COSTS OF CAPITULATION | Strategic implications of Philippine response in Taiwan crisis

From InterAksyon (May 24): COSTS OF CAPITULATION | Strategic implications of Philippine response in Taiwan crisis
By: Jose Antonio Custodio, Special to InterAksyon.com

On May 9, 2013, a Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources patrol vessel, the MCS 3001, encountered the Taiwanese fishing vessel Guang Ta Hsin 28 within Philippine waters. Although the Taiwanese government has claimed that the fishing boat was within their territory, several facts that contradict this claim of Taiwan is that their fishermen frequently poach in the Philippines and Philippine patrol vessels never stray outside of the country’s territorial waters. To further emphasize this, given the materiel deficiencies of the Philippine Coast Guard, the BFAR, and the Philippine Navy as compared to our neighbors in the region, the Rules of Engagement are so strict that it will be out of character to imagine any Philippine patrol vessel going gung-ho in our territorial waters and Exclusive Economic Zone. The policies guiding Philippine maritime enforcement agencies frequently use the term “monitor” which reveals a probable intention not to create international incidents that would put the government in a difficult situation vis-a-vis the country’s more powerful neighbors. This monitoring policy of the Philippines has been roundly condemned by many Filipinos for being too meek in its approach to constant intrusions and poaching by Chinese vessels whether they are from China or Taiwan. Ironically, foreign ministry statements from Beijing and Taipei depicting the Philippines as being arrogant, savage, and barbaric in its protection of its territorial waters are so far from reality. These statements are definitely not aimed against the Philippines but toward the Chinese public to generate support for whatever policies both Beijing and Taipei have to further their own national and political interests.

Despite Taiwan’s near saint-like depiction of the fisherman who died, Chinese and Taiwanese fishermen are a rowdy bunch and have engaged in aggressive acts against Japanese, Vietnamese, and even American vessels. There are also many cases of Taiwanese fishermen routinely abusing Filipinos working in their fishing boats in our country’s northern waters. It is bad enough that Taiwanese fishermen poach in Philippine waters, but what makes it worse is that they use our own poor countrymen to do the dirty work for them. Some Taiwanese fishing vessels also are used for smuggling operations by transnational crime syndicates thereby adding another dimension to the issue of monitoring the movement and taking effective measures against these ships and boats in our territory. Thus, the contention of the PCG personnel manning the MCS 3001 is believable that the Guang Ta Hsin 28 was in Philippine territory and it tried to ram them. Since BFAR vessels are usually made of fiberglass, the consequences of a ramming attack would most likely be lethal to it. Still, the incident at sea does reveal certain matters that the Philippines must address in the protection of its maritime interests.

The phenomenon of the Strategic Corporal or in this case the Strategic Seaman

The term Strategic Corporal is lengthily defined as: the notion that leadership in complex, rapidly evolving mission environments devolves lower and lower down the chain of command to better exploit time-critical information into the decision-making process, ultimately landing on the corporal, the lowest ranking non-commissioned officer, typically commanding a fire team of 4 individuals or a squad of 13 individuals (three fireteams plus NCO). In very rapidly evolving mission situations, obtaining mission instructions from remotely located command may result in mission failure, or in casualties to both force personnel and civilians. Conversely, misusing this kind of responsibility may result in personal liability for the team leader: a decision executed to respond to situational needs may result in later prosecution as the team leader's actions are reviewed by higher authorities.

In another definition: With the onset of the information age and the omnipresence of the media (both social and old), the decisions taken by tactical-level commanders can readily resonate at the strategic level. So the concept of tactical commanders needing to understand the strategic effects of their decisions has been taught as a fundamental part of professional military education.

This can be readily applied to the MCS 3001 crew. They were ordered into the operational area by the government to protect Philippine maritime interests. They were caught in a tense confrontation with an aggressive Taiwanese vessel that demanded quick action. The commanding officer made a judgment call to engage the Taiwanese vessel due to its aggressive actions, suspicions about its purpose in the area, and even the vulnerabilities of his boat. The initial PCG statement explaining this incident was strong and it supported the crew of the MCS 3001 by saying no apologies were forthcoming. However as the days passed and the Taiwanese government delivered threat after threat to the Philippines and irresponsibly targeted Filipino OFWs in Taiwan, the Philippine government made an about-face and issued several apologies which were all rejected by Taiwan. The PCG crew were then subjected to an investigation which although being a standard operating procedure unfortunately became a feasting ground for some Philippine media outfits in portraying the issue as a Taiwan mess just to take anti-administration potshots. The issue of the OFWs further divided policy and opinion makers between those who wanted to take a strong stand and those who wanted to appease Taiwan. Taipei, sensing Filipino disunity, then ramped up the situation further by implementing freezing of hiring of OFWs and even engaging in military exercises near the Philippines, while it did nothing to curb ultra nationalistic comments in their media against Filipinos.

As the Philippines has declared through the words of President Aquino in a previous state of the nation address that “what is ours is ours.” Hence when it comes to our territorial and EEZ interests, more incidents like this are to be expected in the near future. Even if the government strictly implements a monitoring only policy with no engagement, it will not mean that such encounters will not happen especially since the situation in such areas is very fluid (pun intended). In this regard, the government must be prepared to use all of its instruments of national power to communicate a clear and decisive message in defense of the interests of the nation very much as the Taiwanese are doing in this situation. Failure to do so will only result in demoralization among the uniformed services, disunity among the Filipino people, and opportunities for countries we have issues with such as Taiwan and China to exploit us.

The overstated OFW factor

The moment the Taiwanese threatened the Philippines with the OFW freeze, it effectively constrained the actions of the Philippine government as voices counseling restraint resonated both within the administration and from the private sector. The problem is that if the Philippine government’s decisions are a product of knee-jerk reactions without a careful overall assessment of Taiwan’s reliance on skilled and semi-skilled Filipino labor then we may be looking at the problem from a position of weakness. Usually, Philippine assessments on economic relations center on numerical attributes such as investment poured in, amount of dollars and pesos to be gained or lost, and on our vulnerability should this disappear. Rarely is the dependence of the host country examined in order to have a balanced view of the relationship and to see how the Philippines should take threats against the continued employment of its nationals. More often than not, knee-jerk reactions occur which are partly brought about by the emotional appeals of OFWs and companies engaged in economic activity with the host country who all call for resolutions to the crisis favorable to their situation. The knee-jerk reaction is done by the government as an expedient means of resolving a situation without resorting to substantial solutions that entail more effort and to avoid any media circus that may harm its approval ratings.

Granted that 85,150 Filipinos work as OFWs in Taiwan, the bluster in the Taiwanese government’s approach is seen in the fact that it did not immediately deport all Filipinos working there but announced a freeze in hiring. One can very well imagine the economic dislocation that will occur in Taiwan should all these Filipinos immediately leave which is something their government which is already struggling in its own approval ratings will not resort to. No country (especially a country as diplomatically isolated and in search of an identity as Taiwan) will do that as it will face international condemnation and it will find difficulty in hiring other nationalities as it will have a negative image as an inhospitable destination for OFWs. Not unless of course the Taiwanese themselves would want to do the backbreaking work done by the OFWs.

Hence the Philippine government should hold Taiwan accountable for any violent act committed on OFWs since the Taiwanese government chose to whip up national frenzy over the incident. If attacks against OFWs continue, the Philippines may choose to elevate its complaint to the United Nations Human Rights Council. The Philippine government should also ensure that the Taiwanese government guarantees the safety of all Filipinos working in Taiwan and not just merely warn our nationals to stay indoors in that country. This warning to our nationals in Taiwan to stay indoors, without a corresponding reminder to Taipei to at least desist from inflaming public opinion, gives the impression that the Philippine government is washing its hands of any involvement and responsibility if any additional attack on an OFW occurs. The Philippine government should also be true to its word to look for alternate employment areas or better yet to generate more jobs here in the Philippines to lessen the number of Filipinos working in Taiwan which has proven itself to be an unreliable partner in that economic relationship with the Philippines. After all, what is the use of favorable investment ratings given to the Philippines by international bodies if the Philippine government does not act as an effective enabler for investments to come in and generate employment?

Template for additional territorial grabs by Beijing

The Philippines should be very careful in the manner it handles this situation with Taiwan. This is not because of economic or political fallouts that we will have with Taipei, but due to the fact that Beijing is carefully studying the responses and reactions that we are making. They will then use this as a template to make their next territorial grab against the Philippines and as of now the Chinese have more than enough proof that our Achilles heel is not that we have a weak military capability, but that government resolve evaporates quickly especially when the OFW issue is exploited. With an estimated several hundred thousand Filipinos working in Hong Kong alone, Beijing will not think twice in using the OFW issue now that they see that such threats always remain effective against Manila.

Hence, if the Philippine government projects an image of total capitulation to Taiwan, it should expect more aggressive actions on top of already an increasing display of aggressive activities by China in the West Philippine Sea in areas like the Kalayaan Island Group specifically at Ayungin Shoal just a few hundred miles off Palawan. A few weeks ago, Beijing reiterated a demand for Manila to dismantle a grounded World War Two era landing ship at Ayungin Shoal that is being used as an installation by the Philippines to protect the country’s maritime interests in the area. The PLA-Navy has together with Chinese maritime patrol agencies already deployed several vessels including a missile frigate to pressure the Philippines to pull out the garrison. Manila has responded by activating a naval task force composed of several ships, including one of its most modern vessels, a British made Off Shore Patrol Vessel.

So far, the Philippines has stood pat on its decision not to give way, but the Philippine government should be prepared for other threatening moves once China presses further on Ayungin Shoal or elsewhere in the KIG (Kalayaan Island Group). These threatening moves will range from harassment of Philippine vessels at sea, hacking of Philippine websites, and even threats on continued Filipino OFW employment in China and Hong Kong. If the Philippine government caves in, no amount of diplomatic artistry from the Department of Foreign Affairs will be able to stem the onrush of Chinese annexation of the West Philippine Sea and the neutralization of the Philippine presence there. The Philippine government must make the choice between short term labor contracts affecting several hundred thousand Filipinos or the loss of strategic political, economic, and military interests in the resource-rich West Philippine Sea and in northern and eastern territorial waters that will affect the livelihood and food security not only of millions of Filipinos today but of generations to come.

(Jose Antonio A. Custodio is a security and defense consultant having worked at private sector and government offices. He was a technical adviser for a US defense company working for the US Pacific Command. He also specializes in military history and has post-graduate studies in history from the University of the Philippines.)

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/62535/costs-of-capitulation--strategic-implications-of-philippine-response-in-taiwan-crisis