Posted to The Japan Times (Feb 17, 2023): Bilateral defense deals between Tokyo and Manila could reshape Indo-Pacific security (By RICHARD JAVAD HEYDARIAN)
Marcos visited Japan in search of a key partner to play a pivotal role in Manila’s foreign policy direction
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. review an honor guard at the Prime Minister's Official Residence in Tokyo on Feb. 9. | POOL VIA REUTERS
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s recent five-day trip to Tokyo is arguably his most consequential sojourn overseas since taking power more than seven months ago.
By all accounts, it was a highly successful visit, which saw the Filipino leader securing $13 billion in investment pledges, $3 billion in infrastructure loans and a whole host of cooperation agreements aimed at boosting the Philippines’ agriculture, health care and digital economy sectors.
What’s more, the leaders of Japan and the Philippines also laid the foundations for a new era in bilateral defense cooperation that is poised to have major implications for the Indo-Pacific region. Shortly after Marcos’ decision to grant Washington expanded access to key Philippine bases facing the South China Sea and Taiwan, the Filipino leader also confirmed ongoing discussions over a new tripartite Philippine-U.S.-Japan security deal.
Meanwhile, the Philippines and Japan are close to finalizing a reciprocal access agreement that is expected to deepen interoperability and expand joint military exercises between the two countries’ armed forces. Japan has also reportedly agreed to include the Southeast Asian nation among its first beneficiaries of a new overseas security assistance package, with a particular focus on enhancing the Philippines’ maritime security and domain awareness capabilities.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is expected to visit the Philippines later this year to, among other things, discuss the possibility of a visiting forces agreement deal that would place Japan on par with the United States and Australia.
Buoyed by his successful visit to Japan, Marcos has taken an increasingly tough stance against China’s aggressive behavior, going so far as personally summon Beijing’s envoy in Manila to express his displeasure over the latest tensions in the South China Sea.
Less than a year into power, Marcos is overseeing nothing less than a quiet revolution in Philippine foreign policy, with key partners such as Japan playing a pivotal role in Manila’s new strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific.
A month earlier, Marcos visited Beijing for his first major state visit overseas. Although the trip culminated in sizeable investment pledges by China, the two sides couldn’t agree on any concrete deals beyond generic statements. For instance, Beijing didn’t clarify the fate of even a single big-ticket infrastructure project in the Philippines and largely skirted around the festering disputes in the South China Sea.
For Filipinos, China is renowned for what can be described as a “pledge trap” — empty promises of large-scale investments in exchange for geopolitical acquiescence. Under the Beijing-friendly Rodrigo Duterte administration, which soft-pedaled on the South China Sea disputes, China failed to accomplish any big-ticket projects despite its investment pledge of $24 billion in 2016.
As Duterte’s former budget secretary and current Finance Secretary Benjamin Diokno admitted, Japan has been responsible for the bulk of foreign financing for domestic infrastructure projects in the Philippines. With few, if any, breakthroughs during his Beijing trip, Marcos’ visit to Tokyo gained even greater salience.
In recent decades, Japan has emerged as one of the Philippines’ most important economic partners. Not only is Japan the No. 1 source of development aid and infrastructure investments, it’s also the only nation to have signed a bilateral free trade deal — the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement — with Manila. But far from falling into complacency, the two sides doubled down on their substantial economic partnership during Marcos’ visit to Tokyo.
The two sides vowed to press ahead with implementing a whole host of Japan-backed infrastructure initiatives, including the north-south commuter railway and north-south commuter railway for Malolos-Tutuban projects. They also underscored their commitment to finalizing Manila’s first underground metro system in the near future, while jointly modernizing the Philippines’ air transport system.
Following his meetings with top Japanese businessmen, Marcos secured up to $13 billion in investment pledges, which are expected to generate as many as 24,000 jobs. Japan also agreed to assist the Philippines’ ongoing efforts to modernize its agriculture sector, upgrade its digital infrastructure and build a universal health care system.
What made Marcos’ Japan visit even more consequential is the increasingly defense-oriented nature of bilateral relations in recent years. Over the past year, Japan participated in major multilateral drills hosted by the Philippines, including the “Balikatan,” “Kamandag,” “Sama-Sama” and “Lumbas” military exercises, which collectively aim to enhance interoperability among the United States and its key allies in the region.
Both Washington and Canberra have relevant bilateral defense deals with Manila, namely a visiting forces agreement, which provides the legal framework for regularized and large-scale military exercises. Japan seeks a similarly close defense relationship with the Philippines.
During Marcos’ trip, the two sides signed an agreement on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities that facilitates a limited degree of nontraditional security interoperability between Japanese and Philippine forces. In the near future, the two sides will seek to sign an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement and, down the road, a full-fledged visiting forces agreement, which would allow Japan to conduct large-scale joint military activities and drills with the Philippines.
In their joint statement, the two sides emphasized the need for “reciprocal port calls and aircraft visits, transfer of more defense equipment and technology, continuous cooperation on previously transferred defense equipment and capacity building” in order to address shared geopolitical threats.
Japan also agreed to provide the Philippines with defense aid, including 97-meter patrol vessels and modern surveillance systems that are crucial to the Southeast Asian country’s maritime defense.
Crucially, both the Philippines and Japan also underscored their commitment to further enhancing trilateral defense cooperation with Washington amid growing speculations over a new U.S.-Philippine-Japan tripartite military deal in the near future. Marcos has remained mum on the precise details of the proposed agreement, but clearly the Philippines’ decision to grant the Pentagon expanded access to bases close to Taiwan’s shores has, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel, contributed to a “significant strategic reshuffling” in the region.
There is, however, no room for complacency. To begin with, Japan will have to up its public diplomacy by more proactively explaining the merits of infrastructure investments in the Philippines as well as its new defense posture. After all, progressive groups and pro-China elements in Manila will certainly mobilize against any expanded Philippine-Japan defense cooperation by invoking, among other things, Tokyo’s militarist past and widespread atrocities during World War II.
Thus, it’s crucial for Tokyo to win over not only Marcos but also the broader Philippine public, civil society groups and, above all, independent-minded legislators, who will scrutinize any major bilateral defense deal. In the past, the Philippine Senate, which has the constitutional mandate to approve defense treaties, voted in favor of ending U.S. permanent bases and, for years, dragged its feet on ratifying the Philippine-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement. Thus, legislative support for any major deal between Japan and the Philippines is not a foregone conclusion.
Thus, Japan will have to address legitimate concerns over historical revisionism, address compensation issues regarding “comfort women” victims in the Philippines and actively win over relevant stakeholders, who are crucial to the approval and smooth implementation of any major Philippine-Japan defense deal in the future. It also has to reassure the Philippines that any expanded Japanese military presence in the Southeast Asian country won’t lead to, as in the case of several American soldiers in recent decades, human rights and sexual abuses against host communities.
What’s more, Japan also has to justify the legality of any expanded overseas military deployment under its ostensibly pacifist constitution, which is yet to be amended. After six years of populist antics and geopolitical uncertainty under the Beijing-leaning Duterte administration, the Philippines is now actively courting closer defense and strategic cooperation with traditional allies against a resurgent China.
Notwithstanding major geopolitical realignments in the region, strategic reassurance and expansive economic relations will be crucial to determining the future of Philippine-Japan relations.
[Richard Javad Heydarian is a senior lecturer at the University of the Philippines, Asian Center and author of, among others, “The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery.”]
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s recent five-day trip to Tokyo is arguably his most consequential sojourn overseas since taking power more than seven months ago.
By all accounts, it was a highly successful visit, which saw the Filipino leader securing $13 billion in investment pledges, $3 billion in infrastructure loans and a whole host of cooperation agreements aimed at boosting the Philippines’ agriculture, health care and digital economy sectors.
What’s more, the leaders of Japan and the Philippines also laid the foundations for a new era in bilateral defense cooperation that is poised to have major implications for the Indo-Pacific region. Shortly after Marcos’ decision to grant Washington expanded access to key Philippine bases facing the South China Sea and Taiwan, the Filipino leader also confirmed ongoing discussions over a new tripartite Philippine-U.S.-Japan security deal.
Meanwhile, the Philippines and Japan are close to finalizing a reciprocal access agreement that is expected to deepen interoperability and expand joint military exercises between the two countries’ armed forces. Japan has also reportedly agreed to include the Southeast Asian nation among its first beneficiaries of a new overseas security assistance package, with a particular focus on enhancing the Philippines’ maritime security and domain awareness capabilities.
Prime Minister Fumio Kishida is expected to visit the Philippines later this year to, among other things, discuss the possibility of a visiting forces agreement deal that would place Japan on par with the United States and Australia.
Buoyed by his successful visit to Japan, Marcos has taken an increasingly tough stance against China’s aggressive behavior, going so far as personally summon Beijing’s envoy in Manila to express his displeasure over the latest tensions in the South China Sea.
Less than a year into power, Marcos is overseeing nothing less than a quiet revolution in Philippine foreign policy, with key partners such as Japan playing a pivotal role in Manila’s new strategic vision for the Indo-Pacific.
A month earlier, Marcos visited Beijing for his first major state visit overseas. Although the trip culminated in sizeable investment pledges by China, the two sides couldn’t agree on any concrete deals beyond generic statements. For instance, Beijing didn’t clarify the fate of even a single big-ticket infrastructure project in the Philippines and largely skirted around the festering disputes in the South China Sea.
For Filipinos, China is renowned for what can be described as a “pledge trap” — empty promises of large-scale investments in exchange for geopolitical acquiescence. Under the Beijing-friendly Rodrigo Duterte administration, which soft-pedaled on the South China Sea disputes, China failed to accomplish any big-ticket projects despite its investment pledge of $24 billion in 2016.
As Duterte’s former budget secretary and current Finance Secretary Benjamin Diokno admitted, Japan has been responsible for the bulk of foreign financing for domestic infrastructure projects in the Philippines. With few, if any, breakthroughs during his Beijing trip, Marcos’ visit to Tokyo gained even greater salience.
In recent decades, Japan has emerged as one of the Philippines’ most important economic partners. Not only is Japan the No. 1 source of development aid and infrastructure investments, it’s also the only nation to have signed a bilateral free trade deal — the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement — with Manila. But far from falling into complacency, the two sides doubled down on their substantial economic partnership during Marcos’ visit to Tokyo.
The two sides vowed to press ahead with implementing a whole host of Japan-backed infrastructure initiatives, including the north-south commuter railway and north-south commuter railway for Malolos-Tutuban projects. They also underscored their commitment to finalizing Manila’s first underground metro system in the near future, while jointly modernizing the Philippines’ air transport system.
Following his meetings with top Japanese businessmen, Marcos secured up to $13 billion in investment pledges, which are expected to generate as many as 24,000 jobs. Japan also agreed to assist the Philippines’ ongoing efforts to modernize its agriculture sector, upgrade its digital infrastructure and build a universal health care system.
What made Marcos’ Japan visit even more consequential is the increasingly defense-oriented nature of bilateral relations in recent years. Over the past year, Japan participated in major multilateral drills hosted by the Philippines, including the “Balikatan,” “Kamandag,” “Sama-Sama” and “Lumbas” military exercises, which collectively aim to enhance interoperability among the United States and its key allies in the region.
Both Washington and Canberra have relevant bilateral defense deals with Manila, namely a visiting forces agreement, which provides the legal framework for regularized and large-scale military exercises. Japan seeks a similarly close defense relationship with the Philippines.
During Marcos’ trip, the two sides signed an agreement on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief activities that facilitates a limited degree of nontraditional security interoperability between Japanese and Philippine forces. In the near future, the two sides will seek to sign an acquisition and cross-servicing agreement and, down the road, a full-fledged visiting forces agreement, which would allow Japan to conduct large-scale joint military activities and drills with the Philippines.
In their joint statement, the two sides emphasized the need for “reciprocal port calls and aircraft visits, transfer of more defense equipment and technology, continuous cooperation on previously transferred defense equipment and capacity building” in order to address shared geopolitical threats.
Japan also agreed to provide the Philippines with defense aid, including 97-meter patrol vessels and modern surveillance systems that are crucial to the Southeast Asian country’s maritime defense.
Crucially, both the Philippines and Japan also underscored their commitment to further enhancing trilateral defense cooperation with Washington amid growing speculations over a new U.S.-Philippine-Japan tripartite military deal in the near future. Marcos has remained mum on the precise details of the proposed agreement, but clearly the Philippines’ decision to grant the Pentagon expanded access to bases close to Taiwan’s shores has, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to Japan Rahm Emanuel, contributed to a “significant strategic reshuffling” in the region.
There is, however, no room for complacency. To begin with, Japan will have to up its public diplomacy by more proactively explaining the merits of infrastructure investments in the Philippines as well as its new defense posture. After all, progressive groups and pro-China elements in Manila will certainly mobilize against any expanded Philippine-Japan defense cooperation by invoking, among other things, Tokyo’s militarist past and widespread atrocities during World War II.
Thus, it’s crucial for Tokyo to win over not only Marcos but also the broader Philippine public, civil society groups and, above all, independent-minded legislators, who will scrutinize any major bilateral defense deal. In the past, the Philippine Senate, which has the constitutional mandate to approve defense treaties, voted in favor of ending U.S. permanent bases and, for years, dragged its feet on ratifying the Philippine-Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement. Thus, legislative support for any major deal between Japan and the Philippines is not a foregone conclusion.
Thus, Japan will have to address legitimate concerns over historical revisionism, address compensation issues regarding “comfort women” victims in the Philippines and actively win over relevant stakeholders, who are crucial to the approval and smooth implementation of any major Philippine-Japan defense deal in the future. It also has to reassure the Philippines that any expanded Japanese military presence in the Southeast Asian country won’t lead to, as in the case of several American soldiers in recent decades, human rights and sexual abuses against host communities.
What’s more, Japan also has to justify the legality of any expanded overseas military deployment under its ostensibly pacifist constitution, which is yet to be amended. After six years of populist antics and geopolitical uncertainty under the Beijing-leaning Duterte administration, the Philippines is now actively courting closer defense and strategic cooperation with traditional allies against a resurgent China.
Notwithstanding major geopolitical realignments in the region, strategic reassurance and expansive economic relations will be crucial to determining the future of Philippine-Japan relations.
[Richard Javad Heydarian is a senior lecturer at the University of the Philippines, Asian Center and author of, among others, “The Indo-Pacific: Trump, China and the New Struggle for Global Mastery.”]
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/02/17/commentary/world-commentary/philippines-japan-relations/
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