Opinion piece from the Ad Lib column by Greg B. Macabenta in the Business World (Jun 21): Duterte and the CPP-NPA protection racket
If taxes are to be collected only by the government, then Rodrigo Duterte, incoming president of the Republic of the Philippines, actually acknowledges the existence of another government within the country: the Communist Party of the Philippines-New People’s Army. You see, the CPP-NPA also collects “taxes” from businesses and Duterte has publicly urged companies operating in Davao province and the rest of Mindanao to pay this additional imposition on them, on top of what they pay the Bureau of Internal Revenue. It may be assumed that this Duterte Doctrine will be applied nationally when he assumes the presidency.
We know that if we don’t pay taxes to the government, we’ll find ourselves in trouble, pay a hefty fine, see our earnings garnished or even go to jail. What about the “taxes” -- referred to as “revolutionary taxes” -- imposed by the CPP-NPA? How much is collected and what are the consequences if a business doesn’t come across?
The following is a report on CPP-NPA “taxation” in Davao province from a 2011 Asia Report 2011 by the International Crisis Group entitled, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines, Tactics and Talks”:
“The NPA obtains significant amounts of money from the Davao region. The military estimates that the NPA collected P39.5 million ($890,000) there in 2010, nearly half of the P95.5 million ($2.15 million) it raised from revolutionary taxes throughout the country during the year. Most of the funds are collected in the Compostela Valley, where there are many mines.
“In 2009, the military estimated that the province could provide the group with as much as P20 million ($460,000) per month. This is sufficient for guerrillas to allocate surplus funds for their dependents, a luxury units elsewhere cannot afford. The NPA can raise large amounts from the Compostela Valley because of its relationship with small-scale miners. These men resist government efforts to establish larger mines, instead turning to the NPA, which approves the opening of small-scale operations. NPA regulars may even be mining themselves. The CPP, while officially opposing destruction of the environment, considers such limited extraction acceptable as it is not used for export. The NPA targets small businesses as well. The owner of a fleet of trucks transporting gravel and sand from a quarry in the Davao area pays P5,000 ($115) per year for each truck. The NPA also levied a tax of four pesos (ten cents) per kilogram on banana vendors in New Bataan in the Compostela Valley, until the military increased its presence. Other businesses may be taxed a percentage of their total profits.
“In December 2010, seven large mining companies in Caraga threatened to pull out of the region over NPA ‘taxes’, underscoring how control over resources is at stake in the conflict. According to the 4th infantry division, the NPA has increased tax levied on mining companies from P15 million ($340,000) to P20 million ($450,000) a month. The group has also demanded the firms supply computers, radios and guns...
“Dole Food Company’s banana plantations in Surigao del Sur were regularly attacked in 2010. On 26 November, the NPA destroyed around 22,000 plants, with an estimated value of $250,000 in Tago town. Further south in the same province, the NPA cut down around 1,600 plants in Barobo town on 13 December. Both areas had been attacked earlier in the year as well. The NPA argues that because firms such as Dole exploit the region’s resources and people, its attacks are justified.”
Of course, the CPP-NPA will always find a way to “justify” the “taxation” and the “penalties.” In fact, as reported by the media, only recently, Fidel Agcaoili, spokesman of the National Democratic Front (NDF) declared in a forum at the Ateneo de Davao University, “You have to understand [that] revolutionary movements, meron silang political power operating in the countryside and elsewhere. And they have the right, [as] any state... they have the right to impose tax on any form of business that operates within its own territory.”
To support his rationale, Agcaoili added: “Di ba sabi ni President Duterte, ‘Bayaran na lang ninyo!’ Siya nagsabi noon, hindi ako (Wasn’t it President Duterte who said : ‘Just pay it!’ He said that, not me).”
Agcaoili was referring to a statement Duterte made at a trade expo in Davao City in 2013. In that speech, Duterte attempted to rationalize his being “cooperative” with the CPP-NPA: “Crimes I can deal with it. But with the revolutionary (groups), I give it to the (national) government.”
Duterte made that statement as mayor of Davao City. In effect, he admitted that the problem was much bigger than his capabilities as a local executive. But what happens now that Duterte is about to take over the reins of the national government? How will he deal with the situation?
Or is it possible that the much-feared crime fighter -- the one who has vowed to get rid of criminality in six months from his assumption of the presidency -- does not consider “revolutionary” taxation a crime?
How different is the CPP-NPA “revolutionary tax” from the operations of the Mafia in the US and in Sicily, where 80% of businesses reportedly pay “pizzo” or protection money to the gangsters? And how different is the CPP-NPA from the drug cartels in Ciudad Juarez in Mexico which, according to Wikipedia, collect protection money from businesses with the threat of “burning down the business, kidnapping the owners or killing everyone inside with assault rifles.”
To quote a comic paraphrasing Juliet’s line in Romeo and Juliet: “Utot by any other name would smell bantot.” (Fart by any other name would still stink). You can say that about the CPP-NPA “revolutionary tax.” The name is simply an attempt to deodorize what, in fact, is a bigtime protection racket.
Wikipedia adds: “Protection rackets tend to appear in markets where the police and judiciary cannot be counted on to provide legal protection, either because of incompetence (as in weak or failed states) or illegality (black markets).”
In a media report, Lt. Gen. Ricardo Visaya, the outgoing chief of the Southern Luzon Command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and reportedly a “strong contender” for the post of Chief of Staff, was said to have told his troops to “continue their military pressure on the NPA.” According to Visaya, “Until no official and clear-cut guidelines have been issued, until no formal talks have been made, we continue with our current operations in Bicol.”
In this regard, what can Visaya say about the CPP-NPA claiming parts of the country as their “territory” for which reason it has the ”right” to collect taxes? Before Visaya attempts to answer that question, he should perhaps read this excerpt from the 2011 “Asia Report.” It had this to about Visaya’s prospective commander-in-chief:
“In Davao, the Duterte family is a powerful third force in the conflict between the military and the NPA. Rodrigo Duterte, the current vice-mayor, was first elected mayor in 1988, at a time when the ‘sparrow’ units were carrying out killings on the streets of Davao, and the military-backed anti-communist vigilante squads known as the Alsa Masa meted out punishment in return. He subsequently served six terms, and when he could no longer stand for office, his daughter Sara Duterte stepped in and was elected mayor in 2010... Although violence has dramatically declined under Duterte, and the numerous urban squatter communities that served as the communists’ support base no longer exist, the CPP-NPA continues to operate within Davao City... Duterte, who used to employ a former member of the NDF as his chief of staff, in effect grants the guerrillas permission to operate in certain areas of the city. He also ensures leftist activists are safe from extrajudicial killings; in exchange, they do not protest against the ‘Davao death squad.’”
In other words, Rodrigo Duterte, incoming president of the Philippines, has been and could continue to be the biggest protector of the CPP-NPA as it continues to operate its highly profitable protection racket.
[Greg B. Macabenta is an advertising and communications man shuttling between San Francisco and Manila and providing unique insights on issues from both perspectives.]
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