In the Philippines, the 'Punisher' Takes on Terrorism

From Stratfor (Sep 10): In the Philippines, the 'Punisher' Takes on Terrorism

 

Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is more interested in containing Abu Sayyaf than defeating it. (STRINGER/AFP/Getty Images)

Summary

Recently elected Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte is taking on one of his country's most prominent jihadist groups. Duterte, nicknamed "The Punisher," launched a long-awaited military operation against Abu Sayyaf militants on the far southwest island of Jolo on Aug. 26, hoping to disrupt the group's kidnapping base. Since July 2015, Abu Sayyaf cells have abducted 38 foreigners and dozens more locals. After declaring its allegiance to the Islamic State earlier this year, the group escalated its aggression. In the spring, Abu Sayyaf decapitated two Canadian hostages, suggesting that its kidnappings are now driven by more than financial concerns. Combating the Moro Islamic insurgency in Mindanao state and on the Sulu Archipelago is among Duterte's chief priorities, and the recent operation, along with coordinated patrols in the Sulu Sea, is an important step toward realizing that goal. Nonetheless, success will be a relative term for the president's campaign against Abu Sayyaf.

Analysis

So far, Duterte's mission has yielded mixed results. During the initial Aug. 26 offensive, Philippine forces killed Mohammad "Ama Maas" Said, whom authorities suspect of orchestrating the abduction and execution of the two Canadian hostages. Even so, as of Sept. 9 the group was still holding 14 foreigners, including Kjartan Sekkingstad, a Norwegian man who has been in captivity for nearly a year. In the week leading up to the military operation, two Indonesian hostages managed to escape, suggesting that discipline and operational security may be slipping in the militant camps and that the captives are becoming more desperate. With beheadings on the rise, hostages have less to gain from waiting to be released and less to lose in attempting risky escapes. The two escapees were likely an intelligence boon for Philippine security forces, who could have gleaned important intelligence on camp structure and personnel from them.

Curbing Piracy, One Way or Another

In addition to the Jolo offensive, the Philippines, in cooperation with Malaysia and Indonesia, began coordinated maritime patrols and escort missions in the Sulu Sea on Aug. 4 to deter piracy and abduction operations. Abu Sayyaf uses maritime operations to capture most of its foreign hostages, a majority of whom are Malaysian and Indonesian crewmembers taken from boats traversing the Sulu and Celebes seas. Between March and July, the group carried out five kidnapping raids.



Its increased activity in the first half of 2016 paid off handsomely for the group, which received over $2 million in publicly raised donations for the release of five Malaysian sailors in June. During an Aug. 24 press conference, Duterte, in an apparent gaffe, hinted at having paid $1 million for the release of Sekkingstad, who was abducted in 2015. The looming threat of kidnapping and pirate attacks has also ginned up tension among the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, though they have evidently overcome their differences enough to collaborate in patrolling the seas. So far, their efforts seem to have paid off: No piracy attacks by Abu Sayyaf have been reported since the patrols began.



Despite the falloff, Malaysian, Indonesian and Philippine law enforcement have yet to announce any seizures or arrests of pirate boats or kidnappers swept up in the patrols. Their silence is surprising, considering each country's government stands to benefit from the positive press that catching Abu Sayyaf pirates would win. Another, perhaps more likely, explanation for the decrease in maritime crime is the southwest monsoon, which lasts from July to January. Monsoon season creates rough seas, making it harder for Abu Sayyaf militants to navigate the choppy waters in their small crafts to board other boats. Most of the group's cross-strait raids into Malaysia occur between March and July, when seas are calmer. Abu Sayyaf militants may be focusing their attention — and attacks — elsewhere to wait out the off-season, as evidenced by a bombing at a market in Davao City on Sept. 2. Until the southwest monsoon abates in early 2017, the true efficacy of the coordinated patrols will be difficult to ascertain.

A Formidable Threat on Land or at Sea

Even if the patrols reduce Abu Sayyaf's piracy, they will not stop the group's activities elsewhere. Abu Sayyaf is not strictly a maritime threat. The group periodically storms resorts in Malaysia and frequently targets southern Philippine states, where kidnapping for ransom makes up about one-third of its attacks (shootings and bombings account for the remaining two-thirds). In past monsoon seasons, Abu Sayyaf has shifted its focus to the more sheltered waters around Mindanao, attacking marinas in cities on the island such as General Santos City and Davao City.  In fact, the group carried out some of its most high-profile kidnappings of the past year in Mindanao during the last southwestern monsoon season in 2015. Over the course of those attacks, Abu Sayyaf nabbed an Italian cafe owner, as well as Sekkingstad and the two Canadians who were later beheaded.

In spite of Duterte's promises to crush Abu Sayyaf, the task is likely too great for any one administration to take on. The jihadist group has been active since the early 1990s, and in that time it has endured numerous security operations and attempted negotiations designed to put an end to militancy in the southern Philippines. After this operation, too, Abu Sayyaf will survive to keep fighting. Still, Duterte's operation could be considered a success if it puts the group on its heels for the duration of the southwest monsoon and prevents it from conducting another spate of high-profile abductions comparable to last year's. By the time conditions are right to resume piracy operations in the Sulu Sea, the coordinated task force patrolling the area will have had at least six months to work out routes and operational protocols.

The Philippine president is more interested in containing the group than defeating it. After all, the world tends to ignore Abu Sayyaf as long as it is not kidnapping foreigners. In denying the group a repeat of last year's kidnappings, Manila will also deny it the global attention that comes with parading foreign hostages and threatening Islamic State-style executions.

https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/philippines-punisher-takes-terrorism