Posted to India Today (Feb 17, 2023): China's ‘Cabbage Tactics' pestering Philippines to cede territorial waters (By Dipti Yadav)
Much has already been written about disputes engulfing the South China Sea (SCS) region. What keeps it in vogue, nonetheless, is the continual travesty of regional Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) by China, insofar as regarding its persistent incursions into a 'completely harmless meandering'.
China's ‘Cabbage Tactics' pestering Philippines to cede territorial waters© Provided by India Today
The recent case of a 'military-grade' laser used by China to temporarily blind the crew members of a Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) vessel on a resupply mission to the Ayungin Shoal, one of Manila's claimed islands, is not new in the laborious history of Chinese 'uncanny' fleets doing a roundabout in the SCS to badger foreign vessels and labelling them as a 'threat' so as to indirectly grant itself access for counteracting on its own whim.
The response by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the same included, not surprisingly, that it was just a procedure to ensure 'navigational safety' as the vessel had 'intruded' the waters. Hence, the CCG crew was forced to use a laser to measure the distance and speed of the Philippines vessel, and not to intentionally blur the Filipino crew's sight as alleged.
CCP's gambit in the SCS finds mention numerous times within the coteries of highbrow diplomats. One such bizarre tactic termed 'cabbage tactics'--China's long-tested ploy of deploying a diverse assemblage of vessels to wrap, surround, and squeeze an adversary's vessel until the area becomes surrounded by many boats.
Where merely a single warship was leveraged in olden times to intimidate the adversary, China rather opts for a swarm of vessels sectioned in three peels, very much identical to a cabbage - hence the jargon.
The first layer comprises innocuous PAFMM (People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia) fishing vessels which come 'uniquely' equipped with automatic weapons and reinforced hulls. These vessels enter the rival claimants' EEZ or territorial waters in a bid to elicit a reaction and scrutinize the adversary's potential before making another encroachment drive.
If the response is that of retaliation, vessels affiliated with the China Coast Guard (CCG) form the mid peel of the cabbage, ever-ready to counter foreign vessels operating near Chinese-claimed features during a standoff between the two.
Comparatively less militaristic in nature, both the China Coast Guard and PAFMM fleets form the 'grey zone' for harassing other vessels and getting away with it. In case the conditions get worse, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet waits along the shoreline of China's landmass, hence forming the outermost layer.
To sum it all up, the entire tactic boils down to three steps. Exhibiting sovereignty over the waters through the impenetrable layers of multiple vessels, testing the adversary's endurance, and at last exhausting the enemy in order to make it surrender –all without the use of force, albeit 'peaceful intimidation'.
Countless incidents have surfaced in the SCS region since 2016. The Philippines has filed 211 in total as diplomatic protests against China, out of which 153 were in 2021 alone. Though this has not barred China from practicing its bellicose approach of evicting any foreign vessel from its own ratified 'nine-dash line' waters.
In each event of this illegal encroachment, China has never deterred to issue a statement on the same with a benign comeback. As an example, in the March 2021 occurrence in which 200 Chinese fishing boats entered Whitsun Reef which falls under the Philippine EEZ, China countered it by making a point that its vessels were merely seeking shelter from bad weather, claiming in addition that they weren't even a part of its maritime militia.
China has always had a readily baked response for almost every incident involving vessels of Mandarin origin.
The United States has practiced freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) from time to time near the disputed areas of the SCS. Going by the main purpose of the EEZs, it provides a nation with the ability to exercise exclusive economic rights (such as the use of minerals and resources lying beneath the seabed for economical purposes) over nearly 200 NM sea area from its own shoreline, while the region falling within 12 NM is termed as 'territorial waters'.
Nonetheless, China has its own definition of an EEZ – that one has absolute control over waters, both economically as well as territorially. When in actuality, an 'innocent passage' made by a certain vessel is not bound to any repercussions by the state in control of that EEZ.
By getting a hold on nearly all of the features based in the SCS, China attempts to build a protective wall that keeps it away from a probable threat arising from an abrupt increase in the number of U.S. bases near its landmass. Capturing each archipelago gives it a sense of authority over the ultimate EEZ that arises from the same, even if it is getting overlapped by the other nations' EEZs in some way or other.
Duterte's 'immense belief' in China's cooperation gradually came to a halt when Marcos was formally appointed as Philippine's new president. So far, Marcos has been right to balance out China with the US, through striking deals related to the economy with the former, and delving on countering territorial disputes with the latter. Despite repeatedly wording the term 'peace' in its official messaging, China finds no qualms in doing the exact opposite when it comes to action.
Only this month, Marcos granted the US temporary access to four of its military bases and has pledged to resume joint maritime patrols together. Clearly an overt attempt to frighten Shanghai, Marcos instead played soft by stating there was 'no direct threat to China'.
The recent case of a 'military-grade' laser used by China to temporarily blind the crew members of a Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) vessel on a resupply mission to the Ayungin Shoal, one of Manila's claimed islands, is not new in the laborious history of Chinese 'uncanny' fleets doing a roundabout in the SCS to badger foreign vessels and labelling them as a 'threat' so as to indirectly grant itself access for counteracting on its own whim.
The response by the Chinese Foreign Ministry to the same included, not surprisingly, that it was just a procedure to ensure 'navigational safety' as the vessel had 'intruded' the waters. Hence, the CCG crew was forced to use a laser to measure the distance and speed of the Philippines vessel, and not to intentionally blur the Filipino crew's sight as alleged.
CCP's gambit in the SCS finds mention numerous times within the coteries of highbrow diplomats. One such bizarre tactic termed 'cabbage tactics'--China's long-tested ploy of deploying a diverse assemblage of vessels to wrap, surround, and squeeze an adversary's vessel until the area becomes surrounded by many boats.
Where merely a single warship was leveraged in olden times to intimidate the adversary, China rather opts for a swarm of vessels sectioned in three peels, very much identical to a cabbage - hence the jargon.
The first layer comprises innocuous PAFMM (People's Armed Forces Maritime Militia) fishing vessels which come 'uniquely' equipped with automatic weapons and reinforced hulls. These vessels enter the rival claimants' EEZ or territorial waters in a bid to elicit a reaction and scrutinize the adversary's potential before making another encroachment drive.
If the response is that of retaliation, vessels affiliated with the China Coast Guard (CCG) form the mid peel of the cabbage, ever-ready to counter foreign vessels operating near Chinese-claimed features during a standoff between the two.
Comparatively less militaristic in nature, both the China Coast Guard and PAFMM fleets form the 'grey zone' for harassing other vessels and getting away with it. In case the conditions get worse, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) fleet waits along the shoreline of China's landmass, hence forming the outermost layer.
To sum it all up, the entire tactic boils down to three steps. Exhibiting sovereignty over the waters through the impenetrable layers of multiple vessels, testing the adversary's endurance, and at last exhausting the enemy in order to make it surrender –all without the use of force, albeit 'peaceful intimidation'.
Countless incidents have surfaced in the SCS region since 2016. The Philippines has filed 211 in total as diplomatic protests against China, out of which 153 were in 2021 alone. Though this has not barred China from practicing its bellicose approach of evicting any foreign vessel from its own ratified 'nine-dash line' waters.
In each event of this illegal encroachment, China has never deterred to issue a statement on the same with a benign comeback. As an example, in the March 2021 occurrence in which 200 Chinese fishing boats entered Whitsun Reef which falls under the Philippine EEZ, China countered it by making a point that its vessels were merely seeking shelter from bad weather, claiming in addition that they weren't even a part of its maritime militia.
China has always had a readily baked response for almost every incident involving vessels of Mandarin origin.
The United States has practiced freedom of navigation operations (FONOP) from time to time near the disputed areas of the SCS. Going by the main purpose of the EEZs, it provides a nation with the ability to exercise exclusive economic rights (such as the use of minerals and resources lying beneath the seabed for economical purposes) over nearly 200 NM sea area from its own shoreline, while the region falling within 12 NM is termed as 'territorial waters'.
Nonetheless, China has its own definition of an EEZ – that one has absolute control over waters, both economically as well as territorially. When in actuality, an 'innocent passage' made by a certain vessel is not bound to any repercussions by the state in control of that EEZ.
By getting a hold on nearly all of the features based in the SCS, China attempts to build a protective wall that keeps it away from a probable threat arising from an abrupt increase in the number of U.S. bases near its landmass. Capturing each archipelago gives it a sense of authority over the ultimate EEZ that arises from the same, even if it is getting overlapped by the other nations' EEZs in some way or other.
Duterte's 'immense belief' in China's cooperation gradually came to a halt when Marcos was formally appointed as Philippine's new president. So far, Marcos has been right to balance out China with the US, through striking deals related to the economy with the former, and delving on countering territorial disputes with the latter. Despite repeatedly wording the term 'peace' in its official messaging, China finds no qualms in doing the exact opposite when it comes to action.
Only this month, Marcos granted the US temporary access to four of its military bases and has pledged to resume joint maritime patrols together. Clearly an overt attempt to frighten Shanghai, Marcos instead played soft by stating there was 'no direct threat to China'.
https://www.msn.com/en-in/news/world/china-s-cabbage-tactics-pestering-philippines-to-cede-territorial-waters/ar-AA17Cd4S?li=AAgges1
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