Rethinking Philippine Counterterrorism Strategy after the Marawi Siege

 Posted to Fulcrum: Analysis on Southeast Asia (Jun 11, 2024): Rethinking Philippine Counterterrorism Strategy after the Marawi Siege (By ANN BAJO)

A Philippine soldier (front) stands guard while children (behind) look out from their house, four years after Islamic State-inspired Muslim militants laid siege to the southern Philippine city of Marawi (Photo by AFP / Ferdinandh CABRERA)

Seven years after the siege of Marawi, the resurgence of the Abu Sayyaf Group has led to a renewed counter-push by the Philippine armed forces.

The 2017 Marawi siege marked a pivotal moment in the Philippines’ counterterrorism efforts. Initially perceived as a military success, the campaign was expected to contain and dismantle the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), after the latter had sought to take over the city in the country’s south. However, subsequent developments indicate that the group has regrouped under new leadership and is revitalising its brand and operations from previous strongholds. This has warranted a renewed and concerted push by the government and the military to put the group in check.

There are remnants of ASG members that still remain after the siege and a mixture of poverty, jihadism, and dissatisfaction with the Philippine government drove them to continue their terrorist activities. The ASG has also capitalised on deep-rooted political and socio-economic grievances of the community that fueled recruitment, violence and criminal activities. The group continues to carry out attacks and abductions.

In response, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) embarked on a heightened military campaign, notably concentrating efforts in Sulu through a substantial enhancement of Joint Task Force-Sulu’s operational capacity, which is the military unit organised to eradicate the ASG.

This expansion was underpinned by three strategic manoeuvres: augmenting JTF-Sulu’s force structure; enhancing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and implementing proactive civil-military operations (CMO). Given the evolving terrorist landscape in the Philippines, the country’s security forces continue to face challenges in counterterrroism including the complexities of understanding adversaries and garnering public support.

Following the death of ASG leader Isnilon Hapilon in November 2017 during the Marawi siege, the ASG came under new leadership and has persisted in its violent activities on the island of Sulu for over a year. Hatib Hajan Sawadjaan emerged as the group’s new leader and orchestrated the Jolo Cathedral bombing in Jolo, Sulu in January 2019. Despite his short-lived tenure and the defeat in Marawi, the ASG’s resilience underscores the entrenched nature of terrorist networks within their communities, challenging the efficacy of a recurrent ‘decapitation’ strategy. Marawi emerged as a catalysing event that heightened militarised responses to terrorism..

Notably, the Philippines escalated its military campaigns in Sulu which was partly driven by President Rodrigo Duterte’s expedited deadlines to quash the ASG. This surge entailed the expansion of military operations on the island, including the activation of the Philippine Army 11th Infantry Division and the enlargement of JTF-Sulu, all aimed at decisively neutralising the ASG. The deployment of the 1st Brigade Combat Team further exemplified this militarised approach.

The Philippines has a long way to go before restoring peace to the area. While violence may not be eradicated anytime soon, it is necessary to reduce it to a level that can be managed by the local government.

In their quest to fight terrorism, the AFP being highly reliant on human intelligence looks into modernising its ISR capability. This will allow real-time access to necessary information that can aid in missions requiring urgency and capacitate units to conduct their operations directly and efficiently. The subsequent US$4 million acquisition of ScanEagle Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) from the US provided the Philippines with advanced ISR capabilities to support ongoing counterterrorism operations, as what exemplified in Marawi.

In addition to its collaboration with the US, the Philippines has actively pursued enhanced security cooperation with ASEAN member states through joint patrols and intelligence-sharing initiatives. An example is the Trilateral Cooperation Agreement between the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia, aimed at addressing maritime security challenges posed by the ASG in the Sulu Sea. Furthermore, initiatives like the “Our Eye” intelligence-sharing agreement with ASEAN underscores the imperative for collaborative approaches to counterterrorism at the regional level.

To complement the kinetic approach, non-military efforts are an essential ingredient in the accomplishment of the AFP’s mission. These efforts aim to operationalise existing policies and strategies that will help curtail terrorist recruitment and extremism amongst locals. However, these activities have become far more of a burden because of the lack of support from the local government and civil society. There has been minimal effort on the part of the local government to provide basic services, such as access to clean water, health services, and especially education, which is seen as one of the most critical solutions to prevent recruitment. Out-of-school youth have become the most vulnerable to extremist ideas and recruitment because they are not equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills to usher them into getting proper employment.

The military’s kinetic approach alone will not lead to the obliteration of the ASG. Thus the AFP is capitalising on support received from international partners to augment existing civil-military operations. The full-fledged support of the US military in counterterrorism ushered in medical supplies in Sulu during the pandemic. Also, agencies of the United Nations provided grants to the Philippine government for Countering and Violent Extremism (CVE) efforts in Mindanao. One of these efforts is the Philippines’ formulation of the National Action Plan-Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP-P/CVE), which adopts a whole-of-nation approach, involving government agencies, civil society and religious institutions. This plan combines hard and soft approaches in addressing terrorism directly while targeting underlying drivers of radicalisation. It was endorsed by international bodies like the United Nations and the Australian government which signifies a nuanced response to terrorism. The NAP-P/CVE highlights the role of government agencies in deradicalization that removes the burden from the AFP in conducting CVE and will allow them to focus on sustained military operations down south.

The Philippines has a long way to go before restoring peace to the area. While violence may not be eradicated anytime soon, it is necessary to reduce it to a level that can be managed by the local government. The AFP’s enhanced military capabilities for the conduct of focused military operations to defeat local terrorist groups require much-needed assistance from the local government and international partners in facilitating non-military efforts to support the military’s initiatives. Whilst non-military efforts are expected to have an impact on the AFP’s current initiatives and, at the same time, produce long-term outcomes, managing the conflict requires an amalgamation of both military and non-military efforts. A whole-of-nation approach is needed to make these efforts possible. It is important for the national government to manage conflicts happening in Mindanao through a holistic approach to provide a dignified livelihood to communities and destroy the cycle of terrorism in the Philippines.

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[Ann Bajo is currently a PhD student at the University of Portsmouth in the United Kingdom and a former Defense Analyst in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.]

https://fulcrum.sg/rethinking-philippine-counterterrorism-strategy-after-the-marawi-siege/