Thursday, February 14, 2019

With Autonomy in the Southern Philippines, Muslim Rebels Must Learn How to Govern

From the World Politics Review (Feb 12, 2019): With Autonomy in the Southern Philippines, Muslim Rebels Must Learn How to Govern (By Michael Hart)



Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, center, Al-Hajj Murad, chair of Moro Islamic Liberation Front, left, and other leaders at a ceremony at Malacanang Palace in Manila, Philippines, July 17, 2017 (AP photo by Bullit Marquez).

In the fragile west of the Philippines’ war-ravaged southern island of Mindanao, voters in recent weeks overwhelmingly approved an historic peace accord aimed at ending five decades of bloody separatist conflict. The vote ratified a new law on expanded autonomy, known as the Bangsamoro Organic Law, paving the way for a new Muslim-majority self-governing region to replace the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which has been in place since 1989. The public stamp of approval, in a high-turnout, two-stage referendum on Jan. 21 and Feb. 6, marks the culmination of a lengthy peace process between the Philippine government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Mindanao’s largest and most powerful Islamist rebel group.

Between the two votes, though, the atmosphere of hope was shattered when twin explosions rocked a cathedral on the island of Jolo, killing 22 people. The blast came just six days after voters in Jolo and the rest of Sulu province narrowly rejected inclusion in the new autonomous region. The attack, apparently carried out by ISIS-aligned Abu Sayyaf militants, serves as a stark reminder that radical elements opposed to expanded autonomy remain intent on derailing the final stages of the peace process in Mindanao.

Amid the specter of further violence, even with autonomy secured, the hierarchy of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front now faces the challenge of transitioning from insurgents to politicians capable of governing. Its leaders must navigate a tricky three-year implementation period before contesting elections for the first Bangsamoro parliament, scheduled for 2022. The Front must also oversee the demobilization and disarmament of its own ranks while restricting militant activity and curtailing Mindanao’s ingrained culture of clan-based warlordism.

It may be some time before a lasting peace actually takes hold and prospects improve for Mindanao’s impoverished and long-marginalized Moro Muslim population. Past peace deals with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and the older Moro National Liberation Front have failed to bring prosperity or eliminate violence. Senior Front figures are hopeful the new region will avoid the pitfalls of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, which has been hampered by corruption and roundly criticized as a failed experiment in self-governance.

The new Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao will be governed by an 80-member elected parliament, likely to be controlled by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. The region will receive an annual $1.3 billion block grant from Manila and 75 percent of tax receipts from areas it governs, up from the current 70 percent. It will see greater profits from most natural resources within its borders, including timber, gold and mineral deposits, while parliamentarians will hold stronger legislative powers allowing for more effective implementation of its development plans.

Given the referendum’s result, Moro leaders have secured a sizeable public mandate. Yet despite an overwhelming majority of residents voting in favor of expanded autonomy, the unexpected rejection of the law in several areas indicates that not everyone is satisfied.

The combined count of the existing provinces—Basilan, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi—suggests widespread support, with 1.54 million for it and 198,750 against. Yet voters in Sulu rejected the law by a slim margin of 163,526 to 137,630. Their votes, though, were counted in the collective regional total, meaning the province will be forced to accede to the new autonomous region, which could risk a boost in support for Sulu-based Abu Sayyaf among disappointed voters. Isabela city, on the nearby island of Basilan, also rejected the deal, but will not have to join as it is not part of the existing Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
The key in the southern Philippines will be ensuring that the benefits of expanded autonomy are felt by ordinary people in their everyday lives.
Before the fully functioning and geographically expanded Bangsamoro region becomes a reality, the Moro leadership, more attuned to commanding guerrilla forces in Mindanao’s remote jungles, must quickly adapt to politics. During the three-year transition, the territory will be governed by the 105-member interim Bangsamoro Transition Authority, led by Al Haj Murad Ebrahim, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front’s veteran chairman. The Front formed a political wing, the United Bangsamoro Justice Party, in 2014, which is set to participate in the 2022 poll. Former Front commanders must refine the art of negotiation and compromise, as parties representing Christians, indigenous groups, the rival Moro National Liberation Front and other minorities are allocated a proportion of seats in the transitional authority. The Front will be held to its repeated promise for the new region to be inclusive of all religions.

There are other challenges. The Front must take on the corruption that has plagued Mindanao. The new region’s proposed financial auditing and transparency mechanisms will act as a deterrent, yet there is little room for complacency and Front leaders will have to ensure full compliance to maintain public trust.

The demobilization of rebel fighters is due to take place in four phases in line with a 2014 agreement; the first phase was completed in 2015. The ratification of the autonomy law signals the start of phase two, stipulating that the Moro Islamic Liberation Front must decommission 30 percent of its 30,000-40,000 fighters and turn over a third of its 6,000-7,000 firearms in the coming months. Phases three and four will facilitate the full demobilization of the Front by 2022. Fighters who remain active during the transition will form Joint Peace and Security Teams with the Philippine armed forces and National Police, and will be eligible to join their ranks once the interim period ends. Senior Front leaders will likely find the transition into politics easier than regular insurgents, who must find a new sense of belonging as they re-enter mainstream society and resume civilian life.

Tackling Mindanao’s culture of warlordism and clan politics is vital if peace is to take hold, as the region is awash with weapons and armed bandits due to its history of lawlessness, criminality and a weak state presence. Ebrahim has said “dismantling private armies” and “controlling loose firearms” will be priorities, but it is unclear exactly how they will be achieved. Any attempt to disarm these groups by force may provoke conflict. The new autonomous government must also contend with powerful political families and their well-armed bands of followers—a major cause of violence for generations. In the most notorious case, in 2009, the Ampatuan clan massacred 58 political opponents and journalists traveling in a convoy of vehicles prior to a mayoral election in Maguindanao province.

An even greater threat to peace emanates from the presence of jihadist groups aligned with the Islamic State. Abu Sayyaf, Ansar Khalifah Philippines and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters all reject autonomy and continue to fight for a fully independent Islamic entity. Before the Jolo cathedral bombing late last month, a spate of terrorist attacks targeted civilians last year in Lamitan, Isulan, General Santos and Cotabato city as the peace process gained momentum. Jihadists also continue to clash with Philippine security forces in remote towns and villages. President Rodrigo Duterte and the military are aiming to wipe out these groups under martial law, which was extended in mid-December until the end of 2019. Doing so will require close cooperation from the interim transitional authority in Mindanao and demobilizing Moro rebels on the ground.

The key in the southern Philippines will be ensuring that the benefits of expanded autonomy are felt by ordinary people in their everyday lives. The Moro Islamic Liberation Front has promised to improve infrastructure, public services and job opportunities while reducing poverty, which at 59 percent is the worst of any region in the Philippines.

Opponents of the peace process will only be persuaded to lay down their weapons and support the new autonomous region if these promises are met. The new political structure must benefit everyone in western Mindanao, not just the rebels-turned-politicians, to ensure its public support and to dent the recruitment efforts of ISIS-linked groups who prey on marginalized sectors of society. Expanded autonomy in Mindanao will hopefully also spark a wider cultural shift, away from solving disputes through violence and toward overcoming differences through direct participation in politics. For longtime Moro rebels, the hard task of governing and fulfilling their people’s wishes is only just beginning.

[Michael Hart is a freelance writer and researcher focusing on civil conflict and the politics of East Asia. He has written for The Diplomat, Eurasia Review and Geopolitical Monitor, among other publications.]

https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/27415/with-autonomy-in-the-southern-philippines-muslim-rebels-must-learn-how-to-govern

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