Hopefully, Beijing will take the United States more seriously. But in case China chooses to test American resolve, Washington had better be sure that the cavalry is ready...
How the
At the time, the United States was still militarily engaged in South Vietnam ; and some officials feared that
the Gulftrex could turn into another Pueblo
incident (in which North
Korea seized an American surveillance ship
and imprisoned its crew). After a lengthy debate, the decision was made not to
use U.S.
forces to protect the ship, since it had already been warned that it would be
sailing in disputed waters; and a cable was sent to U.S. Pacific Command.
Underlying that decision was an assumption that the United States would remain neutral
in the region’s maritime disputes. In fact, American policy was to “not only be one of scrupulous noninvolvement, but of active
discouragement.”
For
decades thereafter, the cable’s underlying assumption set the pattern for a
hands-off U.S. policy
towards such maritime disputes in the region, including the South
China Sea . The United
States would not take sides in the disputes,
but would encourage the countries involved in them to resolve their conflicts
peacefully.
On Tuesday, it
seemed that Washington
was about to change that policy. A Pentagon official revealed that Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter had requested options for asserting the freedom of
navigation through the South China Sea . Those
options included sending American ships and planes within 12 nautical miles (22 kilometers) of
Chinese-held islands in the South China Sea .
There was precedence for this. The United States
similarly showed the flag in the Gulf of Sidra when Libya
claimed those waters and in the Persian Gulf when Iran preyed on international
shipping during the 1980s. A visible American military presence near the Spratly Islands
would also help steady U.S.
allies and partners in the region.
But
why was such a major policy shift necessary at all? Part of the answer lies in China ’s rise,
of course. Given its political and economic heft, China
feels that it can be more assertive in the South China Sea .
But another part of the answer lies in how President Barack Obama’s
administration has conducted its foreign policy. In almost every crisis it has
faced—in Egypt , Syria , Libya ,
Crimea and eastern Ukraine —it
has seemed unsure, both of itself and American interests. Its policies have
been perceived as confused and prone to vacillation. That has caused many Asian
leaders, including those in Beijing ,
to doubt American commitment and resolve. Indeed, Obama had to personally
travel to Asia last fall to reassure U.S. allies, who have come to see
the president as diffident about international security.
Given that
perception, China
sensed that it could afford to disregard the incremental signs of American
displeasure to realize its objectives. Neither the modest increase in American
military engagement with the region’s countries, nor the signing of the
Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United
States and Philippines
caused China
to relent. Finally, in December 2014, the U.S. Department of State directly
interjected itself into the South China Sea
dispute for the first time. It published a report that questioned the basis of China ’s
maritime claims. But rather than heed the American admonition, China
accelerated its land-reclamation activities across the region, creating about
2,000 acres of new land and its first airfield in the Spratly archipelago. Beijing clearly doubts
the credibility of the Obama administration to stand in its way.
Despite much talk
about its rebalance to Asia, the Obama administration has made few efforts that
have convincingly demonstrated its commitment to the region—surely nothing that
approaches China ’s
major military buildup or its $90 billion offer of economic development funds.
So far, the United States
has contented itself with repositioning its military assets across the
Asia-Pacific, rather than meaningfully adding to them.
How American
credibility is perceived could be heard in the remarkable tone of a speech
given by the U.S. ambassador
to the Philippines
in March 2015. He had to stress that “We make no pretense that we are helping the Philippines,”
as if to say: this time we really mean it. After all, the Obama administration
has complained about Chinese actions in the South China
Sea before, but has rarely taken a stand without an exit. It
revitalized the U.S. mutual
defense treaty with the Philippines ,
but then made clear that Philippine claims in the South
China Sea lay outside the treaty’s protection. China may have
seen that as another mixed signal.
The
United States now finds
itself in an unenviable position where it feels that it must respond to China ’s actions in the South
China Sea . No doubt Secretary of State John Kerry conveyed that
message to Beijing on his trip to China this
week. But at the moment the United States
is still in the middle of its rebalance to Asia .
It has only one littoral combat ship—the Fort Worth ,
based in Singapore —that can patrol near the Spratly Islands (which it
did for the first time on Monday) or quickly respond to a crisis there.
http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-about-get-tough-the-south-china-sea-12901
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