IT is not foolish to think that a head-on collision with the People’s Republic of China will force the Philippines to its knees. That is something we cannot deny. Our military is in such a state of disrepair that it would seem ridiculous to face China now. And even if our armed forces are in good condition, chances are they will be crushed the moment they reach disputed waters, because, if the Chinese so chooses, for whatever silly reason they may have, they could squash us like ants with a push of a button.
The military fleet responsible for asserting China’s claims to the West Philippine Sea (South China Sea) is the South Sea Fleet. Although it is the last of China’s three naval fleets to be modernized, its campaign to upgrade highlighted some of the latest in sea-attack capabilities.
According to a paper by Felix K. Chang, titled “Transforming the Philippines’s Defense Architecture: How to Create a Credible and Sustainable Maritime Deterrent,” the South Sea Fleet has more than enough capability for any faceoff on and around the disputed islands in the West Philippine Sea.
“In the last decade,” Chang writes, “its subsurface force added two Shang-class nuclear attack submarines, as well as four Kilo-class, three Song-class and the first of the newest Yuan-class diesel-electric submarines. Meanwhile, its surface fleet added a Luhai-class, two Luyang I-class, and two Luyang II-class destroyers, as well as four Jiangwei II-class and two Jiangkai-class frigates to its inventory. And it expanded its amphibious-lift capacity with two Yuzhao-class landing platform docks and an assortment of new-build landing ship tanks, landing ship medium, and landing craft utilities, which can better support the sort of ship-to-shore missions needed in the Spratly [or Kalayaan Group of] Islands.”
Obviously, a possible faceoff with the Goliath that is China doesn’t bode well for the Philippines. The Armed Forces of the Philippines’s 2012 to 2018 Capability Upgrade Program only went so far as to get two Hamilton-class cutters from the United States that were once fitted with RGM-84 Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles and anti-submarine warfare equipment. All they have today are an air-search radar system, a helicopter pad and one Phalanx close-in weapons system for anti-air defense. Anything a tad sharper than that would cost the country an arm and a limb.
It is clear in Chang’s assessment, however, that a good buying strategy might garner for the Philippines a bit of an edge. Going conventional, like off-the-cuff purchase of ships and jets, should take second fiddle to a more “unconventional” approach to upgrading our defense capabilities. “Arms procurement must not only adhere to a coherent and comprehensive external defense concept, but also fully consider whether [or not] the operational lifetime costs of those arms can be maintained [with a] long-term budget,” he writes. There are less costly alternatives in the market.
Chang advises to use Kalayaan and Palawan province’s strategic location to our advantage. New lower-cost, lower-maintenance technologies for coastal defense, like the US’s RGM-84L Harpoon and RGM-109B Tomahawk; India’s BrahMos; and Russia’s P-800 Yakhont, might just put the Chinese naval forces at bay. Their rapid deployment along Palawan’s coastal network makes these technologies hard to pinpoint without going deep into Philippine air space.
The idea, Chang says, is to look for alternatives, to not go hastily into a buying spree every time the budget allows; it must be part of the overall strategy. Not for all the tea in China will the Philippines surrender its claims and honor, that’s certain. But let us never forget that having brains to go with strategic might is more than half the battle won.
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