan sa ka­pang­ya­ri­han, hin­di pa nai­sa­sa­lin sa kong­kre­tong pa­ta­ka­ran ang mga pa­nga­ko ni Du­ter­te, at la­long wala sa aktwal na pag­ba­ba­go at bwelo. Kai­la­ngan pa ni­yang pa­tu­na­yang naii­ba si­ya sa kan­yang mga si­nun­dan.

Ma­kai­lang be­ses nang ipi­na­nga­ko ni Du­ter­te na wa­wa­ka­san ni­ya ang kontraktwa­li­sa­syon ng pag­ga­wa. Ang pa­nga­kong ito, ga­yun­pa­man, ay hin­di na­ki­ki­ta sa DOLE Order 174 na ini­la­bas noong Mar­so 10 na nag­pa­pa­ti­bay sa Her­re­ra Law at may la­yon la­mang na maging pamantayan at dag­dag na re­gu­la­syon sa pag­pa­pa­tu­pad ng kon­traktwa­li­sa­syo­n, tu­lad ng pa­ta­ra­kan ng nau­nang mga re­hi­men. Wa­la pang ma­pag­pa­syang mga hak­bang ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te upang tu­gu­nan ang na­ngu­ngu­nang ka­hi­ngi­an ng mga mag­sa­sa­ka pa­ra sa re­por­ma sa lu­pa. Hin­di pa ni­to ti­nu­tu­pad ang pa­ngakong lib­reng pa­tu­big.

Pau­lit-uu­lit na nag­pa­ha­yag si GRP Pre­si­dent Du­ter­te ng dek­la­ra­syon ng nag­sa­sa­ri­ling pa­ta­ka­rang pan­la­bas at kri­ti­kal sa in­ter­ben­syong mi­li­tar ng US. Bi­na­ti­kos ni­ya ang paglulunsad ng eher­si­syo mi­li­tar ng US, ang VFA at ang EDCA ngu­nit wa­la pang kong­kre­tong mga hak­bang pa­ra igi­it ang pam­ban­sang so­be­ran­ya. Sa pag­di­di­in ng mga upi­syal mi­li­tar, su­mang-a­yon si Du­ter­te na pa­hin­tu­lu­tan ang US na mag­ta­yo ng mga pa­si­li­dad mi­li­tar sa Pa­la­wan at iba pang kam­po ng AFP at mag­sa­ga­wa ng Ba­li­ka­tan Exerci­ses ga­yun­din ng 256 iba pang eher­si­syong mi­li­tar sa ba­yan nga­yong taon.

Ma­bi­bi­gat na abu­so sa ka­ra­pa­tang-tao ang na­ga­wa na ng mga pu­lis at pwer­sang mi­li­tar ng es­ta­do sa ila­lim ng “ge­ra kontra-dro­ga” at ng “to­do-ge­ra” ng re­hi­meng Du­ter­te. Si Du­ter­te mis­mo ang na­nul­sol sa bu­lok na ka­pu­li­san na mag­pa­tu­pad ng hi­bang na ge­ra la­ban sa dro­ga. Di ba­ba­ba sa 8,000 na “per­so­na­li­dad sa dro­ga”, na ka­ra­mi­han ay ma­li­li­it na mag­tu­tu­lak at gu­ma­ga­mit ng dro­ga sa ma­ra­li­tang mga ko­mu­ni­dad, ang pi­na­tay ng pu­lis sa mga ope­ra­syong “Oplan Tok­hang” ga­yun­din ng mga vi­gi­lan­te death squads.

Mu­la nang mag­dek­la­ra ng to­do-ge­ra la­ban sa mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa noong Peb­re­ro, nag­lun­sad ang mi­li­tar at itinayo-ng-AFP na mga gru­pong pa­ra­mi­li­tar ng wa­lang-ha­bas na mga pa­ma­mas­lang at ar­ma­dong pa­nu­nu­pil la­ban sa mga mag­sa­sa­ka at mi­nor­yang ma­ma­ma­yan. Inu­tu­san ni Du­ter­te ang AFP na “pa­ta­gin ang mga bun­dok,” gamit ang mga he­licop­ter gunships at ba­gong-bi­ling jet-fighters upang mam­bom­ba mu­la sa him­pa­pa­wid. Lu­bos na wa­lang pa­sa­saa­lang-a­lang sa bu­hay at ka­bu­ha­yan ng mga si­bil­yan, nam­bom­ba ang AFP sa Com­pos­te­la Val­ley, Sa­ra­nga­ni, Abra, Ma­gu­in­da­nao, Agu­san del Nor­te at iba pang lu­gar.

Ina­nun­syo na ng AFP ang ba­gong kontra-in­sur­hen­syang pla­no ni­to na Oplan Ka­pa­ya­pa­an, na sa ka­buuan ay na­ka­ba­tay sa nag­da­ang Oplan Ba­ya­ni­han sa usa­pin ng pag­ku­kum­bi­na ng mga ope­ra­syong say­war, in­te­lid­yens at kom­bat. Ma­hi­git 400 bi­lang­gong pu­li­ti­kal ang na­na­na­ti­ling na­ka­ku­long, ma­ra­mi ang ilang taon nang hin­di ma­ka­ta­ru­ngang na­ka­ku­long nang wa­lang pag­bi­bis­ta.

Nag-ii­ba­yo ang li­ga­lig ng ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no sa na­pa­kong mga pa­nga­ko ni Du­ter­te. Hi­ni­hi­ngi ni­la ang pam­ban­sang so­be­ran­ya, pam­ban­sang in­dustri­ya­li­sa­syo­n, tu­nay na re­por­ma sa lu­pa, pag­wa­wa­kas sa bu­ruk­ra­ti­kong ko­rap­syon at ma­la­wa­kang ka­ra­li­ta­an at pang-aa­pi. Ti­yak na ma­ra­mi­hang mag-aal­sa ang mga mang­ga­ga­wa upang hi­ngi­in ang pag­wa­wa­kas sa kontraktwa­li­sa­syon at ipa­na­wa­gan ang pag­ta­as ng sa­hod at ang pag­ti­gil ng re­hi­yu­na­li­sa­syon ng sa­hod at iba pang pa­ka­na pa­ra pa­ba­ba­in ang sa­hod. Ang pa­ki­ki­ba­kang ma­sa ng mga mag­sa­sa­ka ay pu­mu­pu­tok sa buong ban­sa upang igi­it ang ka­ni­lang ka­ra­pa­tan sa pag­ma­may-a­ri ng lu­pa at pag­ta­nim ng mga pa­gka­ing pa­na­nim (ki­lu­sang “bung­ka­lan”), hu­mi­ngi ng ma­ka­ta­ru­ngang pre­syo pa­ra sa ka­ni­lang mga pro­duk­to, la­ba­nan ang usu­ra at ang ma­pang-a­ping mga bang­ko sa microfi­nancing at pag­la­ban sa mi­li­ta­ri­sa­syon ng ka­ni­lang mga ko­mu­ni­dad. Pi­na­ig­ting ng mga ma­ra­li­tang lun­sod ang ka­ni­lang pa­ki­ki­ba­ka la­ban sa pri­ba­ti­sa­syon ng pa­ba­hay sa ka­ni­lang pi­na­ka­hu­ling pag-o­ku­pa sa ma­hi­git 5,000 na­ka­ti­wang­wang na ba­hay sa Bu­lacan. Ang ka­ba­ta­an at es­tud­yan­te ay hu­mi­hi­ngi ng pag­ti­gil sa prog­ra­mang K-to-12 at la­ban sa pa­pa­ta­as na gas­tos sa edu­ka­syo­n.

Ang tu­luy-tu­loy na pag-a­ban­te ng pa­ki­ki­ba­ka ng ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no sa git­na ng lu­ma­la­lang kri­sis ay nag­si­sil­bing ma­ting­kad na kon­teksto ng usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­ang GRP-NDFP. Tu­luy-tu­loy itong uma­ban­te mu­la nang ma­gsi­mu­lang mu­li noong Agos­to nang na­ka­ra­ang taon.

Sa pa­ki­ki­pag-u­sap sa GRP, tu­mi­tin­dig ang NDFP sa nga­lan ng De­mok­ra­ti­kong Gub­yer­nong Ba­yan upang ka­ta­wa­nin ang in­te­res ng ma­la­wak na ma­sa ng mga mang­ga­ga­wa at mag­sa­sa­ka, pe­ti­bur­ge­sya at pam­ban­sang bur­ge­sya. Ang GRP, sa ka­bi­lang pa­nig, ay ku­ma­ka­ta­wan sa in­te­res ng mga nag­ha­ha­ring uri ng ma­la­king bur­ge­sya kum­pa­dor at ma­la­la­king uring pa­ngi­no­ong may­lu­pa sa ka­bi­la ng hung­kag na pa­na­na­li­tang nag­li­ling­kod ito sa in­te­res ng ma­ma­ma­yan. Ba­tid din ni­to na wa­la itong ka­ka­ya­hang du­ru­gin ang ar­ma­dong re­bo­lu­syon ka­ya sa isang pa­ka­hu­lu­gan ay na­ka­pa­tas di­to.

Sa pag­pa­sok sa usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an, nag­ka­sun­do ang GRP at NDFP na tu­gu­nan ang ugat na da­hi­lan ng ar­ma­dong tung­ga­li­an upang ma­ka­mit ang ma­ka­ta­ru­ngan at ma­ta­ga­lang ka­pa­ya­pa­an. May ma­ka­say­sa­yang pag­ka­ka­ta­on nga­yon ang gub­yer­nong Du­ter­te at ang NDFP na mag­buo ng sus­tan­ti­bong mga pag­ka­kai­sa sa so­syo­-e­ko­no­mi­ko at pu­li­ti­kal at konsti­tu­syu­nal na mga re­por­ma. Ang GRP at NDFP ay nag­ka­sun­dong pa­bi­li­sin ang usa­pan. Hi­na­ha­ngad ng NDFP na ma­buo na ang mga ka­sun­du­ang ito nga­yong taon.

Sa una at ika­la­wang round ng usa­pan sa Oslo, nag­ka­sun­do ang mga Par­ti­do na pa­bi­li­sin ang usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an sa la­yu­ning ma­ga­mit ang mga ka­sun­du­an sa tat­long na­ti­ti­rang sus­tan­ti­bong ad­yen­da at isang ka­sun­du­ang pa­du­la­sin ito sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­la­la­bas ng mag­ka­tu­gong in­te­rim na ti­gil-pu­tu­kan.

Sa ikat­long round ng usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an na idi­na­os sa Ro­me, Italy noong ikat­long ling­go ng Ene­ro, na­ki­ta ang mar­ka­dong pag-usad sa ini­syal na ta­la­ka­yan upang ma­pag­kai­sa ang pi­nag­pa­li­tang mga bo­ra­dor sa CASER, ka­sa­bay ang pag­bu­buo ng bi­la­te­ral na mga tim pa­ra ri­to. Nag­kai­sa rin ang mga pa­nel na buuing mu­li ang lis­ta­han ng may ha­wak ng mga JASIG. Nag­pa­ha­yag na rin ang NDFP ng ka­han­da­ang ma­ki­pag­tu­lu­ngan sa re­hi­meng Du­ter­te sa pag­ta­ta­tag ng isang pe­de­ral na gub­yer­no, na may ma­li­naw na la­yu­ning itu­lak ang par­ti­ku­lar na mga re­por­mang konsti­tu­syu­nal na mag­ta­ta­gu­yod sa de­mok­ra­sya ng ma­ma­ma­yan.

Sa ka­bi­lang ban­da, na­bi­go ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te na tu­pa­rin ang mga pa­nga­kong gi­na­wa ni­to sa maa­gang ba­ha­gi ng usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an, par­ti­ku­lar ang am­nes­ti­ya at pag­pa­pa­la­ya sa la­hat ng bi­lang­gong pu­li­ti­kal. Bi­nig­yan rin ni­ya ang AFP ng man­do na ita­la­ga sa una­han ang mga pwer­sa sa hu­mi­git-ku­mu­lang 500 bar­yo sa buong ka­pu­lu­an upang magsa­ga­wa ng say­war, pa­nik­tik, at pan­lu­pig la­ban sa ma­ma­ma­yan at ope­ra­syong kom­bat la­ban sa BHB.

Nag­sa­ga­wa ng mga ma­ni­ob­rang pang-i­was ang mga yu­nit ng BHB upang iwasan ang mga sa­gu­pa­an sa AFP. May ilang bu­wan na na­na­wa­gan ang Par­ti­do at BHB sa re­hi­meng Du­ter­te na iat­ras ang mga pwer­sa ni­to mu­la sa mga bar­yo, ngu­nit wa­lang nang­ya­ri.

Ang mga sa­lik na ito ang nag­tu­lak sa pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do at ku­mand ng BHB na ta­pu­sin ang sa­ri­ling dek­la­ra­syon ng ti­gil-pu­tu­kan noong Peb­re­ro 10. Tu­mu­gon ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­pu­tol ng sa­ri­li ni­tong dek­la­ra­syon ng ti­gil-pu­tu­kan, ng tuluyang pagta­tapos sa usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an at pag­dek­la­ra ng to­dong ge­ra la­ban sa re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa.

Sa ha­rap ng ma­la­wa­kang pag­ba­ti­kos, na­pi­li­tan ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te na buk­san ang im­por­mal na usa­pan sa NDFP at ma­ki­pag­ka­sun­do sa pag­pa­pa­tu­loy ng na­ka­tak­dang usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an at mu­ling pag­ti­ti­bay ng nau­nang mga pinag­kasunduan, ka­bi­lang na ang pag­bi­bi­gay ng kumpyan­sa sa mga kon­sul­tant at ne­go­sya­dor ng NDFP, isang pa­nga­kong pa­la­ya­in ang hu­mi­git-ku­mu­lang 24 bi­lang­gong pu­li­ti­kal, ka­bi­lang ang tat­long nau­na nang na­sen­ten­sya­han, at pa­la­wi­gin pa ang pyan­sa pa­ra sa mga na­pa­la­yang kon­sul­tant.

Alinsunod sa Joint Sta­te­ment ng Mar­so 11, nag­la­bas ng dek­la­ra­syon ang pamu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do at pam­ban­sang ku­mand ng BHB na iba­ba­lik ang isang in­te­rim na ti­gil-pu­tu­kan, na­hi­ka­yat ng mga pag­si­si­kap na lu­ta­sin sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng usa­pan ang tampok na mga is­yu na nag­du­lot ng pag­ti­ti­gil ng nau­nang dek­la­ra­syon at ga­nap na mu­lat sa pa­nga­ngai­la­ngang ak­ti­bong ipag­tang­gol ng huk­bong ba­yan ang ma­ma­ma­yan.

Ha­bang han­dang harapin ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te sa usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an at mag­buo ng mga ka­sun­du­an pa­ra mag­sil­bi sa ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no, batid na batid rin ng mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa ang mga pa­nga­nib ng pa­si­pi­ka­syon la­lu­na bi­lang re­sul­ta ng isang ma­la­wig na ti­gil-pu­tu­kan na wa­lang sus­tan­ti­bong be­ne­pi­syo pa­ra sa ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no.

Ba­tid ang umii­ral na mga kontra­dik­syong nag­mu­mu­la sa isang mul­ti­po­lar na daig­dig at kaa­ga­pay na mga pag­ha­ha­ti sa loob ng nag­ha­ha­ring uri at nag­ha­ha­ring pang­ka­tin, han­da ang mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa na ha­ya­an ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te na bu­mu­kad­kad at ilad­lad ang sa­ri­li sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an kung ito ba’y tu­ta ng im­per­ya­li­mong US o hin­di.

Sa inspi­ra­syon ng Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so ng Par­ti­do, han­da ang la­hat ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa na isu­long ang de­mok­ra­ti­kong re­bo­lu­syon ng ba­yan at dal­hin ang dig­mang ba­yan sa ba­go at mas ma­ta­as na an­tas. Ka­sa­bay ni­to, han­da rin si­la sa po­si­bi­li­dad na ang usapang pang­kapayapaan ay humantong sa sig­ni­pi­kan­teng prog­re­so sa pag­bu­buo ng mga ka­sun­du­an sa mga re­por­mang pan­li­pu­nan, pang-e­ko­nom­ya at pam­pu­li­ti­ka at pang­konsti­tu­syo­n at sa sa­lu­ngat na mga reak­syon ng im­per­ya­lis­mong US at ng lo­kal na mga reak­syu­nar­yo sa ga­yong mga re­por­ma.

Ga­yun­pa­man, ha­bang na­na­na­ti­li ang ka­sa­lu­ku­yang ka­la­ga­yan, da­pat mag­pur­si­gi ang Par­ti­do sa pang­ka­la­ha­tang lin­ya ng de­mok­ra­ti­kong re­bo­lu­syon ng ba­yan sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng ma­ta­ga­lang dig­mang ba­yan sa pag­lu­lun­sad ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka, pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong or­ga­ni­sa­syong ma­sa at mga or­ga­no ng ka­pang­ya­ri­hang pam­pu­li­ti­ka, pag­pa­pa­la­kas at pag­pa­pa­la­wak ng Par­ti­do at pa­mu­mu­no sa ma­ma­ma­yan sa pag­lun­sad ng mi­li­tan­teng mga pa­ki­ki­ba­kang ma­sa.

III. Ma­ta­tag na su­mu­su­long ang dig­mang ba­yan

Ang lumalalang mapang-api at ma­pag­sa­man­ta­lang ka­la­ga­yang pi­nag­du­ru­sa­han ng ma­ma­ma­yang Pi­li­pi­no ang nag­tu­tu­lak sa ka­ni­la na mag­lun­sad ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka. Ti­nu­tu­pad ni­to ang pa­ngu­na­hing re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong tung­ku­lin ng pag­ba­bag­sak sa ar­ma­dong reak­syu­nar­yong es­ta­do ng mga nag­ha­ha­ring uri at pag­ta­ta­tag ng de­mok­ra­ti­kong gub­yer­nong ba­yan sa ila­lim ng pa­mu­mu­nong pro­le­tar­yo.

Ma­ta­pos ang 48 taon ng pag­su­su­long ng ar­ma­dong re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng ma­ta­ga­lang dig­mang ba­yan, nag­ta­mo ang Ba­gong Huk­bong Ba­yan ng ma­la­la­king ta­gum­pay at na­ka­pag-i­pon ng makabuluhang mga aral sa pag­su­su­long ng dig­mang ba­yan. Sa pa­mu­mu­no ng Par­ti­do, nag­ta­gum­pay ang BHB sa pag­su­su­long ng dig­mang ba­yan sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng ma­sak­law at maig­ting na pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya sa ba­ta­yan ng pa­pa­la­wak at pa­pa­la­lim na ba­seng ma­sa.

Nag­lu­lun­sad ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba ang BHB la­ban sa ma­hi­hi­nang ba­ha­gi ng kaa­way, ma­ta­li­nong ga­mit ang mga tak­ti­ka ng kon­sentra­syon at pag­ka­lat at pag­san­dig sa ma­sa. Nag­sa­sa­ga­wa ito ng mga ak­syong at­ri­ti­bo la­ban sa kaa­way upang mag­sil­bi sa pa­ngu­na­hing di­rek­syong isa­ga­wa ang mga ani­hi­la­ti­bong ak­syo­n, upang mag­sam­sam ng san­da­ta at pa­hi­na­in ang reak­syu­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pwer­sa.

Hu­ma­ha­law ang BHB ng la­kas mu­la sa ma­sak­law at ma­la­lim na su­por­ta ng ma­sang mag­sa­sa­ka at mi­nor­yang ma­ma­ma­yan sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­lu­lun­sad ng ma­la­wak na mga kam­pan­yang an­tip­yu­dal sa ba­lang­kas ng mi­ni­mum at mak­si­mum na prog­ra­ma sa re­por­ma sa lu­pa ng gub­yer­nong ba­yan at pag­ta­ta­gu­yod sa ka­ra­pa­tan sa pag­pa­pa­sya sa sa­ri­li at pag­ta­tang­gol ng lu­pa­ing ni­nu­no la­ban sa pan­da­ram­bong sa ka­bu­ha­yan at ka­pa­li­gi­ran. Nag­bi­gay-inspi­ra­syon din ito sa ma­la­wak na ma­sang mang­ga­ga­wa, mga es­tud­yan­te at in­te­lektwal, ma­ra­li­tang lunsod na ma­lap­ro­le­tar­ya­do, ka­ba­bai­han, pro­pe­syu­nal, mga taong sim­ba­han at iba pang de­mok­ra­ti­kong sek­tor na lu­ma­hok sa re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ga­wa­in at su­ma­nib sa ar­ma­dong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka.

Ang BHB ang pa­ngu­na­hing pwer­sa ng Par­ti­do sa re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ga­wa­ing ma­sa sa ma­sang mag­sa­sa­ka at mi­nor­yang ma­ma­ma­yan, sa pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong or­ga­ni­sa­syong ma­sa ng mga mag­sa­sa­ka, ka­ba­bai­han, ka­ba­ta­an, ba­ta, mga ak­ti­bis­tang pang­kul­tu­ra at mi­li­syang ba­yan at pag­ta­ta­tag ng or­ga­no ng ka­pang­ya­ri­hang pam­pu­li­ti­ka. Ha­bang nag­si­sil­bing pa­ngu­na­hing pwer­sang pan­dig­ma, nag­si­sil­bi rin itong pwer­sang pampro­duk­syon at pa­ra sa pang­kul­tu­rang re­bo­lu­syo­n.

Sa pag­lu­lun­sad ng dig­mang ba­yan, na­ka­tu­on ang Par­ti­do at BHB sa usa­pin ng pag­su­su­long mu­la isang yug­to pa­tu­ngo sa mas ma­ta­as na yu­gto ng estra­te­hi­kong de­pen­si­ba, at mu­la sa ka­sa­lu­ku­yang estra­te­hi­kong de­pen­si­ba tu­ngo sa su­su­nod na an­tas ng estra­te­hi­kong pag­ka­pa­tas.

Sa si­mu­la, ang Par­ti­do ay may ba­seng ma­sang 80,000 ma­ma­ma­yan at inor­ga­ni­sa ang BHB na may siyam na rip­leng aw­to­ma­ti­ko at 26 mas ma­hi­hi­nang ar­mas sa Central Luzon noong 1969 tu­ngong isang huk­bo na may mga iskwad at pla­tun na may hi­git sa 200 ma­la­la­kas na rip­le noong 1971.

Nang mag­dep­loy ang kaa­way ng 5,000 tro­pa at pu­lis sa ila­lim ng Task Force La­win, ang pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do ay lu­mi­pat sa Isa­be­la pa­ra ita­tag ang himpilan at sentro nito ng pag­sa­sa­nay ng mga kad­re at Pu­lang ku­man­der pa­ra sa pam­ban­sang dep­loy­ment. Pag­sa­pit ng 1972, ang mga pau­nang kad­re ng Par­ti­do at BHB ay ku­ma­lat na sa sam­pung re­hi­yon ng ban­sa, ka­bi­lang sa Ilocos-Cor­dil­le­ra, Sout­hern Luzon, Vi­sa­yas at Min­da­nao.

Lu­ma­ki ang BHB tu­ngong tat­long kum­pan­ya na may ma­la­la­kas na rip­le at di­na­dag­da­gan ng mga lo­kal na yu­nit ge­ril­ya. Ito ay ku­ma­lat sa ka­ra­mi­han ng pru­bin­sya ng Ca­ga­yan Val­ley. Ba­go ni­to, tu­mu­gon ang kaa­way ga­mit ang Task Force Sa­ra­nay. Su­ba­lit ang na­ging ka­hi­na­an ng pan­re­hi­yong pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do ay ang sob­rang pag­ta­ta­gal ng da­la­wang kum­pan­ya noong 1972-1976 sa ma­gu­bat na re­hi­yon ng Isa­be­la sa ka­bi­la ng pag­li­kas mu­la roon ng lo­kal na po­pu­la­syo­n.
Si­mu­la Batas Militar noong 1972 hang­gang ka­la­git­na­an ng de­ka­da 1980, lu­ma­wak ang BHB sa buong ban­sa, at nag­ta­yo ng mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya sa iba’t ibang re­hi­yon. Naa­bot ang pam­ban­sang la­tag ng pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya noong si­mu­la ng de­ka­da 1980. Ka­sa­bay ng su­mi­sid­hing kri­sis pang-e­ko­nom­ya at pam­pu­li­ti­ka ng dik­ta­du­rang US-Marcos, ang ma­sak­law na pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya ay nag­bu­nga ng ma­bi­lis na pag­la­wak at pag­la­go ng BHB, ng mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya at ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka sa ka­buuan.

Noong maa­gang ba­ha­gi ng de­ka­da 1980, na­ga­wa ng pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do ang estra­te­hi­kong pag­ka­ka­ma­ling mag­tang­kang lu­mun­dag mu­la sa pang­git­nang yug­to ng estra­te­hi­kong de­pen­si­ba tu­ngo sa inii­lu­syong yug­to ng estra­te­hi­kong kontra-o­pen­si­ba kung saan inii­sip na ma­ta­ta­lon ang aban­teng yug­to ng estra­te­hi­kong de­pen­si­ba at estra­te­hi­kong pag­ka­pa­tas.

Pa­tu­loy na lu­ma­ki at umun­lad ang BHB, su­ba­lit na­hi­gop sa ade­lan­ta­dong re­gu­la­ri­sa­syon kung saan iti­na­yo ang mga pwer­sang ber­ti­kal na may lub­hang ma­li­it na pwer­sang pa­ha­lang. Tu­ngo sa ka­ta­pu­san ng de­ka­da 1980, du­ma­nas ito ng ma­la­la­king pag­ka­ta­lo da­hil sa sa­ri­ling pag­pa­pa­ki­tid da­hil sa pag­ka­lig­ta sa ga­wa­ing ma­sa at sa ba­seng ma­sa at pag­lu­lun­sad ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba la­ban sa ma­ti­ti­gas na tar­get, pag­ba­ba­se sa syu­dad ng ma­ta­as na ku­mand at iba pa. Iki­nom­bi­na ito sa ma­li at ar­ti­pi­syal na pag­ta­tang­ka sa mga in­su­rek­syon sa mga syu­dad at sentrong ba­yan sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­la­la­ro sa is­pon­tan­yong ka­ma­la­yan ng ma­sa at pag­pa­pa­kat ng mga ar­ma­dong yu­nit sa ka­lun­su­ran.

Ini­lun­sad ng Par­ti­do ang Ika­la­wang Da­ki­lang Ki­lu­sang Pag­wa­was­to noong 1992 upang isa­ga­wa ang kompre­hen­si­bong pag­wa­was­to at lu­ta­sin ang mga prob­le­mang ibi­nun­sod ng ade­lan­ta­dong re­gu­la­ri­sa­syon at in­su­rek­syu­nis­mong lun­sod. Mu­ling pi­nag­ti­bay ng Par­ti­do ang mga ba­ta­yang prin­sip­yo tu­lad ng pag­su­su­long ng ma­ta­ga­lang dig­mang ba­yan at pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya. Mu­ling ipi­na­kat ng BHB ang mga pwer­sa ni­to pa­ra abu­tin ang mga nai­wan na lugar sa ga­wa­ing ma­sa, mu­ling ita­yo ang mga or­ga­ni­sa­syong ma­sa, mag­pa­la­wak sa ba­gong mga te­ri­tor­yong ge­ril­ya, mag­lun­sad ng re­bo­lu­syong ag­rar­yo at buuin ang Par­ti­do at mga lo­kal na or­ga­no ng ka­pang­ya­ri­hang pam­pu­li­ti­ka.

Sa tang­kang abu­tin ang ma­la­wak na er­ya, may pag­ki­ling ang BHB sa sob­rang pag­ka­ba­tak sa pag­de­dep­loy ni­to ng mas ma­li­li­it na iskwad ng mga Pu­lang man­di­rig­ma. Da­hil di­to’y na­ging bul­ne­rab­le ang mga yu­nit ng BHB sa mga ata­ke ng kaa­way at nag­bun­sod ng pag­ka­pa­si­bo at kon­ser­ba­tis­mo.

Sa ika-11 Ple­num ng Ko­mi­te Sentral noong 2002, na­na­wa­gan ang Par­ti­do sa BHB na pa­ngi­ba­ba­wan ang prob­le­ma ng kon­ser­ba­tis­mo. Ina­ta­san ni­to ang BHB na mag­ta­yo ng mga pla­tun bi­lang sa­li­gang por­ma­syon upang ita­as ang ka­pa­si­dad ni­tong ha­ra­pin ang kaa­way at mag­lun­sad ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba; at mag­ta­yo ng mga sentro de gra­bi­dad sa la­ra­ngan, pru­bin­sya at re­hi­yon na bu­buuin ng 20-30% ng ka­buuang pwer­sang ge­ril­ya.

Ni­la­yon ng ika-11 Ple­num ang ita­yo sa la­hat ng re­hi­yon ang ma­ka­bu­lu­hang bi­lang ng mga la­ra­ngang la­king-kum­pan­ya kaa­lin­sa­bay ng mas ma­ra­ming mga la­ra­ngang may la­kas na pi­na­li­it na kum­pan­ya na ka­yang ma­bi­lis na umun­lad tu­ngong la­king-kum­pan­ya.

Ti­nar­get ng ika-11 Ple­num na maa­bot ang mga tar­get na ito sa ka­tam­ta­mang haba ng panahon. Na­na­wa­gan itong isa­ga­wa ang ma­sak­law at maig­ting na pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya, pag­ta­ta­yo ng mag­ka­ka­nug­nog na la­king-kum­pan­yang la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya at pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga an­tas ng ku­mand sa la­ra­ngan, pru­bin­sya at re­hi­yon ha­bang nag­si­sil­bing Ko­mi­syong Mi­li­tar ang sentral na pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do. Ni­la­yon ni­tong ma­ta­mo ang pam­ban­sang pag­la­go ng BHB at pag­su­long ng dig­mang ba­yan.

Nag­re­histro ng pag­la­go ang BHB noong 2002 hang­gang 2006 at na­lag­pa­san ang is­to­ri­kong naa­bot noong 1987. Ga­yun­man, may iba’t ibang an­tas ng pag­tu­pad sa mga re­so­lu­syon ng ika-11 Ple­num, ka­bi­lang yaong pa­tung­kol sa istruk­tu­ra ng pwer­sa ng BHB. Ang da­mi ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba ay di ka­tug­ma sa pag­la­go. May sob­rang dis­per­sal at ma­ka-i­sang pa­nig na diin sa ga­wa­ing ma­sa. Na­ka­pag­lun­sad ng pam­ban­sang kam­pan­ya ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba noong 2005 at 2006 su­ba­lit iba’t iba ang re­sul­ta ni­to sa iba’t ibang re­hi­yon.

Ang pag­la­go at pag­la­kas ng BHB ay un­ti-un­ting inuk-ok ng mga prob­le­ma sa pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga pla­tun, la­ra­ngan, pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do sa iba’t ibang an­tas, sob­rang pag­dis­pers, si­bil­ya­ni­sa­syon at kon­ser­ba­tis­mong mi­li­tar. Ang mga yu­nit ng BHB ay na­hu­log sa mi­li­sya­-is­mo at tak­ti­kang re­bel­deng la­ga­lag (mga ar­ma­dong pang­kat pampro­pa­gan­da at mga iskwad na pan­la­ban sa mga lo­kal na ti­ra­no at ma­sa­sa­mang ele­men­to) at iba’t ibang an­tas ng si­bil­ya­ni­sa­syo­n. Da­hil di­to, may un­ti-un­ting pag­hi­na noong 2006-2009. Pi­na­la­la pa ito ng la­king-di­bi­syong mga kam­pan­ya ng kaa­way sa buong ban­sa (Oplan Ban­tay La­ya I at II), na nag­­di­in sa pailan-ilang re­hi­yon sa iba’t ibang pa­na­hon.

Nag­re­histro ng pang­ka­la­ha­tang ma­ba­gal at dis­ba­lan­sya­dong pag­la­ki ang BHB si­mu­la 2009. Sa isang pa­nig, na­na­na­ti­li ang prob­le­ma ng sob­rang dis­per­sal at kon­ser­ba­tis­mong mi­li­tar, na san­hi ng pa­gi­ging pa­si­bo at ka­wa­lang ini­sya­ti­ba ng BHB. Sa ka­bi­lang pa­nig, na­ga­wa ng mga pa­mu­nu­an ng BHB at Par­ti­do sa ibang re­hi­yon na ha­wa­kan ang ini­sya­ti­ba, pa­mu­nu­an ang mga kam­pan­yang mi­li­tar sa an­tas ng re­hi­yon at sub­re­hi­yon at lu­bos na ga­mi­tin ang ki­non­sentrang la­kas at la­tag ng mga pla­tun at kum­pan­ya ng BHB pa­ra mag­lun­sad ng ma­la­wak at maig­ting na pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya, na pum­wer­sa sa kaa­way na mag­ba­tak ng pwer­sa at nag­ka­it di­to ng ii­sang tar­get. Na­hi­gi­tan ng pag­la­go ng BHB sa mga re­hi­yong ito ang pag­ka­ti­gil o un­ti-un­ting pag­hi­na ng BHB sa ibang re­hi­yon.

Sa ilang re­hi­yon sa Min­da­nao, na­ga­wang mag-i­ni­sya­ti­ba ng BHB sa ba­ta­yan ng ta­gum­pay sa pag­bu­buo ng mga pla­tun, pagpapatuloy ng mga pwer­sang ber­ti­kal (kum­pan­ya at ma­li­li­it na kum­pan­ya) at pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga sub­re­hi­yong may mag­ka­ka­rug­tong na la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya. Sa ka­bi­la ng pag­dep­loy ng ma­la­king tro­pa ng AFP la­ban sa BHB, na­bi­go itong sug­pu­in ang pag­la­go ng BHB sa mga re­hi­yon ng Eas­tern Min­da­nao.

Noong ka­la­git­na­an ng 2016, ti­na­ya ng Ka­wa­ni­hang Pam­pu­li­ti­ka (Po­lit­bu­ro) ng Ko­mi­te Sentral ang sit­wa­syon at ti­nu­koy ang pa­nga­ngai­la­ngang pa­ngi­ba­ba­wan ang prob­le­ma ng kon­ser­ba­tis­mong mi­li­tar. Ga­mit ang mga aral mu­la sa po­si­ti­bong ka­ra­na­san sa pag­su­su­long ng re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka sa ilang re­hi­yon sa nag­da­ang mga taon, bi­nuo ng Po­lit­bu­ro ang mga re­so­lu­syon pa­ra pandayin at paunlarin ang ka­ka­ya­han ng BHB pa­ra mas ak­ti­bong mag­lun­sad ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba sa pam­ban­sang sak­law at isa­ga­wa ang mga kam­pan­yang mi­li­tar pa­ra kontra­hin at bi­gu­in ang mga pla­no ng kaa­way.

Pi­nag­ti­bay ng Politbu­ro na da­pat ku­nin ng BHB ang buong ini­sya­ti­ba sa pag­lu­lun­sad ng dig­mang ba­yan sa an­tas pam­ban­sa at panre­hi­yon, ma­pa­nga­has na pa­la­ki­hin ang bi­lang ng mga Pu­lang man­di­rig­ma, pag­dug­tong-dug­tu­ngin ang mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya, iba­yong pa­ra­mi­hin ang bi­lang ng mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya, mag­lun­sad ng mas ma­da­las na tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba, ilun­sad ang re­bo­lu­syong ag­rar­yo at pa­ki­lu­sin ang ma­sang mag­sa­sa­ka sa pa­pa­la­pad na lu­gar at pa­la­wa­kin at kon­so­li­da­hin ang ba­seng ma­sa sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­ta­ta­tag ng mga or­ga­no ng ka­pang­ya­ri­hang pam­pu­li­ti­ka mu­la sa an­tas mu­ni­si­pa­li­dad pa­ta­as.

Sa pa­na­hon ding ito, na­ki­pag­kai­sa ang pa­mu­nu­an ng Par­ti­do at NDFP na sa­bay na ma­ki­pag-ti­gil-pu­tu­kan sa re­hi­meng Du­ter­te, ba­tid na ang umu­us­bong na kontra­dik­syon mu­la sa pan­da­ig­di­gang ka­pi­ta­lis­tang kri­sis at lo­kal na nag­ha­ha­ring sis­te­ma ay may po­ten­syal na lu­mik­ha ng kun­di­syon pa­ra sa po­sib­leng al­yan­sa. Sa ha­los anim na bu­wan, mu­la Agos­to 28, 2016 hang­gang Peb­re­ro 10, 2017, ina­ta­san ng Par­ti­do ang BHB na iti­gil at pigilan ang pag­lu­lun­sad ng open­si­bang kam­pan­ya at ope­ra­syon la­ban sa uni­por­ma­dong ar­ma­dong tau­han ng AFP at PNP, bi­lang pag­ta­li­ma sa ka­sun­du­an ng NDFP at GRP sa una sa ser­ye ng mga usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an.

Ka­sa­bay ni­to, mu­lat na mu­lat ang Par­ti­do na ang ti­gil-pu­tu­kan sa ma­ha­ba-ha­bang pa­na­hon na wa­lang ma­ka­bu­lu­hang pa­ki­na­bang sa ba­yan at sa ka­ni­lang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong la­yu­nin ay pwe­deng ma­ging dis­ben­ta­he sa BHB, la­lu­na sa pa­na­hong si­ni­si­kap ni­tong ku­nin ang buong ini­sya­ti­ba sa pag­lu­lun­sad ng pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya at pi­na­ngi­ngi­ba­ba­wan ang epek­to ng kon­ser­ba­tis­mo.
Sa la­yong pa­na­ti­li­hin ang ti­gil-pu­tu­kan, isi­na­ga­wa ng BHB ang mga ma­ni­ob­rang pag-i­was sa mga ar­ma­dong sa­gu­pa­an sa AFP na nag­dep­loy ng mga ar­ma­dong yu­nit pa­ra isa­ga­wa ang pa­ni­nik­tik, say­war, ar­ma­dong pa­nu­nu­pil at in­ti­mi­da­syon upang wa­sa­kin ang mga or­ga­ni­sa­syong ma­sa, at pa­ra mag­lun­sad ng mga ope­ra­syong stri­ke la­ban sa BHB.

Ma­ta­pos ang mga mun­ti­kan at aktwal na sa­gu­pa­an, la­lu­na noong Ene­ro, nag­pa­sya ang Par­ti­do at BHB na ta­pu­sin ang uni­la­te­ral na dek­la­ra­syong ti­gil-pu­tu­kan noong Peb­re­ro 10. Tu­mu­gon sa ka­ra­ni­wang ka­ra-ka­ra­kang pa­ra­an ang re­hi­meng Du­ter­te, idi­nek­la­ra ang pag­ta­ta­pos ng buong ne­go­sa­syong pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an sa NDFP at ipi­nag-u­tos ang mu­ling pag-a­res­to ng mga kon­sul­tant ng NDFP. Nag­dek­la­ra ng “all-out war” ang AFP, na nag­bun­sod ng mga pro­tes­ta at ma­la­wa­kang pa­na­wa­gan sa re­hi­meng Du­ter­te na ipag­pa­tu­loy ang usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an sa NDFP.

Ang ka­sun­du­ang iba­lik ang ka­ni-kan­yang ti­gil-pu­tu­kan ba­go ang April 2-6 na ikaa­pat sa ser­ye ng mga usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pan ay lu­bos na su­su­por­ta­han ng BHB. Ka­sa­bay ito, da­pat ma­na­ti­li itong mu­lat sa pa­nga­ngai­la­ngang mag-i­ni­s­ya­ti­ba sa pag­ta­tang­gol ng ba­yan la­ban sa say­war, pa­ni­nik­tik, ar­ma­dong pa­nu­nu­pil at ope­ra­syong kom­bat na isa­sa­ga­wa ng mga ar­ma­dong yu­nit ng AFP sa mga bar­yo.

Da­pat lu­bos na pang­ha­wa­kan ng BHB at mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa ang ini­sya­ti­bang pam­pu­li­ti­ka sa pa­na­hon ng ti­gil-pu­tu­kan upang ma­bi­lis na or­ga­ni­sa­hin ang ma­sang mag­sa­sa­ka sa ba­go at da­ting mga lu­gar, ilun­sad ang mga pa­ki­ki­ba­kang an­tip­yu­dal at re­bo­lu­syong ag­rar­yo, ha­bang nag­pa­pa­la­kas sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng mga pag­sa­sa­nay, ma­la­wa­kang pag­re­rek­rut, ma­ging ga­wa­ing pang­kul­tu­ra at edu­ka­syon sa ka­ni­lang ha­nay.

Ha­bang ni­la­la­yon ng Par­ti­do na pa­la­pa­rin at pa­la­ka­sin ang BHB, ang mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya at ar­ma­dong pa­ki­ki­ba­ka sa kompre­hen­si­bo at la­ha­tang-pa­nig na pa­ra­an, bu­kas ito sa po­si­bi­li­dad na ang ne­go­sa­syong pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an ay ha­han­tong sa mga sus­tan­ti­bong ka­sun­du­an at pag­bu­buo ng al­yan­sa ng la­hat ng po­si­ti­bong pwer­sa la­ban sa im­per­ya­lis­mong US at la­ban sa mga tu­ta ni­to. Ka­sa­bay ni­to, han­da rin ito na mang­ya­ri ang ka­ba­lig­ta­ran.

IV. Mga tung­ku­lin sa pag­pa­pa­la­kas ng BHB at pag­su­su­long ng dig­mang ba­yan

ANG KASALUKUYANG KALAGAYAN ng BHB ay iniu­lat at ti­na­sa ng Unang Ple­num ng Ko­mi­te Sentral ng Ika­la­wang Kong­re­so. Bi­nig­yang-pan­sin ng KS ang ma­ka­bu­lu­hang pag­la­ki sa bi­lang ng mga Pu­lang man­di­rig­ma mu­la ka­la­git­na­an ng 2016 sa ga­bay at inspi­ra­syon ng mga re­so­lu­syon ng Po­lit­bu­ro.

Mu­la noo’y isi­na­ga­wa ng BHB ang ki­na­kai­la­ngang reor­ga­ni­sa­syon at pag­sa­sa­nay ng mga upi­syal at man­di­rig­ma. Nag­bu­kas ito ng mga ba­gong la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya at nag­buo ng ba­gong mga pla­tun at kum­pan­ya. Pi­na­la­kas ni­to ang iba’t ibang an­tas ng ku­mand.

Ang Unang Ple­num ng Ko­mi­te Sentral ay nag­ta­tag ng Ko­mi­syong Mi­li­tar ni­to at bi­nuo at pi­nu­long ang Pam­ban­sang Ku­mand sa Ope­ra­syon (NOC o Na­tio­nal Ope­ra­ti­ons Com­mand) ng BHB. Ang NOC ang mag­si­sil­bing pam­ban­sang sentro de gra­bi­dad ng BHB at mag­di­di­ri­he ng dig­mang ba­yan sa pag­lu­lun­sad at pag­su­su­long ng dig­mang ba­yan sa buong ban­sa.

Ini­la­tag ng Unang Ple­num ang mga tung­ku­lin pa­ra pa­bi­li­sin ang pag­tu­pad ng mga tung­ku­lin pa­ra sa pag­su­long mu­la sa pang­git­nang yug­to tu­ngong aban­teng yug­to ng estra­te­hi­kong de­pen­si­ba upang lu­ma­pit pa sa bu­ngad ng estra­te­hi­kong pag­ka­pa­tas.

Inaa­ta­san ng Ko­mi­te Sentral ang BHB na tu­pa­rin ang su­mu­su­nod na mga tung­ku­lin:

1. Ilun­sad ang ma­la­wak at maig­ting na pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya sa ba­ta­yan ng pa­pa­la­wak at pa­pa­la­lim na ba­seng ma­sa pa­tu­ngo sa pag­pa­pa­un­lad ng to­do-lar­gang pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya. Ita­as ang ka­pa­si­dad at istruk­tu­ra ng huk­bong ba­yan pa­ra ilun­sad ang sinkro­ni­sa­do at koor­di­na­dong mga kam­pan­ya at ope­ra­syong mi­li­tar sa an­tas sub­re­hi­yon, pan­re­hi­yon at pam­ban­sa.

Ti­ya­kin ang pag­ta­ta­yo ng mga pwer­sang ber­ti­kal sa an­tas ng re­hi­yon at sub­re­hi­yon upang mag­sil­bing mga sentro de gra­bi­dad ng mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya sa ga­wa­ing mi­li­tar at pa­ra sa pag­lu­lun­sad ng re­bo­lu­syong ag­rar­yo at ga­wa­ing pam­pu­li­ti­ka. Da­pat may mi­ni­mum na la­kas-kum­pan­ya ang mga ku­mand sa la­ra­ngan na may pla­tun bi­lang sentro de gra­bi­dad. Ang mga lo­kal na pla­tung ge­ril­ya na nag­si­sil­bing him­pi­lan ng mga ko­mi­teng sek­syon ng Par­ti­do na su­ma­sak­law sa mu­ni­si­pa­li­dad o ku­lum­pon ng mga bar­yo ay da­pat ma­bi­li­sang ita­yo.

Ita­yo ang mga ku­mand sa ope­ra­syon ng BHB mu­la sa pam­ban­sa hang­gang sa an­tas re­hi­yon, sub­re­hi­yon (pru­bin­sya) at la­ra­ngan. Ku­nin ang ini­sya­ti­ba at pa­na-pa­na­hong ilun­sad ang mga kam­pan­yang mi­li­tar sa an­tas sub­re­hi­yon, re­hi­yon at pam­ban­sa.

2. Pa­bi­li­sin ang rek­rut­ment ng mga ar­ma­dong pwer­sa sa la­hat ng re­hi­yon sa buong ban­sa. Ma­ra­mi­hang mag­re­kut mu­la sa mga es­tud­yan­te at uring mang­ga­ga­wa upang ma­ging mga kad­re at upi­syal sa pu­li­ti­ka ng BHB. Ipa­tu­pad ang tat­long an­tas ng kur­song mi­li­tar upang ita­as ang an­tas ng pag­sa­sa­nay ng mga Pu­lang ku­man­der at man­di­rig­ma. Da­pat lu­ta­sin agad ng mga pan­re­hi­yong ku­mand sa ope­ra­syon (ROC) ang mga prob­le­ma sa pag­re­rek­rut at pag­pa­pa­la­kas ng BHB.

Ita­as ang bi­lang ng mga rip­le ng BHB sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­pa­pa­un­lad ng mga tak­ti­ka sa pa­ki­ki­dig­ma pa­ra sa pag­sam­sam ng ar­mas mu­la sa nag-oo­pe­ra­syong tro­pa ng kaa­way, ma­ging sa mga ar­mo­ri ng mga yu­nit ng Army, mga pa­ra­mi­li­tar, pri­ba­dong huk­bo, mga pwer­sang pan­se­gu­ri­dad at iba pa.

3. Lu­ta­sin ang ma­la­king dis­ba­lan­se ng pag­la­go at pag­la­kas ng pwer­sa ng BHB sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­lu­lun­sad ng kam­pan­yang pag­wa­was­to sa mga pag­ka­ka­ma­li upang itu­lak ang dra­ma­ti­kong pag­la­ki ng la­kas ng BHB sa Luzon at Vi­sa­yas.

Ang mga re­hi­yong re­la­ti­bong may mas ma­ra­mi at mas ma­ka­ra­na­san at ma­ta­gum­pay na kad­re at ku­man­der at mas ma­ra­ming san­da­ta ay maaa­ring mag­sa­nay sa mas ma­hi­hi­nang re­hi­yon o ma­ging han­da na per­ma­nen­teng idep­loy doon o pan­sa­man­ta­lang tour of duty na isang taon.

La­ba­nan ang kon­ser­ba­tis­mong mi­li­tar, mi­li­sya­-is­mo at si­bil­ya­ni­sa­syon sa huk­bong ba­yan. Da­pat mag­pa­tu­loy ang pag­la­ki at pag­la­kas ng BHB sa Min­da­nao. Paun­la­rin ang estra­te­hi­ko at tak­ti­kal na pa­mu­mu­nong mi­li­tar la­lu­na sa pam­ban­sa at pan­re­hi­yong an­tas, na ma­hig­pit na gi­na­ga­ba­yan ng prin­sip­yo ng sentra­li­sa­dong estra­te­hi­kong ku­mand at de­sentra­li­sa­dong ope­ra­syo­n.

4. Ilang ulit na pa­la­ki­hin ang bi­lang ng mga yu­nit ng mi­li­syang ba­yan sa la­hat ng bar­yo na may mga sa­ngay ng Par­ti­do, at ita­yo ang mga lo­kal na yu­nit ge­ril­ya sa an­tas mu­ni­si­pa­li­dad o sek­syon kung saan may mga ko­mi­teng sek­syon ng Par­ti­do. Ilun­sad sa ka­ni­lang ha­nay ang ma­sin­sing pag­sa­sa­nay pam­pu­li­ti­ka at pang­mi­li­tar at pa­ka­wa­lan ang ka­ni­lang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ener­hi­ya at sig­la upang mag­lun­sad ng dig­mang ba­yan sa lo­kal na an­tas at mag­lun­sad ng mga tak­ti­kal na open­si­ba la­ban sa pwer­sa ng kaa­way.

5. Ikon­so­li­da ang la­hat ng la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya at mag­ta­yo ng mga ba­go. Paun­la­rin ang mga teat­ro ng pa­ki­ki­dig­mang ge­ril­ya sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng pag­pa­pa­ta­as ng ka­pa­si­dad ng mga la­ra­ngang ge­ril­ya ng BHB sa pag­ko­or­di­na at pag­ga­mit ng pag-uug­na­yan ng mga pwer­sa ni­to.

Paun­la­rin ang mga sub­re­hi­yong may mas ma­la­wak na dug­tu­ngan ng 3-5 mga la­ra­ngan o dug­tu­ngan ng mga sub­re­hi­yon. Da­pat pan­sa­man­ta­la o pantran­si­syon la­mang ang pag­ka­ka­ro­on ng mga na­hi­hi­wa­lay na la­ra­ngan na wa­lang ka­rug­tong o na­la­la­yo sa ibang la­ra­ngan.

Ita­as ang an­tas ng mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong or­ga­ni­sa­syong ma­sa at mga or­ga­no ng ka­pang­ya­ri­hang pam­pu­li­ti­ka sa an­tas in­ter-bar­yo, mu­ni­si­pa­li­dad, distri­to at pru­bin­sya upang isa­ka­tu­pa­ran ang mga ga­wa­in ng de­mok­ra­ti­kong gub­yer­nong ba­yan at mag­pa­ki­los pa­ra sa dig­ma­an.

6. Mas ma­sin­sin at mas ma­la­wa­kang ipa­tu­pad ang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong prog­ra­ma sa re­por­ma sa lu­pa. Isa­ka­tu­pa­ran ang mga kam­pan­yang an­tip­yu­dal sa in­ter-bar­yo o mas ma­sak­law na an­tas. Isa­ka­tu­pa­ran ang kum­pis­ka­syon sa lu­pang ina­gaw ng mga nag­ha­ha­ring uring pa­ngi­no­ong may­lu­pa, mga kumpra­dor at ka­ni­lang da­yu­hang amo at ipa­tu­pad ang lib­reng pa­ma­ma­ha­gi ng lu­pa sa ma­sang mag­sa­sa­ka kung saan ito maaa­ring ga­win at ipag­tang­gol.

Paun­la­rin ang mga pa­ra­an at tek­ni­ka sa pro­duk­syon upang ita­as ang pro­duk­syong ag­ri­kul­tu­ral at paun­la­rin ang ma­pag­ku­ku­nan ng ma­ka­bu­lu­hang ki­ta. Su­por­ta­han ang mga prog­ra­mang nag­si­sil­bi sa pan­li­pu­nang pa­nga­ngai­la­ngan ng mga komunidad na mag­sa­sa­ka at pam­ban­sang mi­nor­yang tu­lad ng mga paa­ra­lang ele­men­tar­ya at hayskul, mga kli­ni­kang ba­yan, pag­ku­ku­nan ng inu­ming tu­big, kur­yen­te, pa­ba­hay at iba pa.

7. Tu­lu­ngang ita­yo ang Par­ti­do sa ideo­lo­hi­ya, pu­li­ti­ka at or­ga­ni­sa­syo­n, sa loob ng huk­bong ba­yan at sa ha­nay ng ma­sa. Isa­ga­wa ang ma­sin­sing edu­ka­syong pam­pu­li­ti­ka sa ha­nay ng mga Pu­lang ku­man­der at man­di­rig­ma upang ita­as ang ka­ni­lang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong ka­mu­la­tan, pa­ta­ta­gin ang ka­ni­lang ka­pa­sya­hang lu­ma­ban at pa­la­ka­sin ang ka­ni­lang ab­so­lu­tong pa­ni­nin­di­gang mag­sil­bi sa ba­yan at ka­ni­lang re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong la­yu­nin.

8. Mag­pun­ya­gi sa pag­pa­pa­tu­pad ng mga pa­ta­ka­ran ng de­mok­ra­ti­kong gub­yer­nong ba­yan pa­ra lan­sa­gin ang mga sin­di­ka­tong kri­mi­nal, la­lu­na ang mga drug trafficker at gru­po sa pa­ngi­ngid­nap, pri­ba­dong huk­bo ng mga war­lord at lo­kal na ti­ra­no at ma­pa­nu­pil na mga pwer­sang pan­se­gu­ri­dad ng mga kum­pan­ya sa pag­mi­mi­na at plan­ta­syo­n. Ipa­tu­pad ang mga pa­ta­ka­ran sa pa­nga­nga­la­ga ng ka­pa­li­gi­ran, ka­bi­lang yaong su­ma­sa­kop sa ope­ra­syon ng mga ne­go­syo at empre­sa pa­ra ti­ya­kin ang ka­pa­ka­nan ng ba­yan.

9. Bi­gu­in ang Oplan Ka­pa­ya­pa­an at ang kam­pan­yang pa­si­pi­ka­syon at pag­pa­pa­su­ren­der ng re­hi­meng Du­ter­te. Akti­bong la­ba­nan ang kam­pan­ya ng kaa­way ng ar­ma­dong pa­nu­nu­pil. Pa­ru­sa­han ang mga pa­sis­ta at kri­mi­nal sa li­kod ng mga ekstra­hu­di­syal na pa­ma­mas­lang, ili­gal na pag-a­res­to at pag­ku­ku­long, pag­hu­hu­log ng bom­ba, pa­nga­ngan­yon, pwersahang pagpapabakwit o ham­let­ting, oku­pa­syon ng mga eskwe­la­han, ba­ra­ngay hall, day ca­re at iba pang istruk­tu­rang si­bil­yan.

10. Su­por­ta­han ang ne­go­sa­syong pang­ka­pay­pa­ang GRP-NDFP. Pa­ki­lu­sin ang ba­yan pa­ra itu­lak ang pi­na­bi­lis na usa­pang pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an at pa­ra sa pag­pir­ma sa CASER at CAPCR sa ka­sa­lu­ku­yang taon. La­ba­nan ang lin­ya ng pag­ta­ta­pos ng ar­ma­dong tung­ga­li­an sa pa­ma­ma­gi­tan ng ma­ta­ga­lang ti­gil-pu­tu­kan at pag­pa­pa­su­ren­der sa mga re­bo­lu­syo­nar­yong pwer­sa na wa­lang ka­sund­u­an sa ki­na­kai­la­ngang sus­tan­ti­bong re­por­mang so­syo­-e­ko­no­mi­ko at pu­li­ti­kal.

Ha­bang may ti­gil-pu­tu­kang uni­la­te­ral o bi­la­te­ral, da­pat ipag­pa­tu­loy ng BHB ang mga tung­ku­lin ni­tong iti­nak­da ng de­mok­ra­ti­kong gub­yer­nong ba­yan pa­ra ipag­tang­gol ang ka­pa­ya­pa­an at pa­nga­la­ga­an ang ba­yan. Da­pat mi­li­tan­teng ipa­tu­pad ni­to ang ak­ti­bong de­pen­sa la­ban sa mga yu­nit ng reak­syu­nar­yong ar­ma­dong pwer­sa na nag­sa­sa­ga­wa ng mga ope­ra­syong pang­kom­bat la­ban sa BHB at ar­ma­dong pag­su­pil sa ba­yan.

Pag­han­da­an ang po­si­bi­li­dad na hu­man­tong ang ne­go­sa­syong pang­ka­pa­ya­pa­an ng GRP-NDF sa mga ka­sun­du­an sa sus­tan­ti­bong pan­li­pu­nan, pang-e­ko­nom­ya at pam­pu­li­ti­kang re­por­ma at po­si­bi­li­dad ng al­yan­sa o ang ka­ba­lig­ta­ran ni­to. Mag­han­dang mag­sil­bing ta­ga­pa­tu­pad ng re­por­ma sa lu­pa at iba pang prog­ra­ma. Anu­pa­man ang ka­la­ba­san, hin­di kai­lan­man da­pat mag­lu­wag ang ka­pit ng mga Pu­lang man­di­rig­ma ng BHB sa ka­ni­lang mga san­da­ta.

[Ang Bayan is the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Ang Bayan is published in Pilipino, Bisaya, Hiligaynon, Waray and English. Download Ang Bayan from the Philippine Revolution Web Central at Ang Bayan is published fortnightly by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines.]