Decommissioning is a general term for a formal process to remove something from an active status. To decommission is to remove or retire (a ship, airplane, or weapons, as used in the GPH-MILF normalization process).
It can also mean to deactivate or shut out, say a nuclear power plant. It can never equate or will ever interchange or confuse with the word “surrender”. Surrender is to yield (something) to the possession or power of another; deliver up possession of on demand or under duress: to surrender the fort to the enemy; to surrender the stolen goods to the police. Decommissioning has none of all those elements (of surrender).
More importantly, decommissioning, in the context of the GPH-MILF normalization process, is a principled approach in skirting any stigma of surrender on the part of the MILF, which is an ideologically-based movement.
First, decommissioning is part of agreement. It is one of the components of the Annex on Normalization of the GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB). The other components are redeployment of government forces, socio-economic intervention in the Bangsamoro, disbandment of private armed groups, grant of amnesty and pardons, disposition of previously acknowledged MILF camps, conduct of study on transitional justice and reconciliation, putting up of normalization trust fund, etc.
Briefly stated decommissioning is not pursued alone or singly but is interlinked and parallel with the other processes aimed at normalizing the situation in the Bangsamoro.
Second, those decommissioned weapons are not turned over to the government but to an international third body, the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) composed of Turkey, Norway, and Brunei.
And third, except for the symbolic decommissioning, the subsequent three phases (2, 3 and 4) are tied up to the passage and ratification of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), the operationalization of the Bangsamoro Police, and the implementation of all the agreements of the parties.
Some people question the MILF why it agreed to decommission its weapons (and combatants). The answer is very simple. Aside from the above-mentioned reasons, one cannot get or achieve something lofty and big without paying for it also dearly. Besides, who will be in need of weapons when the Moro Problem or Question, the sole agenda of the GPH-MILF peace talks since 1997, has been satisfactorily settled through the passage of the BBL. Hence, only duly constituted authority, like the Bangsamoro police, will bear arms to maintain peace and order in the Bangsamoro.
Admittedly, decommissioning is one of the most difficult decisions ever made by the MILF. It is so sensitive and the impact far-reaching that require long debates and soul-searching. However, at the end of the day, wisdom prevails over those whose articulations hinged mainly on fleeting considerations.
However, that BBL is not any BBL; it should and must be a good BBL. This is the reason that we consistently appeal to Congress to pass a law that is faithful to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). Short of this benchmark, that BBL is a watered down version, which the MILF cannot and will not accept.
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/430-decommissioning-not-surrender
More importantly, decommissioning, in the context of the GPH-MILF normalization process, is a principled approach in skirting any stigma of surrender on the part of the MILF, which is an ideologically-based movement.
First, decommissioning is part of agreement. It is one of the components of the Annex on Normalization of the GPH-MILF Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB). The other components are redeployment of government forces, socio-economic intervention in the Bangsamoro, disbandment of private armed groups, grant of amnesty and pardons, disposition of previously acknowledged MILF camps, conduct of study on transitional justice and reconciliation, putting up of normalization trust fund, etc.
Briefly stated decommissioning is not pursued alone or singly but is interlinked and parallel with the other processes aimed at normalizing the situation in the Bangsamoro.
Second, those decommissioned weapons are not turned over to the government but to an international third body, the Independent Decommissioning Body (IDB) composed of Turkey, Norway, and Brunei.
And third, except for the symbolic decommissioning, the subsequent three phases (2, 3 and 4) are tied up to the passage and ratification of the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), the operationalization of the Bangsamoro Police, and the implementation of all the agreements of the parties.
Some people question the MILF why it agreed to decommission its weapons (and combatants). The answer is very simple. Aside from the above-mentioned reasons, one cannot get or achieve something lofty and big without paying for it also dearly. Besides, who will be in need of weapons when the Moro Problem or Question, the sole agenda of the GPH-MILF peace talks since 1997, has been satisfactorily settled through the passage of the BBL. Hence, only duly constituted authority, like the Bangsamoro police, will bear arms to maintain peace and order in the Bangsamoro.
Admittedly, decommissioning is one of the most difficult decisions ever made by the MILF. It is so sensitive and the impact far-reaching that require long debates and soul-searching. However, at the end of the day, wisdom prevails over those whose articulations hinged mainly on fleeting considerations.
However, that BBL is not any BBL; it should and must be a good BBL. This is the reason that we consistently appeal to Congress to pass a law that is faithful to the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB). Short of this benchmark, that BBL is a watered down version, which the MILF cannot and will not accept.
http://www.luwaran.com/index.php/editorial/item/430-decommissioning-not-surrender
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