Saturday, September 2, 2017

IS-Affiliated groups take control of territories in central Mindanao

Posted to the Relief Web (Sep 1): IS-Affiliated groups take control of territories in central Mindanao

Published on 01 Sep 2017 View Original


OUTLOOK FOR SEPTEMBER 2017—FEBRUARY 2018

The threat of insecurity posed by IS-affiliated armed groups operating in central Mindanao has increased in the last months. The Philippines’ security forces have shown limited capacity to contain this threat. The risk of these groups taking control of territories has now become likely, and could affect up to 4.9 million people who live in conflict-prone areas (Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao and Cotabato provinces).


RATIONALE

Long-term insurgency and disrupted peace processes

The Moro people - several mostly Muslim ethnolinguistic groups who were initially the majority in Mindanao - have been socially and economically marginalised throughout the 20th century. The central government of the Philippines has initiated several waves of Christian migrants to the region in an attempt to integrate it. As a result, since the late 1960s, Mindanao has experienced several insurgencies led by mostly Muslim Moro separatist armed groups in order to gain independence from the central government, starting in 1972 with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF). Several peace agreements have been brokered offering more autonomy to the Moro people. In 1989 there was the creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and in 2014 the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) - a draft legislation that would guarantee them more rights.

However, no long-standing peace has held due to delays in the implementation of these peace agreements, the mistrust between the parties involved, and the evolving political agenda of the insurgents. The two main peace processes have been hindered by the splintering of the insurgency, further fueling the conflict. In 1977, despite the ongoing peace process between the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the central government, a splinter group – the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) was formed in rejection of the autonomy offered by the central government. During the BBL peace process between the MILF and the government, mistrust and delays have resulted in several groups splintering from the MILF, and opting for a more radical Islamic agenda.

Radicalisation of armed groups and support from former insurgencies.

Since 2014 several armed groups in Mindanao have shown support for the Islamic State (IS) and also strengthened collaboration among themselves, moving further away from the peace process. This includes Abu-Sayyaf Happilon (AS-Happilon) - a splinter group of the MNLF, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) - a splinter group of the MILF, and the Maute group - mostly made up of former MILF fighters. Since 2016, these groups have also strengthened their links, covering three different geographic areas. AS-Happilon dominates in Basilan, the BIFF has a strong presence in Maguindanao, and Lanao del Sur region is under Maute’s influence. An example of this cooperation is when BIFF clashed with the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in Cotabato province, likely attempting to divert AFP’s response to Maute’s besiegement of Marawi city.

In addition, IS-affiliated groups have received support from the MILF. The BIFF and Maute groups have carried out attacks against the Philippines’ security forces and hide in areas under MILF’s control where government forces cannot enter. Despite being involved in the peace process, MILF is divided, with some of its commanders supporting splinter groups by, for example, offering training and camps in central Mindanao to Maute fighters.

Security forces’ lack of capacity and IS’ new warfare strategies

Compounding the support of the MILF, the ability of these armed groups to operate is enhanced by the limited number of AFP forces in central Mindanao and the lack of intelligence capacity to monitor the threat posed by these groups. Some areas remain under the control of MILF forces. Intelligence services have long struggled to gain a clear overview of the threat posed by IS-affiliated groups, with contradicting reports of their strength (number of fighters, scope of foreign fighters, links with local communities).

IS-affiliated armed groups have developed new warfare strategies, thus hindering AFP’s response. The three month-long Marawi siege has been made possible by Maute fighters’ use of snipers, tunnels, and sufficient preparation (food and ammunitions stock). This has prevented the AFP from retaking Marawi quickly. Moreover, despite suffering severe backlash in previous operations such as in Butig, Lanao del Sur in 2016, the Maute groups have shown both resilience and capacity-building skills.

Ethnic and clan links strengthen armed groups

IS-affiliated groups have strengthened because of social and economic roots based on ethnic and clan links. This allows wider collaboration and recruitment. Clans provide substantive financial support to armed groups they are linked with and ensure some political legitimacy as clans are well represented in local political institutions. Some clans also have private militia that can provide support to armed groups. For instance, the Maute armed group has originated from the Maute clan, who run several businesses in Lanao del Sur, is politically strong in Marawi and has its own private militia. The Maute clan has also developed links through marriage with the Mimbantas clan, powerful among the MILF. This has enhanced the recruitment of MILF fighters by the Maute.

The ethnic structure of these groups also helps with recruiting fighters on an ethnic basis. Abu Sayyaf is largely made of Yakan, indigenous to Basilian Island, while BIFF is made up of Maguindanaon, and Maute is mostly Maranao. The last two ethnic groups have dominated the MILF, and some Maranao MILF fighters, disappointed by the lengthy process around the BBL, have joined the Maute group.

PREDICTED DEVELOPMENTS

The combination of armed groups uniting under the IS flag, their connection to local communities, and their links with former insurgencies have strengthened these armed groups’ capacity to hold territories in central Mindanao. Violence will likely increase over the next six months in central Mindanao and IS-affiliated groups will seize territories as a result. Attacks will be carried out simultaneously by IS-affiliated groups in order to divert AFP’s response, weakening their ability to counter IS’ long-term control of territories.

Whatever the losses are for IS-affiliated groups involved in the Marawi crisis, the length of this battle will be their first major comprehensive success and will likely trigger recruitment and increase their capacity to carry out new large attacks and to hold territories.

Lack of unified command among the MILF leadership has already disrupted the peace process and has further fueled the conflict. The Marawi crisis further aggravates the stagnation of the BBL process and will likely increase discontent and dissatisfaction among MILF fighters who will be encouraged to join IS-affiliated armed groups. Some MILF commanders will likely also informally split, and/or let these IS-affiliated groups operate with more freedom in their areas of control.

http://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/affiliated-groups-take-control-territories-central-mindanao

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