From ABS-CBN (Jun 22): 2 soldiers shot dead in Maguindanao
Two soldiers from the Army's 34th Infantry Battalion were shot dead by armed men in Barangay Meta in Datu Unsay town in Maguindanao Monday afternoon.
They were identified as Private Milvert Nebrada and a certain Private Sindac.
According to Col. Edgar Delos Reyes, commander of the Army's 34th Infantry Battalion, the soldiers were helping in repairing a damaged classroom in a school near the area.
On their way back to the battalion headquarters to get carpentry tools, Privates Nebrada and Sindac were shot by armed men believed to members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF).
The two were brought to the Integrated Provincial Health Office for autopsy.
A week ago, three soldiers were also shot in Datu Piang town in Maguindanao. One soldier died while two others were injured.
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/06/22/15/2-soldiers-shot-dead-maguindanao
Monday, June 22, 2015
BIFF ambushes 2 soldiers repairing school in Maguindanao town
From GMA News (Jun 22): BIFF ambushes 2 soldiers repairing school in Maguindanao town
SHARIFF AGUAK, Maguidanao— Two young soldiers were killed in attack by members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) around on Monday afternoon.
SHARIFF AGUAK, Maguidanao— Two young soldiers were killed in attack by members of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) around on Monday afternoon.
Captain Jo-Ann Petinglay, spokesperson of Army 6th Infantry Division, said the attack happened while the two soldiers were entering the town from nearby Datu Unsay where they were repairing a school.
Initial reports gathered by the military said the unarmed soldiers were on a motorcycle and were going to fetch building materials from the military outpost in Shariff Aguak when they were tailed by the armed men.
The two soldiers — still only privates — were shot by assailants who were also on motorcycles more than 100 meters from their camp.
One was hit in the head and another in the back.
Assailants also snatched the motorcycle of the soldiers and fled towards the SPMS box, or the area bounded by the towns of Shariff Aguak, Pagatin, Mamasapano, Salbo.
The soldiers were rushed to the Maguindanao provincial hospital but they were declared dead on arrival. Their names have been withheld until their families are notified of their deaths.
“It's very unfornate that these unarmed soldiers working for peace were killed in a treacherous way by the BIFF. They don’t even care for the future of the children in the area where these victims has dreamed also to uplift the education of the kids," Petinglay in a statement.
Repairs have been underway at Meta Elementary school in Datu Unsay town after the school was damaged by fighting. The school is riddled with bullet holes and damage from mortar explosions from fighting against the BIFF last year.
Last week, BIFF also attacked soldiers of the 2nd Mechanized Battalion in Datu Piang town. A soldier was killed and two others were wounded in the attack.
This was followed by an ambush on a Sports Utility Vehicle that left two people — one was wearing a police uniform — dead.
The BIFF's psokesman, Abu Misry Mama, when asked if the group was behind the attack on the two soldiers, replied: “ No other group now is fighting against the military, it is only the BIFF”.
The BIFF is a breakaway group of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. While the MILF has signed a peace agreement with the government, the BIFF has rejected the peace process and has continued to attack government forces.
The AFP launched an all-out offensive against the group earlier this year.
The AFP launched an all-out offensive against the group earlier this year.
[Part 2] The MNLF and the United States
From Rappler (Jun 21): [Part 2] The MNLF and the United States (by Patricio N. Abinales)
'When it comes to economic assistance, communities see US aid as a better and reliable source compared to the Philippine government that had been notorious in breaking promises of bringing development and growth to Muslims'
The Moro National Liberation Front (MINLF) had waged a war of secession against President Ferdinand Marcos after the latter sent the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to Mindanao shortly after he declared martial law and installed a dictatorship.
With guns and other resources provided by Libya and Malaysia, the MNLF fought a conventional war against the AFP. The separatist movement, however, could not sustain this kind of warfare. After two years of open war, the coalition began to splinter as Marcos, with offers of spoils and a chance to reclaim their local power, was able to coax the politicians who joined the MNLF to go back to the fold and form alternative Bangsamoro (Moro people) organizations to rival the MNLF for Muslim support.
Intra-ethnic tensions also prevailed among the activists, with members from the Maguindanao ethnic groups protesting the domination of the Tausogs in the organizational leadership. Among the Maguindanaos were also commanders who were calling for the organization to abandon its secularism in favor of a political program based on Islamic tenets. They would eventually break from the MNLF and form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Faced with these internal fissures, and with Libya deciding that it was time to normalize ties with the Philippine government, the MNLF finally agreed to sit down and begin peace talks with Manila. Intermittent clashes (largely chance encounters) continued to happen, but did not detract the two sides from continuously talking. When Marcos fell in 1986, the negotiations sped up after a more democratic regime headed by the extremely popular President Corazon Aquino took over. A peace agreement was eventually signed in 1996.
In exchange for demobilizing its army, the government offered the MNLF control of the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) and the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), both agencies created by Congress to address the needs of the Muslim minority. Manila also promised to launch a “mini-Marshall plan” for Muslim Mindanao, seeking out the United States, Europe, Japan, the Arab states, and international multi-lateral agencies like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank for support. The United States was one of the first to respond to this request, and set aside funds for an Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP), to be implemented by USAID’s Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM), the largest umbrella project implementing investment and infrastructure programs in the island since 1995. USAID likewise tapped its Washington-based Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to partner with GEM on the project.
WARM WELCOME. The MNLF welcomes USAID. Photo courtesy of Noel Ruiz
One particularly important factor worth noting is the United States' unique position in the southern Philippines. While popular regard of American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan tends to be very critical and even antagonistic, the reverse is the case when it comes to how Mindanao Muslims view the United States. A positive sentiment towards the USA cuts across classes, ethnic groups, and even political ideologies: those who continue to welcome American presence in Muslim Mindanao include warlords and political clans who expressed delighted that American assistance has finally brought “development” to their constituents through farm-to-market roads, medical clinics, and other infrastructure projects.
They also consist of communities where American aid has been instrumental in reviving primary learning, or improving it through massive book donations and computerization. Pro-American sympathies are even strongly evident inside the MILF, which had gone out of its way to seek out American assistance in its negotiations with the Philippine government. The MILF’s late chairman Hashim Salamat wrote a letter to then President George W. Bush requesting the US government to join Malaysia in mediating the peace talks.
The reasons for this unusual widespread approbation of the Americans range from the instrumentalist to the historical. For politicians and local strongmen, American aid is seen as an “alternative” resource that then “frees” their own largesse and opens this to plunder and spoils. “Ordinary” Muslims see American troops as “buffers” between an oppressive state and embattled minority. The presence of an American soldier, accordingly, would make Filipino troops think twice before doing the sordid things they were infamous of in the past: the massacre of Muslim civilians, the burning of their houses, raping of their women, etc. Moreover, when it comes to economic assistance, communities see US aid as a better and reliable source compared to the Philippine government that had been notorious in breaking promises of bringing development and growth to Muslims.
By keeping Islam out of their military and economic transactions, Americans have likewise gained the respect of Muslims. The first “resistance” to USAID arose from a suspicion that GEM and ELAP were programs that were designed to undermine Islam by introducing “Western” values. This was easily dispelled when USAID repeatedly assured Muslims that its projects were aimed solely at economic and educational development.
USAID – particularly its Filipino and Mindanawon staff – that target communities were aware that they were dealing with communities which were not only Islamic, but also parts of parts thriving trading centers (or were centers themselves) whose histories predated the formation of the Philippines, and whose connections reached out beyond national borders to maritime Southeast Asia itself.
FARMS WITH ARMS. A former MNLF fighter guarding his GEM-supported cornfield. Photo courtesy of Noel Ruiz
By focusing on this “economic side” of Muslims, they tapped into a tradition that was also as old as Islam and which never disappeared even if the modern state began to impose restrictions on this now illicit movement of commodities and people. In the May 21, 2002 issue of Manila Bulletin, Jasmin Agbon, a GEM’s area manager, said: “Everyone’s either a businessman or a farmer. A Muslim vegetable farmer is no different from a Christian vegetable farmer. They have the same problems, they employ the same technology and same marketing tools.”
Neither did USAID touch the MNLF’s guns.
In the development world, one of the primary goals of helping conflict-affected areas is the demobilization and disarmament of former rebels. What official development reports one gets to read in Washington, do not tell readers – for obvious reasons – that the US and the Philippine governments have taken away from the MNLF the right to continue to bear arms. The rebel group’s combatants who joined ELAP were demobilized officially, but they were not asked to surrender their arms, and in several occasions were not hampered from purchasing new and more powerful weaponry, using revenues they generated from USAID-funded programs and the joint US-Philippine military exercises.
Conflict resolution and economic rehabilitation in Muslim Mindanao are therefore premised on rebels-turned-entrepreneurs holding on to their arms while staring back at the Philippine military stationed nearby, over the shoulders of American soldiers standing in between the two former combatants.
Mitigating vigorously any attempt to utilize these arms again was the state of the MNLF itself. When it signed the peace agreement, it was already a considerably weakened movement. Its leadership – by the time of the peace agreement – was split into 4 factions, its armed force composed largely of ageing veterans, spread out in small numbers across Muslim Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and in exile in Borneo, Saudi Arabia and Libya. The peace agreement put a close to the MNLF’s rebellion, and its leaders brought into the fold and were instantly attracted to the power and influence of patronage politics, joining the game of spoils and plunder that was once the domain of “traditional” politicians.
[This is the second part of an abridged report I wrote as a fellow at Washington DC’s Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. (READ: [Part 1] Mindanao rehabilitation: Lessons from the past)]
http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/96982-mnlf-united-states-part-2
'When it comes to economic assistance, communities see US aid as a better and reliable source compared to the Philippine government that had been notorious in breaking promises of bringing development and growth to Muslims'
The Moro National Liberation Front (MINLF) had waged a war of secession against President Ferdinand Marcos after the latter sent the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to Mindanao shortly after he declared martial law and installed a dictatorship.
With guns and other resources provided by Libya and Malaysia, the MNLF fought a conventional war against the AFP. The separatist movement, however, could not sustain this kind of warfare. After two years of open war, the coalition began to splinter as Marcos, with offers of spoils and a chance to reclaim their local power, was able to coax the politicians who joined the MNLF to go back to the fold and form alternative Bangsamoro (Moro people) organizations to rival the MNLF for Muslim support.
Intra-ethnic tensions also prevailed among the activists, with members from the Maguindanao ethnic groups protesting the domination of the Tausogs in the organizational leadership. Among the Maguindanaos were also commanders who were calling for the organization to abandon its secularism in favor of a political program based on Islamic tenets. They would eventually break from the MNLF and form the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).
Faced with these internal fissures, and with Libya deciding that it was time to normalize ties with the Philippine government, the MNLF finally agreed to sit down and begin peace talks with Manila. Intermittent clashes (largely chance encounters) continued to happen, but did not detract the two sides from continuously talking. When Marcos fell in 1986, the negotiations sped up after a more democratic regime headed by the extremely popular President Corazon Aquino took over. A peace agreement was eventually signed in 1996.
In exchange for demobilizing its army, the government offered the MNLF control of the Southern Philippines Development Authority (SPDA) and the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), both agencies created by Congress to address the needs of the Muslim minority. Manila also promised to launch a “mini-Marshall plan” for Muslim Mindanao, seeking out the United States, Europe, Japan, the Arab states, and international multi-lateral agencies like the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank for support. The United States was one of the first to respond to this request, and set aside funds for an Emergency Livelihood Assistance Program (ELAP), to be implemented by USAID’s Growth with Equity in Mindanao (GEM), the largest umbrella project implementing investment and infrastructure programs in the island since 1995. USAID likewise tapped its Washington-based Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to partner with GEM on the project.
WARM WELCOME. The MNLF welcomes USAID. Photo courtesy of Noel Ruiz
One particularly important factor worth noting is the United States' unique position in the southern Philippines. While popular regard of American presence in Iraq and Afghanistan tends to be very critical and even antagonistic, the reverse is the case when it comes to how Mindanao Muslims view the United States. A positive sentiment towards the USA cuts across classes, ethnic groups, and even political ideologies: those who continue to welcome American presence in Muslim Mindanao include warlords and political clans who expressed delighted that American assistance has finally brought “development” to their constituents through farm-to-market roads, medical clinics, and other infrastructure projects.
They also consist of communities where American aid has been instrumental in reviving primary learning, or improving it through massive book donations and computerization. Pro-American sympathies are even strongly evident inside the MILF, which had gone out of its way to seek out American assistance in its negotiations with the Philippine government. The MILF’s late chairman Hashim Salamat wrote a letter to then President George W. Bush requesting the US government to join Malaysia in mediating the peace talks.
The reasons for this unusual widespread approbation of the Americans range from the instrumentalist to the historical. For politicians and local strongmen, American aid is seen as an “alternative” resource that then “frees” their own largesse and opens this to plunder and spoils. “Ordinary” Muslims see American troops as “buffers” between an oppressive state and embattled minority. The presence of an American soldier, accordingly, would make Filipino troops think twice before doing the sordid things they were infamous of in the past: the massacre of Muslim civilians, the burning of their houses, raping of their women, etc. Moreover, when it comes to economic assistance, communities see US aid as a better and reliable source compared to the Philippine government that had been notorious in breaking promises of bringing development and growth to Muslims.
By keeping Islam out of their military and economic transactions, Americans have likewise gained the respect of Muslims. The first “resistance” to USAID arose from a suspicion that GEM and ELAP were programs that were designed to undermine Islam by introducing “Western” values. This was easily dispelled when USAID repeatedly assured Muslims that its projects were aimed solely at economic and educational development.
USAID – particularly its Filipino and Mindanawon staff – that target communities were aware that they were dealing with communities which were not only Islamic, but also parts of parts thriving trading centers (or were centers themselves) whose histories predated the formation of the Philippines, and whose connections reached out beyond national borders to maritime Southeast Asia itself.
FARMS WITH ARMS. A former MNLF fighter guarding his GEM-supported cornfield. Photo courtesy of Noel Ruiz
By focusing on this “economic side” of Muslims, they tapped into a tradition that was also as old as Islam and which never disappeared even if the modern state began to impose restrictions on this now illicit movement of commodities and people. In the May 21, 2002 issue of Manila Bulletin, Jasmin Agbon, a GEM’s area manager, said: “Everyone’s either a businessman or a farmer. A Muslim vegetable farmer is no different from a Christian vegetable farmer. They have the same problems, they employ the same technology and same marketing tools.”
Neither did USAID touch the MNLF’s guns.
In the development world, one of the primary goals of helping conflict-affected areas is the demobilization and disarmament of former rebels. What official development reports one gets to read in Washington, do not tell readers – for obvious reasons – that the US and the Philippine governments have taken away from the MNLF the right to continue to bear arms. The rebel group’s combatants who joined ELAP were demobilized officially, but they were not asked to surrender their arms, and in several occasions were not hampered from purchasing new and more powerful weaponry, using revenues they generated from USAID-funded programs and the joint US-Philippine military exercises.
Conflict resolution and economic rehabilitation in Muslim Mindanao are therefore premised on rebels-turned-entrepreneurs holding on to their arms while staring back at the Philippine military stationed nearby, over the shoulders of American soldiers standing in between the two former combatants.
Mitigating vigorously any attempt to utilize these arms again was the state of the MNLF itself. When it signed the peace agreement, it was already a considerably weakened movement. Its leadership – by the time of the peace agreement – was split into 4 factions, its armed force composed largely of ageing veterans, spread out in small numbers across Muslim Mindanao, the Sulu Archipelago, and in exile in Borneo, Saudi Arabia and Libya. The peace agreement put a close to the MNLF’s rebellion, and its leaders brought into the fold and were instantly attracted to the power and influence of patronage politics, joining the game of spoils and plunder that was once the domain of “traditional” politicians.
[This is the second part of an abridged report I wrote as a fellow at Washington DC’s Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. (READ: [Part 1] Mindanao rehabilitation: Lessons from the past)]
http://www.rappler.com/thought-leaders/96982-mnlf-united-states-part-2
MNLF’s Nur Misuari ‘very much alive and happy with his 6th wife’
From the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Jun 22): MNLF’s Nur Misuari ‘very much alive and happy with his 6th wife’
Nur Misuari, the founding chair of the Moro National Liberation Front, is very much alive and enjoying his new found love, a young wife.
This after stories of Misuari being dead spread in social media, particularly Facebook.
Habib Hashim Mudjahab, chair of the MNLF’s Islamic Command Council, has told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that Misuari is alive and is with a new wife.
“At 79 years old, Misuari is alive and kicking and very much in love with his new wife, a 19-year-old college student,” Mudjahab told the Inquirer by phone.
“He is very much alive and in full control of the MNLF forces on the ground. His exact location cannot be disclosed for his own personal security, but he is still somewhere in Sulu,” Mudjahab added.
Col. Allan Arrojado, commander of Joint Task Group Sulu, also debunked reports of Misuari’s death.
“Several sources claimed that Misuari was sighted in different locations attending some assemblies,” Arrojado said.
Arrojado said a report from Dr. Samsulah Adju, information officer of the MNLF in Sulu, revealed that Misuari presided the March 18 meeting in Barangay Kagay in Indanan town.
Misuari also met with Adju on June 12 and June 20, Arrojado added.
Arrojado said they also got a report that Misuari and his chief of staff, Abraham Joel, were sighted with more or less 100 armed followers Barangay (village) Kagay on Monday morning.
“We learned that Misuari has a new wife and her name is Sherry Rahim, a 19-year old woman from Cabingaan Island in Tapul town, and that she is seven months pregnant,” Arrojado said.
Mudjahahab, too, has supported reports that Misuari’s sixth wife is pregnant.
Misuari’s first wife was Desdemona Tan, who died of illness. Rohaida Tan, the elder sister of Desdemona, became Misuari’s second wife. His third wife is Tarhatta, while Maimona Palalisan of General Santos City is the fourth. A Subanen from Zamboanga del Norte is the fifth wife.
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/700077/mnlfs-nur-misuari-very-much-alive-and-happy-with-his-6th-wife
Nur Misuari, the founding chair of the Moro National Liberation Front, is very much alive and enjoying his new found love, a young wife.
This after stories of Misuari being dead spread in social media, particularly Facebook.
Habib Hashim Mudjahab, chair of the MNLF’s Islamic Command Council, has told the Philippine Daily Inquirer that Misuari is alive and is with a new wife.
“At 79 years old, Misuari is alive and kicking and very much in love with his new wife, a 19-year-old college student,” Mudjahab told the Inquirer by phone.
“He is very much alive and in full control of the MNLF forces on the ground. His exact location cannot be disclosed for his own personal security, but he is still somewhere in Sulu,” Mudjahab added.
Col. Allan Arrojado, commander of Joint Task Group Sulu, also debunked reports of Misuari’s death.
“Several sources claimed that Misuari was sighted in different locations attending some assemblies,” Arrojado said.
Arrojado said a report from Dr. Samsulah Adju, information officer of the MNLF in Sulu, revealed that Misuari presided the March 18 meeting in Barangay Kagay in Indanan town.
Misuari also met with Adju on June 12 and June 20, Arrojado added.
Arrojado said they also got a report that Misuari and his chief of staff, Abraham Joel, were sighted with more or less 100 armed followers Barangay (village) Kagay on Monday morning.
“We learned that Misuari has a new wife and her name is Sherry Rahim, a 19-year old woman from Cabingaan Island in Tapul town, and that she is seven months pregnant,” Arrojado said.
Mudjahahab, too, has supported reports that Misuari’s sixth wife is pregnant.
Misuari’s first wife was Desdemona Tan, who died of illness. Rohaida Tan, the elder sister of Desdemona, became Misuari’s second wife. His third wife is Tarhatta, while Maimona Palalisan of General Santos City is the fourth. A Subanen from Zamboanga del Norte is the fifth wife.
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/700077/mnlfs-nur-misuari-very-much-alive-and-happy-with-his-6th-wife
West Ph Sea naval exercises a ‘false united front’ vs China
From the pro-CPP online propaganda publication Bulatlat (Jul 22): West Ph Sea naval exercises a ‘false united front’ vs China
“The naval exercises themselves do very little to develop our own capability for external defense.”
The Philippines kicked off simultaneous joint naval exercises with the US and Japan today, June 22, in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, facing the West Philippine Sea. The naval drills with the US will end on June 26.
The naval war games, which will run up to June 26, are being held in the face of China’s continued aggression and reported military build-up within Philippine territorial waters.
“The Filipino people should be wary because the ongoing military exercises between the US, Japan and the Philippines are nothing but a ploy to project US military power in the region as part of its pivot to Asia, Bayan said in a statement.
“The US is merely exploiting the PH dispute with China by presenting a false ‘united front’ against China,” the statement said.
The annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (Carat) [3] between the Philippine Navy and the US Navy and Marine Corps will also take place in the waters and air over Sulu Sea. Carat features “combined operations at sea, mobile dive and salvage training, coastal riverine operations, and maritime patrol and reconnaissance.”
Participating in Carat for the first time is the littoral combat ship (LCS) USS Fort Worth. The drills will also feature the rescue and salvage ship USNS Safeguard (T-ARS-50) and forward-deployed P-3 Orion aircraft.
The Philippine Navy’s joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-defense Force will be held separately, also in the West Philippine Sea.
Bayan said Japan also aspires to expand its military might in Asia and other parts of the world, but is only a “junior partner” of the US, and is under “the US military umbrella in the region.”
“The naval exercises are meant to promote US and Japan imperialist interests in the region. These two powers do not care for Philippine sovereignty nor territorial integrity,” Bayan said. The statement added that the Philippines should instead “develop its own economy and defense capability,” independent of foreign powers.
Bayan stressed that naval war games “do very little to develop our own capability for external defense.” This year’s Carat is the 21st naval drills between the country and the US, having started in 1995.
“The avowed goal of interoperability is a sham considering the backwardness of our own navy when compared to the US and Japan,” said Bayan.
http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/06/22/west-ph-sea-naval-exercises-a-false-united-front-vs-china/
“The naval exercises themselves do very little to develop our own capability for external defense.”
USS Fort Worth (US Navy photo)
The Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (Bayan) criticized what appears to be a show of force against China by Philippine, American and Japanese naval forces holding exercises in the West Philippines Sea, calling it “a false united front.”
The naval war games, which will run up to June 26, are being held in the face of China’s continued aggression and reported military build-up within Philippine territorial waters.
“The Filipino people should be wary because the ongoing military exercises between the US, Japan and the Philippines are nothing but a ploy to project US military power in the region as part of its pivot to Asia, Bayan said in a statement.
“The US is merely exploiting the PH dispute with China by presenting a false ‘united front’ against China,” the statement said.
The annual Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (Carat) [3] between the Philippine Navy and the US Navy and Marine Corps will also take place in the waters and air over Sulu Sea. Carat features “combined operations at sea, mobile dive and salvage training, coastal riverine operations, and maritime patrol and reconnaissance.”
Participating in Carat for the first time is the littoral combat ship (LCS) USS Fort Worth. The drills will also feature the rescue and salvage ship USNS Safeguard (T-ARS-50) and forward-deployed P-3 Orion aircraft.
The Philippine Navy’s joint exercises with the Japanese Maritime Self-defense Force will be held separately, also in the West Philippine Sea.
Bayan said Japan also aspires to expand its military might in Asia and other parts of the world, but is only a “junior partner” of the US, and is under “the US military umbrella in the region.”
“The naval exercises are meant to promote US and Japan imperialist interests in the region. These two powers do not care for Philippine sovereignty nor territorial integrity,” Bayan said. The statement added that the Philippines should instead “develop its own economy and defense capability,” independent of foreign powers.
Bayan stressed that naval war games “do very little to develop our own capability for external defense.” This year’s Carat is the 21st naval drills between the country and the US, having started in 1995.
“The avowed goal of interoperability is a sham considering the backwardness of our own navy when compared to the US and Japan,” said Bayan.
http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/06/22/west-ph-sea-naval-exercises-a-false-united-front-vs-china/
Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes
Posted to the JK Alternative Viewpoint (Jun 2015): Uncharted Waters: Extended Deterrence and Maritime Disputes (by Mira Rapp-Hooper)
“Let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute,” declared President Barack Obama in Tokyo in April 2014. “Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands,” he continued, referring to the part of the alliance whereby the United States promises to provide military aid to Japan if it is attacked.1 Days later, the President announced a new basing agreement in Manila, affirming Washington’s commitment to help “build the Philippines’ defense capabilities,” calling it a “vital partner” in maritime security.2 These two presidential statements underscore an increasingly salient set of regional policy quandaries. Maritime and territorial disputes in the Pacific have become prominent in recent years and, when U.S. allies are involved, they present a unique challenge to extended deterrence in the region—one with which Washington is only beginning to grapple.
Although it has relied on extended deterrence since the early Cold War, the United States’ so-called “nuclear umbrella” is predominantly designed to deter nuclear and major conventional attacks against the sovereignty and territory of treaty allies. This may, however, have little role to play in deterring conflicts around offshore disputed territories. In recent years, Washington has faced mounting assurance and deterrence challenges because some of its close treaty allies in the Pacific are involved in territorial and maritime disputes, which frequently pit them against a rising China. Rather than fixate on the massive conventional invasions or nuclear attacks that preoccupied U.S. allies during the Cold War, some U.S. allies presently worry that they will not have support if they become involved in a less-than-existential conflict over a disputed island territory or a maritime boundary.
There are at least three reasons why these conflicts present a challenge to U.S. extended deterrence as it has traditionally been practiced. First, existing U.S. treaty commitments themselves do not provide much guidance to adversaries or allies on whether Washington would intervene in a territorial dispute on behalf of an ally, and if it would, under what conditions. Second, where uninhabited islands, rocks, or shoals are at issue, U.S. allies necessarily have a far greater stake in the dispute than the United States itself, making it more difficult for Washington to make its defensive commitments credible. Third, unlike in the Cold War standoff between the United States and Soviet Union, the United States and China are not sworn adversaries. Given its ample incentives to find a modus vivendi with Beijing in other areas, Washington maintains a position of neutrality on most maritime and territorial disputes and does not overtly back its allies’ sovereignty claims. China is, however, rising rapidly, and may therefore have both the capability and the will to press its claims against U.S. partners, even as Washington avoids taking sides. Taken together, these challenges combine to mean that allies’ fear of abandonment may run especially high when it comes to U.S. alliance commitments around lower- level disputes.
This article proceeds with a brief overview of extended deterrence and assurance in U.S. foreign policy, defining these terms and discussing their role in Cold War strategy. I argue that 21st-century East Asia presents a novel extended deterrence context for the three reasons mentioned above, illustrating why U.S. allies’ abandonment fears run especially high with the examples of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands and the U.S.–Japan alliance as well as the Philippines’ Spratly Islands claims in the U.S.–Philippines pact. I argue that it is in Washington’s interest to address these abandonment fears and remain a committed alliance partner in this new extended deterrence context, recommending a few measures it can take to assuage allies’ anxieties while maintaining a working relationship with Beijing.
Extended Deterrence, Past and Present
The United States has relied on extended deterrence, allied assurance, and adversary reassurance as tools of statecraft since the early Cold War.3 Although closely linked, these influence strategies are distinct, so it is useful to begin by defining them. Extended deterrence aims to change the cost calculations of adversaries, specifically by dissuading them from attacking U.S. allies. It seeks to convince potential challengers that an attack on an ally will be met with retaliation by the United States itself. Assurance is a parallel strategy that is directed at allies and seeks to convince them that the United States is committed to their defense. Reassurance, however, is a strategy that aims to convince potential adversaries that they are not going to be the targets of unprovoked, serious harm. It aims in part to convince prospective challengers that extended deterrence is intended to protect allies if they become the victims of attack, but that it will not be used against challengers if they refrain from aggression.4 Thus reassurance is a defensive promise only, not an offensive one. The target of both extended deterrence and reassurance is the potential adversary, while the target of assurance is the ally.
Although they are closely linked, neither extended deterrence nor assurance is a subset of the other. An adversary may be deterred from attacking without the ally being convinced that the adversary will not. Theoretically, the opposite is also true, although less likely. Both extended deterrence and allied assurance are associated with formal security guarantees—positive treaty promises by a major power to provide military aid to an ally if it is the victim of an attack. This analysis will examine U.S. extended deterrence and assurance efforts that are associated with formal security guarantees in East Asia.
Since the early Cold War, the United States has extended deterrence to treaty allies, relying on both nuclear and conventional weapons to do so. While many of the basic contours of deterrence strategy have remained consistent since the early nuclear age, the environment in which the United States extends deterrence today departs from the Cold War context in notable ways. Most Cold War deterrence and assurance efforts were focused on Western Europe and the potential for a massive Soviet conventional or nuclear attack. China was treated as a lesser case. In NATO, the United States and its allies were bound together by a single, multilateral alliance that included hundreds of thousands of forward- deployed U.S. troops, nuclear weapons, and a focus on defending clear front lines. Allies were perennially concerned about whether the United States would make good on its promise to use nuclear weapons on their behalf, but there was no question that if the Soviet Union invaded Europe, Washington would be drawn into the conflict and would meet its treaty obligations to NATO.
Present-day extended deterrence efforts in East Asia diverge from this model in several respects. First, the United States extends deterrence to its allies in the Pacific through a “hub-and-spokes” system—with the United States at the center creating bilateral treaties with regional states—rather than through a cohesive multilateral organization. The depth and breadth of these alliance ties vary significantly within the region: for instance, the United States has over 50,000 military personnel in Japan, and almost none in the Philippines. Deterrence is also geographically distinct today, with no single land border as the focus of defense efforts. Most U.S. allies in East Asia are maritime powers. The U.S. military presence in the region is significant, yet its deterrence efforts are not signaled by a clear front line that is relevant to all of its allies or all potential conflicts in which they might be involved.
Another difference from the Cold War is that multiple potential threats exist in East Asia, rather than just one. While many Pacific nations are concerned about the rise of China, they are also wary of North Korea and the potential for renewed Russian aggression. The nature of most likely conflicts is also distinct from the contingencies that policymakers contemplated during the Cold War. Any future conflict could theoretically escalate into a major conventional or even nuclear exchange, but there is far less reason to fear a deliberate great power war in the region than there was between the United States and Soviet Union. A major ground war on the Korean Peninsula remains a serious concern, but it is difficult to envision a single, massive contingency that would envelop the region—the United States and China each recognize that a major power war would be catastrophic for both.
Most importantly, China and the United States are clearly competitors, but they are not sworn adversaries. Washington therefore has ample incentive to try to reassure Beijing that its alliances do not threaten its security, while at the same time deterring China from taking actions that may be destabilizing and dangerous. In present-day East Asia, extended deterrence commitments and the threats they are intended to address are therefore highly variegated, and in no way zero-sum. This means that the strategies used to deter and reassure China, as well as assure Pacific allies, may be employed in much more subtle and nuanced ways than they have been in the past.
As will be addressed shortly, some longstanding U.S. allies are deeply concerned that they may face limited conventional and sub-conventional conflicts around disputed territories. This environment is clearly preferable to the specter of catastrophic superpower conflict that suffused the Cold War, but complicates extended deterrence. For decades, the United States relied heavily on its nuclear arsenal to dissuade nuclear and major conventional attacks against allies. When the conflicts of concern are at lower levels of escalation, however, it is not clear that these can be deterred using the same means.
This is not to say that nuclear weapons do not play a central role in extended deterrence and assurance in East Asia. Especially since North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, U.S. policymakers have been keenly focused on strengthening extended nuclear deterrence in the region, and have included Pacific allies in nuclear-related consultations to an unprecedented degree.5 Deterrence at high levels of escalation does not necessarily beget deterrence at lower levels, however, and indeed it may invite lower-level opportunism.6 Beyond these big-picture differences between extended deterrence in Europe during the Cold War and extended deterrence in East Asia in the 21st century, however, territorial and maritime conflicts specifically present some novel extended deterrence challenges for the United States.
Extended Deterrence in Dispute
Since the early Cold War, scholars and policymakers have wrestled with obstacles that a major power like the United States faces in making credible deterrent threats on behalf of an ally. While it is quite reasonable to expect that a powerful state would mount a strong response if an adversary attacked its own homeland, extended deterrence requires that the same state convince its adversaries that it will do so on behalf of another state—that is, that it will treat its ally’s territory and sovereignty as though it were its own. Such promises may be hard to make credible because they mean that through these defense commitments, the deterrence-extending state may invite retaliation upon itself that it might have otherwise avoided entirely, putting its own territory, citizens, and armed forces at risk.
Existing scholarly research has demonstrated that disputed territory is the most common reason that states wage war.7 Since 1945, Asia has experienced more territorial disputes than any other part of the world. It has also experienced more armed conflict over territory than any other region, and its territorial disputes have been more resistant to settlement.8 It is therefore unsurprising that several U.S. allies in Asia are involved in territorial conflicts, and that they see these as significant security priorities. Where an ally’s territorial or maritime conflicts are concerned, however, it is even more difficult than usual for the United States to send credible signals of extended deterrence. There are at least three reasons why this is the case.
First, U.S. security treaties—the written basis of Washington’s extended deterrence commitments—are not particularly detailed in their content. These security guarantees generally pledge that the United States will treat an attack on an ally as a threat to its own peace and security, but they do not detail what precisely constitutes an attack, the conditions under which the United States would intervene in a dispute, or the means it would employ in its ally’s defense if it did so. This treaty ambiguity serves the purposes of general deterrence, and where many U.S. commitments are concerned, these details need not be put on paper to be understood. Washington’s longstanding relationships with Japan and South Korea, for example, make it unthinkable that it could stand aside if Tokyo or Seoul was attacked. Moreover, its significant troop presence on both allies’ territory makes it all the more likely that the United States would quickly become involved in conflict if one of these allies was the victim of aggression.
Where an ally has a remote territorial dispute, however, U.S. intervention cannot be so easily presumed. U.S. security treaties generally state that they apply to the ally’s home territory, but if a piece of territory is the subject of a sovereignty dispute, there is necessarily some debate as to whether it belongs to the ally at all, and therefore, whether the security guarantee applies there. Washington can, of course, go out of its way to state that its deterrence commitment extends to the territory in contention, as it has done with the Senkaku Islands, but the existence of multiple sovereignty claims injects some additional uncertainty into an already ambiguous treaty promise.
The credibility of deterrence promises may also be strained when the United States and an ally place different value on a territory. Because of its close partnerships, the United States may reasonably assert that it is willing to sacrifice blood and treasure and possibly face ruinous retaliation to defend Tokyo or Seoul. Where an ally’s disputed territory is concerned, however, there is far less symmetry of interest. A territorial dispute may invoke the core interests of the claimant states and hold deep symbolic value for that country, but the stakes for a far-off ally like the United States are necessarily diminished. As analysts often note, many of the disputes in the East and South China Seas are over rocky, uninhabited islets, and a pledge to treat these far-off land features as though they were U.S. soil strains belief. Moreover, as scholars Alexander George and Richard Smoke have argued, deterring limited conflicts such as those that may arise over an ally’s offshore islands is far more difficult than deterring major wars, as more limited threats are not easy to signal, especially on behalf of an ally.9 Unlike a massive attack on an ally’s home territory, a challenger’s assault on a far-off island would entail a limited use of military force. For a patron who hopes to deter such an attack, calibrated threats of retaliation are harder to convey.
Finally, as already noted, the United States and China are not locked in a zero-sum standoff as the United States and Soviet Union were during the Cold War. Rather, they compete in some areas and cooperate in others. Washington’s desire to maintain a modus vivendi with Beijing helps to explain why it takes a position of neutrality on most sovereignty disputes, including those involving close allies. This balancing act makes good sense, but it adds a third level of complication to U.S. extended deterrence. If Washington remains officially neutral on its allies’ territorial disputes, it cannot easily signal an extended deterrence commitment to those territories if it has made one. Strong public statements that the United States intends to defend the disputed territory or clear shows of force in the vicinity hardly signal a neutral position on sovereignty. Moreover, while the United States and China are not sworn adversaries, China is rising rapidly, and this gives it the military capabilities and increasingly the will to advance its sovereignty claims, including those that pit it against U.S. allies. It can therefore employ what Thomas Schelling called “salami tactics”—limited probes of U.S. commitments that aim to advance Chinese interests incrementally and opportunistically without triggering U.S. intervention.
When these factors are combined, they may lead U.S. allies to be especially fearful that their superpower patron will abandon them in conflicts arising from their territorial disputes. States are generally said to abandon an alliance partner if they formally abrogate the alliance treaty, fail to support the ally when the agreement’s casus foederis (or case for the alliance) arises, or decline to back a partner in a dispute with an adversary.10 Managing abandonment fears is a central challenge in any alliance. The ambiguous role of allies’ territorial disputes in U.S. treaties, the allies’ disparate stakes in these disputes, and the United States’ need to maintain a relationship with China, however, each inject additional uncertainty into already ambiguous U.S. extended deterrence commitments, and may provoke fears from U.S. allies that they will not have Washington’s support if a territorial dispute escalates and pits them against Beijing. Japan’s alliance fears over the Senakus Islands in the East China Sea, and the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea illustrate why these factors may elicit unusually high abandonment anxieties from U.S. allies, and why they present a management challenge for extended deterrence and allied assurance.
The Senkakus, South China Sea, and U.S. Alliance Commitments
As China’s power-projection capabilities and regional interests have grown in recent years, U.S. allies in East Asia have become increasingly concerned about territorial and maritime disputes in the region. The United States’ treaty guarantees with its East Asian allies are longstanding—most date to the early 1950s. Competing sovereignty claims over island territories in the Pacific are also decades old in many cases. China has claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands since the 1970s and Japan has administered them for over a century, with a three-decade break following World War II. The Philippines has claimed features in the Spratly Islands since the 1950s, and China has done so since the 1980s. Only since Beijing has developed the maritime and aerial capabilities which allow it to press its claims, however, have U.S. allies become fearful that small island disputes could bring them into a serious conflict. The conundrum that competing, if long-simmering, sovereignty claims pose for enduring U.S. extended deterrence commitments has therefore only risen to prominence in recent years.
The Senkakus
Since the United States returned the Ryukyu island chain to Japan through the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, it has maintained that the U.S.–Japan security guarantee applies to the Senkaku Islands.11 This is because Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.–Japan security treaty applies to the “territories under the administration of Japan.”12 China began to voice objections to Japan’s authority over the islands in the early 1970s, but has only actively challenged the sea and airspace around the islands in recent years.13 In line with its official neutrality position, however, Washington does not publicly support Japan’s sovereignty claims to the Senkakus over China’s.
Despite its neutrality on the underlying sovereignty dispute, the United States has reiterated its extended deterrence commitment to Japan when Senkaku tensions have spiked. Following the 2010 diplomatic dispute that arose from the collision of a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. position that the Senkakus fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan security treaty.14 Shortly after Tokyo purchased three of the five islands in the chain, resulting in another diplomatic row with Beijing in 2012, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell again reaffirmed that the United States took no position on the underlying sovereignty dispute, but that the Senkakus fell within the scope of the Article 5 commitment in the U.S.–Japan security treaty.15
Outside of specific crises, the United States has actually strengthened its public position on the Senkakus in recent years. In a 2013 statement, Secretary Clinton stated that Washington “would oppose any unilateral action that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus.16 President Barack Obama restated Clinton’s pledge in 2014.17 Nonetheless, the Senkakus still occupy a somewhat uneasy spot in the alliance.
Officials and scholars in Japan have expressed concern that the dual nature of the U.S. Senkaku position—neutrality on the sovereignty dispute, and treaty application via Japan’s administration—could undermine Japan if China manages to wrest control of the islands without provoking U.S. military intervention. Some fear that the guarantee may become moot if Beijing executes a fait accompli seizure and takes the islands in a surprise grab. China could also take a different tack, and erode Japanese administration slowly over time through a “creeping invasion.”18 This approach could rely on tactics that may be intended to undermine Japanese control of the islands over time. This includes a unilateral pronouncement by Beijing in 2013 in which it declared an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in an attempt to assert its authority to regulate the airspace over the disputed area. It also includes China’s regular Coast Guard incursions into the Senkaku territorial waters, which may be intended to undermine Japanese control.
Particularly if non-military vessels or individuals took the islands, some officials worry that Japan could lose its administrative control without the United States invoking its Article 5 treaty promise. Both a Chinese fait accompli and creeping invasion appear to be included in Clinton’s 2013 and Obama’s 2014 statements opposing unilateral actions which undermine Japanese administration. Nonetheless, because Japanese officials understand that Japan’s national interest in the Senkukus is far greater than the United States’, some remain anxious that if their hold on the islands is challenged months or years from now, they may have to go it alone, without the assistance of the U.S. umbrella.
An asymmetry of capabilities compounds this asymmetry of allied stake in the Senkakus sovereignty dispute. Although the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are world class, the U.S.–Japan alliance has historically been unilateral in nature. Japan has only recently raised the defense of the Senkakus to a national strategic priority, and the current U.S.–Japan bilateral defense guidelines, which form the heart of the alliance’s strategy and were written in 1997, do not address the possibility of a low-level conflict in the East China Sea.19 So-called “grey zone” conflicts like the Senkakus will presumably be a primary focus as Washington and Tokyo revise these alliance guidelines and as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe moves forward with his revision of Collective Self-Defense in spring 2015.20 At the present time, within the alliance, Japan is responsible for engaging low-level conflicts that may erupt around the Senkakus.21 Tokyo has long maintained a very modest military budget and is only just beginning to acquire some of the capabilities it needs to mount a Senkakus defense.22 It is therefore unsurprising that despite the United States’ consistent commitment, Japan remains anxious about what exactly Washington’s role would be if the U.S. ally faced an island row with China.
The South China Sea
Washington’s position on its treaty commitment to the Senkakus may seem complex and nuanced. The role of U.S. extended deterrence, however, is much more ambiguous when it comes to the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea. The murky nature of this commitment came to light during the 2012 Scarborough Shoals incident, and has resurfaced in several statements that Washington has made since.
On June 15, 2012, the Philippines conceded to China a two-month standoff over Scarborough Reef, a South China Sea land feature that is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. During the incident, Chinese vessels trapped Filipino fisherman inside the reef and engaged in economic coercion against the Philippines. As the standoff unfolded, the Philippines sought clarification from the United States about the conditions that would trigger its mutual defense treaty. The United States maintains “strategic ambiguity” on the treaty implications of an outbreak of hostility in the South China Sea— while Washington reaffirmed its security guarantee to the Philippines on multiple occasions during the crisis, it cleaved closely to its neutrality position on sovereignty disputes. It also avoided making any statement on the conditions under which it might enter a conflict in the South China Sea.23
During the Scarborough standoff, the United States acted as a third-party mediator between China and the Philippines, and believed itself to have brokered a deal for mutual withdrawal from the reef, only to watch China move back in and occupy it.24 During these negotiations, China reportedly called its South China Sea claims “core interests,” and refused to open a separate negotiating channel with the Philippines, forcing the talks to become a U.S.–China issue. U.S. officials were therefore cautious to consider the totality of Washington’s relationship with Beijing, and in the same press conference in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the Philippines, they also underscored the importance of the U.S.–China dynamic.25 Once they had gained de facto control over the Scarborough reef, Chinese officials reportedly began referring to the “Scarborough Model” of advancing their interests. They also began to speak of strategies of “extended coercion” to pressure allies under the U.S. defense umbrella.26 The United States’ limited stakes in the Scarborough Shoal and its desire to maintain a modus vivendi with China meant that it gave circumscribed support to the Philippines.
Since 2012, Washington apparently does not intend to clarify the role of U.S. extended deterrence in the South China Sea or strengthen its support for the Philippines’ territorial claims. In 2014, top national security officials called the U.S.–Philippines mutual defense treaty a “rock solid commitment.” In the same statement, however, they made plain that Washington does not see the U.S.– Philippines treaty as applying to the South China Sea the way the U.S.–Japan treaty applies to the Senkakus. The Deputy National Security Advisor referred to a South China Sea conflict as “hypothetical” and refused to speculate on U.S. action in the case of escalation.27 Under the terms of the U.S.–Philippines treaty, Washington reserves the right to intervene following attacks on the Philippines armed forces or vessels, but it has certainly not made a commitment to do so.28 Instead, the United States had made clear that it has an interest in seeing South China Sea disputes resolved through peaceful, legal means, but it has not declared a national interest in any of the Philippines’ actual island claims.
The asymmetry of capabilities between the allies heightens this alliance uncertainty. The Philippines has scant naval and coast guard capabilities, and its military is no match for Beijing’s.29 Unlike Japan and South Korea, which have long maintained consistently close defense ties to the United States and have robust independent military capabilities, the Philippines is home to no permanent U.S. bases or troops. In April 2014, Washington and Manila signed a defense agreement to allow the United States rotational base access, and the United States has pledged millions of dollars in maritime security aid to its ally.30 The U.S. commitments to help train and equip the Philippines Armed Forces, however, are a long-term project that will take years to bear fruit. Few in Washington or Manila harbor illusions that the Philippines will gain the capacity to defend its own territorial claims any time soon.
Additional U.S. military aid and presence in Southeast Asia may help to assuage some of Manila’s most acute abandonment fears. Nonetheless, the fact remains that this U.S. treaty partner faces a much stronger challenger in China. Precisely because it has few hard power options for protecting its interests, the Philippines is now engaged in international arbitration at the Hague against China over its South China Sea claims. Washington has provided some support in this endeavor, including repeated public statements backing the legal process and a State Department research report that may be useful to the Court.31 The arbitration is highly unlikely to settle all of Manila’s disputes with Beijing, however. In the meantime, the Philippines’ position in the Spratly Islands is far from secure. The Second Thomas Shoal, for example, may be a near-term flashpoint between Manila and Beijing. The Philippines holds the shoal and protects its claim using a rusted-out naval vessel, but China keeps the area surrounded with its own ships. If Manila’s vessel slips off the shoal, Beijing will likely move in and take control.32 How U.S. extended deterrence enters this equation, if at all, remains to be seen.
Extending Deterrence Downwards?
These brief case studies of the relationship between U.S. extended deterrence commitments and allies’ potential territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas raise an obvious question: if the United States has limited interests in offshore island disputes and clear reasons to maintain its neutrality position and relationship with China, should it worry at all if its allies are anxious about these potential conflicts? Need it really do more to assuage jittery partners’ fears of abandonment around these remote flashpoints?
One reason why Washington should be attentive to the relationship between Japan and the Philippines’ sovereignty disputes and its extended deterrence commitments is because of the role assurance plays in any alliance. Extended deterrence is a highly perceptual undertaking, where both allies and adversaries are concerned. The failure to persuade allies that their defense needs are being met at low levels of conflict could conceivably have a deleterious effect on U.S. security guarantees broadly. The belief that U.S. extended deterrence is inoperable at any level of escalation could erode allies’ faith in its overall credibility. To remain active and engaged in the region, the United States will need to rely on its forward bases and strong host-nation support—if allies are wary of U.S. support in discrete areas, they may pursue capabilities or policies that may be inimical to these interests.
Another reason why the United States should treat its allies’ territorial disputes as an extended deterrence concern is the role that these may play in crisis stability and crisis readiness. U.S. neutrality towards allies’ disputes may prove useful for deterrence if a challenger—namely, China—remains reasonably well convinced that the United States may nonetheless intervene on behalf of its partners in the case of war. But if Beijing believes that Washington will likely stand aside in an island row despite its alliance commitments, this may instead invite opportunism and “salami tactics” that test the commitment. Salami tactics will be a less attractive resort if a challenger believes it cannot slice much without provoking a serious response, but if the United States waits to decide whether it will intervene, it may ultimately find itself in a crisis or conflict that it could have avoided.
Additionally, while the United States may not see a clear stake in discrete territorial disputes, it unequivocally has one in the maintenance of the political and territorial status quo in East Asia more broadly defined. No one island feature will tip the balance of power in the Pacific in China’s favor, but if Beijing attempted over time to acquire all the land it claims, this would be a strategic game-changer for U.S. partners and Washington itself.
At present, however, it would be unwise for the United States to change its neutrality position on sovereignty disputes and unequivocally bring its allies’ claimed territories under the U.S. umbrella. One reason is that doing so may create a moral hazard problem, encouraging allies to press their claims with more confidence. Knowing that they have guaranteed U.S. backing, Tokyo or Manila may grow more assertive in disputes with Beijing than if they expected to bear primary responsibility for the defense of their claims. This, in turn, could cause crisis escalation or conflict that might otherwise have been avoided.
Resource constraints represent a second reason why Washington should not explicitly take on new extended deterrence commitments in the form of its allies’ claimed territories. It is no secret that the defense budget is under substantial pressure, and although 60 percent of the U.S. Navy’s assets will be in the Pacific by 2020, this does not constitute a radical increase. The number of ships deployed is also expected to shrink under sequestration, and the Navy will struggle to maintain its target number of vessels over the next several decades.33 This raises serious questions about whether or not Washington could reasonably take on new defensive, amphibious roles and missions that it does not already assume. Disputed territories themselves may be no more than rocky islets or submerged reefs, but patrolling the large bodies of water in which they sit is no small task. Taking the lead in comprehensive deterrence and rapid defense missions against maritime challenges may require U.S. resources that are simply unavailable.
The most compelling argument against changing U.S. declaratory policy on allies’ disputes, however, is the United States’ interest in not alienating Beijing. Washington has been attempting this through a nuanced regional engagement strategy. There are countless areas in which Washington and Beijing can and do cooperate, and great power collaboration will help to mitigate the risk of broader conflict in the region, even if the two also remain competitors. If the United States removes the uncertainty over its role in allies’ territorial disputes, it will almost certainly trigger backlash from China. Long-concerned that U.S. alliances constitute efforts to contain it, Chinese officials have also expressed fears that extended deterrence emboldens Washington’s allies. Some Chinese strategists have explicitly called on the United States to remove its alliance commitments “from small conflicts” and to “publicly limit extended nuclear deterrence…to existential threats.”34 Beijing may well interpret a declared broadening in the scope of U.S. security guarantees as a direct and serious provocation.
There are clear costs and benefits to the uncertainty over the United States’ relationship between its extended deterrence commitment and allies’ territorial disputes. A carefully calibrated deterrence policy, however, seeks to protect the status quo while avoiding dangerous, unnecessary security spirals. If one state is determined to revise the status quo and meets little resistance, it may be encouraged to continue pushing the boundaries. If status quo-protecting states do not evince a willingness to use force to protect their interests, the challenger may be emboldened. Even minor conflicts of little intrinsic value may become indices of resolve, requiring firmness to check aggression.35 If, however, the potential challenger is not seriously revisionist but rather predominantly security-seeking, efforts to deter it may be interpreted as direct threats. Policies that are meant only to secure the status quo may result in counteractions by the target that leave all parties worse off.36
Put differently, the United States faces clear tradeoffs in strengthening extended deterrence and allied assurance on one hand, and reassuring China on the other. U.S. policymakers do not and cannot know whether China will pursue a systematically revisionist strategy in the future. China has displayed tendencies toward “moderate revisionism,” and only time will tell whether Beijing will press all of its expansive Pacific claims.37 Simultaneously, China has also taken some important if modest steps to encourage maritime stability, such as agreeing to military-to-military confidence-building measures with the United States in late 2014, and an East China Sea crisis mechanism with Japan in 2015. If these efforts do not bear fruit and China appears to be systematically employing coercion toward U.S. allies around disputed territories, Washington may want to rethink its neutrality position, and should at least state publicly that it retains the right to do so in response to bad behavior by Beijing. For the time being, however, the United States must find ways to engage its allies’ abandonment fears in the East and South China Seas without compromising reassurance efforts towards China.
Navigating Uncharted Waters
As long as the United States pursues a China strategy that relies on reassurance, it should try to assuage allies’ abandonment fears through policies that focus on bolstering assurance within the alliance itself, as opposed to efforts that explicitly aim to ratchet up deterrent threats. There are a few intra-alliance measures that Washington can take to bolster assurance around island disputes without alienating Beijing.
The United States is already engaged in significant efforts to help allies and partners boost their own capacity to deter and defend in potential island contingencies. It should continue to help train and equip countries like the Philippines, and should encourage other states in the region to do the same. It should also invest in coast-guard-to-coast-guard efforts and focus on helping partners build their maritime domain awareness capabilities. The better allies’ coast guards are able to engage these island hotspots, and the more they can monitor events at sea, the less likely accidental or inadvertent escalation is to occur. China makes ample use of its non-military maritime law enforcement capacity, and the United States and its allies can do the same. Training allies to use and maintain new systems is as important as the defense equipment itself. Partner capacity-building efforts are, however, long projects and will take years to bear fruit. In the nearer term, Washington can take some additional, concrete steps to assuage allies’ abandonment fears around these flashpoints.
First, Washington should continue to strengthen peacetime consultation efforts in all of its Pacific alliances. Even if some ambiguity remains in the public U.S. positions on maritime disputes, it is vital that allies share a common understanding of each nation’s responsibilities when crises occur. Washington and its East Asian allies maintain numerous and highly productive strategic dialogues. These may, however, be segmented across the conflict spectrum. The Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan and Extended Deterrence Policy Committee with South Korea, for example, are important initiatives that focus on strategic deterrence, but do not deal with lower-level crises or how these might escalate into wider war. Washington should consider the integration of some of its strategic dialogues, so that allies have a unified understanding of how minor conflicts may escalate and where off-ramps may exist. The United States may also want to form a conventional extended deterrence consultation mechanism with the Philippines, modeled off those it holds with the ROK and Japan. This would complement its ongoing military assistance and capacity- building efforts with Manila.
Second and relatedly, Washington should consider establishing standing bilateral crisis bodies with both Japan and the Philippines to ensure operational coordination if island disputes begin to escalate.
Of the United States’ East Asian partners, only South Korea maintains a standing, combined military command with the United States. The U.S.–Japan alliance does have a Bilateral Coordination Mechanism, but only a major armed attack can trigger it, and thus it has never actually been activated. In contrast, the U.S.–Philippines alliance has few standing alliance institutions at all and no crisis mechanism whatsoever. By establishing standing crisis bodies, the United States and its allies can promote steady-state readiness around disputed territories, even if Washington does not publicly commit itself to allies’ sovereignty claims. Washington’s commitment to intervene militarily in a crisis in the East or South China Seas may remain contingent or probabilistic, but it can still help its allies prepare to manage these flashpoints, and it can promote crisis readiness within the alliance if escalation occurs.
Without requiring an overhaul in the way Washington thinks about extended deterrence, these intra-alliance prescriptions may improve coordination, mollify allies’ abandonment anxiety, and send the message to potential challengers that U.S. partners are not alone when they are targeted around sovereignty disputes. Integrated alliance dialogues and bilateral crisis coordination mechanisms are appropriate measures whatever Beijing’s long-term intentions are in the East and South China Seas.
During the implementation of these intra- alliance measures, Washington should take care to emphasize its defensive objectives. The United States and China still need to move forward on defense transparency efforts and military-to- military ties, and none of these assurance initiatives should prevent that from occurring.38 If, however, Beijing persistently resorts to coercion, more overt deterrent measures may be necessary. In addition to publicly announcing its support for allies’ sovereignty claims (revealing its intent to help defend them), the United States may take a number of measures in concert with its allies to send stronger signals of capability to do so. The United States and its allies may need to conduct military exercises near or in disputed areas, or more regularly and publicly practice the defense and retaking of maritime territories.
In crafting an approach to extended deterrence and assurance around disputed territories, Washington has a menu of options from which to choose. Measures that emphasize intra-alliance coordination and readiness can provide assurance and reinforce deterrence without undermining efforts to reassure Beijing. If, down the road, China appears to be systematically using coercion, consistently frustrating efforts at confidence building, then bringing allies’ territorial disputes under the U.S. security umbrella may make strategic sense. The balance between extended deterrence, assurance, and reassurance will almost certainly need to be revisited and recalibrated in the years to come.
Conclusions
The United States can manage its uneasy relationship between extended deterrence and assurance around its allies’ disputes, but must balance this with the need to maintain reassurance to and a working relationship with China. In the near term, Washington can bolster allied assurance and deterrence around disputed territories through several intra-alliance mechanisms, and shift to a firmer deterrence policy if it judges that Beijing’s use of coercion against its allies has become chronic.
The novel nature of this lower-level deterrence problem, however, highlights a larger point. The United States and the Soviet Union only began to extend deterrence to allies in the early Cold War. When they did, each gave security guarantees to states that were already in or associated with clear spheres of influence, in an international environment that was often judged to be zero- sum. Many of the extended deterrence tools of the past, including large conventional troop deployments and nuclear declaratory policies, may not be finely tuned enough to engage either potential conflicts around island disputes or a potential challenger who is not a full-blown adversary. The extended deterrence and assurance efforts of the future will have to be uniquely nimble and nuanced, with an eye to reassuring challengers like China as well as assuring and deterring on behalf of allies along the way.
It is also worth noting that history has never seen one superpower rise in a region in which another had a dense system of long-standing alliances. Security guarantees are, first and foremost, tools for protecting the territorial status quo. But when a major power is on the ascent, its conceptions of what constitutes the status quo may differ fundamentally from those of the dominant state.39 Maritime and territorial disputes are just one particularly prominent example of this fact.
In addition to the task of carefully calibrating its extended deterrence and assurance policy, policymakers in Washington therefore face greater and more abstract challenges. Beyond any particular sovereignty dispute, how will they define the status quo that is to be protected, and what will constitute an unacceptable infringement upon it? How will they communicate this defensive delineation to Beijing or others, without provoking destabilizing enmity? Extended deterrence has been an incredibly successful tool of U.S. foreign policy, but like all influence strategies, it is a means to an end. The puzzles that plague the uneasy relationship between territorial disputes and U.S. extended deterrence as well as assurance today can only be solved by broader strategies that reinforce U.S. interests and bring security to this vital region.
Notes
1. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Press Conference by Obama, Japanese PM Abe,” in Tokyo, April 24, 2014, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/ texttrans/2014/04/20140424298237.html#ixzz30J147bNS.
2. “Full Transcript of the Remarks of the Remarks of President Aquino and President Obama in their Joint Press Conference,” GMA News, April 28, 2014, http://www. gmanetwork.com/news/story/358751/news/nation/full-transcript-of-the-remarks-of-pre sident-aquino-and-president-obama-in-their-joint-press-conference.
3. This section is adapted in part from: Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance during the Second Nuclear Age,” in Strategic Asia 2013–2014: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner, eds. (National Bureau for Asian Research, October 2013), pp. 270–277.
4. Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses,” in Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 14–16.
5. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review called for the “strengthening” of extended deterrence on the regional level with emphasis on North East Asia. Nuclear Posture Review Report (Department of Defense, April 2010), http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/ 2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
6. Glenn Herald Snyder, The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis
A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 258–277.
7. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
8. Taylor M. Fravel, “Territorial and Maritime Boundary Disputes in Asia,” in Oxford Handbook of the International Relations in Asia, Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), chapter 27.
9. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 2.
10. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 182.
11. Mark E. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations (CRS Report No. R42761) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2013), p. 4, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf.
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
13. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, p. 1.
14. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Mehara,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Honolulu, Hawaii, October 27, 2010, http://m.state.gov/md150110.htm.
15. Maritime Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in Asia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong., 2 (September 20, 2012) (statement of Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76697/ html/CHRG-112shrg76697.htm.
16. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida after their Meeting,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Washington, DC, January 18, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203050.htm.
17. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Press Conference by Obama, Japanese PM Abe,” in Tokyo, April 24, 2014, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/ texttrans/2014/04/20140424298237.html#axzz30DVXhFDm.
18. Sugio Takahashi, “Upgrading Japan-US Defense Guidelines: Toward a New Phase of Operational Coordination,” Project 2049 Institute, 2013, pp. 7–8, http://project2049. net/documents/japan_us_defense_guidelines_takahashi.pdf.
19. “Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html.
20. “Abe Circles 1959 Top Court Ruling to Justify Collective Self Defense,” April 16, 2014, Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/16/national/government-to- cite-past-ruling-to-justify-exercise-of-collective-self-defense/#.U1BEQMcoxTU.
21. Takahashi, “Upgrading Japan-US Defense Guidelines,” p. 8.
22. “Japan Approves Record 4.98 Trillion Yen Defense Budget,” January 13, 2015, BBC News Asia, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30808685.
23. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Washington DC, April 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/ 2012/04/188982.htm; Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Aquino of the Philippines after Bilateral Meeting,” in the Oval Office, Washington DC, June 8, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2012/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-philippines-after- bilateral.
24. Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef,” The National Interest, November 21, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons- scarborough-reef-9442.
25. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Washington DC, April 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/ 2012/04/188982.htm.
26. Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef,” November 21, 2013, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarbor ough-reef-9442.
27. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes and NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs Evan Medeiros,” in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, April 27, 2014, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/27/press-briefing-deputy-national-security- advisor-strategic-communication-.
28. “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines,” The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, August 30, 1951, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.
29. “Philippines Military Strength,” Global Firepower, March 27, 2014, http://www. globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=philippines.
30. Keith Bradsher, “U.S. Forging Closer Military Ties with Philippines,” The New York Times, December 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/asia/us-forging- closer-military-ties-with-philippines.html?_r=0.
31. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” Limits in the Seas no. 143, , December 5, 2014, http://www.state. gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.
32. Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” New York Times Magazine, October 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/.
33. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, (CRS Report No. RL32665) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf.
34. Li Bin and He Yun, “Credible Limitations: U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in Northeast Asia,” in Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia, Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, eds. (Woollahra: Longueville Media, 2012), pp. 61–68.
35. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–62.
36. Ibid., pp. 62–67.
37. Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China (CRS Report No. R42784) (Washington, DC: December 24, 2014),
pp. 8–11, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.
38. For specific proposals to this effect, see: James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.–China Relations in the 21st Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), Appendix A.
39. See Mira Rapp-Hooper and Zachary Cooper, “A New Model of Great Power Transitions?: Extended Deterrence and U.S.–China Relations,” presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, August 30, 2014.
Published in Washington Quarterly (May 1, 2015)
http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/uncharted-waters-extended-deterrence-and-maritime-disputes
[Mira Rapp Hooper is a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Her expertise includes Asia security issues, deterrence, nuclear strategy and policy, and alliance politics. She was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Her Ph.D. dissertation, “Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics,” is a study of the formation and management of so-called nuclear umbrella alliances. Dr. Rapp Hooper’s academic and policy writings have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies, the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, and the Washington Quarterly (forthcoming). She holds a B.A. in history from Stanford University and an M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. http://csis.org/expert/mira-rapp-hooper]
http://jkalternativeviewpoint.com/jkalternate/?p=7549
“Let me reiterate that our treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute,” declared President Barack Obama in Tokyo in April 2014. “Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku Islands,” he continued, referring to the part of the alliance whereby the United States promises to provide military aid to Japan if it is attacked.1 Days later, the President announced a new basing agreement in Manila, affirming Washington’s commitment to help “build the Philippines’ defense capabilities,” calling it a “vital partner” in maritime security.2 These two presidential statements underscore an increasingly salient set of regional policy quandaries. Maritime and territorial disputes in the Pacific have become prominent in recent years and, when U.S. allies are involved, they present a unique challenge to extended deterrence in the region—one with which Washington is only beginning to grapple.
Although it has relied on extended deterrence since the early Cold War, the United States’ so-called “nuclear umbrella” is predominantly designed to deter nuclear and major conventional attacks against the sovereignty and territory of treaty allies. This may, however, have little role to play in deterring conflicts around offshore disputed territories. In recent years, Washington has faced mounting assurance and deterrence challenges because some of its close treaty allies in the Pacific are involved in territorial and maritime disputes, which frequently pit them against a rising China. Rather than fixate on the massive conventional invasions or nuclear attacks that preoccupied U.S. allies during the Cold War, some U.S. allies presently worry that they will not have support if they become involved in a less-than-existential conflict over a disputed island territory or a maritime boundary.
There are at least three reasons why these conflicts present a challenge to U.S. extended deterrence as it has traditionally been practiced. First, existing U.S. treaty commitments themselves do not provide much guidance to adversaries or allies on whether Washington would intervene in a territorial dispute on behalf of an ally, and if it would, under what conditions. Second, where uninhabited islands, rocks, or shoals are at issue, U.S. allies necessarily have a far greater stake in the dispute than the United States itself, making it more difficult for Washington to make its defensive commitments credible. Third, unlike in the Cold War standoff between the United States and Soviet Union, the United States and China are not sworn adversaries. Given its ample incentives to find a modus vivendi with Beijing in other areas, Washington maintains a position of neutrality on most maritime and territorial disputes and does not overtly back its allies’ sovereignty claims. China is, however, rising rapidly, and may therefore have both the capability and the will to press its claims against U.S. partners, even as Washington avoids taking sides. Taken together, these challenges combine to mean that allies’ fear of abandonment may run especially high when it comes to U.S. alliance commitments around lower- level disputes.
This article proceeds with a brief overview of extended deterrence and assurance in U.S. foreign policy, defining these terms and discussing their role in Cold War strategy. I argue that 21st-century East Asia presents a novel extended deterrence context for the three reasons mentioned above, illustrating why U.S. allies’ abandonment fears run especially high with the examples of the Senkaku/ Diaoyu Islands and the U.S.–Japan alliance as well as the Philippines’ Spratly Islands claims in the U.S.–Philippines pact. I argue that it is in Washington’s interest to address these abandonment fears and remain a committed alliance partner in this new extended deterrence context, recommending a few measures it can take to assuage allies’ anxieties while maintaining a working relationship with Beijing.
Extended Deterrence, Past and Present
The United States has relied on extended deterrence, allied assurance, and adversary reassurance as tools of statecraft since the early Cold War.3 Although closely linked, these influence strategies are distinct, so it is useful to begin by defining them. Extended deterrence aims to change the cost calculations of adversaries, specifically by dissuading them from attacking U.S. allies. It seeks to convince potential challengers that an attack on an ally will be met with retaliation by the United States itself. Assurance is a parallel strategy that is directed at allies and seeks to convince them that the United States is committed to their defense. Reassurance, however, is a strategy that aims to convince potential adversaries that they are not going to be the targets of unprovoked, serious harm. It aims in part to convince prospective challengers that extended deterrence is intended to protect allies if they become the victims of attack, but that it will not be used against challengers if they refrain from aggression.4 Thus reassurance is a defensive promise only, not an offensive one. The target of both extended deterrence and reassurance is the potential adversary, while the target of assurance is the ally.
Although they are closely linked, neither extended deterrence nor assurance is a subset of the other. An adversary may be deterred from attacking without the ally being convinced that the adversary will not. Theoretically, the opposite is also true, although less likely. Both extended deterrence and allied assurance are associated with formal security guarantees—positive treaty promises by a major power to provide military aid to an ally if it is the victim of an attack. This analysis will examine U.S. extended deterrence and assurance efforts that are associated with formal security guarantees in East Asia.
Since the early Cold War, the United States has extended deterrence to treaty allies, relying on both nuclear and conventional weapons to do so. While many of the basic contours of deterrence strategy have remained consistent since the early nuclear age, the environment in which the United States extends deterrence today departs from the Cold War context in notable ways. Most Cold War deterrence and assurance efforts were focused on Western Europe and the potential for a massive Soviet conventional or nuclear attack. China was treated as a lesser case. In NATO, the United States and its allies were bound together by a single, multilateral alliance that included hundreds of thousands of forward- deployed U.S. troops, nuclear weapons, and a focus on defending clear front lines. Allies were perennially concerned about whether the United States would make good on its promise to use nuclear weapons on their behalf, but there was no question that if the Soviet Union invaded Europe, Washington would be drawn into the conflict and would meet its treaty obligations to NATO.
Present-day extended deterrence efforts in East Asia diverge from this model in several respects. First, the United States extends deterrence to its allies in the Pacific through a “hub-and-spokes” system—with the United States at the center creating bilateral treaties with regional states—rather than through a cohesive multilateral organization. The depth and breadth of these alliance ties vary significantly within the region: for instance, the United States has over 50,000 military personnel in Japan, and almost none in the Philippines. Deterrence is also geographically distinct today, with no single land border as the focus of defense efforts. Most U.S. allies in East Asia are maritime powers. The U.S. military presence in the region is significant, yet its deterrence efforts are not signaled by a clear front line that is relevant to all of its allies or all potential conflicts in which they might be involved.
Another difference from the Cold War is that multiple potential threats exist in East Asia, rather than just one. While many Pacific nations are concerned about the rise of China, they are also wary of North Korea and the potential for renewed Russian aggression. The nature of most likely conflicts is also distinct from the contingencies that policymakers contemplated during the Cold War. Any future conflict could theoretically escalate into a major conventional or even nuclear exchange, but there is far less reason to fear a deliberate great power war in the region than there was between the United States and Soviet Union. A major ground war on the Korean Peninsula remains a serious concern, but it is difficult to envision a single, massive contingency that would envelop the region—the United States and China each recognize that a major power war would be catastrophic for both.
Most importantly, China and the United States are clearly competitors, but they are not sworn adversaries. Washington therefore has ample incentive to try to reassure Beijing that its alliances do not threaten its security, while at the same time deterring China from taking actions that may be destabilizing and dangerous. In present-day East Asia, extended deterrence commitments and the threats they are intended to address are therefore highly variegated, and in no way zero-sum. This means that the strategies used to deter and reassure China, as well as assure Pacific allies, may be employed in much more subtle and nuanced ways than they have been in the past.
As will be addressed shortly, some longstanding U.S. allies are deeply concerned that they may face limited conventional and sub-conventional conflicts around disputed territories. This environment is clearly preferable to the specter of catastrophic superpower conflict that suffused the Cold War, but complicates extended deterrence. For decades, the United States relied heavily on its nuclear arsenal to dissuade nuclear and major conventional attacks against allies. When the conflicts of concern are at lower levels of escalation, however, it is not clear that these can be deterred using the same means.
This is not to say that nuclear weapons do not play a central role in extended deterrence and assurance in East Asia. Especially since North Korea acquired nuclear weapons, U.S. policymakers have been keenly focused on strengthening extended nuclear deterrence in the region, and have included Pacific allies in nuclear-related consultations to an unprecedented degree.5 Deterrence at high levels of escalation does not necessarily beget deterrence at lower levels, however, and indeed it may invite lower-level opportunism.6 Beyond these big-picture differences between extended deterrence in Europe during the Cold War and extended deterrence in East Asia in the 21st century, however, territorial and maritime conflicts specifically present some novel extended deterrence challenges for the United States.
Extended Deterrence in Dispute
Since the early Cold War, scholars and policymakers have wrestled with obstacles that a major power like the United States faces in making credible deterrent threats on behalf of an ally. While it is quite reasonable to expect that a powerful state would mount a strong response if an adversary attacked its own homeland, extended deterrence requires that the same state convince its adversaries that it will do so on behalf of another state—that is, that it will treat its ally’s territory and sovereignty as though it were its own. Such promises may be hard to make credible because they mean that through these defense commitments, the deterrence-extending state may invite retaliation upon itself that it might have otherwise avoided entirely, putting its own territory, citizens, and armed forces at risk.
Existing scholarly research has demonstrated that disputed territory is the most common reason that states wage war.7 Since 1945, Asia has experienced more territorial disputes than any other part of the world. It has also experienced more armed conflict over territory than any other region, and its territorial disputes have been more resistant to settlement.8 It is therefore unsurprising that several U.S. allies in Asia are involved in territorial conflicts, and that they see these as significant security priorities. Where an ally’s territorial or maritime conflicts are concerned, however, it is even more difficult than usual for the United States to send credible signals of extended deterrence. There are at least three reasons why this is the case.
First, U.S. security treaties—the written basis of Washington’s extended deterrence commitments—are not particularly detailed in their content. These security guarantees generally pledge that the United States will treat an attack on an ally as a threat to its own peace and security, but they do not detail what precisely constitutes an attack, the conditions under which the United States would intervene in a dispute, or the means it would employ in its ally’s defense if it did so. This treaty ambiguity serves the purposes of general deterrence, and where many U.S. commitments are concerned, these details need not be put on paper to be understood. Washington’s longstanding relationships with Japan and South Korea, for example, make it unthinkable that it could stand aside if Tokyo or Seoul was attacked. Moreover, its significant troop presence on both allies’ territory makes it all the more likely that the United States would quickly become involved in conflict if one of these allies was the victim of aggression.
Where an ally has a remote territorial dispute, however, U.S. intervention cannot be so easily presumed. U.S. security treaties generally state that they apply to the ally’s home territory, but if a piece of territory is the subject of a sovereignty dispute, there is necessarily some debate as to whether it belongs to the ally at all, and therefore, whether the security guarantee applies there. Washington can, of course, go out of its way to state that its deterrence commitment extends to the territory in contention, as it has done with the Senkaku Islands, but the existence of multiple sovereignty claims injects some additional uncertainty into an already ambiguous treaty promise.
The credibility of deterrence promises may also be strained when the United States and an ally place different value on a territory. Because of its close partnerships, the United States may reasonably assert that it is willing to sacrifice blood and treasure and possibly face ruinous retaliation to defend Tokyo or Seoul. Where an ally’s disputed territory is concerned, however, there is far less symmetry of interest. A territorial dispute may invoke the core interests of the claimant states and hold deep symbolic value for that country, but the stakes for a far-off ally like the United States are necessarily diminished. As analysts often note, many of the disputes in the East and South China Seas are over rocky, uninhabited islets, and a pledge to treat these far-off land features as though they were U.S. soil strains belief. Moreover, as scholars Alexander George and Richard Smoke have argued, deterring limited conflicts such as those that may arise over an ally’s offshore islands is far more difficult than deterring major wars, as more limited threats are not easy to signal, especially on behalf of an ally.9 Unlike a massive attack on an ally’s home territory, a challenger’s assault on a far-off island would entail a limited use of military force. For a patron who hopes to deter such an attack, calibrated threats of retaliation are harder to convey.
Finally, as already noted, the United States and China are not locked in a zero-sum standoff as the United States and Soviet Union were during the Cold War. Rather, they compete in some areas and cooperate in others. Washington’s desire to maintain a modus vivendi with Beijing helps to explain why it takes a position of neutrality on most sovereignty disputes, including those involving close allies. This balancing act makes good sense, but it adds a third level of complication to U.S. extended deterrence. If Washington remains officially neutral on its allies’ territorial disputes, it cannot easily signal an extended deterrence commitment to those territories if it has made one. Strong public statements that the United States intends to defend the disputed territory or clear shows of force in the vicinity hardly signal a neutral position on sovereignty. Moreover, while the United States and China are not sworn adversaries, China is rising rapidly, and this gives it the military capabilities and increasingly the will to advance its sovereignty claims, including those that pit it against U.S. allies. It can therefore employ what Thomas Schelling called “salami tactics”—limited probes of U.S. commitments that aim to advance Chinese interests incrementally and opportunistically without triggering U.S. intervention.
When these factors are combined, they may lead U.S. allies to be especially fearful that their superpower patron will abandon them in conflicts arising from their territorial disputes. States are generally said to abandon an alliance partner if they formally abrogate the alliance treaty, fail to support the ally when the agreement’s casus foederis (or case for the alliance) arises, or decline to back a partner in a dispute with an adversary.10 Managing abandonment fears is a central challenge in any alliance. The ambiguous role of allies’ territorial disputes in U.S. treaties, the allies’ disparate stakes in these disputes, and the United States’ need to maintain a relationship with China, however, each inject additional uncertainty into already ambiguous U.S. extended deterrence commitments, and may provoke fears from U.S. allies that they will not have Washington’s support if a territorial dispute escalates and pits them against Beijing. Japan’s alliance fears over the Senakus Islands in the East China Sea, and the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea illustrate why these factors may elicit unusually high abandonment anxieties from U.S. allies, and why they present a management challenge for extended deterrence and allied assurance.
The Senkakus, South China Sea, and U.S. Alliance Commitments
As China’s power-projection capabilities and regional interests have grown in recent years, U.S. allies in East Asia have become increasingly concerned about territorial and maritime disputes in the region. The United States’ treaty guarantees with its East Asian allies are longstanding—most date to the early 1950s. Competing sovereignty claims over island territories in the Pacific are also decades old in many cases. China has claimed sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands since the 1970s and Japan has administered them for over a century, with a three-decade break following World War II. The Philippines has claimed features in the Spratly Islands since the 1950s, and China has done so since the 1980s. Only since Beijing has developed the maritime and aerial capabilities which allow it to press its claims, however, have U.S. allies become fearful that small island disputes could bring them into a serious conflict. The conundrum that competing, if long-simmering, sovereignty claims pose for enduring U.S. extended deterrence commitments has therefore only risen to prominence in recent years.
The Senkakus
Since the United States returned the Ryukyu island chain to Japan through the 1972 Okinawa Reversion Treaty, it has maintained that the U.S.–Japan security guarantee applies to the Senkaku Islands.11 This is because Article 5 of the 1960 U.S.–Japan security treaty applies to the “territories under the administration of Japan.”12 China began to voice objections to Japan’s authority over the islands in the early 1970s, but has only actively challenged the sea and airspace around the islands in recent years.13 In line with its official neutrality position, however, Washington does not publicly support Japan’s sovereignty claims to the Senkakus over China’s.
Despite its neutrality on the underlying sovereignty dispute, the United States has reiterated its extended deterrence commitment to Japan when Senkaku tensions have spiked. Following the 2010 diplomatic dispute that arose from the collision of a Chinese trawler and Japanese Coast Guard vessels, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton reaffirmed the U.S. position that the Senkakus fall within the scope of the U.S.–Japan security treaty.14 Shortly after Tokyo purchased three of the five islands in the chain, resulting in another diplomatic row with Beijing in 2012, Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell again reaffirmed that the United States took no position on the underlying sovereignty dispute, but that the Senkakus fell within the scope of the Article 5 commitment in the U.S.–Japan security treaty.15
Outside of specific crises, the United States has actually strengthened its public position on the Senkakus in recent years. In a 2013 statement, Secretary Clinton stated that Washington “would oppose any unilateral action that would seek to undermine Japanese administration” of the Senkakus.16 President Barack Obama restated Clinton’s pledge in 2014.17 Nonetheless, the Senkakus still occupy a somewhat uneasy spot in the alliance.
Officials and scholars in Japan have expressed concern that the dual nature of the U.S. Senkaku position—neutrality on the sovereignty dispute, and treaty application via Japan’s administration—could undermine Japan if China manages to wrest control of the islands without provoking U.S. military intervention. Some fear that the guarantee may become moot if Beijing executes a fait accompli seizure and takes the islands in a surprise grab. China could also take a different tack, and erode Japanese administration slowly over time through a “creeping invasion.”18 This approach could rely on tactics that may be intended to undermine Japanese control of the islands over time. This includes a unilateral pronouncement by Beijing in 2013 in which it declared an East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone in an attempt to assert its authority to regulate the airspace over the disputed area. It also includes China’s regular Coast Guard incursions into the Senkaku territorial waters, which may be intended to undermine Japanese control.
Particularly if non-military vessels or individuals took the islands, some officials worry that Japan could lose its administrative control without the United States invoking its Article 5 treaty promise. Both a Chinese fait accompli and creeping invasion appear to be included in Clinton’s 2013 and Obama’s 2014 statements opposing unilateral actions which undermine Japanese administration. Nonetheless, because Japanese officials understand that Japan’s national interest in the Senkukus is far greater than the United States’, some remain anxious that if their hold on the islands is challenged months or years from now, they may have to go it alone, without the assistance of the U.S. umbrella.
An asymmetry of capabilities compounds this asymmetry of allied stake in the Senkakus sovereignty dispute. Although the Japanese Self-Defense Forces are world class, the U.S.–Japan alliance has historically been unilateral in nature. Japan has only recently raised the defense of the Senkakus to a national strategic priority, and the current U.S.–Japan bilateral defense guidelines, which form the heart of the alliance’s strategy and were written in 1997, do not address the possibility of a low-level conflict in the East China Sea.19 So-called “grey zone” conflicts like the Senkakus will presumably be a primary focus as Washington and Tokyo revise these alliance guidelines and as Prime Minister Shinzo Abe moves forward with his revision of Collective Self-Defense in spring 2015.20 At the present time, within the alliance, Japan is responsible for engaging low-level conflicts that may erupt around the Senkakus.21 Tokyo has long maintained a very modest military budget and is only just beginning to acquire some of the capabilities it needs to mount a Senkakus defense.22 It is therefore unsurprising that despite the United States’ consistent commitment, Japan remains anxious about what exactly Washington’s role would be if the U.S. ally faced an island row with China.
The South China Sea
Washington’s position on its treaty commitment to the Senkakus may seem complex and nuanced. The role of U.S. extended deterrence, however, is much more ambiguous when it comes to the Philippines’ territorial claims in the South China Sea. The murky nature of this commitment came to light during the 2012 Scarborough Shoals incident, and has resurfaced in several statements that Washington has made since.
On June 15, 2012, the Philippines conceded to China a two-month standoff over Scarborough Reef, a South China Sea land feature that is claimed by China, Taiwan, and the Philippines. During the incident, Chinese vessels trapped Filipino fisherman inside the reef and engaged in economic coercion against the Philippines. As the standoff unfolded, the Philippines sought clarification from the United States about the conditions that would trigger its mutual defense treaty. The United States maintains “strategic ambiguity” on the treaty implications of an outbreak of hostility in the South China Sea— while Washington reaffirmed its security guarantee to the Philippines on multiple occasions during the crisis, it cleaved closely to its neutrality position on sovereignty disputes. It also avoided making any statement on the conditions under which it might enter a conflict in the South China Sea.23
During the Scarborough standoff, the United States acted as a third-party mediator between China and the Philippines, and believed itself to have brokered a deal for mutual withdrawal from the reef, only to watch China move back in and occupy it.24 During these negotiations, China reportedly called its South China Sea claims “core interests,” and refused to open a separate negotiating channel with the Philippines, forcing the talks to become a U.S.–China issue. U.S. officials were therefore cautious to consider the totality of Washington’s relationship with Beijing, and in the same press conference in which they reaffirmed their commitment to the Philippines, they also underscored the importance of the U.S.–China dynamic.25 Once they had gained de facto control over the Scarborough reef, Chinese officials reportedly began referring to the “Scarborough Model” of advancing their interests. They also began to speak of strategies of “extended coercion” to pressure allies under the U.S. defense umbrella.26 The United States’ limited stakes in the Scarborough Shoal and its desire to maintain a modus vivendi with China meant that it gave circumscribed support to the Philippines.
Since 2012, Washington apparently does not intend to clarify the role of U.S. extended deterrence in the South China Sea or strengthen its support for the Philippines’ territorial claims. In 2014, top national security officials called the U.S.–Philippines mutual defense treaty a “rock solid commitment.” In the same statement, however, they made plain that Washington does not see the U.S.– Philippines treaty as applying to the South China Sea the way the U.S.–Japan treaty applies to the Senkakus. The Deputy National Security Advisor referred to a South China Sea conflict as “hypothetical” and refused to speculate on U.S. action in the case of escalation.27 Under the terms of the U.S.–Philippines treaty, Washington reserves the right to intervene following attacks on the Philippines armed forces or vessels, but it has certainly not made a commitment to do so.28 Instead, the United States had made clear that it has an interest in seeing South China Sea disputes resolved through peaceful, legal means, but it has not declared a national interest in any of the Philippines’ actual island claims.
The asymmetry of capabilities between the allies heightens this alliance uncertainty. The Philippines has scant naval and coast guard capabilities, and its military is no match for Beijing’s.29 Unlike Japan and South Korea, which have long maintained consistently close defense ties to the United States and have robust independent military capabilities, the Philippines is home to no permanent U.S. bases or troops. In April 2014, Washington and Manila signed a defense agreement to allow the United States rotational base access, and the United States has pledged millions of dollars in maritime security aid to its ally.30 The U.S. commitments to help train and equip the Philippines Armed Forces, however, are a long-term project that will take years to bear fruit. Few in Washington or Manila harbor illusions that the Philippines will gain the capacity to defend its own territorial claims any time soon.
Additional U.S. military aid and presence in Southeast Asia may help to assuage some of Manila’s most acute abandonment fears. Nonetheless, the fact remains that this U.S. treaty partner faces a much stronger challenger in China. Precisely because it has few hard power options for protecting its interests, the Philippines is now engaged in international arbitration at the Hague against China over its South China Sea claims. Washington has provided some support in this endeavor, including repeated public statements backing the legal process and a State Department research report that may be useful to the Court.31 The arbitration is highly unlikely to settle all of Manila’s disputes with Beijing, however. In the meantime, the Philippines’ position in the Spratly Islands is far from secure. The Second Thomas Shoal, for example, may be a near-term flashpoint between Manila and Beijing. The Philippines holds the shoal and protects its claim using a rusted-out naval vessel, but China keeps the area surrounded with its own ships. If Manila’s vessel slips off the shoal, Beijing will likely move in and take control.32 How U.S. extended deterrence enters this equation, if at all, remains to be seen.
Extending Deterrence Downwards?
These brief case studies of the relationship between U.S. extended deterrence commitments and allies’ potential territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas raise an obvious question: if the United States has limited interests in offshore island disputes and clear reasons to maintain its neutrality position and relationship with China, should it worry at all if its allies are anxious about these potential conflicts? Need it really do more to assuage jittery partners’ fears of abandonment around these remote flashpoints?
One reason why Washington should be attentive to the relationship between Japan and the Philippines’ sovereignty disputes and its extended deterrence commitments is because of the role assurance plays in any alliance. Extended deterrence is a highly perceptual undertaking, where both allies and adversaries are concerned. The failure to persuade allies that their defense needs are being met at low levels of conflict could conceivably have a deleterious effect on U.S. security guarantees broadly. The belief that U.S. extended deterrence is inoperable at any level of escalation could erode allies’ faith in its overall credibility. To remain active and engaged in the region, the United States will need to rely on its forward bases and strong host-nation support—if allies are wary of U.S. support in discrete areas, they may pursue capabilities or policies that may be inimical to these interests.
Another reason why the United States should treat its allies’ territorial disputes as an extended deterrence concern is the role that these may play in crisis stability and crisis readiness. U.S. neutrality towards allies’ disputes may prove useful for deterrence if a challenger—namely, China—remains reasonably well convinced that the United States may nonetheless intervene on behalf of its partners in the case of war. But if Beijing believes that Washington will likely stand aside in an island row despite its alliance commitments, this may instead invite opportunism and “salami tactics” that test the commitment. Salami tactics will be a less attractive resort if a challenger believes it cannot slice much without provoking a serious response, but if the United States waits to decide whether it will intervene, it may ultimately find itself in a crisis or conflict that it could have avoided.
Additionally, while the United States may not see a clear stake in discrete territorial disputes, it unequivocally has one in the maintenance of the political and territorial status quo in East Asia more broadly defined. No one island feature will tip the balance of power in the Pacific in China’s favor, but if Beijing attempted over time to acquire all the land it claims, this would be a strategic game-changer for U.S. partners and Washington itself.
At present, however, it would be unwise for the United States to change its neutrality position on sovereignty disputes and unequivocally bring its allies’ claimed territories under the U.S. umbrella. One reason is that doing so may create a moral hazard problem, encouraging allies to press their claims with more confidence. Knowing that they have guaranteed U.S. backing, Tokyo or Manila may grow more assertive in disputes with Beijing than if they expected to bear primary responsibility for the defense of their claims. This, in turn, could cause crisis escalation or conflict that might otherwise have been avoided.
Resource constraints represent a second reason why Washington should not explicitly take on new extended deterrence commitments in the form of its allies’ claimed territories. It is no secret that the defense budget is under substantial pressure, and although 60 percent of the U.S. Navy’s assets will be in the Pacific by 2020, this does not constitute a radical increase. The number of ships deployed is also expected to shrink under sequestration, and the Navy will struggle to maintain its target number of vessels over the next several decades.33 This raises serious questions about whether or not Washington could reasonably take on new defensive, amphibious roles and missions that it does not already assume. Disputed territories themselves may be no more than rocky islets or submerged reefs, but patrolling the large bodies of water in which they sit is no small task. Taking the lead in comprehensive deterrence and rapid defense missions against maritime challenges may require U.S. resources that are simply unavailable.
The most compelling argument against changing U.S. declaratory policy on allies’ disputes, however, is the United States’ interest in not alienating Beijing. Washington has been attempting this through a nuanced regional engagement strategy. There are countless areas in which Washington and Beijing can and do cooperate, and great power collaboration will help to mitigate the risk of broader conflict in the region, even if the two also remain competitors. If the United States removes the uncertainty over its role in allies’ territorial disputes, it will almost certainly trigger backlash from China. Long-concerned that U.S. alliances constitute efforts to contain it, Chinese officials have also expressed fears that extended deterrence emboldens Washington’s allies. Some Chinese strategists have explicitly called on the United States to remove its alliance commitments “from small conflicts” and to “publicly limit extended nuclear deterrence…to existential threats.”34 Beijing may well interpret a declared broadening in the scope of U.S. security guarantees as a direct and serious provocation.
There are clear costs and benefits to the uncertainty over the United States’ relationship between its extended deterrence commitment and allies’ territorial disputes. A carefully calibrated deterrence policy, however, seeks to protect the status quo while avoiding dangerous, unnecessary security spirals. If one state is determined to revise the status quo and meets little resistance, it may be encouraged to continue pushing the boundaries. If status quo-protecting states do not evince a willingness to use force to protect their interests, the challenger may be emboldened. Even minor conflicts of little intrinsic value may become indices of resolve, requiring firmness to check aggression.35 If, however, the potential challenger is not seriously revisionist but rather predominantly security-seeking, efforts to deter it may be interpreted as direct threats. Policies that are meant only to secure the status quo may result in counteractions by the target that leave all parties worse off.36
Put differently, the United States faces clear tradeoffs in strengthening extended deterrence and allied assurance on one hand, and reassuring China on the other. U.S. policymakers do not and cannot know whether China will pursue a systematically revisionist strategy in the future. China has displayed tendencies toward “moderate revisionism,” and only time will tell whether Beijing will press all of its expansive Pacific claims.37 Simultaneously, China has also taken some important if modest steps to encourage maritime stability, such as agreeing to military-to-military confidence-building measures with the United States in late 2014, and an East China Sea crisis mechanism with Japan in 2015. If these efforts do not bear fruit and China appears to be systematically employing coercion toward U.S. allies around disputed territories, Washington may want to rethink its neutrality position, and should at least state publicly that it retains the right to do so in response to bad behavior by Beijing. For the time being, however, the United States must find ways to engage its allies’ abandonment fears in the East and South China Seas without compromising reassurance efforts towards China.
Navigating Uncharted Waters
As long as the United States pursues a China strategy that relies on reassurance, it should try to assuage allies’ abandonment fears through policies that focus on bolstering assurance within the alliance itself, as opposed to efforts that explicitly aim to ratchet up deterrent threats. There are a few intra-alliance measures that Washington can take to bolster assurance around island disputes without alienating Beijing.
The United States is already engaged in significant efforts to help allies and partners boost their own capacity to deter and defend in potential island contingencies. It should continue to help train and equip countries like the Philippines, and should encourage other states in the region to do the same. It should also invest in coast-guard-to-coast-guard efforts and focus on helping partners build their maritime domain awareness capabilities. The better allies’ coast guards are able to engage these island hotspots, and the more they can monitor events at sea, the less likely accidental or inadvertent escalation is to occur. China makes ample use of its non-military maritime law enforcement capacity, and the United States and its allies can do the same. Training allies to use and maintain new systems is as important as the defense equipment itself. Partner capacity-building efforts are, however, long projects and will take years to bear fruit. In the nearer term, Washington can take some additional, concrete steps to assuage allies’ abandonment fears around these flashpoints.
First, Washington should continue to strengthen peacetime consultation efforts in all of its Pacific alliances. Even if some ambiguity remains in the public U.S. positions on maritime disputes, it is vital that allies share a common understanding of each nation’s responsibilities when crises occur. Washington and its East Asian allies maintain numerous and highly productive strategic dialogues. These may, however, be segmented across the conflict spectrum. The Extended Deterrence Dialogue with Japan and Extended Deterrence Policy Committee with South Korea, for example, are important initiatives that focus on strategic deterrence, but do not deal with lower-level crises or how these might escalate into wider war. Washington should consider the integration of some of its strategic dialogues, so that allies have a unified understanding of how minor conflicts may escalate and where off-ramps may exist. The United States may also want to form a conventional extended deterrence consultation mechanism with the Philippines, modeled off those it holds with the ROK and Japan. This would complement its ongoing military assistance and capacity- building efforts with Manila.
Second and relatedly, Washington should consider establishing standing bilateral crisis bodies with both Japan and the Philippines to ensure operational coordination if island disputes begin to escalate.
Of the United States’ East Asian partners, only South Korea maintains a standing, combined military command with the United States. The U.S.–Japan alliance does have a Bilateral Coordination Mechanism, but only a major armed attack can trigger it, and thus it has never actually been activated. In contrast, the U.S.–Philippines alliance has few standing alliance institutions at all and no crisis mechanism whatsoever. By establishing standing crisis bodies, the United States and its allies can promote steady-state readiness around disputed territories, even if Washington does not publicly commit itself to allies’ sovereignty claims. Washington’s commitment to intervene militarily in a crisis in the East or South China Seas may remain contingent or probabilistic, but it can still help its allies prepare to manage these flashpoints, and it can promote crisis readiness within the alliance if escalation occurs.
Without requiring an overhaul in the way Washington thinks about extended deterrence, these intra-alliance prescriptions may improve coordination, mollify allies’ abandonment anxiety, and send the message to potential challengers that U.S. partners are not alone when they are targeted around sovereignty disputes. Integrated alliance dialogues and bilateral crisis coordination mechanisms are appropriate measures whatever Beijing’s long-term intentions are in the East and South China Seas.
During the implementation of these intra- alliance measures, Washington should take care to emphasize its defensive objectives. The United States and China still need to move forward on defense transparency efforts and military-to- military ties, and none of these assurance initiatives should prevent that from occurring.38 If, however, Beijing persistently resorts to coercion, more overt deterrent measures may be necessary. In addition to publicly announcing its support for allies’ sovereignty claims (revealing its intent to help defend them), the United States may take a number of measures in concert with its allies to send stronger signals of capability to do so. The United States and its allies may need to conduct military exercises near or in disputed areas, or more regularly and publicly practice the defense and retaking of maritime territories.
In crafting an approach to extended deterrence and assurance around disputed territories, Washington has a menu of options from which to choose. Measures that emphasize intra-alliance coordination and readiness can provide assurance and reinforce deterrence without undermining efforts to reassure Beijing. If, down the road, China appears to be systematically using coercion, consistently frustrating efforts at confidence building, then bringing allies’ territorial disputes under the U.S. security umbrella may make strategic sense. The balance between extended deterrence, assurance, and reassurance will almost certainly need to be revisited and recalibrated in the years to come.
Conclusions
The United States can manage its uneasy relationship between extended deterrence and assurance around its allies’ disputes, but must balance this with the need to maintain reassurance to and a working relationship with China. In the near term, Washington can bolster allied assurance and deterrence around disputed territories through several intra-alliance mechanisms, and shift to a firmer deterrence policy if it judges that Beijing’s use of coercion against its allies has become chronic.
The novel nature of this lower-level deterrence problem, however, highlights a larger point. The United States and the Soviet Union only began to extend deterrence to allies in the early Cold War. When they did, each gave security guarantees to states that were already in or associated with clear spheres of influence, in an international environment that was often judged to be zero- sum. Many of the extended deterrence tools of the past, including large conventional troop deployments and nuclear declaratory policies, may not be finely tuned enough to engage either potential conflicts around island disputes or a potential challenger who is not a full-blown adversary. The extended deterrence and assurance efforts of the future will have to be uniquely nimble and nuanced, with an eye to reassuring challengers like China as well as assuring and deterring on behalf of allies along the way.
It is also worth noting that history has never seen one superpower rise in a region in which another had a dense system of long-standing alliances. Security guarantees are, first and foremost, tools for protecting the territorial status quo. But when a major power is on the ascent, its conceptions of what constitutes the status quo may differ fundamentally from those of the dominant state.39 Maritime and territorial disputes are just one particularly prominent example of this fact.
In addition to the task of carefully calibrating its extended deterrence and assurance policy, policymakers in Washington therefore face greater and more abstract challenges. Beyond any particular sovereignty dispute, how will they define the status quo that is to be protected, and what will constitute an unacceptable infringement upon it? How will they communicate this defensive delineation to Beijing or others, without provoking destabilizing enmity? Extended deterrence has been an incredibly successful tool of U.S. foreign policy, but like all influence strategies, it is a means to an end. The puzzles that plague the uneasy relationship between territorial disputes and U.S. extended deterrence as well as assurance today can only be solved by broader strategies that reinforce U.S. interests and bring security to this vital region.
Notes
1. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Press Conference by Obama, Japanese PM Abe,” in Tokyo, April 24, 2014, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/ texttrans/2014/04/20140424298237.html#ixzz30J147bNS.
2. “Full Transcript of the Remarks of the Remarks of President Aquino and President Obama in their Joint Press Conference,” GMA News, April 28, 2014, http://www. gmanetwork.com/news/story/358751/news/nation/full-transcript-of-the-remarks-of-pre sident-aquino-and-president-obama-in-their-joint-press-conference.
3. This section is adapted in part from: Linton Brooks and Mira Rapp-Hooper, “Extended Deterrence, Assurance, and Reassurance during the Second Nuclear Age,” in Strategic Asia 2013–2014: Asia in the Second Nuclear Age, Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark and Travis Tanner, eds. (National Bureau for Asian Research, October 2013), pp. 270–277.
4. Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Security Assurances: Initial Hypotheses,” in Security Assurances and Nuclear Nonproliferation, ed. Jeffrey W. Knopf (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), pp. 14–16.
5. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review called for the “strengthening” of extended deterrence on the regional level with emphasis on North East Asia. Nuclear Posture Review Report (Department of Defense, April 2010), http://www.defense.gov/npr/docs/ 2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf.
6. Glenn Herald Snyder, The Balance of Power and the Balance of Terror (San Francisco: Chandler, 1965). Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis
A Quantitative Approach,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53, no. 2 (2009): 258–277.
7. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
8. Taylor M. Fravel, “Territorial and Maritime Boundary Disputes in Asia,” in Oxford Handbook of the International Relations in Asia, Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill, and Rosemary Foot, eds., (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014), chapter 27.
9. Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974), p. 2.
10. Glenn H. Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), p. 182.
11. Mark E. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations (CRS Report No. R42761) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, January 22, 2013), p. 4, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42761.pdf.
12. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America,” http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n- america/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
13. Manyin, Senkaku (Diaoyu/Diaoyutai) Islands Dispute: U.S. Treaty Obligations, p. 1.
14. U.S. Department of State, “Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Mehara,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Honolulu, Hawaii, October 27, 2010, http://m.state.gov/md150110.htm.
15. Maritime Territorial Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in Asia: Hearing before the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong., 2 (September 20, 2012) (statement of Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg76697/ html/CHRG-112shrg76697.htm.
16. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida after their Meeting,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Washington, DC, January 18, 2013, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2013/01/203050.htm.
17. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Press Conference by Obama, Japanese PM Abe,” in Tokyo, April 24, 2014, http://iipdigital.usembassy.gov/st/english/ texttrans/2014/04/20140424298237.html#axzz30DVXhFDm.
18. Sugio Takahashi, “Upgrading Japan-US Defense Guidelines: Toward a New Phase of Operational Coordination,” Project 2049 Institute, 2013, pp. 7–8, http://project2049. net/documents/japan_us_defense_guidelines_takahashi.pdf.
19. “Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1997, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/guideline2.html.
20. “Abe Circles 1959 Top Court Ruling to Justify Collective Self Defense,” April 16, 2014, Japan Times, www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/16/national/government-to- cite-past-ruling-to-justify-exercise-of-collective-self-defense/#.U1BEQMcoxTU.
21. Takahashi, “Upgrading Japan-US Defense Guidelines,” p. 8.
22. “Japan Approves Record 4.98 Trillion Yen Defense Budget,” January 13, 2015, BBC News Asia, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-30808685.
23. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Washington DC, April 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/ 2012/04/188982.htm; Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Remarks by President Obama and President Aquino of the Philippines after Bilateral Meeting,” in the Oval Office, Washington DC, June 8, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press- office/2012/06/08/remarks-president-obama-and-president-aquino-philippines-after- bilateral.
24. Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef,” The National Interest, November 21, 2013, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons- scarborough-reef-9442.
25. U.S. Department of State, “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert Del Rosario, and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin After Their Meeting,” speech by Hillary Rodham Clinton, in Washington DC, April 30, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/ 2012/04/188982.htm.
26. Ely Ratner, “Learning the Lessons of Scarborough Reef,” November 21, 2013, The National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/learning-the-lessons-scarbor ough-reef-9442.
27. Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, “Press Briefing by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes and NSC Senior Director for Asian Affairs Evan Medeiros,” in Kuala Lampur, Malaysia, April 27, 2014, http:// www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/27/press-briefing-deputy-national-security- advisor-strategic-communication-.
28. “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of the Philippines,” The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School, August 30, 1951, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/phil001.asp.
29. “Philippines Military Strength,” Global Firepower, March 27, 2014, http://www. globalfirepower.com/country-military-strength-detail.asp?country_id=philippines.
30. Keith Bradsher, “U.S. Forging Closer Military Ties with Philippines,” The New York Times, December 17, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/18/world/asia/us-forging- closer-military-ties-with-philippines.html?_r=0.
31. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs, Office of Ocean and Polar Affairs, “China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” Limits in the Seas no. 143, , December 5, 2014, http://www.state. gov/documents/organization/234936.pdf.
32. Jeff Himmelman, “A Game of Shark and Minnow,” New York Times Magazine, October 27, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/newsgraphics/2013/10/27/south-china-sea/.
33. Ronald O’Rourke, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, (CRS Report No. RL32665) (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 1, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL32665.pdf.
34. Li Bin and He Yun, “Credible Limitations: U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence and Stability in Northeast Asia,” in Disarming Doubt: The Future of Extended Nuclear Deterrence in East Asia, Rory Medcalf and Fiona Cunningham, eds. (Woollahra: Longueville Media, 2012), pp. 61–68.
35. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 58–62.
36. Ibid., pp. 62–67.
37. Ronald O’Rourke, Maritime Territorial and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) Disputes Involving China (CRS Report No. R42784) (Washington, DC: December 24, 2014),
pp. 8–11, http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pdf.
38. For specific proposals to this effect, see: James Steinberg and Michael E. O’Hanlon, Strategic Reassurance and Resolve: U.S.–China Relations in the 21st Century (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014), Appendix A.
39. See Mira Rapp-Hooper and Zachary Cooper, “A New Model of Great Power Transitions?: Extended Deterrence and U.S.–China Relations,” presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Meetings, August 30, 2014.
Published in Washington Quarterly (May 1, 2015)
http://twq.elliott.gwu.edu/uncharted-waters-extended-deterrence-and-maritime-disputes
[Mira Rapp Hooper is a fellow with the CSIS Asia Program and director of the CSIS Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative. Her expertise includes Asia security issues, deterrence, nuclear strategy and policy, and alliance politics. She was previously a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. Her Ph.D. dissertation, “Absolute Alliances: Extended Deterrence in International Politics,” is a study of the formation and management of so-called nuclear umbrella alliances. Dr. Rapp Hooper’s academic and policy writings have appeared in Political Science Quarterly, Security Studies, the National Interest, Foreign Affairs, and the Washington Quarterly (forthcoming). She holds a B.A. in history from Stanford University and an M.A., M.Phil., and Ph.D. in political science from Columbia University. http://csis.org/expert/mira-rapp-hooper]
http://jkalternativeviewpoint.com/jkalternate/?p=7549
PHL, Australia, Japan, US conducts military planning in Hawaii
From Ang Malaya (Jun 22): PHL, Australia, Japan, US conducts military planning in Hawaii
Twenty-six Armed Forces of the Philippines were in Ford Island, Hawaii for Concept Development Workshop (CDW) with their American counterparts. The Philippine delegation was headed by Brigadier General Rodolfo Santiago, AFP Commandant, AFP Command & General Staff College.
The said Concept Development Workshop tackled the upcoming Balikatan (BK) 2016.
“The workshop provides a bilateral forum in which U.S. and Philippine senior level leaders have the opportunity to discuss exercise guidance, coordinate requirements, and develop exercise concepts for Balikatan,” the US Navy said.
BK 2016 planners addressed the Field Training Exercise, Staff Exercise, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Lines of Operation of the said upcoming war games.
Representatives from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) also participated in the workshop.
http://www.angmalaya.net/nation/2015/06/22/11581-phl-australia-japan-us-conducts-military-planning-in-hawaii
Twenty-six Armed Forces of the Philippines were in Ford Island, Hawaii for Concept Development Workshop (CDW) with their American counterparts. The Philippine delegation was headed by Brigadier General Rodolfo Santiago, AFP Commandant, AFP Command & General Staff College.
The said Concept Development Workshop tackled the upcoming Balikatan (BK) 2016.
“The workshop provides a bilateral forum in which U.S. and Philippine senior level leaders have the opportunity to discuss exercise guidance, coordinate requirements, and develop exercise concepts for Balikatan,” the US Navy said.
BK 2016 planners addressed the Field Training Exercise, Staff Exercise, and Humanitarian and Civic Assistance Lines of Operation of the said upcoming war games.
Representatives from the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) also participated in the workshop.
http://www.angmalaya.net/nation/2015/06/22/11581-phl-australia-japan-us-conducts-military-planning-in-hawaii
US government close to fulfilling Congressional request to provide PHL with Archangel – report
From Ang Malaya (Jun 22): US government close to fulfilling Congressional request to provide PHL with Archangel – report
While the acquisition project of six close air support aircraft (CASA) for Philippine Air Force is on hold, report from IHS Jane’s says that IOMAX chief executive officer (CEO) Ron Howard noted during the Paris Air Show that the United States government is close to fulfilling a Congressional 1206 Request (Security Assistance) to provide Archangel Border Patrol Aircraft to the Philippines.
Section 1206 of the US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has two purposes. First is to enable foreign military and security forces to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations.
The second one is to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. Armed Forces are participating.
Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) account.
“The Archangel’s design supports air component requirements for counterinsurgency (COIN), armed reconnaissance (AR), close air support (CAS), forward air control (airborne) (FAC(A)) and combat search and rescue (CSAR),” IOMAX said.
It was reported that IOMAX is interested in joining DND’s CASA acquisition project, however, new date for bid submission and opening is yet to be announced after several rescheduling.
http://www.angmalaya.net/nation/2015/06/22/11598-us-government-close-to-fulfilling-congressional-request-to-provide-phl-with-archangel-report
While the acquisition project of six close air support aircraft (CASA) for Philippine Air Force is on hold, report from IHS Jane’s says that IOMAX chief executive officer (CEO) Ron Howard noted during the Paris Air Show that the United States government is close to fulfilling a Congressional 1206 Request (Security Assistance) to provide Archangel Border Patrol Aircraft to the Philippines.
Section 1206 of the US National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has two purposes. First is to enable foreign military and security forces to perform counterterrorism (CT) operations.
The second one is to enable foreign military forces to participate in or to support military and stability operations in which U.S. Armed Forces are participating.
Section 1206 programs are funded from the DOD operations and maintenance (O&M) account.
“The Archangel’s design supports air component requirements for counterinsurgency (COIN), armed reconnaissance (AR), close air support (CAS), forward air control (airborne) (FAC(A)) and combat search and rescue (CSAR),” IOMAX said.
It was reported that IOMAX is interested in joining DND’s CASA acquisition project, however, new date for bid submission and opening is yet to be announced after several rescheduling.
http://www.angmalaya.net/nation/2015/06/22/11598-us-government-close-to-fulfilling-congressional-request-to-provide-phl-with-archangel-report
Member of terror group Islamic State arrested in southern Philippines
From Ang Malaya (Jun 22): Member of terror group Islamic State arrested in southern Philippines
Colonel Manolo Samarita, 103rd Brigade Deputy Commander, confirms over radio station DXMS in Cotabato City that a suspect arrested for carnapping and attacks on army personnel last Wednesday, June 17 is a member of terror group ISIS.
The Filipino suspect, Junaid Kiram Undac, was arrested by government security forces in Marawi city.
Marawi City’s official name is Islamic City of Marawi. It is the capital city of Lanao del Sur in Mindanao.
Last September 2014, a flag of ISIS, Islamic State, was seen at a mosque in Marawi City. It was also reported that Muslim Filipinos in the area pledged allegiance to ISIS.
In November 2014, The ISIS Study Group said one Filipino is part of ISIS beheading team. “The recent IS execution video showing the beheadings of the Syrian pilots and Peter Kassig is extremely important due to the fact that a Filipino foreign fighter was involved in the execution of the pilots, and quite possibly was also involved in Kassig’s execution as well,” ISIS Study Group said.
http://www.angmalaya.net/nation/2015/06/22/11617-member-of-terror-group-islamic-state-arrested-in-southern-philippines
Colonel Manolo Samarita, 103rd Brigade Deputy Commander, confirms over radio station DXMS in Cotabato City that a suspect arrested for carnapping and attacks on army personnel last Wednesday, June 17 is a member of terror group ISIS.
The Filipino suspect, Junaid Kiram Undac, was arrested by government security forces in Marawi city.
Marawi City’s official name is Islamic City of Marawi. It is the capital city of Lanao del Sur in Mindanao.
Last September 2014, a flag of ISIS, Islamic State, was seen at a mosque in Marawi City. It was also reported that Muslim Filipinos in the area pledged allegiance to ISIS.
In November 2014, The ISIS Study Group said one Filipino is part of ISIS beheading team. “The recent IS execution video showing the beheadings of the Syrian pilots and Peter Kassig is extremely important due to the fact that a Filipino foreign fighter was involved in the execution of the pilots, and quite possibly was also involved in Kassig’s execution as well,” ISIS Study Group said.
http://www.angmalaya.net/nation/2015/06/22/11617-member-of-terror-group-islamic-state-arrested-in-southern-philippines
Army ‘to bring fight' to NPA
From the Visayan Daily Star (Jun 22): Army ‘to bring fight' to NPA
We will bring the fight to them.
http://www.visayandailystar.com/2015/June/22/topstory4.htm
We will bring the fight to them.
This was the message of Col. Francisco Delfin,
newly-installed commanding officer of the 303 rd Infantry Brigade, to the New
People's Army remnants, who continue to defy the declaration of Negrenses that
the province is now peaceful and ready for further development.
Delfin, who met Friday with members of the Negros Press
Club, said that if the NPA remnants will not make peace with the people, then
the Philippine Army will continue to look for them.
He acknowledged the help of the people of Negros Occidental
in providing information on NPA presence in their areas, that led to armed
engagements.
They (NPA) are now engaging more on extortion activities,
Delfin added.
The military estimates that there are about 200 armed NPA
members operating in Negros island, which is
now known as Region 18, or the Negros Island Region.
The violent activities of the NPA subsided in the past
years, after the 303 rd IB launched its comprehensive peace and development
programs in conflict-affected communities in the 1st and 5th districts,
spearheaded by the provincial government through its Provincial Peace
Integration and Development Unit, in tandem with multi-sectoral groups.
Delfin said the programs and projects launched by his
predecessor, Brig. Gen. Jon Aying, helped in the declaration of Negros
Occidental as peaceful and ready for further development, the last of the
provinces of Western Visayas to be declared as
such.
Last year, Negros Oriental was also declared peaceful and
ready for further development.
Delfin said the atrocities committed by the NPA in the past
years, are “good indicators” that the people no longer support them.
“The Negrenses have already realized that giving support to
the rebel group would mean continuance of their (NPA) banditry activities,” he
added.
Delfin vowed to continue, or even enhance the programs and
projects left behind by Gen. Aying, by focusing on the environment and
empowering the youth, in collaboration with multi-sectoral groups, including
the Church.
He met Friday with leaders of the Diocese of San Carlos, and
some of the priests assigned at the Diocese of Bacolod, who also assured
assistance to his peace advocacy.
Delfin reiterated his call for the Negrenses to help in
attaining and achieving peace in the province.
http://www.visayandailystar.com/2015/June/22/topstory4.htm
Group welcomes resumption of government-NDF peace talks
From the Business Mirror (Jun 22): Group welcomes resumption of government-NDF peace talks
THE Philippine Chapter of the International League of Peoples’ Struggle (ILPS-Phils) welcomed on Monday the resumption of peace talks between government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) before President Aquino leaves office.
ILPS-Phils issued the statement as Communications Secretary Herminio B. Coloma Jr. hinted that the government is open for the resumption of the talks, which has been stalled since April 2013.
For its part, NDF has not totally closed all communication lines as revealed by NDF chief negotiator Luis Jalandoni in April.
Informal efforts, Jalandoni said, could eventually lead to the formal return of both parties to the negotiating table.
“This is a positive development to address the root causes of the armed conflict in the country,” ILPS-Philippines Chairman Elmer Labog said.
The Aquino administration recently negotiated peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the formal end of hostilities premised on the approval of the Bangsamoro basic law (BBL) that is still pending in Congress.
On the other hand, any advance in the peace negotiations between the NDF and the Aquino administration has been stymied by the adamant refusal of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to honor previous agreements with the NDF.
Presidential Peace Adviser Teresita Quintos Deles has been condemned for this just as she continues to be criticized in Congress for purportedly cutting a one-sided deal with the MILF that leads to the creation of a “substate” for the MILF.
Among the accords that Deles does not recognize are the framework agreement of The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 and the 1995 Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (Jasig).
There are currently more than 500 political prisoners with 17 of them NDF peace consultants holding documents of identification protected under the provisions of the Jasig.
The latest NDF consultant to be arrested was Adelberto Silva, who was snatched in Bacoor, Cavite, on June 1 along with his wife Sharon Cabusao and aide Isidro de Lima.
ILPS-Phils said the Pilgrims for Peace and Kapayapaan peace advocates would hold a forum dubbed “The People’s Agenda: Impetus for Peace” on Friday.
The forum will hear testimonies from people’s organizations that are taking a closer look into the Aquino administration’s peace policy.
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/group-welcomes-resumption-of-government-ndf-peace-talks/
THE Philippine Chapter of the International League of Peoples’ Struggle (ILPS-Phils) welcomed on Monday the resumption of peace talks between government and the National Democratic Front (NDF) before President Aquino leaves office.
ILPS-Phils issued the statement as Communications Secretary Herminio B. Coloma Jr. hinted that the government is open for the resumption of the talks, which has been stalled since April 2013.
For its part, NDF has not totally closed all communication lines as revealed by NDF chief negotiator Luis Jalandoni in April.
Informal efforts, Jalandoni said, could eventually lead to the formal return of both parties to the negotiating table.
“This is a positive development to address the root causes of the armed conflict in the country,” ILPS-Philippines Chairman Elmer Labog said.
The Aquino administration recently negotiated peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the formal end of hostilities premised on the approval of the Bangsamoro basic law (BBL) that is still pending in Congress.
On the other hand, any advance in the peace negotiations between the NDF and the Aquino administration has been stymied by the adamant refusal of the Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to honor previous agreements with the NDF.
Presidential Peace Adviser Teresita Quintos Deles has been condemned for this just as she continues to be criticized in Congress for purportedly cutting a one-sided deal with the MILF that leads to the creation of a “substate” for the MILF.
Among the accords that Deles does not recognize are the framework agreement of The Hague Joint Declaration of 1992 and the 1995 Joint Agreement on Security and Immunity Guarantees (Jasig).
There are currently more than 500 political prisoners with 17 of them NDF peace consultants holding documents of identification protected under the provisions of the Jasig.
The latest NDF consultant to be arrested was Adelberto Silva, who was snatched in Bacoor, Cavite, on June 1 along with his wife Sharon Cabusao and aide Isidro de Lima.
ILPS-Phils said the Pilgrims for Peace and Kapayapaan peace advocates would hold a forum dubbed “The People’s Agenda: Impetus for Peace” on Friday.
The forum will hear testimonies from people’s organizations that are taking a closer look into the Aquino administration’s peace policy.
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/group-welcomes-resumption-of-government-ndf-peace-talks/
Zamboanga hero leads TOPS ’15
From the Business Mirror (Jun 22): Zamboanga hero leads TOPS ’15
THE commander of one of the military’s elite units, who was instrumental in ending the occupation by Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters of at least six barangays of Zamboanga City, led this year’s awardees for the Ten Outstanding Philippine Soldiers (TOPS) sponsored by the Metro Bank Foundation.
Col. Danilo Pamonag, commander of the Army’s Light Reaction Regiment (LRR), was cited for his role as the senior military commander who stopped the attack and occupation of MNLF fighters of the six barangays of Zamboanga City in 2013.
More than a hundred Moro fighters and soldiers were killed during the intense fighting as the troops cleared the barangays of the attackers.
“In 2013 his leadership was vigorously tested when a number of rogue MNLF members stormed Zamboanga City holding civilian hostages and human shields,” the citation reads for Pamonag.
“As the commander of the Armed Forces’ counterterrorism unit, he was able to successfully guide and motivate his men to accomplish their mission of rescuing more than 162 hostages, capturing more than 160 MNLF fighters and recovering high-powered firearms without leaving any of his men behind,” it added.
Aside from his role in the Zamboanga City siege, Pamonag’s peace advocacy and his achievements in establishing strong and good relationship between the Armed Forces and other foreign militaries.
Pamonag served as Dohuk Sector commander in the United Nations Mission in Iraq and “went out of his way despite security risks to conduct dialogues with the locals which helped promote peace and order in the area.”
Aside from Pamonag, the other awardees were Master Sgts. Ariel Cariaga and Ferdinand Lascano from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces (Isafp); Marine Col. Ariel Caculitan; Technical Sgt. Romel Bancairin; Disbursing Clerk 3 Dennis Gurrea of the Naval Intelligence Security Force; Col. Maxima Ignacio; Senior Master Sgt. Romeo Austria; Staff Sgt. Adriano Reginales Jr. and Maj. Jonna Dalaguit.
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/zamboanga-hero-leads-tops-15/
THE commander of one of the military’s elite units, who was instrumental in ending the occupation by Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) fighters of at least six barangays of Zamboanga City, led this year’s awardees for the Ten Outstanding Philippine Soldiers (TOPS) sponsored by the Metro Bank Foundation.
Col. Danilo Pamonag, commander of the Army’s Light Reaction Regiment (LRR), was cited for his role as the senior military commander who stopped the attack and occupation of MNLF fighters of the six barangays of Zamboanga City in 2013.
More than a hundred Moro fighters and soldiers were killed during the intense fighting as the troops cleared the barangays of the attackers.
“In 2013 his leadership was vigorously tested when a number of rogue MNLF members stormed Zamboanga City holding civilian hostages and human shields,” the citation reads for Pamonag.
“As the commander of the Armed Forces’ counterterrorism unit, he was able to successfully guide and motivate his men to accomplish their mission of rescuing more than 162 hostages, capturing more than 160 MNLF fighters and recovering high-powered firearms without leaving any of his men behind,” it added.
Aside from his role in the Zamboanga City siege, Pamonag’s peace advocacy and his achievements in establishing strong and good relationship between the Armed Forces and other foreign militaries.
Pamonag served as Dohuk Sector commander in the United Nations Mission in Iraq and “went out of his way despite security risks to conduct dialogues with the locals which helped promote peace and order in the area.”
Aside from Pamonag, the other awardees were Master Sgts. Ariel Cariaga and Ferdinand Lascano from the Intelligence Service, Armed Forces (Isafp); Marine Col. Ariel Caculitan; Technical Sgt. Romel Bancairin; Disbursing Clerk 3 Dennis Gurrea of the Naval Intelligence Security Force; Col. Maxima Ignacio; Senior Master Sgt. Romeo Austria; Staff Sgt. Adriano Reginales Jr. and Maj. Jonna Dalaguit.
http://www.businessmirror.com.ph/zamboanga-hero-leads-tops-15/