Posted to Geographical (Feb 23, 2023): USA moves to contain China with more military bases in the Philippines (By Tim Marshall)
A US Navy ship refuels in a US military base in Subic Bay, the Philippines. Image: Shutterstock
Tim Marshall takes a look at the US military base agreement with the Philippines, and what it means for China’s activity in the region
The USA is manoeuvring to place China in a ‘straitjacket’ designed to restrict its ability to bend neighbouring states to its will.
Many of us are familiar with the great straits of the world, such as Hormuz, Malacca and Bering. Less well-known is the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan. This may change with the recent military agreement between the Philippines and the USA.
US forces will now have access to four military camps in addition to the five they already use on a non-permanent basis. This will allow them to better monitor Chinese military activity in the region, to pre-position heavy weapons and to surge forces to key locations during times of high tension. The two countries will also partially integrate their command structures and increase their ability to carry out combined operations. US military parlance calls this ‘setting the theatre’. The Philippines’ position in territorial disputes with China will be strengthened and signals the fact that Manila has made its choice in which way to lean in the key geopolitical strategic contest of the 21st century. The deal also plugs the gap in the arc of pro-American countries that begins in Japan and stretches down to Australia via Taiwan.
The locations of the new bases haven’t been made public, but at least one is probably in the Caydon region of Luzon, which is the largest island in the Philippines archipelago and home to the capital. It’s in the north of the country and is the Philippines’ closest large landmass to Taiwan, which it faces across the 965-kilometre-wide Luzon Strait. Within the strait are several small islands, including Y’Ami Island, which is part of the Philippines, and Taiwan’s Orchid Island. Between these two is the Bashi Channel, which connects the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.
In 2015, the Chinese air force and navy held military exercises in the Luzon Strait. The following year, it sailed an aircraft carrier group through the Miyako Strait between Taiwan and Japan, and entered the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel. Exercises have continued ever since.
Beijing views these two passageways as their most important routes to the Pacific. If China controlled them, the potential for its navy to be contained in the China seas and for a naval blockade of its ports would be hugely reduced. It doesn’t matter that no-one is planning a blockade – only that one is theoretically possible. As a country reliant on exporting its manufactured goods, it must counter the possibility.
Looking out to sea, China sees a wall consisting of islands and US naval power, which, together with America’s allies, could deny it free movement into the Pacific. The archipelagos that stretch from northern Japan all the way down to south of the Philippines are known as the First Island Chain. The gaps between the islands are narrow enough to allow America’s fleet to control entry and exit between them.
If Beijing wants to make this impossible, and if it wants to invade Taiwan without incurring huge losses during the 160-kilometre sea crossing, it needs to be at least able to achieve ‘anti-access, area-denial’ (A2/AD) supremacy over its potential enemies. Conversely, if the USA and its allies have A2/AD dominance, an invasion plan looks very risky, and even if it succeeds, the threat of a blockade in retaliation might still exist.
Because of the strong relationship between Japan and the USA, and Japan’s rapidly increasing military power, the Miyako Strait is a tougher nut to crack for Beijing. When Rodrigo Duterte was president of the Philippines (2016–22), China made inroads into drawing the country away from the Americans. However, the same period saw China building and militarising artificial islands in disputed waters in the South China Sea, including one at Mischief Reef, which is inside the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, appears to have concluded that if China controlled Taiwan and/or the Luzon Strait, it would be in a much stronger position to dominate the Philippines and dictate terms on the territorial disputes it has with Manila. It’s no coincidence that two of the other bases the Americans are expected to have access to face the disputed waters. China owns the starting gun in that it can act on a timeline of its choosing, but the Philippines is now joining the USA and Japan in ‘setting the theatre’.
The USA is manoeuvring to place China in a ‘straitjacket’ designed to restrict its ability to bend neighbouring states to its will.
Many of us are familiar with the great straits of the world, such as Hormuz, Malacca and Bering. Less well-known is the Luzon Strait between the Philippines and Taiwan. This may change with the recent military agreement between the Philippines and the USA.
US forces will now have access to four military camps in addition to the five they already use on a non-permanent basis. This will allow them to better monitor Chinese military activity in the region, to pre-position heavy weapons and to surge forces to key locations during times of high tension. The two countries will also partially integrate their command structures and increase their ability to carry out combined operations. US military parlance calls this ‘setting the theatre’. The Philippines’ position in territorial disputes with China will be strengthened and signals the fact that Manila has made its choice in which way to lean in the key geopolitical strategic contest of the 21st century. The deal also plugs the gap in the arc of pro-American countries that begins in Japan and stretches down to Australia via Taiwan.
The locations of the new bases haven’t been made public, but at least one is probably in the Caydon region of Luzon, which is the largest island in the Philippines archipelago and home to the capital. It’s in the north of the country and is the Philippines’ closest large landmass to Taiwan, which it faces across the 965-kilometre-wide Luzon Strait. Within the strait are several small islands, including Y’Ami Island, which is part of the Philippines, and Taiwan’s Orchid Island. Between these two is the Bashi Channel, which connects the South China Sea to the Pacific Ocean.
In 2015, the Chinese air force and navy held military exercises in the Luzon Strait. The following year, it sailed an aircraft carrier group through the Miyako Strait between Taiwan and Japan, and entered the South China Sea via the Bashi Channel. Exercises have continued ever since.
Beijing views these two passageways as their most important routes to the Pacific. If China controlled them, the potential for its navy to be contained in the China seas and for a naval blockade of its ports would be hugely reduced. It doesn’t matter that no-one is planning a blockade – only that one is theoretically possible. As a country reliant on exporting its manufactured goods, it must counter the possibility.
Looking out to sea, China sees a wall consisting of islands and US naval power, which, together with America’s allies, could deny it free movement into the Pacific. The archipelagos that stretch from northern Japan all the way down to south of the Philippines are known as the First Island Chain. The gaps between the islands are narrow enough to allow America’s fleet to control entry and exit between them.
If Beijing wants to make this impossible, and if it wants to invade Taiwan without incurring huge losses during the 160-kilometre sea crossing, it needs to be at least able to achieve ‘anti-access, area-denial’ (A2/AD) supremacy over its potential enemies. Conversely, if the USA and its allies have A2/AD dominance, an invasion plan looks very risky, and even if it succeeds, the threat of a blockade in retaliation might still exist.
Because of the strong relationship between Japan and the USA, and Japan’s rapidly increasing military power, the Miyako Strait is a tougher nut to crack for Beijing. When Rodrigo Duterte was president of the Philippines (2016–22), China made inroads into drawing the country away from the Americans. However, the same period saw China building and militarising artificial islands in disputed waters in the South China Sea, including one at Mischief Reef, which is inside the Philippines’ 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone. Duterte’s successor, Ferdinand Marcos Jr, appears to have concluded that if China controlled Taiwan and/or the Luzon Strait, it would be in a much stronger position to dominate the Philippines and dictate terms on the territorial disputes it has with Manila. It’s no coincidence that two of the other bases the Americans are expected to have access to face the disputed waters. China owns the starting gun in that it can act on a timeline of its choosing, but the Philippines is now joining the USA and Japan in ‘setting the theatre’.
https://geographical.co.uk/geopolitics/bad-news-for-china-as-the-philippines-agrees-to-more-us-military-bases
