In Photo: A soldier stands beside bullet-riddled gate and walls in an area where government troops battled Islamic extremists in Marawi City on June 15, 2018.
IN May last year, it took the Marawi siege for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to learn its lesson—the urgent need for its troops to train, equip and improve their skills in urban warfare.
Thirteen months later, and this time, in the province of Samar, it took both the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the military to learn another invaluable lesson—the need for a more “realistic” coordination.
While both events happened in different settings with different objectives, both happened under the same course of combat operations.
While investigations are still being conducted into the events, including possible lapses, leading to the killings of six rookie policemen in the rather so unfortunate “misencounter” in Samar, officials are already laying the cornerstone that governs coordination between the police and the military in future combat operations.
As to how this coordination should be properly conducted, relayed, and to whom, should be incorporated into the report that is probing the “whys” of the debacle that also wounded nine other policemen.
To spell out the importance of coordination, which is being pointed to as the culprit behind the debacle, AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Carlito Galvez Jr. even went as far as suggesting the crafting of “future joint campaign plans” with the PNP so that “at least, coordination will be strong.”
While the policemen may have coordinated with a detachment near the operational area in Santa Rita, Samar, Galvez said protocols may not have been followed that may have precipitated the incident.
“It’s on the protocols which we have been implementing, our joint letter directive in operations… we have our own protocols in the Armed Forces…[that are] also different from the protocols of the PNP,” Galvez said.
Friendly fire
The Samar misencounter evoked three tales about the deaths of soldiers from friendly fire while they were on combat operations.
In May and July last year, 12 soldiers who were among those operating against members of the Islamic State and the Maute Group in Marawi City were killed after bombs dropped by Air Force planes hit the operating troops.
Such incidents, no matter how bitter, are considered as a “fog of war,” according to military public affairs office chief Col. Noel Detoyato, adding that the Samar misencounter and the deaths of soldiers in the bombing run in Marawi are two different things.
“Fog of war, meaning you already have the information, you know you already knew everything, but in the middle, something crops up which you do not know,” he said. “And it happens.”
Detoyato said that in an urbanized warfare setting, soldiers could suffer disorientation, especially if they happen to operate in an unfamiliar area.
“This is the characteristic of urbanized terrain,” he said.
The military public affairs office chief said the technical side of combat operations entails a lot of work, with soldiers even needing to visit the exact area of operations to determine and establish the distance and field of fire, among others.
The Samar incident is a different thing, since according to Detoyato it needs more detailed information.
In June 2014, six elite soldiers were also killed after a howitzer fired by the Marines hit them, instead of its intended targets who are members of the Abu Sayyaf Group in Sulu.
The Marines, at that time, were providing fire support for their colleagues who were in the middle of an operation against the terrorists.
Military officials blamed that incident on “stress.”
Joint training
In order to avoid future misencounters, Galvez even considered the prospect of the military holding a joint training with the PNP in a higher form of coordination, something that PNP chief Director Oscar Albayalde was very much amenable to.
“We talked about joint campaign planning in the future. Our plans are integrated. We will also have joint interagency training,” he said.
Galvez said the PNP and the military will come up with protocols on coordination, which is multilevel or from top to bottom and down to the operating units.
An earlier news statement by Local Government Secretary Eduardo Año said protocols exist between the PNP and the AFP governing operations, but he did not elaborate on what these protocols are.
“There are existing protocols between the Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines in field operations. We will try to determine why these were not followed and if these need review and modifications,” Año, a former chief of staff of the AFP, said.
Coordinative effort
Año may be referring to the Joint Peace and Security Coordinating Center (JPSCC) that was struck in 2010 by the PNP and the AFP, which even covered their joint security activities in times of elections.
The JPSCC governs the execution of plans on joint military and police operations against lawless groups, criminal elements, private armed groups, and other threat groups within their areas in support of local government units and government agencies in need of military and police assistance.
This is the reason why some police or military operations were joined by forces from each side.
‘Overbearing’
Some officials in the PNP said the overbearing pressures being exerted by Albayalde on his police commanders may have contributed to the debacle that befell the rookie policemen.
Police commanders from regional directors down to city and municipal chiefs of police are being rated and evaluated on a monthly basis for their performance, and for those who will not fare well, they will be relieved of their posts.
Elite units, on the other hand, such as the Special Action Force and Regional Mobile Force Battalions, especially those deployed on the ground, are required to conduct one major operation and two minor operations with positive results on a monthly basis.
Those who were killed are members of the 805th Company of the Regional Mobile Force Battalion 8.
Given that the AFP has been lamenting that the bulk of its annual budget is being eaten up fighting the nearly four-decade communist insurgency, it’s deplorable, note military observers, that other State forces—like the police—which could help fight the “enemy,” are in fact being decimated by such incidents as the Samar “misencounter.” And that’s a problem that tweaking protocols may not easily resolve.
https://businessmirror.com.ph/treachery-of-the-fog-of-war/
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