The Islamic State (IS) has aroused much media attention in
the Philippines Mindanao
rebels.
By Joseph Franco
Recent Philippine media reports has given the
erroneous impression that the Islamic State (IS) had arrived in force. Mayor
Rodrigo Duterte from Davao City “confirmed” the recruitment of youths in the
city; while former Philippine President Fidel V Ramos estimated 100 Filipinos
are undergoing training with IS in Syria
Notwithstanding their subsequent retractions and admissions
that information was derived from “raw intelligence” the reports had stirred
widespread discussion in forums and the media. Such discussions often feature
gross oversimplifications of conflict in the Southern
Philippines . National media had caricatured the belligerents in Mindanao , without looking into the greater context that
fuels the persistence of conflicts. Religion and ideology act as discourses for
justification rather than acting as the motivation in their use of violence.
The pre-eminence of material factors instead of ideational factors in
explaining conflict in the Southern Philippines
has long been recognised in studies by international organisations.
The Abu Sayyaf Group and the Western
Mindanao kidnapping “industry”
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) continues to engage in extortion
and engaging in kidnap-for ransom activities, considered by US special
operations forces as a “desperate bid”. Pundits making the claim of increased
Abu Sayyaf activity pointed out the growing number of cross-border raids into Eastern Sabah .
This conclusion fails to take into consideration the long
history of conflict and porous national borders. Violence in the maritime
region bracketed by Mindanao, Borneo, and Sulawesi
existed long before Islamist militants. Anthropological research has referred
to the existence of a contiguous “Sulu Zone” characterised by slave-raiding and
warfare, which in the contemporary period morphed into a hub for the illicit
small arms trade. Cultural artifacts from the area such as Tausug poetry and
folklore are replete with references to a “just war” and the preference for
combat. Combined with high levels of illicit firearm possession in Mindanao , what results is a potent mix of
socially-constructed inclination to violence and the material capability to
engage in such activity.
It is telling that the Philippine military refers to ASG
bands as “community armed groups”, wherein members nimbly switch allegiance
based on convenience. It is not uncommon for armed individuals whether or not
formally aligned with the ASG, to provide assistance to their relatives who are
formally linked to the Islamist group. ASG bands involved in kidnappings
operate akin to a cottage industry. The islands off the coast of Western Mindanao host a coterie of individuals who grab
the victims. “Facilitators” shunt the kidnapped to villages that provide “room
and board” (a euphemism for detention), and up to the local officials who act
as “negotiators”. It is a similar modus operandi used by organised kidnapping
groups operating elsewhere in the Philippines
Clan warfare and the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement
On the other hand, the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Movement
(BIFM) in Central Mindanao is mostly motivated
by clan conflicts. It is oft-ignored that the BIFM bay’at came with a major
caveat—explicitly stating they do not need financial or training support from
overseas.
Like the ASG, the BIFM had been a consistent fixture of
alarmist reporting emanating from Manila Central Mindanao , there is little evidence to
suggest that the BIFM ever had strong links with overseas groups, much less to
IS. Geography and demography would also not work in favour of foreign militants
considering taking refuge in BIFM areas. Central Mindanao, unlike the other
trade-centric cities of Mindanao , does not
house burgeoning communities of foreigners, previously exploited by JI
operatives to hide in plain sight.
In fact, the BIFM’s attacks can be correlated to the rice
harvest season as shown by prior research by the International Crisis Group.
What emerges is a pattern of parochial disputes (i.e. land ownership), overlain
with Islamist themes. A simple misunderstanding between a pro-government
militia farmer and a BIFM member may be misrepresented as a Muslim-Christian
clash by Manila-based media. Clashes between Muslim families follow the same template
but are spared of an “us-versus-them”, inter-sectarian rhetoric.
It is clear that the BIFM and ASG pledges are nothing more
than a superficial declaration of moral support. Community recruitment remains
as the mechanism of involvement in armed groups in Mindanao
and is no different from choosing a vocation. Neither group has a compelling
reason to link up with IS, considering the trade-off in terms of greater
pressure from state security forces. Kidnapping Malaysia-based traders and
Filipino civil servants makes Manila
Disconnect between “materialist” Mindanao
and ideological IS
Minimising actual operational/organisational links with IS
aligns with the role played by communities in facilitating ASG and BIFM
violence. The infusion of foreign influences would only disturb the delicate
balance of demographic, social, and economic factors that make ASG “community
armed groups” and BIFM “clans” sustainable. Such destabilisation in turn, can
disrupt the conduct of their illicit livelihood—kidnapping and extortion,
relied upon by these militants and their kin.
Nonetheless, these groups still pose a tangential threat to
Southeast Asia (SEA). While ideological indifference diminishes the potential
for organisational convergence with jihadi groups in the region, Mindanao retains the potential of acting as a logistics
hub for purchasing arms and explosives. In fact, materiel and even explosive
materials intended for the Singapore JI truck bomb plot in 2001 were mostly
procured from Mindanao . Without appropriate
intervention, Mindanao-based militant skill sets and weapons are vulnerable to
exploitation or even outright purchase. Such resources do not even have to come
from the ASG and the BIFM as the presence of an insecure and conflict-wracked
environment is sufficient to foster a marketplace of illicit resources.
On a positive note, the ongoing efforts to establish an
autonomous Bangsamoro sub-state in Mindanao will go a long way towards
undermining the material motivations of the militants in the Southern
Philippines . Effective self-governance by Filipino Muslims under
the Bangsamoro can also be a strong counterpoint to the erroneous and
simplistic discourse of IS—that Muslims can only thrive under a caliph.
Governments proximate to the “Sulu Zone” must not rely
heavily on counter-ideological solutions to address material-based problems.
Doing so would result in policy dissonance and would fail to capitalise on an
unrecognised vulnerability of IS-related discourse in the SEA region—the
Islamic State’s disconnect with Southern Philippines-based groups.
[Joseph Franco is an Associate
Research Fellow with the Centre of Excellence for National Security (CENS), a
constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University
[RSIS Commentaries are intended to provide timely and, where appropriate, policy relevant background and analysis of contemporary developments. The views of the author/s are their own and do not represent the official position of the S.Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), NTU, which produces the Commentaries.]
http://www.eurasiareview.com/13092014-islamic-state-southern-philippines-tenuous-links-militants-analysis/
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