2nd of three parts
In Photo: Secondhand military boots, similar to those used by college students doing basic military training under the now-defunct Reserved Officers’ Training Corps, are displayed in a Guadalupe shoe store in Makati City.
Second of three parts
DESPITE the enactment of Commonwealth Act 1, otherwise known as the National Defense Act, in 1935, the road to establishing the nucleus for a reserve force composed of a citizen army was bumpy.
Much of the problem arose when Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon and Douglas Macarthur, a US Army general and former US Army chief of staff, had a falling out because of the costs of raising and maintaining an army.
Quezon had hired MacArthur as a military adviser.
“Becoming national defense adviser to the Philippines would allow MacArthur to exit gracefully, escaping what, in all other senses, would be a demotion,” Ricardo T. Jose wrote in his book The Philippine Army 1935 to 1942. “Indeed, he would get the highest position in an army he himself would create.”
It turned out that MacArthur was actually interested in being named as the US high commissioner to the Philippines. “He lobbied for it,” Jose wrote. Unfortunately for MacArthur, it turned out that under US laws, it was illegal for an officer to hold two appointments at the same time.
This was one way for MacArthur to restore his prestige, which was tainted after he had ordered soldiers to attack and disperse a rally held by World War I veterans in Washington, D.C.
As a sop to his ego, MacArthur was given the rank in the Philippines as “field marshal.” Then MacArthur went on with the task of forming the Philippine Army.
Budget
ACCORDING to Jose, MacArthur had promised Quezon that it would take only P16 million annually to finance “an army suitable for the Philippines.”
“If you have a small regular force, as a nucleus to be expanded by employing the citizen army in time of peril, no nation will care to attack you, for the cost of conquest will be more than the expected profits,” MacArthur told Quezon.
However, it turned out that it would cost P25 million annually to maintain at a bare minimum a regular force of 19,000 soldiers. That would mean a cost of P250 million instead of the P160 million in 10 years, which would extend to the period when the Philippines had gained independence.
Another Filipino also worked on finding a solution to the budget problem. L. Siguion Reyna, a technical adviser to the secretary of the Interior, submitted a preliminary study on national defense and related problems to Quezon.
Jose wrote: “The main problem, Reyna concluded, was attaining maximum effec-tiveness at minimum cost. Despite economic difficulties, the Philippines needed an organized army similar to the Belgian and Swiss models, though the Philippine situation was compounded by a longer exposed coastline.”
“A navy was out of the question because of its excessive cost but a coast artillery corps and an air corps could be developed to insure protection from threats at sea,” Reyna explained.
“Coming to the same conclusion as others before him, Reyna stressed that the best solution was a small regular army with a large reserve force and militia, with various sectors of the country contributing to the defense effort,” Cortes wrote. “In order to further economize, Reyna stressed that the army must be useful both in times of war and peace, otherwise, it would be considered by the already overburdened taxpayers as a real parasite in time of peace.”
“Reyna hit the problem on the head when he noted that it was essentially a problem of maximum effectiveness for minimum cost,” Cortes wrote.
This was a problem in 1935 and more than 80 years later, the dilemma of adequately funding the Armed Forces of the Philippines still exists.
Choices
THERE were three basic systems that the Philippine Commonwealth could adopt for its fledgling army.
The first was to adopt the voluntary service, which was in use in the United States at that time. However, this was seen as the most expensive in the long run.
“The second system was to adopt the monarchical system, “which was in use in old Prussia, Imperial Russia and Japan, wherein there was mandatory two- or three-year military service for all males,” Cortes wrote.
The third system was to adopt either the Swiss or Austrian models, which contemplated a small regular force with a citizenry that was trained for fixed periods.
Because of budget constraints, the third system was chosen.
This was the opportunity for Quezon to realize his vision for the Philippines.
Quezon, during his acceptance of his nomination for president, had said he wanted a neutral Philippines under the League of Nations. However, “we cannot rely exclusively on these implements of peace for our national defense,” Cortes quoted Quezon as saying.
“I favor preparedness for national defense,” Quezon said. “We cannot afford to have, nor do I approve of, a large standing army or costly military establishments, but we must have a regular army of sufficient size for our requirements and a trained citizenry ready to be drafted for service in any emergency.” As part of adapting to the cut in military budget, the decision was build up the existing ROTC program.
It was decided to revise its original two-year basic course and four-year optional course into a three-year compulsory course for college students. Training hours were extended from the previous three hours to four hours.
“Under this new program, all graduates would be eligible for direct commission in the reserve force as officers or noncommissioned officers,” Cortes wrote. “This would solve the problem of shortage of reserve officers at reduced cost.”
Additionally, specialized ROTC units were formed. For example, the University of the Philippines (UP) and the University of Santo Tomas were to provide one ROTC medical unit and a field artillery unit each, while the Mapua Institute of Technology was to have one ROTC engineering unit.
These units would form the cadre of trained officers and troops for specialized military units if the reserve was mobilized.
These units were also to form the backbone of the reserve force in the event of actual mobilization, because it was realized that it was too expensive to hold annual practice mobilizations and not all military trainees could join because of the disruption it would cause to the civilian economy.
This system was still partially in place when World War II arrived in Philippine shores.
The reserve force was called up and mobilized to firm up the 10 Philippine Commonwealth Army divisions and form the Philippine Coastal Artillery Units.
Unfortunately, the budget cuts resulting in lack of proper equipment took its toll on Philippine Army units.
When the Philippines fell to the Imperial Japanese Army, the bulk of ROTC graduates who did not surrender formed the cadre for different guerrilla units throughout the country. One of the most famous came to be known as the Hunters ROTC Guerillas. They were citizen soldiers of the country’s underground army.
After the war
THE signing of the surrender documents on the deck of the battleship USS Missouri in Japan in 1945 marked the official end of World War II.
By 1946, the Philippines regained its independence. Two months after Philippine independence was restored, on September 13, 1946, the 10-division strong prewar Philippine Army organization was revived. This included the reactivation of the ROTC program.
According to the Army Reserve Command (Arescom), this set up for a citizen army was further strengthened “when the Philippine Army became the Armed Forces of the Philippines on December 23, 1950,” with the Philippines divided into four military areas. “ROTC units operating within these areas fell under the supervision of their respective Area Commanders,” the Arescom said.
The prewar ROTC program, which emanated from Quezon’s Executive Order 207 in 1939, was updated on February 8, 1967. Under the updated order issued by then- President Ferdinand E. Marcos, ROTC was to be taken as a mandatory course at all college and universities with an enrollment of at least 250 male students. Under the old Commonwealth era order, the requirement was only 100 male students.
Rainbow rangers
A year later saw the rise of an experimental reserve unit based in UP.
This was the Rainbow Rangers-Sunday Soldiers. Their officers came from the ROTC program, while the trainees were students who specialized in small-unit tactics and unconventional warfare to be used as the backbone for civil home-defense units.
In November 1971 one battalion of Sunday Soldiers and UP ROTC officers under the command of Lt. Col. Benjamin Vallejo mobilized and sent to guard the elections in the provinces of Lanao.
“During its three-week stint of peacekeeping in Lanao, nine citations for bravery were earned by the cadets of the battalion,” according to publicly available records from the UP ROTC.
Among these citations was a post-humous award for Cadet Captain Eustaquio Granadillos for acts of bravery. In honor of the slain cadet officer, the main barracks of the UP ROTC now bears his name.
This unit was disbanded in 1983 with the retirement of its founder, Gen. Benjamin Vallejo, a member of UP ROTC class 1952.
Rot within ROTC
AFTER Marcos declared martial law in 1972, military training in campuses under the ROTC program was put under a bad light.
The abuses committed under the Marcos administration transformed the image of the military from being “protectors” to “oppressors.”
And corruption set in within certain ROTC units. There were kickbacks in ordering supplies for uniforms, food and drinks. Students can avoid mandatory military training by bribing ROTC personnel. Others can opt for “light duty” instead of training for a fee.
Instead of training college students to be part of a citizen army, certain individuals made the ROTC program into a milking cow. Many used it for personal gain while others used the money raised to finance ROTC training activities because most of the designated military funds were now going to regular forces engaged in the counterinsurgency campaign. Whatever the reason, it was still corruption.
Then came 2001 and the discovery of Mark Welson Chua Jr.’s body in the Pasig River. Because of his murder, mandatory military training came to an end.
In the third and final part of this series, the article will focus on the aftermath of Chua’s murder, which relegated military training as just one of the three optional courses college students can take under the National Service Training Program. More than a decade after Chua’s murder, there have been attempts to reinstate mandatory military training in campuses throughout the country.
To be concluded
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/mandatory-military-training-is-it-time-2/
