Saturday, April 20, 2013

ANAD: Reestablishment of the CPP--CPP Five Year Plan (2010-2015)

Posted to the anti-communist ANAD Facebook page (Apr 16): Reestablishment of the CPP--CPP Five Year Plan (2010-2015)


Pambansa-Demokratikong Paaralan (PADEPA)

PADEPA 101

LESSON FOR THE DAY: April 16, 2013

... THE REESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

By Arthur J. Tariman
National Council Member, ANAD Party-list


CPP Five-Year Plan (2010-2015)

• “The NPA must firmly and vigorously pursue the strategic line of protracted people's war. This involves encircling the cities from the countryside and accumulating sufficient armed strength here over a protracted period of time until it gains the capability to launch the strategic offensive against the enemy holdouts in the cities and seize political power on a nationwide scale…”

• “It must exercise flexibility in the use of tactics of concentration, dispersal and shifting. It concentrates strength superior to that of a target enemy unit for attack. It disperses to deprive the enemy of any visible target or when it conducts mass work among the people. It shifts position when it evades the attack of a superior enemy force and maneuvers to gain time or an advantageous position.”

• “The existing 110 guerrilla fronts must continuously be developed so that all or most of them become company-size fronts and give rise to new guerrilla fronts. They must increase to at least 180 guerrilla fronts in the next five years…”

Comment: This is in consonant with the objective of one guerilla front for each rural congressional district in the country.

• “Guerrilla fronts adjacent to each other are clustered to form a wider war theater that enables a wider scope of command, coordination, mutual support and maneuver…”

Comment: Such is the case in Claver, Surigao del Norte where three guerilla fronts had combined their strengths to simultaneously attacked three mining and mineral processing firms.

• “The Party must direct the formation of various levels of command in order to make effective deployment of NPA units for various objectives on varied scales…”

• “The NPA has already accumulated a critical mass for bold intensification of guerrilla warfare and advance toward a higher stage in the people's war. The people's army must relentlessly launch tactical offensives in order to seize weapons for creating new units, to increasingly change the balance of forces and to move from the stage of strategic defensive to the strategic stalemate. It must aim to accumulate 25,000 rifles in order to develop into the stage of the strategic stalemate…

• “Every level of command and every unit of the NPA must be conscious of its current armed strength, estimate and plan or target how many more weapons can be seized within a certain period and how to carry out the tactical offensives to seize weapons. The people's army must always be alert to opportunities for tactical offensives aimed at seizing weapons.

• “The whole array of the structure of force of the NPA which should include regional forces, local forces, people's militia and urban partisans must continue to wage intensive and extensive guerrilla warfare on the basis of an ever widening and deepening mass base in order to seize firearms and develop the capability of platoons and companies to wipe out enemy units. The main form of tactical offensives must be annihilative, the objective being to wipe out enemy units in order to seize weapons and demoralize the enemy forces.”

Comment: Heavily-guarded mining sites are good sources of firearms as proven in the Claver incident and other NPA raids and attacks prior to it. Additionally, the NPA has increased the use of roadside improvised explosive devices or IEDs targeting military vehicles that ferries troops and weapons. They are also targeting weak and/or isolated police and military detachments and patrol bases in the countryside, and ill-manned police stations in far-flung municipalities. Given a chance, they raiding parties of the NPA would kill everyone in a military detachment or police station to seize weapons and to demoralize government forces.

• “But certain other tactical offensives must be undertaken to inflict attrition and wear down the enemy forces. These include partisan warfare in urban areas, sparrow warfare, sniping operations, land mine warfare, interdiction of the fuel and supply lines of the enemy and destruction of military vehicles, depots and other fixed installations that are being used against the people's army…”

Comment: The NPA has been carrying out all these instructions from the CPP Central Committee.

TO BE CONTINUED.
 

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