This urgent motion for reconsideration (UMR) pertains to the mutual terminations of the respective unilateral ceasefires first by the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and New People’s Army (NPA) effective 11 February 2017, on one hand, and followed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
This UMR is personally occasioned by haunting visions of coming sad homecomings of fallen rebels and soldiers returning for the last time to hometowns in my province Camarines Sur and the uBicol region. This UMR is addressed to both sides, but mainly the CPP-NPA leadership for initiating the ceasefire termination, with the GRP only reluctantly following suit as it is the side clearly more keen about the ceasefire but of course cannot allow its troops to be just on the defensive receiving end of NPA tactical offensives.
In a manner of speaking, the main ground for this UMR is “prematurity” -- if we may adopt this term which was the ground used by the Supreme Court in recently dismissing the petitions of PHILCONSA and others relevant to another peace process, that between the GRP and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The petitions questioning the constitutionality of the 2012 Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro and the 2014 Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro were deemed “premature” without the implementing Bangsamoro Basic Law. But that is another story.
It is in our view premature or too early to terminate the reciprocal unilateral ceasefires of the CPP-NPA and GRP-AFP. First of all, “it does not compute,” so to speak, in relation to the recently concluded “successful” third round of formal peace talks between the GRP and the National Democratic Front of the Philippines (NDFP) in Rome last January 19 to 25 where the parties achieved on six major issues listed on their January 18 common agenda. In their Joint Statement, the parties noted that their unilateral indefinite ceasefire statement and behavior “remain in place” although “there are issues and concerns related thereto.”
And so, the two ceasefire committees (CFCs) were to meet again on February 22-27 to tackle an interim bilateral ceasefire, for which the GRP CFC had already submitted a draft Agreement to the NDFP CFC which “said that it will seriously study the proposal, submit comments and may provide its own updated version of its proposed draft agreement for an interim bilateral ceasefire.”
It is such an interim bilateral ceasefire -- with clear definitions and parameters -- that precisely would address what the CPP-NPA cited as its loaded second reason for terminating its unilateral ceasefire: “The GRP has treacherously taken advantage of the unilateral declaration of interim ceasefire to encroach on the territory of the people’s democratic government.” As GRP Panel Chairperson Secretary Silvestre H. Bello III said, without clear definitions and parameters, “you won’t know the violations.” Both sides have however submitted to each other documented complaints of ceasefire violations, the NDFP typically submitting more complaints than the GRP.
But despite all of those complaints, it is fair to say that the reciprocal unilateral ceasefires have held since last August. At least between the AFP and NPA, there have been no notable armed hostilities and consequent casualties. Ironically, these have happened only since the time of the Rome talks, starting with the January 21 Makilala, North Cotabato clash where one rebel was killed (with the NPA claiming eight soldiers killed) and leading up to encounters after the CPP-NPA declaration terminating the unilateral interim ceasefire and where at least six soldiers were killed. That looks just like a morbid preview that the worst is yet to come. And if it is the AFP that the NPA says has “waged offensive operations,” why are there disproportionately more soldier casualties? (Of course, we know that that does not always follow, as most notably shown in the Mamasapano encounter.)
Such encounters that may violate the ceasefire can be sorted out and reduced by a good ceasefire agreement (which is necessarily bilateral) but will also need more trust and confidence-building, or as Article 19 of the Civil Code provides, “observ[ance] of honesty and good faith.”
The CPP-NPA’s framing of the second reason for its ceasefire termination shows the strong residual lack of trust in the GRP by using the phrase “has treacherously taken advantage....” It also speaks of GRP “encroach[ment] on the territory of the people’s democratic government…. at least 500 barrios [the present term for this is barangays] within the authority of the revolutionary government.”
The NDFP or the CPP-NPA cannot expect the GRP to take sitting down or let pass that assertion of another government in the country. But the experience in the peace process with the MILF shows that there are mutually acceptable ways to get around such assertions without the rebel side necessarily dropping them, as well as ways to build trust between two erstwhile mortal combat enemies of different religions at that.
The first reason for the CPP-NPA’s ceasefire termination -- that “The GRP has not complied with its obligation to amnesty and release all political prisoners” -- strikes us not only as premature but also not enough reason to terminate the ceasefire. The matter of amnesty and releases was in fact covered by the Rome Talks Joint Statement with certain specific measures. Notably, both “Parties agreed to continue to study the issuance of an amnesty proclamation consequent to the substantial progress of the peace negotiations” (underscoring supplied). Actually, in the normal course of armed conflicts and under international humanitarian law (IHL), amnesty is granted “at the end of hostilities.” In this concept, the termination of the unilateral interim ceasefire in fact tends to make any grant of amnesty premature, if we may use this word again.
The negotiations are not yet at the stage where the fate of the envisioned comprehensive agreements on socio-economic reforms (CASER) and political and constitutional reforms (CAPCR) is clear, one way or the other, and that may take about two years yet, according to remarks by some NDFP personalities. But the Rome talks achieved a breakthrough in the discussion of socio-economic reforms, achieving understanding on its first four items, including the most crucial item of agrarian reform. The initial exchange of drafts and initial discussions on political and constitutional reforms were said to “have advanced ahead of schedule.” So, what gives? If the ceasefire were to be terminated, let it be mainly due to failure to achieve the CASER and CAPCR, and not non-substantive agenda matters like amnesty and releases.
Various NDFP personalities have remarked that the release of all political prisoners should not be tied or held hostage (used as “aces” or bargaining chips) to the forging of an interim bilateral ceasefire but it is the NDFP and the CPP-NPA that appear on the other hand to have tied or held hostage a ceasefire (even its unilateral one) to the release of all political prisoners. The latter do represent about 400 lives who seek to regain their lost freedom. On the other hand -- and we are not counter-posing different lives that matter -- how about the thousands who will likely lose no less than their very lives with the resumption of armed hostilities?
Is the GRP’s not (yet) complying with its obligation to amnesty and release all political prisoners reason enough to terminate the ceasefire with all the morbid consequences of that? As it is, the Rome Talks Joint Statement indicated at least three commitments of the GRP relevant to the release of political prisoners: first, facilitating the release of three remaining NDFP consultants; second, expeditiously processing the release of all the political prisoners listed by the NDFP starting with the 200 qualified prisoners; and third, filing immediately the necessary manifestations in support of the motions for temporary liberty of the NDFP consultants and staff granted bail and released last August. These all need reasonable time to do. Surely, that time has not yet lapsed so soon after the Rome Talks. So again, what gives? But President Duterte for his part should not also prejudge the matter by saying that the rebel demands “are too huge that it is impossible to meet, or even work out a compromise.” Try hard first.
The matter of amnesty and releases -- and for that matter ceasefire -- can and should be addressed parallel to but separately from the substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations. The latter are or should be the main concern of the two Negotiating Panels and the Reciprocal Working Committees (RWCs), while there are already the two CFCs to focus on the ceasefire where violations may be also dealt with by the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) -- for which Supplemental Guidelines are among the achievements of the “successful” Rome talks. The JMC or better still some other special lawyer-heavy joint committee can focus on amnesty and releases.
Following the framework of the 1992 Hague Joint Declaration, amnesty, releases and ceasefire can be treated as “specific measures of goodwill and confidence-building to create a favorable climate for peace negotiations” as distinguished from “the [four-item] substantive agenda of the formal peace negotiations.” Goodwill and confidence-building are important for the substantive negotiations to prosper. The premature termination of the unilateral interim ceasefire has already cast a dark pall (or is it a dark spell?) over the peace negotiations. Witness President Duterte’s pessimistic remark that “I guess that peace with the communists cannot be realized during our generation.”
The CPP-NPA and a number of personalities associated with it -- and strangely, in fact, some AFP spokespersons -- say, as if to console us, that “it is possible to negotiate while fighting.” But the mode of “talking while fighting” has been tried for decades without much progress beyond the first substantive agenda item on human rights and IHL (with the CARHRIHL) often because substantive talks are sidetracked by certain hostile acts, notably by arrests of NDFP-claimed consultants, on the ground. It will be the same old dynamic again where the revival of the JMC will only reprise a deluge of complaints for violations of human rights and the subsequent investigations that partake of a propaganda war that matches the intensity of the fighting on the ground. We might as well throw goodwill and confidence-building out of the window. This is in stark contrast to the trust between the MILF and then President Aquino which was acknowledged to be the key factor that carried to completion the substantive negotiations on that Moro front.
The CPP-NPA says that “We oppose the use of interim ceasefires as basis for a protracted or indefinite ceasefire without substantial benefit for the people and their revolutionary forces and for laying aside peace negotiations on substantive issues such as social, economic, political reforms. Such is tantamount to the capitulation and pacification of the revolutionary people and forces.” Again, it is too early to pronounce that this has come to pass. The Rome Talks Joint Statement certainly does not lay aside, but on the contrary advances peace negotiations on substantive issues such as social, economic, political reforms. Surely, substantial benefit for the people in terms of those reforms will take some more time, at least to make a definitive pronouncement either way.
NDFP Panel Chairperson Fidel V. Agcaoili himself was cited in the media in the build-up (or build-down?) to the Rome Talks as saying that a peace pact was unlikely before 2019. NDFP Chief Political Consultant Jose Maria Sison for his part envisioned a CASER and CAPCR approved within the first two years of the Duterte government so that these agreements can be implemented for at least two years before the end of his term. This for Sison would “lay the full basis” of the last substantive agenda item agreement on the end of hostilities and disposition of forces (CAEHDF) “as early as 2020-21.” All these also in the context of a CPP policy of alliance and struggle with the Duterte regime. So, finally, what gives?
Given how the CPP-NPA Declaration terminating the unilateral interim ceasefire does not seem to square with the “successful” Rome Talks and the remarks of certain NDFP Panel personalities, perhaps the answer can be gleaned from a media report of Agcaoili saying that the decision to continue the unilateral ceasefire did not rest with the NDFP Panel alone but with the leadership of the revolutionary movement, a.k.a. the CPP Central Committee and the NPA National Operations Command, whose spokesperson at least in the person of Jorge “Ka Oris” Madlos who announced the Declaration is based in Mindanao, also the President’s home region where he admittedly had good relations with them.
Only last December 26, on the 48th anniversary of the CPP, its Central Committee stated among others that “The Party must further strengthen its leadership of the people’s war by firmly directing the New People’s Army in waging revolutionary armed struggle…. The Party continues to support the peace talks and other means for possible agreement with the Duterte government on cooperation to realize basic patriotic and social reforms… The unilateral ceasefire of the CPP and NPA has become increasingly untenable…. Thus, the termination of the CPP’s unilateral ceasefire declaration becomes finevitable…. Nonetheless, the Party and the NDFP remain open to forging a bilateral ceasefire that would take effect simultaneously with the release of all political prisoners…. The revolutionary forces estimate that negotiations on socio-economic reforms and political and constitutional reforms can be completed in one or two years. This will give the Duterte government and the NDFP at least four more years to implement the agreements and help improve the situation of the people.”
While alliance and struggle can indeed go together, it is hard to imagine the viability of armed struggle against one’s ally. It appears that, for the CPP-NPA leadership especially in-country, a protracted or indefinite ceasefire of even just five to six months is untenable for the primacy of waging the revolutionary armed struggle of the protracted people’s war (PPW). For this strategy, a return to arms must be called even at the risk of jeopardizing the peace negotiations and its envisioned reforms, even at the additional costs in terms of more thousands of lives lost (and they will no longer be around to benefit from the substantial reforms in case the negotiations succeed after all), AND even if Sison himself as well as especially the MILF experience has pointed out or shown that ceasefires do not necessarily blunt armed capacity and readiness in case it is needed. Apparently, there is still no CPP-NPA paradigm shift about armed struggle and people’s war -- in a subjective sense, as distinguished from an objective sense, this might be said to also be among “the roots of the armed conflict.”
It is of course understandable for the CPP-NPA to keep reaffirming its long-time PPW strategy which is responsible for its revolutionary gains and degree of its politico-military strength. Short of a paradigm shift, surely two years or so of giving ceasefire a chance to accompany substantive peace talks is a manageable revolutionary calculated risk compared to possible political, military and human losses due to a premature return to arms.
Please reconsider urgently and well your terminating the unilateral interim ceasefire.
[SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR. is a Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City, Camarines Sur. He is a long-time human rights lawyer; legislative consultant and legal scholar; peace advocate, researcher and writer. He is the author of a number of books on Philippine peace processes, including his latest How do you solve a problem like the GPH-NDFP peace process? (Siem Reap, Cambodia: The Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, 2016).]
http://www.bworldonline.com/content.php?section=Opinion&title=urgent-motion-for-reconsideration-of-the-ceasefire-termination&id=140924
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