Saturday, November 2, 2019

US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2018: Chapter 1 – Country Reports on Terrorism: East Asia and Pacific

Excerpt from the US Department of State Country Reports on Terrorism 2018 (Nov 1, 2019): Chapter 1 – Country Reports on Terrorism: East Asia and Pacific

OVERVIEW

In 2018, governments in East Asia and the Pacific continued to work to strengthen legal frameworks, investigate, and prosecute terrorism cases, increase regional cooperation and information sharing, and address critical border and aviation security gaps. Regional cooperation between domestic law enforcement and judicial authorities among countries throughout Southeast Asia resulted in high numbers of terrorism-related arrests and, in many cases, successful prosecutions.

The region was shocked by the May 2018 attack in Surabaya, Indonesia, when entire families, including women and children, committed suicide bombings against security forces and churches. Southeast Asian governments remained concerned about FTFs returning from Iraq or Syria and using their operational skills, connections, and experience to launch attacks.

East Asian countries actively participated in regional and international efforts to counter terrorism. Australia, Fiji, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Taiwan are partners in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Australia, China, Indonesia, Japan, and New Zealand are members of the GCTF. As co-chairs of the GCTF CVE Working Group, Australia and Indonesia organized an annual plenary meeting and a number of CVE-related workshops.

China’s efforts focused primarily on “extremists” whom Beijing ascribes to the so-called East Turkistan Islamic Movement, despite a lack of independent evidence that a group by that name is still active. Using counterterrorism as a pretext, the Chinese Communist Party arbitrarily detained more than one million Uighurs, ethnic Kazakhs, and other members of Muslim minority groups in camps in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.
COUNTRIES: EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

Australia
China
Indonesia
Malaysia
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand

AUSTRALIA

Overview: In 2018, Australia strengthened counterterrorism laws, investigated and disrupted suspected terrorist plots, and maintained high levels of cooperation with the United States and other international partners. Australia played a major role in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS and was a leading contributor to the Coalition’s military support, humanitarian assistance, and efforts to disrupt FTFs.  Australia also played a major role in the GCTF as co-chair of its CVE Working Group. In May, the Australian Parliament passed legislation to finalize the functions and responsibilities of Australia’s new Department of Home Affairs, its most significant domestic security and law enforcement reform in decades. At the end of 2018, Australia’s National Terrorism Threat Advisory System remained at “Probable,” the third-highest level on a five-level scale.

Australia focused on counterterrorism threats in Southeast Asia through capacity-building programs that thwart terrorist travel; effectively manage incarcerated terrorists; stabilize the southern Philippines, including Marawi City; and counter the financing of terrorism.

Other chief concerns included FTFs returning to Australia and the role of social media in inspiring terrorist radicalization.  Australian security agencies estimate that about 230 Australian citizens have traveled to Iraq and Syria since 2012. The government estimates that approximately 100 remain in conflict areas, 40 have returned to Australia, and between 90 and 94 Australian FTFs have died in the conflict zone.

Australian officials are aware of approximately 70 children who traveled with their parents to ISIS-controlled areas or were born in such areas. Since 2016, state and territory governments have analyzed how best to balance the security risks returnees might pose with the humanitarian need to reintegrate them back into Australian society and provide needed support.

Since September 2014, Australian counterterrorism authorities have disrupted 15 terrorism plots domestically, and cautioned that a major terrorist event in Australia is “inevitable.”

In 2018, the United States worked closely with Australia to identify and develop new capabilities that meet a wide variety of requirements for countering terrorist threats. Through a cost-sharing bilateral relationship, both countries advanced their technical ability to defeat or mitigate the evolving capabilities of terrorists and criminal organizations. The United States and Australia also worked closely on capacity-building efforts in Southeast Asia.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: Australia experienced two terrorist-related attacks, both in Melbourne. In February, a Bangladeshi woman traveling on a student visa stabbed and injured her landlord. Australian authorities reported that the woman was inspired and motivated by ISIS’s extremist ideology, going so far as to obtain a student visa and move to Australia to commit this attack. Having admitted her intention in court to “trigger the West” after a failed attempt to travel and fight in Syria, she faces charges of engaging in a terrorist act and attempted murder. In November, a Somalia-born man stabbed three pedestrians, killing one, before he was fatally shot by police. While ISIS claimed responsibility, police called it a lone-offender terror attack. The attacker was known to Australian intelligence and law enforcement for his radical views and family and social ties to other terrorists.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Australia continued to apply its comprehensive counterterrorism legislation against domestic threats and passed additional legislation to strengthen national security protections. In May, the Australian Parliament passed legislation to finalize implementation of its new Department of Home Affairs, a process that began in July 2017. The new department combines federal law enforcement, national and transportation security, criminal justice, emergency management, multicultural affairs, and immigration- and border-related functions from various agencies. The Home Affairs portfolio includes the Australian Border Force (ABF), the Australian Security Intelligence Organization, the Australian Criminal Intelligence Commission, the Australian Federal Police, and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC).

In November 2018, Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced Australia would further amend the Australian Citizenship Act of 2007 to lower the threshold requirements for dual citizens convicted of terrorism offenses to lose their Australian citizenship. To date, between nine and 12 dual citizens have been stripped of their citizenship under Australia’s citizenship cessation legislation. Prime Minister Morrison also announced the government’s intention to introduce a Temporary Exclusion Order scheme to prevent Australians involved in overseas terrorism-related activities from returning to Australia for up to two years.

Significant law enforcement actions in 2018 included the following:
  • In January, authorities coordinated closely with Turkish counterparts to issue 20 arrest warrants for Australians who traveled to the Middle East to fight with ISIS.
  • In June, an Australian man was arrested for planning terrorist acts and preparing for a foreign incursion.
  • In November, authorities arrested three men for planning an ISIS-inspired mass casualty attack.
Australia’s border security remained robust and the country continued to promote international cooperation on information sharing to thwart terrorist travel. In August, Australia’s Department of Home Affairs hosted the Five Country Ministerial, where senior security officials from Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the United States, and the United Kingdom discussed persistent and emerging threats.  Since 2012, an estimated 240 Australian passports have been canceled in relation to the Iraq and Syria conflict, including reviews of respective domestic procedures for releasing data about watchlisted individuals in order to promote the relevant and timely disclosure of actionable information. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the Australian Department of Home Affairs also made progress with operational plans for a limited Global Entry pilot and an international expedited traveler initiative.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Australia is a member of the FATF and co-chairs the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Australia’s FIU is a member of the Egmont Group and Australia chairs or co-chairs the Egmont Group’s Information Exchange Working Group.

Australia remained a regional and global leader in countering terrorist financing. In June, Australia’s largest bank was fined AUD 533 million (US $378.8 million) for serious and systemic breaches of AML/CFT laws. In its settlement, Commonwealth Bank admitted the late filing of more than 53,000 reports of transactions exceeding AUD 10,000 (US $7,100), failure to properly monitor transactions on more than 778,000 bank accounts, failure to perform checks on 80 suspicious customers, and late or missing suspicious matter report filing for 149 cases. AUSTRAC said it suspected “significant further undetected money laundering through Commonwealth Bank accounts.” Australia and Thailand co-hosted the fourth regional Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit in Bangkok, attended by more than 350 representatives from 31 countries. At the summit, AUSTRAC announced it would post its first financial intelligence analyst to Guangzhou to work more closely with China’s FIU.

Australia cooperated closely with the United States on terrorist designations and implemented its obligations to restrict terrorism financing, including funding to terrorist groups operating in Syria and Iraq, as well as freezing assets.

Countering Violent Extremism: The Department of Home Affairs, the lead coordinator for national CVE efforts, remained focused on four overlapping streams that emphasize diversity and social participation, target work with vulnerable communities and institutions, address online terrorist propaganda, and assist diversion and de-radicalization. In July, the Victoria State Government hosted the third annual Strong Cities Network Global Summit. Additionally, Australia is a donor to GCERF and actively promotes GCERF activities globally.

Australia is active in the GCTF and co-chairs the GCFT CVE Working Group with Indonesia. In February, the co-chairs organized a workshop on monitoring, measuring, and evaluating CVE programs. In October, the co-chairs organized a workshop on CVE in prisons. Finally, in December, the CVE Working Group held its annual plenary session in Melbourne and a workshop exploring issues of gender and extremism that included government and civil society actors from across Southeast Asia. At the GCTF Coordinating Committee meeting in September, Australia announced that it would partner with Switzerland and the United Kingdom to create a policy toolkit on the Zurich-London Recommendations that outline good practices for CVE and terrorist recruitment online.

International and Regional Cooperation: Australia is a member of the UN, the GCTF, the Pacific Island Forum, the East Asia Summit, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum, and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. Australia chaired the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group from 2017 to 2018.

At the eighth Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, which convened in August, Australia pledged to cooperate with the United States and Japan to counter the terrorism financing, combat the flow of FTFs, and increase cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. In March, Australia signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ASEAN outlining cooperation on counterterrorism, including law enforcement cooperation, capacity building, and technical assistance.

CHINA (HONG KONG AND MACAU)

Overview: China’s response to terrorism remained difficult to distinguish from the government’s suppression of peaceful activities that authorities deemed separatist or subversive in nature. China’s primary counterterrorism focus remained on ethnic Uighur so-called “extremists” whom Beijing ascribes to the East Turkistan Islamic Movement. Using counterterrorism as a pretext, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has detained more than one million Uighurs and members of other Muslim minority groups in camps in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) since 2017. More than two million others have been subjected to political indoctrination in daytime facilities. China also developed new legal guidelines and law enforcement tools to justify and improve its capabilities to carry out this repressive campaign, which included pervasive, arbitrary, high-tech surveillance; the collection of personal data, including DNA samples; compulsory stays by Chinese government officials in Uighur homes; and controls on the expression of cultural or religious observations. Additionally, China has continued to misuse the INTERPOL Red Notice system, which is intended to flag travelers and request that member states provisionally arrest individuals pending extradition. As recently as 2017, China issued INTERPOL Red Notices to target Uighur activists or political dissidents who had not engaged in violence, but were accused of involvement in terrorism.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: Details about alleged terrorism-related incidents inside China were difficult to verify due to a lack of transparency and information from Chinese authorities. China also impeded U.S. diplomatic, law enforcement, and third-party efforts to independently verify state media accounts, which are often the only source of reporting on incidents in China. In addition, Chinese officials provided few responses to requests from U.S. law enforcement officials for information on terrorist incidents. In a notable shift from previous years, China announced that no violent terrorist incidents occurred in the XUAR in 2018 owing to “new counter-extremism policies,” – thus publicly justifying Beijing’s repressive campaign in Xinjiang.

Chinese citizens abroad were targeted in terrorism-related incidents in 2018. The Baloch Liberation Army claimed responsibility for a string of attacks in Pakistan linked to the Chinese Pakistan Economic Corridor and its infrastructure. In August, a suicide bomber targeted a bus carrying Chinese engineers in Balochistan province. In November, Balochistan separatists attacked the Chinese consulate in Karachi and killed four Pakistani citizens.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In June, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Supreme People’s Court, Ministry of Public Security, and Ministry of Justice issued joint guidelines on legal procedures and penalty standards for terrorism crimes, including aiding or preparing terrorist activities. The guidelines clarified that wearing clothes or symbols that advocate terrorism or extremism, and individuals who write, publish, broadcast, or advocate terrorism-related content online are criminally liable. In October, the XUAR regional government amended existing regulations to state that authorities can use “vocational skills training centers” to “de-radicalize” people suspected of extremism. Satellite imagery analysis, eyewitness accounts, and human rights groups document the use of razor wire, guard towers, and single points of egress consistent with imprisonment. Previous rules made no reference to vocational centers and the change retroactively provided legal cover for the mass detention of Uighurs and other minorities in the XUAR that began in 2017. In November, official media reported that the XUAR and Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region governments pledged closer “counterterrorism stability maintenance” cooperation and signed an agreement regarding counterterrorism cooperation and the management of Xinjiang residents studying in Ningxia. International media reports also began to emerge regarding the mass transfer of Uighurs to China’s interior due to overcrowding at the camps, and described draconian detention conditions in the facilities including torture and deaths.

In 2018, the CCP made several changes to the People’s Armed Police (PAP), a paramilitary organization that deploys both domestically and internationally for counterterrorism efforts. On January 1, the Central Military Commission assumed sole authority to command the PAP. On March 21, the CCP’s Central Committee announced changes designed to deepen the militarization and professionalization of the PAP, in part by moving several of its purely civilian functions to other government ministries.

The Chinese government continued to leverage its domestic technology sector to bolster its surveillance capabilities. Police continued to deepen use of closed-circuit television camera networks paired with facial recognition, iris scanning, and other technologies to track, discover, or predict threats to public safety across the country and most extensively in the XUAR. Although such technology has been used to catch criminal actors, it is also used to monitor and control domestic dissidents and ethnic and religious minorities. The government also continued to stress the threat of both domestic and international “cyber terrorism,” as it continued to tighten monitoring and censorship of online speech and mobile communications.

In May, member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) – China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – agreed to an extradition treaty on the basis of terrorism charges, which China could potentially use to extradite minority Uighurs on purported “terrorism” charges from SCO member countries. In 2018, China continued to pressure Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among other countries, to deport Uighurs to China.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: China is a member of the FATF, the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EAG). Based on current law enforcement investigations, the United States is concerned that China does not adequately control terrorist financing. Chinese law enforcement claims to have limited ability to freeze funds and investigate banking transactions. Additional concerns include a lack of guidance for designated non-financial businesses and professions, underdeveloped procedures for individuals and groups who seek to be delisted from domestic sanctions, and inadequate regulations defining the rights of bona fide third parties in seizure and confiscation actions.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: China continued to implement broad campaigns in the XUAR under the guise of countering what the Chinese government called “extremism.” Authorities intensified a campaign of mass “re-education” or “vocational training” of Uighurs and other Muslims, which began in April 2017 with the purported goal of countering “extremism,” but whose actual goal the United States assesses to be the repression of religious minorities. Uighurs, Kazakhs, and other Muslims are reportedly forced to learn Chinese, recite slogans in praise of the CCP, and renounce their culture and religion. Authorities implemented pervasive controls throughout the XUAR that punish Uighurs and other Muslims for displaying signs of “extremism” that included such peaceful and mainstream practices as praying, growing long beards, traveling to Muslim-majority countries, possessing unauthorized religious texts or written materials in minority languages, and refusing to consume pork or alcohol. Chinese officials also mobilized Chinese civilians and officials to occupy the homes of Uighurs and other Muslims in the XUAR through “home stays” to monitor, indoctrinate, and in some cases, abuse them. The government’s broad definitions of “terrorism” and “extremism” and its unclear definition of “cyber terrorism” continued to raise human rights concerns. We refer you to the Department of State’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for further information.

Regional and International Cooperation: China continued to promote the UN as the primary international forum for counterterrorism while increasing its engagement in other multilateral, regional, and bilateral fora. In April, Brazil, China, India, Russia, and South Africa held their third Counterterrorism Working Group meeting. China continued to participate in the Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism for Counter Terrorism, along with Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Tajikistan and sought to present itself as a global leader on counterterrorism. In May, 28 countries sent representatives to attend the PAP’s biennial Great Wall International Forum on Counterterrorism. In June, the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure conducted its first legal experts meeting in Pakistan. In August, China and other SCO member states conducted a joint counterterrorism military exercise in Russia that included more than 3,000 participating troops. Beijing also pursued bilateral counterterrorism cooperation with Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan, including agreeing to support the development of an Afghan mountain brigade that would combat terrorists in eastern Afghanistan. China is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional Forum, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and East Asia Summit, and it is also a member of the GCTF.

Hong Kong

Hong Kong continued its security and law enforcement partnership with the United States through the Hong Kong Customs and Excise Department’s joint implementation of the Container Security Initiative and participation in U.S.-sponsored training on port and border security. In October and November, Hong Kong underwent a FATF mutual evaluation review.

No terrorist incidents were reported in Hong Kong in 2018.

Counterterrorism remained an operational priority for the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF). The Police Counterterrorism Response Unit provides a strong deterrent presence. It assists police districts with counterterrorism strategy implementation and complements the tactical and professional support of existing police specialist units, such as the Explosive Ordnance Disposal Bureau, the Special Duties Unit, the Airport Security Unit, and the VIP Protection Unit.

In April, the Hong Kong government stood up the Inter-departmental Counterterrorism Unit to strengthen overall counterterrorism efforts by monitoring global trends, reviewing and improving counterterrorism strategies in Hong Kong, developing specialized counterterrorism training, and optimizing emergency response plans.

Hong Kong is a member of the intergovernmental FATF and the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Hong Kong’s Joint Financial Intelligence Unit is a member of the Egmont Group. Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Hong Kong, and financial institutions are required to search continuously for terrorist financing networks. They must also screen accounts using designations lists made publicly available by the United States under relevant authorities, as well as the UNSC 1267 ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida and 1988 (Afghanistan/Taliban) Sanctions Committees’ lists. In March, Hong Kong operationalized two laws to strengthen its ability to counter terrorism financing. The first law placed customer due diligence and record-keeping requirements on numerous designated non-financial businesses and professions, including trust company and service providers (TCSPs). The second required TCSPs to pass a fit and proper test before obtaining a license from the Companies Registry. In July, a law imposing reporting requirements for cross-border currency movements over US $15,385 went into effect.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Hong Kong law enforcement officers attended U.S. government-sponsored capacity-building training at the International Law Enforcement Academy on personnel and facility security, law enforcement techniques to counter terrorism, and financial investigations.  In 2018, a HKPF officer participated in a counterterrorism-focused International Visitor Leadership Program in the United States. In December, the Inter-departmental Counterterrorism Unit visited Xinjiang to evaluate mainland China’s counterterrorism response in that province. Hong Kong is also an APEC economy.

Macau

Macau’s counterterrorism cooperation with the United States included information sharing. The Police Intervention Tactical Unit (UTIP), which falls under the Macau Public Security Police Force, is responsible for protecting important installations and dignitaries and conducting high-risk missions, such as improvised explosive device deactivation. UTIP’s Special Operations Group’s mission is counterterrorism operations. Macau cooperated internationally on counterterrorism efforts through INTERPOL and other security-focused organizations.

No terrorist incidents were reported in Macau in 2018.

Macau is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Macau’s Financial Intelligence Office (FIO) is a member of the Egmont Group. In response to FATF recommendations, Macau established a declaration and disclosure system to detect cross-boundary movement of large quantities of currency and bearer negotiable instruments. Macau has not yet brought criminal charges on offenders based on two laws that went into effect in May 2017 that widened the scope of identifiable criminal offenses and strengthened customer due diligence measures. In October, the Government of Macau moved responsibility for its FIO from the Secretary for Economy and Finance to the Secretary for Security, to reinforce Macau’s law enforcement efforts.

Terrorist financing is a criminal offense in Macau. Banks and other financial institutions are required to search continuously for terrorist financing networks and screen accounts using designations lists provided by the United States under relevant authorities and the UN Security Council ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime. Filing suspicious transactions reports irrespective of transaction amounts is obligatory.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

In 2018, the FIO signed separate memoranda of understanding/cooperation for exchange of AML/CFT intelligence with their counterparts in the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Estonia, and the Kyrgyz Republic.

INDONESIA

Overview: Indonesia applied sustained pressure to detect, disrupt, and degrade terrorist groups operating within its borders and deny them safe haven. ISIS-affiliated Jamaah Ansharut Daulah (JAD) and its offshoots continued to target police and other symbols of state authority. While not a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, the Indonesian government and Muslim civil society leaders forcefully and repeatedly denounced ISIS and actively promoted a “soft approach” to CVE to complement “hard” law enforcement counterterrorism efforts. Indonesia is an active member of the GCTF and co-chairs the group’s CVE Working Group with Australia. The Indonesian, Malaysian, and Philippines’ militaries continued coordinated patrols in the Sulu and Sulawesi Seas to deter and prevent kidnapping and terrorist transit in their adjoining exclusive economic zones. In May, a series of suicide bombings in Surabaya prompted Indonesia to amend legislation to strengthen law enforcement’s counterterrorism capabilities.

In September 2018, the United States and Indonesia signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to strengthen and expand cooperation on counterterrorism, to include the exchange of information on known and suspected terrorists.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: JAD predominantly targeted police throughout the year. From May 8-10, JAD-linked prisoners killed five police officers during a riot and subsequent hostage standoff at a Police Mobile Brigade (BRIMOB) pre-trial detention facility near Jakarta. From May 13-14, a JAD cell consisting of three families, including children, committed a series of coordinated suicide bombings in Surabaya targeting three churches and Surabaya Police Headquarters. The bombings resulted in 25 fatalities, including 13 attackers, and 57 injured persons. One terrorist family accidentally detonated a bomb in their apartment before their planned attack, killing two bombers and wounding three others. The Surabaya bombings marked the first time entire families, including children, committed suicide bombings in Indonesia.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: In May, lawmakers passed an amendment to the 2003 Law on Combating Criminal Acts of Terrorism, which strengthened and expanded existing counterterrorism provisions. The amendment criminalizes extraterritorial fighting, preparatory acts, and material support for terrorism, and extends the detention period to gather evidence and build a case. The amendment also states that the Indonesian military will have a role in counterterrorism operations that should be clarified in a presidential regulation by May 2019. It mandated the Indonesian National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) to formulate national counterterrorism policy, coordinate counterterrorism-related law enforcement, and implement national awareness of counterterrorism strategies and de-radicalization campaigns.

Indonesian law enforcement agencies were increasingly able to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist attacks. The elite police counterterrorism force, Detachment 88, and BRIMOB lead counterterrorism investigations and operations. Terrorism prosecutions usually resulted in convictions. On June 22, an Indonesian court sentenced JAD figure Aman Abdurrahman to death for inciting others to commit at least five terrorist attacks in Indonesia, including the 2016 Thamrin attacks and the 2017 Kampung Melayu bombing. The South Jakarta District Court indicted JAD as a terrorist organization on July 24 – the first time an organization and not just an individual was charged – and officially banned JAD on July 31. Prison sentences tended to be short, with some exceptions. Corrections officials took steps to improve terrorist prisoner management. A drastic increase in the numbers of arrests and convictions has created additional pressure on overcrowded prisons. The Government of Indonesia is building a new super-maximum prison on Nusa Kambangan Island in Central Java.

From May to December, police arrested more than 370 terrorist suspects and convicted 150. The Indonesian Attorney General’s Office Directorate of Terrorism and Transnational Crimes are prosecuting criminal cases. Trials for all terrorist suspects take place in Jakarta district courts, regardless of where in Indonesia the act of terrorism occurred.

Border security remained a challenge. The Customs and Excise Directorate General, which collects API and PNR data to screen travelers, continued to struggle with passenger targeting, analysis, management systems, and high-level management turnover. Police maintained a watchlist of suspected terrorists, but lines of communication and coordination among stakeholder agencies were not always clear. Indonesia’s Immigration Directorate General used INTERPOL databases to expand screening of international passengers at key immigration checkpoints in airports and seaports but relies on the Customs Excise Directorate General for access to API/PNR.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Indonesia is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Indonesia’s FIU, the Indonesian Financial Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (PPATK), is a member of the Egmont Group. In July, the APG released a generally positive mutual evaluation review (MER) of Indonesia’s financial system based on compliance with FATF’s 40 recommendations. Indonesia was recently afforded observer status in FATF and is on track toward gaining full membership, pending the results of an upcoming FATF MER.

Indonesia’s Counterterrorist Financing Law (9/2013) criminalized money laundering and terrorist financing and authorizes terrorist asset freezing pursuant to UNSCRs. Indonesia has prosecuted and convicted individuals for financing terrorism. In November, PPATK and the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Center (AUSTRAC), in partnership with Thailand’s Anti-Money Laundering Office, hosted the fourth Regional Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit in Bangkok. Indonesia and the Philippines signed an MOU on the prevention of money laundering and terrorism financing, aligning Indonesia’s AML/CFT efforts with FATF guidelines.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: BNPT continued its work on a draft CVE National Action Plan for anticipated release as a Presidential executive order. The National Action Plan will coordinate CVE efforts of 36 ministries, institutions, and civil society organizations. BNPT also managed de-radicalization programs for terrorist convicts. Indonesians deported from third countries for attempted travel to Iraq and Syria were enrolled in a one-month de-radicalization program at a rehabilitation shelter operated by the Ministry of Social Affairs in Bambu Apus, East Jakarta. BNPT used former terrorists for CVE outreach campaigns and helped establish religious boarding schools for children of former terrorists, to prevent their radicalization.

International and Regional Cooperation: Indonesia continued to support counterterrorism efforts in several regional and multilateral organizations, including the UN, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Indonesia remained active in the ARF Inter-Sessional Meetings on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime and the APEC Counter-Terrorism Working Group. At an October 19 meeting, ASEAN Defense Ministers agreed to adopt Indonesia’s “Our Eyes” initiative to improve strategic information sharing on counterterrorism among Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

Indonesia is a member of the GCTF and co-chairs the GCTF CVE Working Group with Australia. In February, the GCTF CVE Working Group co-chairs organized a workshop on theoretical frameworks, dimensions, and considerations in designing and implementing national monitoring, measuring, and evaluation frameworks and practices. In October, the CVE Working Group co-chairs organized a workshop on CVE in prisons. They also convened their annual plenary meeting as well as a workshop in December exploring gender and CVE issues that included government and civil society actors from across Southeast Asia. In May, Indonesia hosted the Southeast Asia regional GCTF event on Addressing Challenges of Returning Families of FTFs. Indonesia continued to use the Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation as a regional training center.

MALAYSIA

Overview: Although there were no ISIS-affiliated attacks in Malaysia in 2018, the country remained a source, transit point, and, to a significantly lesser extent, destination country for terrorist groups including ISIS, Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), al-Qa’ida, and Jemaah Islamiya. Suspected ISIS supporters deported from Turkey and individuals planning to travel to the southern Philippines to support ISIS-affiliated groups used Malaysia as a transit point. Malaysia monitored, arrested, deported, and tried suspected supporters of terrorist groups. Malaysia also cooperated with the United States and others to increase border security capacity at airports and in the Sulu Sea, to counter terrorist messaging on social media, and to improve terrorist prosecutions. The national elections in May resulted in the first transition of power since independence, and the new government pledged to review and potentially amend or repeal several pieces of legislation that govern how terrorist suspects are arrested, investigated, and detained. Malaysia is a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: After a lull in 2017 and much of 2018, Malaysian security forces thwarted a kidnapping-for-ransom attempt in Malaysian territorial waters in August. On September 11, two Indonesian fishermen were kidnaped off the coast of Semporna in Sabah state and later held by ASG militants in Sulu, Philippines with a US $1 million ransom demand. One of the fishermen reportedly escaped on December 6, but the other remained a hostage at year’s end. On September 20, two members of a kidnapping-for-ransom group, believed to be spotters for kidnapping activities, were killed in a shootout with Malaysian security forces on an island near the town of Kunak in Sabah state.  On December 5, three Malaysian crewmembers were kidnapped from a tugboat in Malaysian waters near Pegasus Reef, off the coast of Kinabatangan in Sabah state, and taken to the Philippines.  During the kidnapping, the captain of the vessel was shot in the leg.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: On November 30, the government lifted a moratorium it had recently imposed on several security laws, including those governing how terror suspects are arrested, investigated, and detained. The laws included the Prevention of Crime Act, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, the Sedition Act, and the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act. The laws were under formal review for potential repeal or revision to remove “elements of oppression.” However, a November 27 riot at a Hindu temple in Selangor sparked concern among officials about the potential threat to national security, public order, and race relations, if the laws were no longer available. Legislative amendments were not announced by year’s end, but officials said the legislation would only be used to protect those three areas of concern. Authorities, however, continued to use the Sedition Act against individuals who criticized the country’s royalty.

During the year, police arrested approximately 20 individuals in Sabah state who were allegedly involved in various terrorism-related activities, including smuggling militants into the southern Philippines, enabling kidnapping-for-ransom operations, recruiting children as militants and human shields, and participation in ASG-led beheadings.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: In February, Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), the central bank, issued a policy directive called the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Financing of Terrorism Policy for Digital Currencies (Sector 6). The directive aims to ensure that effective measures are in place against money laundering and terrorism financing risks associated with the use of digital currencies and to increase the transparency of digital currency activities in Malaysia. It requires all entities and persons who are involved in the exchange of digital currencies into money and vice versa, as well as the exchange of one digital currency for another, to register with BNM. The directive also requires the filing of reports pertaining to the identification and verification of customers and beneficial owners and the ongoing monitoring of customers’ transactions. Lastly, the new law establishes requirements for suspicious transaction reporting and record keeping.

In October, the FATF published its Third Enhanced Follow-up Report and Technical Compliance Re-Rating for Malaysia on AML/CFT measures. This report analyzed Malaysia’s progress in addressing technical compliance deficiencies identified in the mutual evaluation report. According to the report, as a result of Malaysia’s progress in strengthening its framework to tackle money laundering and terrorist financing since its 2015 mutual evaluation, the FATF has re-rated the country on four of the 40 recommendations, and found Malaysia to be compliant on all four, including on the “terrorist financing offense.”

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: In August 2018, the new government announced that the King Salman Center for International Peace, a former partnership with the Government of Saudi Arabia, would immediately cease operations and its functions would be absorbed by the Malaysian Institute for Defense and Security. The Global Movement of Moderates, an initiative started under the previous prime minister, announced it would cease operations as of July 31.

International and Regional Cooperation: Malaysia continued to support counterterrorism efforts in regional and multilateral organizations and participated in numerous counterterrorism events hosted by the UN, the GCTF, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the East Asia Summit. Malaysia hosted ASEAN’s Senior Officials’ Meeting on Transnational Crime, multiple UN workshops on preventing violent extremism, and an ARF workshop on countering online extreme messaging.

PHILIPPINES

Overview: Since defeating groups affiliated with ISIS at the siege of Marawi in 2017, the Philippine government has closely tracked terrorist groups that continue to operate in some areas, particularly in the southern Philippines. In 2018, the government further deepened close counterterrorism cooperation with the United States, enhancing military and law enforcement efforts to address the full spectrum of terrorist threats. The Philippine government acknowledged threats from terrorist groups affiliated with ISIS and welcomed assistance from the United States and other international partners. In 2018, the Philippines joined the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS.

Groups affiliated with ISIS-Philippines attempted to recover from losses sustained in the 2017 Marawi siege, recruiting and training new members and staging attacks with IEDs and small arms, and targeting security forces and civilians. Government counterterrorism operations thwarted these attempts to occupy territory in the Philippines. Overall, terrorist incidents declined compared with 2017. ISIS affiliates active in the Philippines in 2018 included parts of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), the Maute Group, Ansar al-Khalifa Philippines (AKP), and elements of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). The Philippines remained a destination for FTFs from Indonesia and Malaysia, and a potential destination for those fleeing Syria and Iraq.

The Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) made progress toward political settlement of long-running insurgencies. In July, the Philippine Congress passed, and President Duterte signed, the Bangsamoro Organic Law (also called the Bangsamoro Basic Law), to implement the previous administration’s peace agreement with the MILF. Some MILF fighters and breakaway groups, including BIFF, ASG, AKP, and the Maute Group, continued to oppose a peace agreement. The Communist Party of the Philippines/New People’s Army continued attacks on security forces and civilians and the government sustained military and law enforcement operations against the group.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: Terrorist attacks against civilians and security forces continued, though at a slower pace than the previous year. ISIS claimed that a German-Moroccan terrorist carried out a July 31 suicide VBIED attack in Lamitan, Basilan. The government linked the attack, which killed 10 people, to the ASG. It blamed radical factions of the BIFF, AKP, and remnants of the Maute Group for other terrorist attacks in Western Mindanao. The government held the BIFF responsible for IED attacks on civilian targets in Isulan, Sultan Kudarat on August 28 and September 2 that collectively killed six people and wounded more than 40. The ASG continued terrorist activities in the Sulu Archipelago, though defections from the group increased and Philippine media observed that the tempo of kidnapping-for-ransom operations declined.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: The country’s main counterterrorism legislation includes the 2007 Human Security Act (HSA) and the 2012 Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act. In 2018, the Government of the Philippines proposed amendments that would strengthen the HSA by covering preparatory acts and reducing administrative hurdles to terrorism prosecutions. These amendments were pending in Congress at the end of 2018.

Investments in personnel and training for the Philippine National Police’s (PNP) Special Action Force and other specialized police units resulted in improvements to law enforcement’s ability to detect, deter, and prevent terrorist acts. The government stepped up law enforcement and judicial responses to terrorism, detaining terrorism suspects, disrupting plots, continuing terrorism-related investigations and prosecutions, and securing the first trial conviction for terrorism charges under the HSA. A Philippine court granted a U.S. request for the extradition of Russell Salic to face charges stemming from his alleged involvement in a plot to attack New York City targets, though extradition was pending appeal at year’s end, as Salic faces prosecution in the Philippines on separate charges. In October, Philippine authorities detained a suspect allegedly involved in placing an IED near the U.S. Embassy in Manila in November 2016. The PNP continued to participate in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program and used the training and equipment received for post-blast investigations and other actions to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents.

The government worked towards compliance of UNSCR 2396, taking steps to curb terrorist travel. The Bureau of Immigration (BI) used deportation and exclusion against foreign nationals suspected of terrorist links. For example, the BI deported a suspected Egyptian ISIS commander in October. Although the BI screened against domestic and INTERPOL watchlists at ports of entry, additional capacity is needed to collect API and PNR. The Department of Foreign Affairs, National Bureau of Investigation, and Philippine Center for Transnational Crime worked with INTERPOL to enhance collection and reporting of lost and stolen passport information. Interagency information sharing further improved among Philippine law enforcement units and with international partners. The Philippines continues its efforts to increase aviation security capacity by procuring of advance screening technologies, additional training, strengthening oversight programs, information sharing, and closer collaboration with foreign partners. However, despite ongoing efforts by the United States and other international partners to meet international standards for security requirements at airports, the Manila International Airport continued to fail assessments. The U.S. Transportation Security Administration issued a public notice in December alerting travelers of the deficiencies.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: The Philippines is a member of the Asia/Pacific Group (APG) on Money Laundering, a FATF-style regional body. Its FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), is a member of the Egmont Group. The Philippines continued efforts to bring its banking controls up to international standards following a 2017 National Risk Assessment that identified key terrorism finance vulnerabilities. In November, President Duterte approved an executive order adopting a new National AML/CFT Strategy and establishing a National AML/CFT Coordinating Committee with AMLC as its secretariat, to facilitate interagency coordination on AML/CFT issues. The Joint Terrorist Financing Investigation Group continued to work with the United States to investigate suspected terrorist finance cases.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: The government continued efforts to finalize a CVE National Action Plan that will outline a whole-of-government strategy. Various government agencies developed and implemented CVE training for security forces and civil servants. Local governments, civil society, and the private sector partnered to mitigate conflicts, build social cohesion, expand opportunities for youth, and address other drivers of terrorist radicalization. The Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) worked with local stakeholders to encourage defections from the ASG, BIFF, and the Maute Group, and to rehabilitate former fighters. The government also supported strategic communications efforts to counter terrorist messaging, using AFP-supported media to highlight a May declaration against terrorism by a group of Philippine imams. The AFP and the PNP both have nascent counter-messaging operations.

International and Regional Cooperation: The Philippine navy continued joint patrols with its Indonesian and Malaysian counterparts under a June 2017 trilateral arrangement to combat piracy, terrorism, and the illegal drug trade. The Philippines joined other Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) members in supporting the “Our Eyes” initiative to enhance the regional exchange of terrorism information. The Philippines continues to support counterterrorism efforts as a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation.

SINGAPORE

Overview: Singapore continued to identify counterterrorism as the nation’s top security policy priority and developed a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy based on global and regional trends. This strategy includes vigilant security measures, regional and international law enforcement cooperation, counter-radicalization efforts, and a campaign to prepare the populace for possible attacks. Singapore was a committed, active, and effective counterterrorism partner in 2018.

Counterterrorism remained a pillar of the non-defense security relationship between Singaporean and U.S. law enforcement and security services. The levels of cooperation in recent years on counterterrorism efforts and expanded information sharing continued in 2018. Singapore’s domestic counterterrorism apparatus and its ability to detect, deter, and disrupt threats remained effective. Singapore has been a member of the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS since 2014, expanding its support in 2016 to also include medical teams and a counterterrorism-training unit in 2018. Singapore was the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) chair for 2018, and hosted East Asia Summit and related meetings in November 2018.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: There were no terrorist incidents reported in Singapore in 2018.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Singapore uses its Internal Security Act (ISA) to arrest and detain suspected terrorists. The ISA authorizes the Minister for Home Affairs (MHA), with the president’s consent, to order arrest and detention without warrant if it determines that a person poses a threat to national security. The initial detention may be for up to two years, and the MHA may renew the Detention Order for an unlimited period (in increments of up to two years at a time), with the president’s consent. Alternatively, the government can issue a Restriction Order limiting a person’s international travel and changes of residence or employment without government approval. ISA cases are subject to review by the courts to ensure strict compliance with procedural requirements under the act.

Singapore’s existing legal framework, in conjunction with the ISA, provides the government the necessary tools to support the investigation and prosecution of terrorism offenses. Parliament passed the Public Order and Safety (Special Powers) Act in March, granting the government new authority to shut down communications networks and ban the public from taking photos and videos of a “serious incident.”

The Government of Singapore maintains a “not if, but when” stance regarding the likelihood of terrorist attacks within the city-state. The government’s SGSecure public awareness campaign, launched in 2016 to improve emergency preparedness, promote security awareness, and build national resiliency continued with additional police drills and exercises in schools and workplaces to prepare community and religious groups for “maintaining social cohesion” in the aftermath of an attack. The SGSecure smartphone app broadcasts official alerts during major emergencies and enables users to report incidents and request help from authorities.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Singapore has maintained an Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Industry Partnership (ACIP) since 2017. The ACIP is a joint initiative between the Monetary Authority of Singapore and the Commercial Affairs Department of the Singapore Police Force, with the goal of bringing together relevant government agencies and private sector participants to strengthen the country’s capabilities to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. In November, Singapore’s parliament passed the “Serious Crimes and Counter-Terrorism (Miscellaneous Amendments) Bill” to amend and update the existing Terrorism (Suppression of Financing) Act. The amendments include increased penalties for violations of Singapore’s AML/CFT laws and regulations; enhancements to Singapore’s ability to prosecute cases involving overseas AML/CFT violations, as well as cases involving the use of money mules; and an explicit prohibition against financing travel for terrorist training.

Countering Violent Extremism: Through entities such as the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) and the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), Singapore serves as a regional CVE hub. The ICPVTR conducts research, training, and outreach programs aimed at understanding the causes of radicalization and formulating practical rehabilitation programs. The government also encourages inter-religious and inter-ethnic dialogue through Interracial and Religious Confidence Circles and the inter-agency Aftercare Group, local community forums that bring leaders from Singapore’s religious and ethnic communities together to discuss issues of concern and build trust.

The government believes in building regional CVE capacity and highlighted opportunities for constructive engagement for those concerned with the conflict in Syria and Iraq, such as promoting legitimate charities that work to ease suffering in conflict zones. The Islamic Religious Council of Singapore (MUIS), the Islamic authority in charge of Muslim affairs, maintains a Facebook presence and holds outreach and educational events to counter terrorist propaganda and recruitment efforts. MUIS manages the Asatizah Recognition Scheme that vets Islamic religious teachers and scholars in Singapore.

Singapore’s RRG, a volunteer organization, has had success in counseling detainees held under the Internal Security Act. The comprehensive program includes religious and psychological counseling and involves the detainee’s family and community. In 2016, the RRG launched a smart phone app designed to counter extremist narratives by providing users with opportunities to ask questions and have conversations with RRG imams and counselors.

International and Regional Cooperation: Singapore is an active participant in ASEAN, the ASEAN Regional Forum, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and is a member of the “Our Eyes” regional intelligence sharing initiative. Singapore participated in the June UN High-Level Conference of Heads of Counterterrorism Agencies of Member States in New York. In October, as ASEAN chair, Singapore hosted the 2018 Southeast Asia Counter-Terrorism Symposium examining collective approaches to counterterrorism that included representatives from ASEAN Member States’ Ministries of Defense and national police forces, nongovernmental organizations working on countering and preventing violent extremism, and social media companies. Singapore also hosted the East Asia Summit (EAS) and U.S.-ASEAN Summit in November, which endorsed a Singapore-sponsored EAS Statement on “Smart Cities.” Although not a member, Singapore is an active participant in GCTF efforts and hosted a regional workshop on the nexus between transnational organized crime and terrorism.

THAILAND

Overview: Thailand experienced no attacks attributed to transnational terrorist groups in 2018 and violence was heavily restricted to attacks by ethno-nationalist insurgents in the country’s restive southern region. The number of terrorist incidents in the Deep South (the southernmost provinces of Narathiwat, Pattani, parts of Songkhla, and Yala) in 2018 was the lowest since the conflict reignited in 2004. Although Thai security officials remain concerned about the potential for ISIS to infiltrate domestic insurgent groups, Thai security officials have maintained that there is no evidence to date of any operational linkages between these domestic groups and international terrorism networks. Given the high volume of travelers through Bangkok’s main airport, an available market of illegal goods, and relatively weak banking oversight, Thailand’s principal vulnerability to international terrorism continues to be as a transit and facilitation hub. Thailand remained a productive counterterrorism partner, though the Thai government continues to focus on domestic political challenges as its primary security priority.

2018 Terrorist Incidents: The number of insurgent attacks and related fatalities decreased from 2017 and attacks were mostly confined to Thailand’s southernmost provinces. Methods primarily included shootings, arson, IEDs, and VBIEDS, although a series of landmine attacks represented a divergence from these typical tactics.

In January, a motorcycle bomb exploded at a market in Yala province’s Mueang district killing three people and injuring 18 others.

In February, three districts of Pattani province were hit by a series of bomb attacks, injuring six people but causing no fatalities. According to media reports, six bombs exploded and six others were defused by Thai authorities.

In May, insurgents used small IEDs to launch a series of coordinated attacks across all four provinces of the Deep South, wounding at least three people but causing no fatalities. Most of the two-dozen IEDs targeted ATMs, with others targeting electric poles or government-related institutions.

In early July, a series of five landmine explosions took place in Yala province over the course of a week, all on Buddhist-owned rubber plantations. Human Rights Watch claimed separatist insurgents were responsible for the attacks, but there was no claim of responsibility. Although the long-running insurgency has seen extensive use of command-detonated IEDS, use of victim-activated IEDs is much less common.

In December, two bombs exploded and an additional three were detonated by Explosive Ordinance Disposal officials on Samila Beach in the north of Thailand’s Songkhla province, located just outside the region typically regarded as the “Deep South.” The bombing caused no injuries or fatalities but damaged a famous golden mermaid statue that is a popular tourist attraction for both Thai and foreign vacationers.

Legislation, Law Enforcement, and Border Security: Thailand is drafting a new Counterterrorism Act, which aims to integrate existing terrorism-related laws into one document. The National Legislative Assembly had not yet passed the bill at the end of 2018. Thailand continues to apply the 2017-21 National Counterterrorism Strategy to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, but details of the strategy are not public.

Thailand’s law enforcement authorities demonstrated some capacity to detect, deter, and respond to terrorist incidents. Multiple entities – including the Royal Thai Police, the Department of Special Investigation and components of the Thai military – have law enforcement responsibilities on counterterrorism cases. Interagency cooperation and coordination was sporadic, information sharing was limited, and the delineation of duties between law enforcement and military units with counterterrorism responsibilities was unclear. Annual routine reassignments of senior government and military officials hampered continuity in leadership.

The Thai government engaged in programs with establishments such as hotels, schools, and shopping centers to raise awareness on soft target protection and conducted activities to enhance the capacity of security officials to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. In September, a Thai court sentenced nine men from the Deep South to four to six years in jail for conspiring to launch car-bomb attacks in the Bangkok region in 2016. The defendants’ attorney asserted that the detainees were forced to confess under torture, but the judge rejected this claim.

Thailand’s borders are relatively porous, and information sharing within Thailand and with neighboring countries is limited. The market in fraudulent documents remained active despite government efforts to crack down on criminal counterfeit networks. Bangkok’s main airport experienced two significant security breaches in 2018. Although neither incident was terrorism-related, these incidents revealed security deficiencies at Suvarnabhumi International Airport. Beginning in 2016, Thailand began to collect and analyze API/PNR data on commercial flights at all international airports. As of late 2018, Thailand’s immigration system is reported to be real-time connected with INTERPOL’s Stolen and Lost Travel Document Database.

Throughout 2018, Thai law enforcement units benefitted from U.S.-provided capacity building assistance. Bilaterally, Thai law enforcement received U.S. training on forensic evidence collection and analysis, complex investigation techniques, police tactics, explosives, and cryptocurrencies. Thailand hosted and participated in courses offered at the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, which included relevant training on financial investigations, cyber investigations, tactical safety, personnel and physical security, radiological material detection, post-blast investigations, and border interdictions. Thailand also participated in the Department of State’s Antiterrorism Assistance program.

The Thai government generally does not regard counterterrorism or CVE efforts as high priorities in comparison with competing domestic concerns.

Countering the Financing of Terrorism: Thailand belongs to the APG, a FATF-style regional body, which commits to the effective implementation and enforcement of FATF internationally accepted AML/CFT standards. Thailand’s FIU, the Anti-Money Laundering Office (AMLO), is a member of the Egmont Group. Thailand does not have a significant unregulated informal banking and money transfer system that could aid terrorism financing activities. In cases where the central bank (Bank of Thailand) has discovered unauthorized remittances, it has coordinated with police to arrest the offenders.

Through AMLO, Thailand has promptly issued designation orders each time the UN changed the list of designated persons or entities pursuant to UNSCRs 1373, 1267, and 1988, passed the updates to all relevant agencies through the electronic gateway through secure email, and published an updated consolidation of all designations on the AMLO website. If any transaction was found by the designated person/entity under the UNSCRs, AMLO would freeze those assets. Thailand displays a generally high level of political commitment to combating terrorist financing and demonstrates generally good compliance. In 2018, 12 terrorism financing cases were under investigation, and one case was prosecuted.

In November, AMLO, in partnership with FIUs from Indonesia, Australia, and five other countries, hosted the fourth Regional Counter-Terrorism Financing Summit in Bangkok. This year’s summit focused on expanding regional synergies and solutions including a regional risk assessment on non-profit organization red flag indicators; the identification and prioritization of ISIS-affiliated organizations and emerging terrorist organizations in the region; the release of a secure information-sharing platform prototype; and a multilateral intelligence analyst exchange.

Thailand continues to implement UNSCR 1373 obligations in the banking and insurance sectors. Some assets have been frozen in compliance with UNSCR 1373, but no assets have been frozen pursuant to the UNSC ISIL (Da’esh) and al-Qa’ida sanctions regime.

For additional information on money laundering and financial crimes, see the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume II, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes.

Countering Violent Extremism: The national counterterrorism strategy published in 2017 includes a CVE component. Thailand is currently drafting a CVE national action plan.

International and Regional Cooperation: Thailand is a member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and the East Asia Summit. Thailand also submitted its Counter Terrorism Action Plan to APEC’s Counter Terrorism Working Group in 2018.

No comments:

Post a Comment

Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.