Posted to the MILF Website (Nov 15):
Iqbal’s opening statement in Osaka University
Negotiating an agreement is difficult but implementing it is much harder
(A
Paper Read by Mohagher Iqbal, Chair of the MILF Peace Panel and Bangsamoro
Transition Commission, in a Forum Sponsored by Osaka University, Japan
on November 13, 2015)
One
of the hardest lessons learned in our peace process with the Government of the
Philippines (GPH) is that it is difficult to negotiate an agreement but the
implementation of the agreement is much harder to realize. Agreements are
pieces of paper and they will not implement themselves, but implementation
involves definitive and corresponding actions and programs for the Parties, as
part of their commitments and obligations, including legal process on the part
of the government. Besides, there are already so many players of varied
orientations, approaches, and motivations.
The
two concluding agreements, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) and
the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB), which are political
documents that seek to create a genuine autonomy for the Moros, cannot be
implemented unless an internal legal process through the enactment of a law, in
this case, the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL), will be passed by Congress. This
legal process is a unilateral responsibility of the government, which the MILF
has no direct or official participation. I will discuss this in more details,
as follows:
Let
us discuss negotiation first. Negotiation, as the word implies, is not an easy
matter. Getting people to compromise is usually not a wholesome offer. An idea
you think will work will not click to others. The challenge is rendered more
difficult if the agenda of the negotiation is not about simple matters, like
changing rules in an office or doing some adjustments on the salary scales of
employees, but, in the GPH-MILF peace negotiation, it is about solving the
Bangsamoro Problem or Question, which is about the “historic injustice”
committed against the Bangsamoro people. This is practically a centuries-old
conflict which is complex and complicated, encompassing political, military,
religious, social, cultural, economic, etc.
In
this engagement, it took the Government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) seventeen long and harsh years of negotiation,
11 government and four MILF negotiators, virtually involving five Philippine
presidents, and interspersed with three major wars, before they were able to
sign the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) on March 27,
2014.
To
illustrate one instance of this prolonged hard negotiation is the case of the
botched Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which was first
tabled for deliberation in December 2004 and only to be initialled on July 27,
2008. It took the Parties three years and eight months before they agreed on
the final text of the document. But their efforts did not pay-off,
because the Philippine Supreme Court subsequently declared it unconstitutional.
As a result, war ensued that displaced around one million people.
Our
negotiation with the government passed through difficult processes and bitter
experiences, such as impasses, withdrawals, cancellations, delays, walkouts,
shouting matches, no-showups, proximity engagements, back-channelling, etc.
Even the choice of negotiators and the personality of the facilitators were not
totally left to the discretion of the concerned party. Worse, sometimes, while
we were facing each other in the negotiating table, the armies of both Parties
were already engaged in battles in many frontlines in Mindanao.
From 1997 up to the remaining period of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in
2010, the ceasefire agreement was more breached rather than honoured, and, as
expected, the violations were mainly at the instances of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines (AFP) and its allies, the Police and paramilitary forces.
Now,
let me deal with the harder part of the peace process in Mindanao:
The implementation of the agreements. Since we started the peace
negotiation in 1997, the government and the MILF had signed more or less 100
agreements or documents, which culminated in the signing of the two most
important ones namely, the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012
and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. All these
agreements including the FAB and CAB are political documents and therefore, as
far as the establishment of the autonomous Bangsamoro is concerned, as proposed
in the FAB and CAB, a legal instrument, in the form of a law, hence, the
proposed BBL, will have to be enacted into law by Congress. This legal process
is a sole responsibility of the government. The MILF has no direct role.
Up
to now, the BBL is still languishing in the halls of Congress and under the
mercy of lawmakers, and oftentimes, tyrannized by anti-Moro lawmakers through
their endless and sometimes pointless interpellations. Clearly, some of them
are already filibustering the passage of the BBL.
Let
me further explain in details this difficulty, especially in term of the legal
process, as part of the implementation of the political agreements. Here is the
road map of that legal process:
1.The
15-man Bangsamoro Transition Commission (BTC) was created through an Executive
Order signed by President Benigno Aquino III in December 2012. Its tasks, among
others, is to draft the proposed BBL, which will be the governing law for the
Bangsamoro political entity;
2.The
BBL was submitted to the Office of the President (OP), which, after two months,
revised about 60 percent of the original draft; returned it to the BTC, which
in turn elevated it to the MILF and GPH peace panels to settle the outstanding
differences; and like the BTC, the peace panels have attempted but in vain to
fix the differences. Subsequently, the OP headed by the Executive Secretary and
the Chair of the BTC and MILF peace panel assumed the discussion. After four
meetings, two in Davao City and another two in Manila, they have settled all,
except seven, items which were elevated to President Aquino and Chairman Murad
to settle, which they did in September 2014;
3.On
September 10, 2014, in a formal ceremony in Malacañan Palace, President Aquino,
together with the Chair of the BTC and other high government officials,
officially turned over the BBL to the leaders of Congress, both the Senate and
the Lower House. This signalled the official legislative process to enact the
BBL into, but until now Congress is still deliberating on BBL with very little
hope of passing it soon. November-December is the fourth and probably the last
deadline Congress can still do it before President Aquino leaves office on June
30, 2016;
4.Granting
the BBL will pass in Congress and signed into law by the President, this will
still be subject for ratification by the people of the proposed autonomy. If
they ratify it, then it becomes a law; if not, then the law is dead;
5.Upon
ratification of the BBL, immediately the BTC will be phased out and the
Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA), which is vested with legislative and
executive powers, will be organized, which will act as the government, during
the transition period. Similarly, the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM) will also be abolished; and
6.The
BTA will exit immediately after the election for the regular Bangsamoro
Government takes place.
The
status of the BBL, as pointed out earlier, is clouded with uncertainty. We do
not know whether it will pass Congress or not or whether a bad BBL is in the
offing. The main reason for this, citing the statement of Cardinal Orlando
Quevedo, is the fears, hatred, prejudice, and paranoia of the majority
Christian populations against the Moros which are shared by many if not most
lawmakers. They feared that once Moros are given powers and access to
resources, they will secede from the Philippines and form an independent
state.
In
the House, it is plagued with continuous lack of quorum. Sometimes, out of more
than 240 members only 12 or 30 appeared in sessions. In the Senate, several
senators asked so many questions, some of which were very basic and should not
be asked at all.
If
the BBL does not pass, the political settlement of the armed conflict in Mindanao will also be put on hold. Consequently,
frustrations of the people especially Moros will also rise up which can lead to
many uncertainties.
Of
course, both Parties are expected to pursue the path of peace and maintain the
ceasefire on the ground, but the legal process will not take place immediately
after the new president gets into office in July 1, 2016. The new president
might change policy that is radically different from his or her predecessor.
The
MILF’s clout and legitimacy will also be put into question. Frankly, the
decision of the MILF to enter into negotiation with the government is not a
universal consensus. Many viewed the government as “enemy” and therefore cannot
be trusted. Expectedly, the so-called radicals and foes of the MILF will take
advantage of this situation to denounce the government of insincerity and the
MILF for adopting a wrong approach in settling the conflict in Mindanao.
Thank
you very much and good day to all!
