STRUGGLE FOR THE SHOALS | Why does PH need to secure Ayungin, Scarborough?

From InterAksyon (Jul 31): STRUGGLE FOR THE SHOALS | Why does PH need to secure Ayungin, Scarborough?

A little more than a hundred nautical miles from the island of Palawan, a standoff involving half a dozen Filipino soldiers aboard a rusting and grounded World War II- era LST and several Chinese maritime surveillance and PLA Navy vessels is taking place at Ayungin Shoal (Second Thomas Reef). Though this maritime drama is small in nature, with only a tiny motley array of vessels and personnel on both sides deployed there, it does have a significant effect on the current security environment in the Asia Pacific Region.

This current standoff followed an earlier one last April 2012 when the Chinese sought to physically challenge Philippine control of Bajo de Masinloc (Scarborough Shoal). Initially the Philippine government sought to confront the Chinese vessels deployed at the shoal but subsequently withdrew on the assumption that China would abide by an agreement on mutual withdrawal forged behind closed doors. Unfortunately, China reneged on that agreement and instead of pulling out, refused to withdraw its own vessels even after the Philippines did.

That act by the Philippine government of pulling out its own vessel from Bajo de Masinloc was a mistake that may cost the country its claim to the shoal as China has begun to consolidate its occupation of the area.

This confrontation over shoals is not something totally new between China and the Philippines in the West Philippine Sea. In the late 1990s, both sides had been involved in terse diplomatic exchanges brought about by unilateral Philippine actions that China at that time was still not ready to physically challenge. BRP Sierra Madre, a Philippine Navy ship was run aground at Ayungin Shoal in 1999 and this was protested by the Chinese.

During the same period, there were several initiatives proposed within the Philippine government on what to do to strengthen its claim to Bajo de Masinloc, which during the time of the US bases had been used as a training site by American and even Philippine military forces. One such proposal was to erect a lighthouse in the shoal to serve as a navigation aid for ships travelling through the area. However, as is typical of Philippine initiatives and proposals, much talk was spent on this without anything happening and Manila sought other ways to reinforce its claim in the shoal.

Plans for the West Philippine Sea

The first decade of the 21st Century may be characterized as a period of wasted opportunities for the Philippines. Both the Estrada and Arroyo administrations became bogged down in internal security and even political destabilization that managed to bring down the former and almost toppled the latter administration.

This left the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs bereft of anything more substantial than diplomatic declarations against Beijing as the Philippine defense establishment was preoccupied with fighting terrorists in Mindanao (this became a priority for Manila following the 9-11 attacks), monitoring political opponents of the administration, and finally even trying to neutralize a resurgence of military disgruntlement that manifested itself in the large military mutinies of 2003 and 2006.

All of these made the Philippines neglect modernization of its security and defense sectors. Instead, Manila anchored its approach to dealing with the territorial disputes on mobilizing international opinion through diplomacy and the establishment of environmentalist policies. As an example, through the years, Bajo de Masinloc was the site of a project by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources and the University of the Philippines for raising and protecting large clams.

Fortunately, at Ayungin a continuous physical presence has been maintained for more than a decade which now in hindsight is a better approach in protecting sovereignty over the shoals and islets than by air or naval patrols or environmental policies.

There was hope at that time that the Chinese could still be won over to act more responsibly through confidence-building measures and track-2 informal levels of diplomacy which had become buzzwords in engagements with Beijing in the 1990s up to the first decade of the 21st Century.

Unfortunately it was a mistake to have relied on Chinese willingness to voluntary abide through codes of conduct and to even assume that Beijing was thinking in the same level as Manila. In fact as it turned out, the Philippines provided China with good catch for its ravenous fishing fleets at Scarborough Shoal when the BRP Gregorio del Pilar was pulled out from the shoal last year during that earlier standoff with the Chinese.

The Philippine strategy on the defense of Bajo de Masinloc was similar to defenders setting up a minefield against an attacking enemy and leaving it unguarded thus allowing the attacker to conveniently remove one mine after the other without any form of harassment. Leaving Bajo de Masinloc unguarded and occasionally visited by a Philippine vessel was tantamount to handing it over to the Chinese as every nation involved in the disputes in the West Philippine Sea are aware that physical occupation is ownership and China had made no secret of its desire to occupy that shoal.

As successive administrations in the Philippines hemmed and hawed on modernization and as the Philippine military debated about which threats to prioritize with internal security gaining dominance over external security, the Chinese continued with a massive build-up of its assets.

From limited presence in the 1990s the Chinese not only improved their structures in the West Philippine Sea but also increased the number of floating and even flying assets in the area. From 2009 onward, Beijing began to notify rival claimants that it would begin deploying maritime surveillance vessels at disputed areas.

In 2012, feeling that it was sufficiently equipped to make another grab against the Philippines, which Beijing saw as not serious in physically protecting its interests in the WPS, Chinese maritime vessels challenged the attempt of the BRP Gregorio del Pilar to accost Chinese poachers at Bajo de Masinloc. A few months later, Beijing announced the establishment of the Sansha Administrative Region that has administrative and military jurisdiction over the WPS.

These heralded a new phase in the confrontation at the WPS between Manila and Beijing. Whereas before the PN and PCG could still blow up Chinese markers and arrest Chinese poachers, these actions stopped as Manila sought to physically disengage from the area in the face of Chinese aggressive patrolling. This emboldened China as it realized that a few CMS/FLEC vessels backed by several old frigates aggressively deployed at the WPS are more than enough to prevent the PN and PCG from fully carrying out its missions to protect the maritime territorial and resource interests of the Philippines.

Chinese focus has now been directed at engaging and threatening Philippine garrisons at the Kalayaan Island Group. The first directly threatened was the tiny garrison at Ayungin Shoal.

Again, due to Manila’s indecision to modernize the Philippine military, particularly the Philippine Air Force, command of the air over the KIG has passed to the Chinese, whose combat aircraft have been patrolling in force over the WPS. No PAF aircraft now and even the planned purchase of Korean light combat aircraft which will take several years to complete can challenge that current Chinese air presence. This then leaves the PN and PAF totally ill-equipped in facing the Chinese challenge at Ayungin Shoal and despite these limitations, the personnel of these two services remain totally dedicated and committed to their duties and missions.

What the shoals represent

Recently, a Chinese general, Major General Zhang Zhaozhong spoke about a cabbage strategy which called for layers of defenses in Chinese claims at the WPS which would be set up following the ouster of Philippine presence in the area.

 China’s strategy for the area of which the shoals play a very important role is to provide a capability for the Chinese to interdict Philippine lines of communication between metropolitan Philippines and its garrisons at the WPS. Philippine supply runs to and from the KIG will be put to an end through a series of intimidations and threats ranging from statements coming from Beijing to harassments by PLA Navy and CMS/FLEC vessels of PN, PCG and civilian vessels.

If China manages to secure Ayungin Shoal, it will be a dagger pointed at both the garrisons at the KIG and at military and civilian installations at Palawan itself. The construction of a Chinese garrison at Ayungin will provide them with a means to effectively restrict Philippine vessels to Palawan’s immediate coasts and interfere with freedom of navigation there as Beijing will naturally project 200 nautical miles from it towards the Philippines as part of its own definition of an EEZ.

Worse is what a Chinese presence at Bajo de Masinloc represents for the Philippines. Although Manila simply saw that shoal as either a fishing area or even as a former training area of the Americans during the time of the bases, what it failed to realize is that this maritime geographic feature is a threat toward the centers of gravity of the Philippines. Consider that the shoal is a mere 124 nautical miles away from Subic, Zambales, which is a major economic and military hub of the Philippines. It is also near Clark Airport and Metro Manila with its extensive transport hubs as well as being the capital of the Philippines.

What will stop the Chinese from using Bajo de Masinloc as a forward operating base to initially monitor Philippine movements, contain them eventually, and even threaten them through the deployment of area denial missiles once structures are built there?

Although Bajo de Masinloc in Chinese hands serves to threaten the global commons in terms of commerce and freedom of navigation, it has an even more sinister role in threatening the political and economic centers of gravity of the Philippines itself.

(Editor's note: Jose Antonio A. Custodio is a security and defense consultant and was a technical adviser for a US defense company working for the US Pacific Command. He also specializes in military history and has post-graduate studies in history from the University of the Philippines. He also teaches history and political science at several universities in Metro Manila.)

http://www.interaksyon.com/article/67626/struggle-for-the-shoals--why-does-ph-need-to-secure-ayungin-scarborough