Blueboard
Alma Maria O. Salvador
FOR MANY DECADES, naval modernization in the Philippines has been suspended to give way to an army-led warfare against insurgency. This has led to a tremendous allocation of resources in support of the development of personnel, operations and capital needs of the ground forces, leaving the archipelagic state devoid of a focused and well-financed maritime strategy.
With the ongoing peace process that ended the Moro rebellion and the “handover” of Communist-cleared provinces to the local governments, a more prominent role for the Philippine Navy is being called for as the Armed Forces of the Philippines shifts from internal to external defense.
Recognizing the altered transnational threat in the region, the new Navy chief, Vice-Admiral Jesus Millan, aptly states that “the menace of various threats to national security and territorial integrity are real and present.”
Aligned with the National Security policy 2011- 2016 and the Philippine Defense Transformation 2012, the Navy is now being poised to beef up its amphibious capabilities. Its mandate: to protect maritime interests and to “ensure the sovereignty of the archipelago and the country’s Exclusive Economic Zone.”
Koh Swee Lean Collin, associate research fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies of the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore, notes that the makeup of an amphibious capability upgrade is inclusive of the development of “specialized amphibious ground forces” and the procurement of amphibious vessels such as landing platform docks (LPD), large amphibious landing ships and amphibious transport docks, landing helicopter docks (LHDs, such as amphibious assault ships), amphibious troop carriers, aircraft carriers, etc.
The strategic importance of these forces is based on the increasing requirement of the militaries for airlifts and sealifts for transporting supplies, relief personnel, water and relief goods overseas and in locations ravaged by disasters. Because ASEAN has been wanting of these capabilities, a collective response expected of an emergent political and security community fell short during Typhoon Haiyan.
As in all other choices that the Philippines has to make, the military has to contend with either a territorial or a humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR)-oriented defense.
To Wu Shang-su, RSIS research fellow, the choice is a zero-sum game that would translate to giving priority to sea-control and sea-denial-capable patrol vessels, fast-attack crafts and the like, over sea lift-capable amphibious forces. The dilemma is further compounded when neighbours in the region factor in these choices in making their own external threat calculations. For instance, China has viewed the Philippines’ joint and interoperability exercises with the United States as part of the US’ Asia-Pacific “rebalancing” strategy and a realist positioning to boost the Philippines’ claims in the South China Sea.
RSIS analyst Euan Graham’s pragmatic perspective highlights the duality of purpose of certain types of amphibious forces such as frigates which can be positioned in realpolitik terms and for humanitarian assistance. Objectives of “force mobility,” “territorial defense,” and “power projection” can be achieved when amphibious forces are deployed for joint exercises. At the same time, large amphibious landing ships (LALS) are able to perform the peacetime functions of patrolling, crisis response and HADR. During Haiyan, LALS were used to transport personnel, goods and vehicles.
As has previously reported, the recently concluded agreement between the Philippine government and an Indonesian naval firm will build up the Philippine Navy’s LALS capability in 2016.
But how can the goals of minimum credible deterrence and active archipelagic defense be sustained after the end of President Aquino III’s term in 2016? What progress has been made in the non-materiel areas of doctrine, force structure and human resources? What is the emergent role of the Philippine Army and how effectively does the Army Transformation Roadmap pave the way for a paradigm and operational shift? How much attention has the government paid to police reform?
[Alma Maria O. Salvador, PhD, former chair of the Political Science Department of Ateneo de Manila University, is an assistant professor of international relations and the convener of the Working Group on Security.]
http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=time-to-reorient-the-philippine-navy&id=97640
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